


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A

MANUAL OF RELIGION

AND OF THE

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

A
MANUAL OF RELIGION
AND OF THE
HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH,
FOR THE USE OF
UPPER CLASSES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN GERMANY
AND FOR
All Educated Men in General.

BY
KARL GOTTLIEB BRETSCHNEIDER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS, AND ROBERTS.

1857.

D

such a student requires and is anxiously looking for, is certainly to be found in the works of our religious writers; but it is so scattered, so mixed up with controversial matter, that to collect it in a tangible form is one of the most difficult and disheartening tasks that can well be imagined. I am not the only one who has had to contend with these difficulties; they have been partaken by all those who, like me, were desirous of systematizing their religious education. During a long residence in Germany at a later period of my life, I was struck with the difference which exists in this respect between that country and England; and, thanks to my intimate intercourse with some distinguished men at the head of public instruction, I had good opportunities of ascertaining how rich German Literature is in the very books I had so often wished for, and the absence of which had been to me and to others a source of so much toil and trouble in my own country.

In each of the numerous States of Germany, Manuals of great merit have been produced by independent writers for the use of public instruction. There, all the different Schools, from the strictest orthodoxy and the most enlightened liberalism to the most extreme rationalism, condense in popular Manuals their peculiar views and religious opinions. There Marheinecke,* Ludewig,†

* 'Lehrbuch des Christlichen Glaubens und Lebens:' 2nd edition. Berlin, 1836. (*Philosophically treated.*)

† 'Handbuch beim Religions-Unterricht:' Halle, 1830. (*Liberal*)

Schmieder,* Osiander,† Kniewel,‡ Palmer,§ Hagenbach,|| Simon,¶ Ideler,** Bretschneider,†† prepare for the use of upper classes in schools, books of comparatively easy comprehension, replete with profound knowledge and equally profound convictions.

In the great variety of publications of that sort by the different Theological Schools, the elementary work of Bretschneider, the first edition of which was published in 1824, appeared to me a fair specimen of a concise and clear treatise, steering between the extremes. The book has had the great advantage of having, during several years, gone through the ordeal of practical use and enlightened criticism. Long before the Author determined on publishing it, he had used it as a Manual in the

* 'Evangelisches Lehrbuch für Schüler der oberen Classen : ' Nürnberg, 1839. (*Orthodox.*)

† 'Lehrbuch zum Christlichen Religions-Unterricht : ' Tübingen, 1839. (*Liberal.*)

‡ 'Christliches Religionsbuch für mündige Christen : ' 3rd edition, Berlin, 1843. (*Orthodox.*)

§ 'Lehrbuch der Religion und der Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche : ' Darmstadt, 1843. (The first edition *Liberal*, the latter *Orthodox.*)

|| 'Leitfaden zum Christlichen Religions-Unterricht : ' Leipzig, 1853. (*Liberal.*)

¶ 'Christliche Religions-Lehre für die oberen Classen,' 3rd Cursus : Leipzig. (*Rationalistic.*)

** 'Lehrstücke der Evangelisch-unirten Kirche in Zusammenhang.' (*Liberal.*)

†† 'Lehrbuch,' etc. (*Liberal.*)

In this list I have given the most approved works in different localities. The terms *Orthodox*, *Liberal*, *Rationalistic*, are attached to mark the School to which they incline, and are the names by which these Schools designate themselves in their controversies in Germany.

“Gymnasium,” where it was his duty to give religious instruction to the upper classes.

In explaining the object he had in view, the Author expresses himself in the following manner:—“I have not hesitated to publish this Handbook, which is intended for the educated classes in general, but more especially for those who devote themselves to the pursuit of scientific knowledge, although from the nature of its contents it is addressed to the young students who do not purpose taking degrees in Theology. Yet I flatter myself that it may be adapted to the instruction of enlightened men at large, and that it will be read with some profit even by those amongst them who have attained the maturity of life. At a time when infidelity, coldness of heart, indifference, and irreligion on the one side, and Superstition, Mysticism, and Pantheism, dallying with obsolete ecclesiastical forms, on the other, are so often met with; when moreover Proselytism, which especially prevails amongst the higher ranks of society, stealthily takes advantage of those conflicting opinions, and of the ignorance of many people as to the nature of Christianity and of the Protestant and Roman Churches,—at such a time I thought it very necessary to afford such a knowledge of Religion in general, and of Christianity and its various forms in particular, that Religion should be firmly rooted in the public mind, and preserved from philosophical and theological false lights; that veneration for Scriptural Christianity and for the Protestant Church should be revived, and any

deviation from them towards infidelity and indifference, as well as towards Superstition and Mysticism, prevented. Agreeably to this view, I thought it necessary to lay down, in the First Part, some philosophical principles, and to expound, in the Second, the Philosophy of Religion, which has proved very useful during my experience of eight years; and then I considered that the main object of the History of Religion was to acquaint the reader with the nature of each particular Church, and with the origin of its peculiar features.

“It would be highly gratifying to me, if the learned thought, and experience confirmed, that the philosophical doctrine here propounded, and all that is said regarding the Scripture and the History of Religion, is calculated to lay the foundation of a Christian faith, which, keeping pace with the progress of science, would incur no danger of being shaken by scientific researches, and be able to prevent the stronger heads amongst the students and the educated, from falling into infidelity and irreligion, or, owing to their ignorance of the real value of evangelical knowledge and the Church, from becoming a prey to wily Proselytism.”

I availed myself of some leisure hours, during my last stay in Germany, to translate for my own use, and from the last revised and corrected edition, the religious part of Bretschneider's book; but I soon found, in applying the book to the education of my children, that my task would remain incomplete if I suppressed the

philosophical part of the Treatise. The objection which at first had arisen in my mind to the use of that part, had been also the subject of some critical and friendly observations made by others to the Author himself, to which, in a subsequent edition, he made the following reply:—

“There are some suggestions of which I could not avail myself because they would have made the book too bulky; and there are others, and especially the application to Theology drawn from the Kantian Philosophy, to which I could not give admission. The Introduction to Philosophical Theology I have somewhat shortened; but I could not make up my mind to omit the whole of Philosophical Theology, as some had advised me to do, and this from well-weighed grounds. As Religion rests on faith in the Ideal, which is entirely the province of Philosophy, a religious doctrine, intended for cultivated minds, without Philosophy, is a structure without a foundation; and it was not my intention to write such a book, for the public are not in need of it, being, as it were, inundated with popular religious handbooks. As class-books are generally our favourite books through all life, to which we refer all the information we subsequently acquire, I have adopted for this Manual such an arrangement as it may stand in after-life, for those who have not attended in a special way to theological matters, as a book to which they may revert, and refer what their own studies and reading may teach them on religious

matters. Hence so many references in the notes, and the great number of quotations, which are only intended to promote individual inquiry; for I do not think that the teacher ought, in giving instruction, to develope all the indications contained in the notes, or sift all the passages he quotes."

On my return to England, I thought that a book which has proved so useful to myself and to others might not be without interest to English readers in general, and to teachers in particular, as combining within itself the Dogma, the Ethical part, and the History of the Church, and treating the whole in a strictly scientific arrangement and method; and I hope it may serve as a safe guide, if not as a whole, at least in its essential parts. Another inducement for the publication of this Translation is my conviction that, notwithstanding the numerous publications which have of late appeared, religious and philosophical Germany is as little known in England, as religious England is in Germany; that the most erroneous notions exist, in this respect, between the two great Protestant countries; that in the present difficult times it is of the utmost importance that all the Protestant denominations should live in friendship and mutual esteem; and that such an end cannot be attained, and the difference of the growth of Christian life among different nations duly appreciated, without a thorough acquaintance with the state of the religious education of the people.

The Author, in alluding to the use which is to be made of his Handbook in public schools, gives some practical hints, which, coming from so experienced a teacher, must be of interest. "It is," he says, "in that respect rather difficult to lay down any general rule of application, because this will depend on the fact as to whether the instruction is given by one or by several teachers, whether the book is used in one or several classes, and how many hours are devoted to it every week. I will therefore confine myself to the remark, that instruction on Christian Morals might be commenced in some of the lower classes, and this would be followed by that part which is introductory to the Holy Scripture. One might also, in some of the lower classes, go through the fundamental principles of Biblical Theology, which would have afterwards to be demonstrated in one of the upper classes. With the more advanced pupils the First, Second, and Sixth Parts must be thoroughly investigated; and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth in such a way, at least, as to fix a general judgment upon each subject, and to point out the connection of the whole. If the teacher be not too sparing of his time, know how to make the most of it, do not indulge too much in philological elucidations, and insist on the pupils being properly prepared each hour for his lessons, he will be able to go through the course of his Lectures easily in the ordinary academical time."

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HANDBOOK OF RELIGION

AND OF THE

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.

THE object of this Manual is to afford such a knowledge of Religion in general, and of the Christian Religion in particular, as all educated men, especially those who are engaged in scientific pursuits, ought to possess (Theoretical Religion, Theology); and thus to awaken, purify, and vivify their religious feelings (Practical Religion, Religious Life). In the first place, religious truths, as they develope themselves in the human heart (Philosophical Theology), will be treated of; in the second, it will be shown how, by the means of a Divine enlightenment, these truths are historically developed, and have attained their perfection in Christianity (Revealed Theology).

§ 2.

Every one is in want of such instruction. 1. For Religion is not only the highest stage of the human mind, by which we raise ourselves above the animals, and ennoble our nature, but it solves the highest problems

of life, quickens the seeds of all that is good, and begets those convictions relating to the general conditions of our existence and of the world, by which the peace of our heart is firmly established and invariably maintained (*a*). Religion therefore is a natural and indispensable condition of the human being (*b*); and its essential elements are knowledge or faith, works, and feelings (*c*), but in such a way as knowledge should be the leading criterion, and the spring that purifies the works and feelings; whence the necessity of religious instruction (*d*).

2. Moreover it behoves a *Christian* to know the origin and essence of his religion, and the events relating to the church of which he is a member, the benefits he enjoys, the rights he exercises.

3. Lastly, the learned ought to pay an earnest attention to religion as to a mental phenomenon which has the most powerful influence upon the laws, the civilization, and the state of the world.

(*a*.) Spalding, 'Religion eine Angelegenheit des Menschen' (Berlin, 1806). 'Die Religion an sich und in ihrem Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Leben, und zu den verschiedenen Formen derselben,' von Amad. Wendt. (Salzbach, 1813, 8vo.)

(*b*.) All nations therefore, if ever so little raised above the mere animal state, have a religion. Arist., De Cœlo, i. 3: πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσι ὑπόληψιν. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 16: "In omnium animis Deorum notionem impressit ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum?"

(*c*.) Not in *one* of these three alone. See § 99.

(*d*.) See §§ 95, 99. How practical religion depends upon knowledge, see §§ 100, 102. In Religion, knowledge is to be obtained by instruction; the working and awakening of religious feelings by the active appropriation of instruction, by example, and by worship.

§ 3.

Religion (*a*), in the *historical* sense, is faith in the

existence of superhuman powers (Gods), who are to be feared and venerated by man (*b*); in a *philosophical* sense, is faith (*c*) in the objective (*d*) reality of religious ideas and of a supernatural world, combined with such a mode of thinking and acting as is conformable to this faith.

(*a*.) Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 28: "Qui omnia, quæ ad cultum Dei pertinerent, diligenter retractarunt, sunt dicti religiosi, ex *relegendo*, ut elegantes ex elegendo, tanquam a diligendo diligentes, et intelligendo intelligentes; his enim verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem, quæ in religioso." Lactantius, *Institut.* Div. iv. 28: "Hac conditione gignimur, ut generati nos Deo justa et debita obsequia præbeamus, hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur. Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo et *religati* sumus; unde ipsa *religio* nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interpretatus est, a *relegendo*."

(*b*.) Cicero, *De Invent.* ii. 35: "Religio est, quæ superioris cujusdam naturæ (quam divinam vocant) curam cærimoniamque affert."—Usual definition, *Modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi*.

(*c*.) *Faith*, a firm belief in the truth of what is not immediately perceivable as a fact (either by Consciousness or by Experience). (Heb. ii. 1.) *Knowledge*, a firm belief in the truth of what is immediately perceivable (either by Consciousness or by Experience).—Faith therefore is an indirect knowledge derived from facts. If the fact be founded on Consciousness, faith is *rational*. If it be founded on nature or experience, faith is *historical*. To *believe* is to cling to an opinion as true, but with the uncertainty as to the value of his judgment.—*Ahnung* (presentiment, vague notion), is the admission of truth, not upon grounds clearly understood, but upon *sentiment*.

(*d*.) *Objective*, *i. e.* they possess a reality independent of the apprehension of our mind. (Biblical names, φόβος τοῦ Θεοῦ, λατρεία, εὐσέβεια, δουλεία, θρησκεία.)

§ 4.

With Religion is not to be confounded, 1. *Superstition* (*a*), *i. e.* the belief in such a *condition* of the supernatural world, or in such a connection between the invisible and the visible world, as would be in contradiction with the laws of reason and with experience.

2. "*Schwärmerei*" (*b*), religious infatuation, eccen-

tricity, excitement (Mormons, Quakers, Shakers, Plymouth Brethren, Swedenborgians, etc. etc.), that is, the delusion by which the highest truth and reality—the objects of knowledge and faith—are realized according to the capricious impulses of imagination, to an over-excitement of feelings invariably connected with an unruly mode of acting.

(a.) Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 42: “Superstitio, in qua est timor inanis Deorum,—religio, quæ Deorum cultu pio continetur.” *Ibid.*, ii. 28: “Qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sui sibi liberi *superstitēs* essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati; quod nomen postea latius patuit.” Lactantius, *Instit. Christ.*, lib. iv. 28: “Superstitiosi, qui aut superstitem defunctorum memoriam colunt, aut parentibus suis superstitēs colebant eorum imagines domi, tanquam deos penates.” Servius, in the commentary to the eighth book of the *Æneid*: “Superstitio est timor superfluous et delirus; aut ab aniculis dicta superstitio, quæ multis superstitēs per ætatem delirant et stultæ sunt; aut secundum Lucretium superstitio est superstantium rerum, i. e. celestium et divinarum, quæ super nos stant, inanis et superfluous timor.” Donatus (ad *Terent. Andr.* iii. 2, 7): “Superstes nunc salvus; alias superstitēs sunt senes et anus, quia ætate multis superstitēs jam delirant. Unde et superstitiosi, qui Deos timent nimis: quod signum est deliramenti.”

(b.) The German word *Schwärmerei* (ranting) is probably derived from the swarming of bees, expressing an irregular motion attended with noise. It must not be confounded with *enthusiasm*, which arises from a clear insight into the high value of an object. The extreme degree of *Schwärmerei*, bordering on a kind of madness, is called *Fanaticism* (*fanaticus*, from *fano*, *fanum*).

§ 5.

The contrary of Religion is *unbelief*, which shows itself *theoretically* by this—that the unbeliever does not acknowledge the truths of religious ideas, which, in his opinion, are mere delusions; *practically*, by this—that (let him acknowledge them or not) he does not feel their value, and consequently does not conform his actions to them, in which case unbelief is called *irreligion*.

Unbelief is not only want of faith, but rejection of it. In relation—

1. To the idea of the Deity, it is called *Atheism*, which theoretically is *disbelief in a Supreme Being*; practically, *ungodliness, impiety*.

2. In relation to the idea of freedom it is *immorality*, which, logically or theoretically, is termed *determinism, fatalism*; practically, *want of conscientiousness*.

3. In relation to the idea of immortality, it is *epicurism*, which, theoretically, is *materialism*, practically, *sensuality*.

§ 6.

The subjective conceptions, the individual forms of religious ideas, and the effect they have upon life, constitute Religion in a *subjective* sense. If these ideas are defined and expressed by notions and words, so as to form a whole and a doctrine resting upon arguments, they constitute Religion in an *objective* sense,—*Theology*.

(Private religion, and public or social religion.)

§ 7.

The different kinds of Religion, arising from the different modes of apprehending religious ideas and of laying their foundations, are :—

1. According to the number of venerated objects: *Polytheism* (idolatry, heathenism, paganism); *Dualism* (Zoroaster's system, or Ormuzd = Kingdom of Light, and Ahriman = Kingdom of Darkness), and *Monotheism* (Mosaic, Christian, and Mahometan religion).

According to the mode of human development (which begins by the apprehension of the material world) may have developed themselves, first Fetishism, Zoolatry, and Astrolatry, then Polytheism, and lastly, Monotheism.

§ 8.

2. According to the source from which the perception of religious ideas flows, we may distinguish *philosophical* religion, discovered by the spontaneous efforts of reason

(a), and *positive* (b) religion resting upon an historical authority. If the latter be based upon the fact that it is God himself, who, by some extraordinary means, has given instruction, it is called *revelation*; and if it be deposited in documents, and thus absolutely sanctioned, *statutory* religion.

(a.) Philosophical religion has formerly been termed *natural* religion, in opposition to revelation; this expression however has of late been restrained to the knowledge of God derived from nature, or to physico-theology.

(b.) Religio positiva, i. e. *posita, externa auctoritate nixa, etc.*

§ 9.

The knowledge of the various existing religions, which have not only a dogmatical connection (a), but also bear a geographical (b) and historical (c) relation to each other, forms an important part of the history of civilization of mankind (d).

(a.) The religious ideas, though perceived in a different manner, are inherent to, and may be traced in, every man's mind. Moreover most religions have in common the conception of a golden age, of good and evil spirits, of sacrifices and lustrations, revelation and incarnation of Gods, etc.

(b.) Egypt and Judæa; Egypt, Greece, Italy; Chaldæa and Palestine.—Judaism, Christianity, and Mahometanism from Western Asia.

(c.) India, Egypt, (Greece); Moses, Zoroaster, Christ, Mahomet.

(d.) 'Grundriss der Geschichte aller Religionen,' by Christoph Meiners (Lemgo, 1787-8). 'Allgemeine kritische Geschichte der Religionen' (Hanover, 1806-8), by the same author. 'Ueber den Geist der Religiosität aller Zeiten und Völker,' by J. K. F. Schlegel (Hanover, 1819).—According to Hassel's Statistics (Weimar, 1823), out of the 1,000,000,000 inhabitants of the globe, 382,823,700 are Monotheists, viz. 252,565,700 Christians, 120,105,000 Mahometans, 3,930,000 Jews. Conf. § 242.

§ 10.

An exposition of religious doctrines, systematically (a)

arranged and supported by principles and demonstrations, is called *scientific theology* (*b*), or, *Science of Religion*.

(*a*.) *Σύστημα*, a well-arranged whole,—in speaking of systems of doctrine, an *ensemble* of propositions subordinate to a higher and main principle; in a wider sense, an *ensemble* of propositions forming a logical whole, according to general ideas connected with each other. The contrary of a system is an *aggregate*. (Necessity of giving a systematical arrangement to all our thoughts.)

(*b*.) *Θεολογία*, *i. e.* *λόγος περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*; whence, in Herodot., ii. 53, Homer and Hesiod are called *θεόλογοι*; whilst the fathers of the Church give that name to the writers on Biblical subjects. *Θεολογία*, doctrine of the Trinity, is the title of the Apocalypse. Since Aheilard (twelfth century) *θεολογία* is used for the scientific exposition of religious truths in general.

§ 11.

Theology and Religion differ—

1st. As to their *nature*, in this, that the one is merely doctrine, knowledge; the other, faith, feeling, work.

2ndly. As to their *end*, that the one teaches how a true knowledge of religion is to be acquired, how to be demonstrated and defended; the other sanctifies and blesses the heart.

3rdly. As to *form*, that the one has the scientific form, the other has not.

4thly. As to *matter*, that the one contains more (demonstrations, history) than the other.

5thly. As to *age*, that religion precedes theology.

6thly. As to their *dignity*, that theology exists for the sake of religion; religion for its own sake.

§ 12.

Theology may be divided almost in the same way as religion (§§ 7, 99). The most important division (§ 8) is the one into philosophical and positive (rational and experimental) religion.

(*Philosophy of religion*, although often used as identical with *rational theology*, is, properly speaking, philosophy applied to a positive religion.)

§ 13.

Philosophical theology is a scientific deduction of religious ideas by human reason, combined with an inquiry into their objective reality. It must precede every positive theology.

§ 14.

Religious ideas, like all others, emanate from reason; hence man alone—not the animal destitute of reason—is capable of religion. The nature and value of rational knowledge cannot be appreciated, unless the nature of the Understanding itself, and of its products, is inquired into,—an inquiry by which the validity of religious ideas is ascertained.

(The perception by the senses, as the first and most lively, appears to the generality of men to be also the most true; whilst ideas appear to them as mere fancies. Tendency to materialism and atheism.)

§ 15.

We must therefore prelude, as an introduction to Philosophical Theology, by some remarks, 1st, on Knowledge by the Senses; 2nd, on Knowledge by Reason; 3rd, on their respective value.

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY.

I. ON KNOWLEDGE BY THE SENSES.

§ 16.

WITHIN the sphere of sensible knowledge come all notions (*a*) acquired through the senses (sight, hearing, touch, etc.). All notion produced by the apprehension of the senses, is called *intuition* (*Anschauung*) (*b*). The complex of sensible beings is called *sensible world*, and the complex of our intuitions *experience* (*c*).

(*a*.) *Vorstellung*, representation, *i. e.* the apprehension of an object brought to our consciousness ; whatever enters our consciousness, or that with which consciousness combines itself. Representation therefore is the *general* expression, the different *species* of which are intuition, notion, and idea.

(*b*.) Intuition is, properly speaking, only used for the perceptions by sight ; then (*a potiori fit denominatio*) for every perception by the senses. Not only the perceptions of "light," "sun," etc., are intuitions ; but of "sound," "hardness," "softness," etc. Intuitions by *touch* are also called "sensations." Intuition is not to be confounded with "Notion."

(*c*.) Experience = Knowledge *a posteriori* (*parte*), in contradistinction to Knowledge by Reason (*a priori*).

§ 17.

To form a representation through the senses, we want—

1. An impression made by the object upon the sensible organ; 2. An active power of the soul to perceive this impression in consciousness (receptivity, spontaneity). The soul therefore, by directing intentionally consciousness upon other objects, may lessen, interrupt, or entirely obliterate the sensible impression (*a*).

(*a*.) *E.g.* In bodily pain, grief may be silenced by fixing consciousness upon consolatory considerations; the instigation of the senses to evil, by presenting to the mind the dictates of duty and honour, etc.

§ 18.

The *correctness* of sensible Perception requires—1. A normal constitution (*a*) and action (*b*) of the sensible organs (correct Receptivity); 2. A normal action of the soul, or the natural freedom of consciousness (correct Spontaneity) (*c*).

(*a*.) Wanting in cases of blindness, deafness, lameness.

(*b*.) Wanting in sleep, fainting, disease.

(*c*.) Wanting in deep meditation, ecstasy, passion, fear, melancholy, etc.

§ 19.

The objects of sensation, as far as they are our representations (subjectively conceived), are called *phenomena* (*φαινόμενα*), *i. e.* objects represented as in time and space. The objects abstractedly considered, *i. e.* as that upon which our representation of them is based objectively, *the Things in themselves*, *νοούμενα* (*a*). The knowledge acquired by the means of the *sensible Faculty* does not make manifest the *Thing in itself*, but only the impression it produces on the senses (*b*). We can therefore perceive only those qualities of *Things in themselves* which fall under the senses (*c*).

(*a*.) A *rose*, *e.g.*, is a phenomenon, as far as it exists as an intuition

in our representation; but the principle of this phenomenon, that which produces it, is *the Thing in itself*.

(b.) It is not the *Thing itself* (Object) that is involved in the representation, but the sensation alone which the *Thing* produces. All perceptions by senses, such as size, shape, hardness, etc., merely express what impression a thing makes upon the senses.

(c.) Had we fewer senses, we should be deprived of many representations of the material world, as it is the case with persons born blind or deaf; had we one or some senses more, the world of phenomena would become richer for us; a sense, *e. g.*, which would reach other celestial bodies.—Possibility of some more senses (Magnetism?).

§ 20.

The original and necessary *Form* (*a*) under which, or the fundamental intuition according to which, all things are apprehended by the senses (brought to our consciousness), is,—

1. *Space*, or the representation of extent, with three different dimensions,—length, breadth, and depth (height) (*b*); and

2. *Time*, or the representation of duration, with three dimensions also,—past, present, and future (*c*).

For all objects are conceived as existing *somewhere* and *somewhen*.

(a.) *Form*, *i. e.* manner of apprehending; condition under which sensible representations are possible. The word *Law* may be used instead of *Form*.

(b.) *Real Space*, *i. e.* Space which is conceived as filled with objects; *absolute Space*, *i. e.* Space in itself (abstractedly) without the conception of its being filled with objects.

(c.) *Real Time* and *absolute Time*, as above. Every part of Space or Time is called a *Quantity*. (Pure and applied mathematics.)

§ 21.

Space and Time therefore are not representations produced by external objects, but both must necessarily precede all perception by the senses (*a*). For 1. were

this not the case, they could not *necessarily* have three different dimensions (§ 20); because experience can tell us that something *is*, but not that it cannot be otherwise.

2. They have not, like notions derived from intuitions, several characteristics (*b*); and

3. The qualities which *must* be ascribed to time and space are only possible on the condition that we possess both these notions previous to all experience,—that we possess them as fundamental laws, which we apply to all sensible perception (*c*).

(*a.*) *I. e.* We know beforehand, that every sensible object must be represented as being *somewhere* and *somewhen*. (Hence the necessity of mathematics, and the possibility of persons born blind being mathematicians.)

(*b.*) Space contains the only characteristic of extent (in three directions); Time the only characteristic of duration (in three relations). Length, breadth, and depth are no different species of Space, but parts of the same Space; the same applies to Time.

(*c.*) Space and Time must be considered as—

1. *Infinite in extent*, because our Representative Faculty, which can conceive absolutely nothing without Space and Time, cannot possibly conceive a *No-Space* and a *No-Time*. The end is again to be conceived as something, and therefore as another Space and another Time, and so forth. For the same reason, Space and Time exist in our representation.

2. *In intensity infinitely divisible*. The smallest part of extent and duration, for the very reason that it is represented as a part, admits of another division. The representation therefore of something simple (indivisible and not subject to the condition of Time) is impossible.

3. They are *continuous*, *i. e.* we cannot conceive anything between Space and Space, Time and Time, which would not be Space, not Time (=Nothing); and

4. *Uniform*, *i. e.* of the parts of Space and Time, none differ from each other; because the form of the representative faculty is one and the same in all representations.

§ 22.

It cannot be *known by experience* that there is some-

thing in the sensible objects themselves which corresponds precisely to our Representation of Space and Time (*a*), because in this case a comparison would be required between the *things in themselves* and our representation of them (*b*) ; and for such a comparison we should want another faculty of knowing external objects, which we do not possess.

(*a.*) *I. e.* That extent and juxtaposition exist in the objects themselves exactly in the same manner as they do in our representations.

(*b.*) With this must not be confounded the correction of one sense by another (the sight, *e. g.*, by the touch), by which we rectify only the subjective sensation produced by the objects, but do not feel what they are without our representation.

§ 23.

But this we are taught by our consciousness ; that *in the objects themselves there must be something analogous* to our representations of Time and Space ; for the mere Form of the sensible representation, without the existence of any object, would give an empty Space and an empty Time (*a*). The application of the Form however varies (*b*), and this modification is always produced by the objects themselves, as it is attested by our consciousness, the assertions of which are superior to all doubts and to all arguments. Hence it follows, that not only the existence of the objects is certain, but that, objectively, they possess qualities according to which our representations of them are formed.

(*a.*) Without an object we have the mere Form = extent, duration ; without an object we should not be able to apply the Form. The reason why we think of some part of the heaven not as mere æther, but filled with something, a comet for instance, does not exist within but without ourselves. It is the same with respect to the reason why we think of two clocks as not striking at once, but the one after the other, of a war terminated by peace, etc.

(*b.*) It cannot be imagined that the application of the Form was de-

terminated before the impression of the object, except where the form itself (absolute Space and absolute Time) is considered, as in pure mathematics. We can quote also, as it were, by anticipation this principle of Theology, that the wisdom and goodness which gave us the power of apprehending by the senses, must be supposed to have arranged it conformably to the qualities of the objects.

(It is possible and probable that the objects possess some properties for which we have no sense, and which therefore do not come within the limits of our consciousness.)

II. ON KNOWLEDGE BY REASON.

§ 24.

Reason, in a wide sense, is the faculty of thinking, *i. e.* of bringing representations to the unity of consciousness, which is done by dividing and combining them. In a special sense, Reason is the *Faculty of producing Ideas*, and then it is distinguished from *Understanding (a)*, *i. e.* the faculty of forming notions, judgments, and conclusions.

(*a.*) Hitherto Understanding and Reason have not been sufficiently distinguished. Kant still considered the Understanding as the faculty of forming notions and judgments, Reason as the faculty of forming arguments.

(*a.*) *On Understanding.*

§ 25.

By dividing and combining the representations already acquired the Understanding forms *Notions*. A Notion is a representation formed by separating (*abstracting*) those characteristics (*a*) which are common (*b*) to various representations (*c*), and by combining them in a new representation (a Unity) in Consciousness.

(*a.*) The component elements of Notions are called *characteristics*; they are parts of a representation. They may be divided into general and special characteristics (*e. g.* in the Notion "body," heavy, elec-

tric); affirmative and negative (*e.g.* just and unjust); essential and accidental (*e.g.* heavy is essential in the Notion "body;" round is accidental; round is essential in the Notion "ball;" wooden is accidental).

(*b.*) Notions immediately derived from intuitions are called *Notions of lower abstraction* (*e.g.* fish, plant); Notions derived from other Notions are called *Notions of higher abstraction* (creature, being), which however are not to be confounded with Ideas (§ 43).

(*c.*) *E.g.* From the intuition of all human individuals, those characteristics which are common to them all (body and reasoning mind), are abstracted and combined in a new representation—"man." Characteristics which are not common to all, *e.g.* ill, wise, vicious, must not be included in the Notion, else it becomes too *narrow*. If, on the other hand, the peculiar characteristic is wanting, the Notion is too *wide* (*e.g.* man is an organic being).

§ 26.

Notions are divided—

1. According to their *quantitative extension*, into general and particular (*a*); according to the quantity of their *comprehension*, into simple and compound notions (*b*).

2. According to their *quality* (the manner in which they exist in our consciousness) they are distinct or indistinct (*c*).

3. According to their *relation* to each other,—absolute or relative (*d*), concordant or conflicting (*e*).

4. According to their *modality* (their relation to the representative faculty),—possible or impossible (*f*), experimental or abstract (*g*).

(*a.*) According as they express a Genus or a Species, *e.g.* Man, European. The general Notion referred to a higher one may become a particular Notion (*e.g.* creature, man); and the particular Notion referred to an inferior one, may again become a Genus (*e.g.* European, German). The representation of an Individual (*e.g.* moon, Cicero) is not a Notion, but an Intuition.

(*b.*) *Simple*, if they contain only one characteristic (*e.g.* something); *compound*, if they contain several characteristics.

(*c.*) *Distinct* (as to extension), when all Species and Individuals which the Notion embraces are known; the notion "man," *e.g.*,

taken in the representation of man as circumnavigator; distinct (as to comprehension), when the characteristics of the Notion are completely understood; *e. g.* "man" in his quality as "wise." (A Notion is *clear* when it is so far known as to be sufficiently distinguished from others.)

(*d.*) *Absolute* notions, which do not express a relation (wise, just); *relative* notions, *e. g.* high, long, large, and all comparatives.

(*e.*) *Concordant* notions, which may be represented as existing together, *e. g.* wisdom and goodness; *conflicting* notions, on the contrary, are, everlasting and transitory, square and circle.—Principium contradictionis.—Conflicting characteristics must not be included in the same Notion. The *Opposition* of Notions is twofold: 1. a *contradictory* opposition if the affirmation of the one includes the negation of the other, without the negation of the one including the affirmation of the other. This is always the case when there are more than two terms of Opposition; *e. g.* richness and poverty, between which lies a third, competency. 2. A *contrary* opposition, if two Notions exclude each other entirely; in this case there is no third term, and therefore the negation of the one necessarily includes the affirmation of the other; *e. g.* simple and compound, everlasting and temporary.—Principium contrarietatis.—Every object must possess, of two qualities standing in contrary opposition to each other, either the one or the other.

(*f.*) *Possible* notions, the characteristics of which may be united in our consciousness; *e. g.* a golden hill;—"a flat hill" would be an impossible notion.

(*g.*) *Empirical* notions, which are given by experience (*e. g.* town, animal); *abstract* notions, formed by Reason (virtue, wisdom).—To these, among others, belong the Ideas.

§ 27.

The contents of Notions are found either by *Induction*, *i. e.* by comparing all, or at least most of their species and individuals (synthesis) (*a*); or by examining and comparing what they contain, according to the sense attached to the word that represents them, and putting these elements together (analysis) (*b*).

(*a.*) It is most frequently used in Notions of the lower abstraction (§ 25, *b*), especially in natural objects.

(*b.*) More frequently used in Notions of the higher abstraction;

e. g. embarrassment is used for a state of indecision, disappointed expectations, great anxiety, shame in consequence of a detected weakness, etc.

§ 28.

A Notion becomes *distinct*—

1. Partly by *description*, when not all its characteristics are specified, but those only by which it is to be distinguished from others (*a*).

2. Partly by *definition*, *i. e.* a complete, precise, and distinct statement of its essential characteristics, and of its Genus (*b*) ; and

3. Partly by *distinction*, *i. e.* the explanation of its difference from kindred and similar Notions (*c*).

(*a.*) *Description*, especially to be applied to all Notions in natural philosophy (necessarily and exclusively used for individuals).

(*b.*) The definition must be—

1. *Complete*, *i. e.* it must specify the essential characteristic, else it would be too wide.

2. *Precise*, *i. e.* it should not contain a characteristic which is *not* essential, else it would be too narrow ; *e. g.* a learned man is he who knows and *teaches* science.

3. *Distinct*, *i. e.* it should contain neither a “trope” (*e. g.* virtue is the health of the soul) nor “tautology” (*e. g.* a spirit is a spiritual being), and should give the next genus of the defined object, and exactly state the difference between this object and other subdivisions of that genus ; *e. g.* a painter is (not a man, but) an artist, who possesses the skill (not of painting, drawing, representing objects, but) of representing objects in a true and beautiful manner by colours.

(*c.*) *E. g.* Learned school and school of learned ; a moral history and the moral of history.

§ 29.

By separating and combining representations the Understanding forms *Judgments*. A Judgment is the perception of the relation existing between two or more representations, and, if expressed in words, is called a *proposition*. Every Judgment contains three Terms :—

1. The *Subject*, or the principal representation, of which something is asserted.

2. The *Predicate*, or the representation, which is compared with the Subject, and either ascribed to or denied of it.

3. The *Copula*, or the sign of this relation between the Subject and Predicate.

E.g. Cicero—orator; Cicero was an orator. World—God; the world is not God. (In Grammar, Substantive, Adjective, Verb.) Often the Copula and the Predicate are contained in the Verb; *e.g.* I hear, *i. e.* I am hearing. Sometimes the Subject is hidden; *e.g.* it rains.

§ 30.

The Judgments are subdivided—

1. According to the *quantity* of their extension, into general, particular, and individual (*a*).

2. According to the *quantity* of their comprehension, into simple and compound (*b*).

3. According to the *quality* or to the nature of the copula, they are affirmative or negative (*c*); categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive (*d*).

4. According to their *relation* to each other, they are subordinate, equivalent, and conflicting (*e*).

5. According to the *modality*, *i. e.* their relation to the representative faculty; problematical, assertory, and apodictical (*f*).

(*a.*) According as the Predicate is ascribed to the whole sphere of the subject, or only to one species or individual; *e.g.* *all* men are mortal; *some* men are wise; *Homer* was a poet.

(*b.*) *Simple*, those which contain only one Subject and one Predicate; *compound*, those which contain several Subjects or several Predicates. (Compound Judgments really contain several Judgments.)

(*c.*) According as the Copula affirms or denies the Predicate of the Subject.

(*d.*) *Categorical* Judgments purely affirm or deny the Predicate of the Subject (God is holy; the world is not eternal). In *hypothetical*

Judgments this takes place under a certain condition (supposition (*e.g.* if the earth throws in all positions a circular shadow, it must be round. In these Judgments is involved a Syllogism). *Disjunctive Propositions* are those in which either the Subject or the Predicate have several terms (*e.g.* either the Greeks or the Romans are the most celebrated nation ; the aerolites come either from the atmosphere, or from the moon, or from the cosmic space).

(*e.*) *Subordinate Judgments*, when a Judgment comprises another as a particular proposition (*e.g.* virtue is beneficial,—justice and benevolence are beneficial). *Equivalent Judgments* are those which have the same contents (*e.g.* $2 + 2 = 1 + 3 = 4$, tautologies). *Conflicting Judgments* are those, the contents of which suppress each other (*e.g.* man is immortal, he is not immortal).

(*f.*) According as the relation between Subject and Predicate is considered as *possible* (*e.g.* the planets are very likely to be inhabited, *supposition*) ; or as *real* (*e.g.* man is immortal, *belief*) ; or as *necessary* (*e.g.* God must be just, *knowledge*).

§ 31.

The correctness of Judgments partly depends on the correctness of the notions forming the Subject and the Predicate, partly on the suitable determination of the Copula.

§ 32.

The Perception of the relation of different Judgments to each other, accompanied by its reason (*a*) ; or the deduction of one Judgment from another by means of a third (*b*), is an *Argument*.

(*a.*) *E.g.* All men have moral dispositions, consequently they have a moral destination (these are called abridged Arguments, and are really based upon a Syllogism).

(*b.*) *E.g.*—

Wise men deserve esteem ;
Plato was a wise man ;
Plato deserves esteem.

Plato deserves esteem, because
he was a wise man ; and all wise
men deserve esteem.

The two first Propositions are termed *Propositiones præmissæ*, the last one *Conclusio*.

§ 33.

Arguments are either simple or compound. The *sim-*

ple argument is called *Syllogism*. It consists of three Propositions—*Propositio major*, *Propositio minor*, and *Conclusio* (*a*), and contains three Notions, each of which is repeated twice—*Terminus major* (which forms the Predicate of the *Propositio major* and *Conclusio*) ; *Terminus medius*, the middle Notion (the Subject of the *Propositio major* and the Predicate of the *Propositio minor*) ; and *Terminus minor* (the Subject of the *Propositio minor* and *Conclusio*) (*b*).

(*a*.) *E.g.* All men are subject to error ;

I am a man ;

Therefore, I am subject to error.

(*b*.) In the foregoing argument, “subject to error” is the *Terminus major* ; “man” the *Terminus medius* ; and “I” the *Terminus minor*. They are to be put in this order :—

M(iddle notion),	P(redicate),
S(ubject),	M(iddle notion),
<hr/>	
S(ubject),	P(redicate).

§ 34.

The demonstrative power of Syllogism depends in general on the subsumption of Notions, or on the Proposition, that what may be ascribed to the Genus, may be equally said of the different Species and Individuals comprised in this Genus ; a Proposition, the truth of which results from the manner in which Notions are formed (§ 25). The *formal* truth of the conclusion depends on this, that the three *Termini* (*a*) be used in the same sense ; the *material* truth on this, that the subsumption in the *Propositio minor* be correct (*b*), and that the connection between Subject and Predicate in both Propositions be not a false (*c*), accidental (*d*), or conditional (*e*), but a true, necessary, and unconditional one.

(*a*.) The three termini, § 33,—*e.g.* all animals may be slaughtered, Sempronius is an animal, therefore, etc.

(b.) *E.g.* Arithmetic is a science ; reckoning by the fingers is arithmetic ; therefore reckoning by the finger is a science.

(c.) *E.g.* He who has the fewest wants, possesses the purest happiness ; the beggar has the fewest wants ; therefore he possesses the purest happiness.

(d.) *E.g.* What makes man more perfect is to be desired ; suffering makes man more perfect ; therefore, etc.

(e.) *E.g.* We must remove from others what is prejudicial to their virtue ; richness is prejudicial to their virtue ; therefore, etc.

§ 35.

Compound arguments are those which have more than two Premises. To these belong—

1. The *hypothetical* and *disjunctive* arguments, the *Propositio major* of which contains a hypothetical or disjunctive judgment (a).

2. The *dilemma*, an argument in which the *Propositio major* contains a hypothetical judgment, with a disjunction in its second part, the terms of which are denied in the *Propositio minor*, whence the conclusion is drawn, that the hypothesis in the *Propositio major* is wrong (b).

(a.) *E.g.* If we can sail round the earth, the earth must be round ; we *can* sail round the earth ; therefore, etc. (the *Propositio minor* must always deny or affirm the *condition* of the *Propositio major*, not the *consequence* of this condition).—Disjunctive : the World is either eternal or created ; it cannot be eternal, therefore it is created. (The opposition between the disjunctive terms must be correct and complete ; see § 38.)

(b.) *E.g.* If our soul is destroyed by death, God either *cannot* preserve it, or does not *wish* to preserve it ; but God *can* preserve it, and *wishes* to do so ; therefore it is not destroyed in death. (The Sophists liked to use this kind of argument, “*Syllogismus cornutus*, or *crocodilinus*.” If the disjunction contains three, four, or more terms, the argument is called *trilemma*, *quadrilemma*, *polylemma*.) The opposition in the disjunction must be correct and complete, else the argument is wrong.

§ 36.

3. *Arguments by induction*, in which, by comparing

as many facts as possible, a judgment is derived as a Conclusion (*a*) ; and

4. The "*Sorites*" (a string of Arguments), in which several Propositions are so connected that the Predicate of the preceding Proposition is made the Subject of the following, to which a new Predicate is added, and so forth, till you come to the final Conclusion, which reproduces the Subject of the first, and the Predicate of the last Proposition (*b*).

(*a*.) When Induction is complete, the result is not, properly speaking, a Syllogism, but rather a proof of the correctness of a judgment founded on experience. When Induction is incomplete, and from the qualities of known objects we conclude to the qualities of other similar, but unknown objects, a subsumption takes place, and an argument by analogy is formed, the Proposition major of which is, "Objects of the same kind are likely to be similar, not in one point only, but in many points : " *e.g.* Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and Mars, have mountains ; therefore other planets are supposed to have also mountains.

(*b*.) *E.g.* Drunkenness destroys the mental faculties ; what destroys the mental faculties, deprives us of human dignity ; what deprives us of human dignity, lowers us to the degree of animals ; therefore drunkenness lowers us, etc. (The connection between Subject and Predicate must be true, invariable, and necessary, else the Conclusion is wrong ; *e.g.* the boldness of others detects our faults ; what detects our faults leads to self-knowledge ; what leads to self-knowledge is valuable ; boldness is valuable.) Every Sorites may be resolved into several Syllogisms.

§ 37.

All Arguments are demonstrations, which however produce only a *discursive* (*a*) knowledge or conviction. Errors in demonstrating are—

1. *Petitio principii* (begging the question), if the principle from which the Conclusion is drawn, presupposes the truth of this Conclusion (*b*).

2. *Arguing in a circle*, if the same Proposition is used as Proposition major and as Conclusio (*c*).

3. *Argumentum nimum probans*, in which the *Propositio major* is wrong in all cases (*d*).

4. *The conclusion from something Possible to something Real*; it contains a fallacy, because the *Conclusio* can never contain more truth than the *Premises* (*e*).

(*a*.) Discursive (*discurro*), because we must run through Notion, Judgment, and Argument, in order to arrive at the demonstration; it is therefore a mediate knowledge, and is opposed to intuitive, immediate apprehension of truth.

(*b*.) *E.g.* Amazons did exist, because we have records of them. God exists, because there is a divine revelation.

(*c*.) *E.g.* The senses make us acquainted with the objects as they are, for they impart an objective knowledge.

(*d*.) *E.g.* A revelation is impossible, because God cannot exercise an immediate action upon our soul. (According to this, God is not the Almighty, nor the creator of the soul.)

(*e*.) "A posse ad esse non valet conclusio." The *Propositio major* would be, "All that is possible is also real."

§ 38.

The Understanding, like Sensibility, has two necessary principal forms for the apprehension of all real things, viz. *Entity* and *Causality* (*a*). On account of the unity of the thinking subject, the forms of Sensibility—Time and Space—naturally combine themselves with these latter in the act of thought, unless they are artificially separated by abstraction (*b*).

(*a*.) All things must be *something* (what they are and what constitutes their entity), and must be *in consequence of something* (which causes them).

(*b*.) Therefore anything we may represent to ourselves appears as existing in Space, and the smallest point that may be conceived is not a simple one. Again, anything consequent upon another appears as a subsequence in Time.

[*Kant*, who called the Forms of Understanding "Categories," arranged them in the following fourfold manner:—1. *Quantity*: Unity, Plurality, Universality. 2. *Quality*: Reality, Negation, and Limitation. 3. *Relation*: Subsistence and Inherence (Substance and Acci-

dence), Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect), and Community (reciprocal action). 4. *Modality*: Possibility and Impossibility, Reality (Existence) and Not-Existence, Necessity and Casualty.—The first two classes being threefold, the two last sixfold (for “Community” is also twofold, being either “Conformity” or “Conflict”), shows that these Categories are not of the same kind. Reality in the 2nd class, and Existence in the 4th, are, as categories of Entity and Being, the principal Condition of all thought and of all rational conception; whence Krug (*System der theoretischen Philosophie*, Part II. p. 81) considers “Reality” and “Being” as the fundamental Categories common to the Forms of Sensibility as well as of the Understanding. The “Negation” in the 2nd class, and the “Impossible” and “Non-Existing” in the 4th, cannot be the Forms of the representation of an Object by the Understanding, as they deny all representation, but they are only the negative expression of a knowledge which is derived from the objects; they are the negative copula of Judgments. It is also clear that “Entity” and “Causality,” according to the *schema* of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th class, may be conceived by the Understanding as a Unity, Plurality, or Universality, as a Conditionality or Non-Conditionality, as a Possibility, Reality, or Necessity; but, on the contrary, Unity, Plurality, or Universality; Negation and Limitation, Possibility or Impossibility; Non-Existence and Necessity or Casualty,—are neither an Entity nor a Causality.]

§ 39.

Both these Forms have only two sides in their application, a positive and a negative one, namely, Entity is either *Substance* or *Non-Substance*, *i. e.* *Accidence*. Substance is what constitutes the essence of a thing, and cannot be imagined separated from it, without annihilating the thing itself. We distinguish between *logical* Substance, *i. e.* the essential properties of a thing, the properties that form the necessary contents of a representation (*a*) and *metaphysical* Substance (*substratum*), the Subject which contains the essential properties, and forms their permanent unity (*b*). Accidence is what is added to the Substance, what is *in* or *with* an object, but may be separated from it without annihilating it (*c*).

(a.) "Round" in the Notion "globe;" "reason" in the Notion "man;" "Omniscience" in the Notion "God." What is essential in one notion may be accidental in another (see § 26).

(b.) Metaphysical Substance, *the Thing in itself*, which is never found in our representations, and therefore is = *x*.

(c.) "Quod accedit ad notionem" therefore "accedit;" *e.g.* "fluid," "solid," in the Notion "body;" "ill," "clever," in the Notion "man." Accidences indicate *the Becoming*, Substance *the Being*. God has no Accidences, because we can realize Him only as *Being*, and not as *Becoming*. The Substance referred to a higher Whole, as a part of this Whole, may be an Accidence to this; *e.g.* "to have a body" in the representation of a "rational Being."

§ 40.

Causality is either positive, *Cause*, or negative, *Not Cause*, that is, *Effect*. *Cause* (Reason, Condition) is that by which something exists and is determined (a); *Effect* (Consequence, Conditioned) is that which exists because something else exists, which is the "*conditio*" of the former (b).

The *reciprocal action* is no third term of Causality, because it merely means either that there are two causes which produce the same or different effects (c); or that, under peculiar circumstances and by different relations, Causes may become Effects and Effects Causes (d).

(a.) *E.g.* The rotation of the Earth round its axis, as the cause of the alternation of day and night. Sufficient, insufficient Ground; subordinate, coordinate Ground; physical, moral Causes. Language seems not to admit any other difference between *Ground* and *Cause* than this, namely, that Cause is an occasionally but repeatedly, and Ground a constantly, acting principle. Convictions "therefore" are not founded upon Causes, but on Grounds, because the influence of these on our judgments is considered as a lasting one. This difference however is not always observed by language.

(b.) *E.g.* The alternation of the Seasons as a Consequence of the inclination of the Ecliptic. Necessary, accidental consequences; nearer, remote consequences. In God, as the Cause of all things, there is no effect.

(c.) In the first case they act in harmony with each other, *e.g.* the

Sun and the Moon, as the Causes of the Tides ; in the second case they are conflicting, *e. g.* the claims of the lower propensities and those of reason.

(*d.*) The Cause, subject to no condition, is the ultimate Cause, and therefore only one = God.

§ 41.

The Notions of Entity and Causality—like those of Space and Time, and for the same reason (§ 21)—are not produced by experience, but are inherent to our mind (§ 21). Though it cannot be *demonstrated* that the *Thing in itself* corresponds to them (§ 22), yet there must be some connection between these forms and the objects, because otherwise, as mere forms, they would be empty, and we could not find any ground in our mental constitution for their existence and application, either as a positive or as a negative condition of thought (§ 23).

That we conceive here a mountain, there a plain (as Accidences to the Earth); whether light be a Substance or an Accidence (a motion similar to that of sound); to determine all this does not depend on ourselves. It is the same with Cause and Effect, *e. g.* a comet and the weather.

(b.) *On Reason.*

§ 42.

Reason in the special sense, and as distinguished from Understanding, is a creative faculty, and Ideas are its products.

§ 43.

Ideas (*a*) are conceptions formed by Reason according to the law of perfection, which is involved in its essence, and this by bringing plurality into a unity determined by itself, as well as perceived by itself as perfect. Ideas therefore are suggested by experience, but they

are not drawn, like notions, from experience : they spring from Reason.

(a.) From the Greek *idéa*, likeness, form. In Plato's writings Ideas are the original conceptions (schemes) of things, the patterns of creation as they exist in God's mind : he considers them as the Unity of Plurality. We mean by the word Ideas the standards (types) of perfection which our Reason possesses.

(b.) *E.g.* By experience we come to the notion "Church," viz. by abstracting and combining in a new conception those characteristics which are common to all religious societies bearing the name of "churches." But if we form the conception of a religious community according to the highest design and standard which Reason finds in itself for it, then we come to the *Idea* of Church. The Idea expresses what *should* be (because the perfection has an intrinsic necessity) ; the Notion tells us what (*experimentally*) *is*. State, man, etc., as they *should be*, are not Notions, but Ideas. To idealize a Notion therefore means to determine its contents, not according to experience, but according to the law of perfection, which belongs to Reason. The Idea, as the principle of all our attempts and efforts, is called *the Ideal*.

§ 44.

The Form under which Reason apprehends the Ideal is the Form of intrinsic perfection. As the human mind possesses three different faculties, the cognitive, the appetitive, and the sensible faculty,—Reason also possesses a triple type of perfection, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful (a), which are the foundation of all Ideals.

(a.) "*True* is what, with respect to our conceptions and to the Knowledge depending on them, has a general validity, and does not contain any impossibility or contradiction ; *Good*, what with respect to our aims and to the actions depending on them has also a general validity, and contributes to the harmony of the whole." (Definition given by Krug.) As far as every action is conditioned by a knowledge which fills our consciousness, so far what is good is determined by what is true, or what is true is also good (in relation to our appetitive faculty). *Beautiful* is what, on account of the perfect form in which it appears, affords a disinterested (not depending on the usefulness or

the material of things) enjoyment. The Beautiful, being an Ideal, awakens the sentiment of the Ideal in general, and consequently belongs to Religion, where the Infinite is brought nearer to the heart by Symbols. Symbols which do not embody any Idea, or which are at variance with the Idea in its pure essence, are offsprings of Superstition. Ideals of the Beautiful are images of *Things* possessing the *Form* in its highest perfection.

§ 45.

The proceedings of Reason in forming *Ideas* are like those of Understanding in forming *Notions*, and consist in separating and combining; in other words, they remove from Ideas all the imperfections which are to be found in experience, and attribute to them that fullness and reality which, according to the law of Perfection (§§ 43, 44), belong to the products of Reason.

E. g. In forming the Idea of "State," Reason points out the highest end of human society, according to which (as the principle governing the whole) it removes all limitations which are found in experience (depending on local and temporary circumstances, on positive religion, and constitution), and ascribes to it only the necessary characters determined by this highest end, and harmonizing with it.

§ 46.

Ideas being the type of all perfection, the possibility of a gradual perfection of the human kind, and of all human conditions, rests exclusively on Reason, or on the power of producing Ideas (*a*). The more Reason develops itself in the human kind, the more pure and perfect is the Ideal becoming, which, for this very reason, is always in advance when compared with Reality (*b*).

(*a*.) Hence it follows that animals, being destitute of Reason, have no perfectibility. Ideas form the province of Philosophy, which is the fundamental Science of all those Sciences which, like mathematics and natural philosophy, are not confined within the limits of experience.

(*b*.) Ideas in their perfect state exist only in Divine Reason. The Idea of a still rude age (the ideas of justice, of State, *e. g.*), if realized in a succeeding time, ceases to be an Idea and becomes a Notion.

§ 47.

The *subjective* certainty of the Idea depends on the necessity by which Consciousness is induced to admit it (*a*). The correctness of the Idea is proved by reflecting on the manner in which it is formed, if it is formed according to the law of perfection, and by comparing it with other Ideas, with which it must not stand in contradiction. On account of the very nature of Ideas (§ 43), their *objective* reality cannot be demonstrated within the sphere of experience (*b*); but we are not less obliged to believe in their objective reality, than we believe in the perception of Sensibility and Understanding, because Ideas are not arbitrary products of imagination, but are awakened by external or internal experience; because they are the *perfect* type of the *imperfect* things we meet with on the field of experience, and because they force themselves, as it were, upon us, who act according to their suggestions (*c*).

(*a*.) The necessary harmonious combination of single elements into a perfect whole, is the foundation of the Idea, which, once perceived, must necessarily be admitted, *e. g.* the Idea of Right, of State; and the Ideal therefore is something which *must* be thought, and which determines us accordingly. It is distinguished thereby from what is possible, or *may* be thought (*i. e.* something, the characteristics of which do not imply a contradiction). The Ideal can never be considered in itself as something *possible*, but only in relation to the efforts of our reason to attain it, as, for instance, in the realization of the Idea of Morality.

(*b*.) The Idea therefore cannot be demonstrated, nor does it require any demonstration, be the demonstration founded upon Experience or upon Understanding. Experience cannot go beyond sensation.

(*c*.) Ideas must be real, not indeed in the limited sphere of experience, but in the universal sphere of existences. No positive legislation could claim an inherent right, had not the Idea of Right a universal reality; there could exist no world, no religion, if God had no reality; no Church, if God's kingdom, no duty, if morality, were mere words.

III. RELATION OF THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

The Idea of Deity.

§ 48.

It is evident from the preceding remarks that there are only two sources of human knowledge, *experience* and *reason*. The first produces Intuitions, the second Ideas. Understanding (§ 24) is only the source of knowledge derived from intuitions and ideas by means of Notions, Judgments, and Arguments.

§ 49.

The certainty of all our cognitions (those acquired by the senses, as well as those acquired by reason) has its foundation in the necessity with which our consciousness feels itself impelled to approve of them. This necessity again rests upon this, that we are conscious to have formed our knowledge according to the original laws of our cognitive faculty. Of this we become certain by reflecting on the manner in which knowledge was obtained. The laws of Sensibility and Reason therefore are principles (*axiomata*), the certainty of which cannot be demonstrated by other propositions, but is immediately perceived in Consciousness.

§ 50.

These laws—those of sensible, as well as those of rational knowledge—determine our Consciousness with *equal necessity*, and therefore have an *equal* claim, to be considered as truths. The conviction they carry with them may be called *knowledge* (immediate consciousness) as well as *belief* (confidence in the laws of the

cognitive faculty) (*a*). In calling the perception by senses *knowledge*, we do not mean to say that it produces a stronger conviction than Knowledge by Reason (*b*).

(*a*.) Knowledge by senses also receives its certainty from the confidence in the correctness of the impression made by the objects.

(*b*.) The inclination to place the experimental above the rational Knowledge, partly arises from Reason not being adequately developed, and partly from the ignorance of the nature of both kinds of Knowledge. The delusions of Sensibility, as to the existence and qualities of things, are innumerable.

§ 51.

The Idea of Ideas, or the absolutely Perfect, is the Idea of *Deity* (*a*). Reason arrives at it in the same way in which it forms all Ideas (§ 45):—

1. By removing from it all that experience shows to be conditioned and limited, *i. e.* partly the form of Sensibility (Space and Time), partly the negative side of the Forms of Understanding (§§ 39, 40, Accident and Effect), both being conditioned (*b*), so that God appears as the fundamental Substance, immaterial and eternal (in relation to which all other Substances are Accidences), and as the absolute Cause (in relation to which all other Causes are Effects) (*c*).

2. By affirming of the Idea of Ideas (God) all Realities and Perfections, inasmuch as they can be connected as a Unity in our Consciousness (*d*).

(*a*.) Therefore a definition of God in few words would be: God is the most perfect Being. (Query, whether a definition of God can be given?)

(*b*.) *E. g.* The absolute Being cannot be limited by Space, nor by Time (origin, end).

(*c*.) Hence the definition, God is the necessary Being, the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the World.

(*d*.) *E. g.* Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc. Hence the definition, God is the Being the most real.

§ 52.

On the other hand, it would be erroneous to conceive that which is given by experience (the external world, § 16) as an Idea (*a*), for this would be at variance with the nature and power of Sensibility, which is the faculty of perceiving the particular and imperfect, Reason only being the faculty of perceiving the universal and perfect (*b*). Reason alone therefore would be able to raise the visible world to the Absolute. But this would go against Reason itself, because Reason would then make unlimited what is limited, infinite what is finite, *i. e.* would do something contradictory, and, as it were, false to its own nature (*c*).

(*a.*) An infinite time, an infinite space, an infinite matter.

(*b.*) The Senses never give a totality of intuitions, but only single Perceptions, and with these Reason forms a Whole, by following its natural laws, which lead to such a conception.

(*c.*) The Senses do not show anything but fragments of real Space and real Time (§ 20), *i. e.* Space and Time in a conditioned, limited state. An unconditioned Time, an infinite Time, and an infinite Space therefore, are *contradictiones in adjecto* (= an infinite Finite, an unconditioned Conditioned); that is, nothing but empty words.

§ 53.

If nevertheless the material world has sometimes been considered as something Absolute, the reason is that, according to our experience, the representation of the World can reach an extreme limit neither in Space nor in Time (*a*), which has given rise to the erroneous opinion that the infinity of the material world may be demonstrated by experience (*b*), whilst the reason really lies in the subjective impossibility of using another form for the representation of material objects, but that of Time and Space (*c*). It is from the confusion of a subjective impossibility with the objective infinity of things

that *Materialism*, and the belief in the necessity of Nature, arise (*d*). *Idealism* and *Pantheism* are only an inverted *Materialism*.

(*a*.) It is impossible to conceive the end of Time and Space, because, to attain it, Time and Space would be again required (see § 21, *c*).

(*b*.) As all things apprehended through the medium of Sensibility must necessarily be represented as existing in Time and Space, it follows that, when we try and realize the end of Time and Space, we must bring forth another representation of Time and Space, and this without ever being able to bring to an actual reality the representation of the *End* in Consciousness; consequently the Infinity of sensible objects is a mere subjective representation (*Schein*, appearance), without any objective reality.

(*c*.) This takes place when we seek the reason why all things are apprehended in Time and Space, and no representation can take place without this Form, not in ourselves, but in the objects. By not sufficiently observing ourselves, we attribute to the objects those necessary laws under which Sensibility can only be affected by them. Time and Space appearing as infinite in extent and contents (see note *b*), if we seek in the objects the reason of this appearance, we give birth to the notion of the infinity and eternity of matter, to the negation of all simple (spiritual) Substances, and the conception of a mechanism of nature, as a *continuous* (§ 21, *c*) connection of material causes and effects (therefore, a negation of the Spiritual in general, of God, of the immateriality and immortality of the Soul, of Providence, of moral freedom).

(*d*.) *Materialism*, *Idealism*, and *Pantheism* equally affirm the identity of all things, and they differ only in this, that *Materialism* acknowledges the reality of those things only which are perceptible by the senses, considering all rational and spiritual substance as mere delusions. *Idealism* denies the reality of the visible world, and considers both the sensible and the spiritual world as mere subjective conceptions. *Pantheism* either (like Spinoza) gives up the World in favour of the Idea of Deity, and considers the former as a modification of the Divine Substance, or (like Schelling) sacrifices God to the World, and makes a Deity of the World in its infinity. Thus each of these opinions assumes the identity of all things (in opposition to *Theism*, which separates God and the spiritual from the material world, and is therefore Dualism), and tries to solve the apparent contradiction of the infinity of material objects, by identifying the latter with the ideal world.

§ 54.

The Idea of Deity, and the Ideas determined by it, are called *religious Ideas*; they are, according to the ideal type of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful (§ 44), either *theoretical* Ideas, which refer to the knowledge of God (God and His relation to the world), or *practical* Ideas, which refer to the religious life (the divine law and the moral freedom), or *æsthetical* Ideas, which refer to the external form in which Religion manifests itself (Church, God's Kingdom).

PART II.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY.

A. THEORETICAL RELIGIOUS IDEAS.

I. THEOLOGY.

1. *On God in Himself.*

§ 55.

IN affirming the existence of God, we not only affirm that the Idea of God (§ 51) exists as an Idea in the human Reason, but that it has also a reality independent of our Reason. As the unity of Consciousness (*i. e.* Personality) belongs to the Notion of a *rational* Being, we must attribute this same personality to God, whereby also His difference from all that is beside Him (= World) is expressed. The belief in a God whose nature differs from that of the world is called *Theism* or *Deism* (*a*).

(*a.*) See § 5 and § 53.

§ 56.

The existence of God neither can nor requires to be demonstrated, *i. e.* deduced from a higher principle; because the Idea of God is, by its intrinsic necessity, quite as evident as a mathematical truth (see §§ 48–50). Demonstrations, therefore, brought forth to prove the existence of God, have no other bearing but to show how

the belief in God is a natural and necessary principle of Reason, and all such demonstrations rest upon the proposition, "the *Unconditioned* must exist, because the *Conditioned* exists" (*a*).

(*a*.) See the special demonstrations. This Argument does not express anything but the right of Reason to form Ideas, or the law according to which it ascends from the imperfect to the perfect. The belief in God therefore is essential and necessary to our Reason.

§ 57.

The *ontological* (*a*) demonstration is founded on the argument, "to the most real Being all realities must be attributed; Existence or absolute Independence is a reality; therefore it must be attributed to the Supreme Being." However little this argument, in *this* form, may demonstrate (*b*), still it contains the truth, that Reason is impelled by its own nature to believe in an absolute Being, that the existence of the *Imperfect* presupposes the Existence of the *Perfect* (*c*), and that the Idea of Perfection would not be our highest standard, were it not real (*d*).

(*a*.) The name is taken from *Ontologia*, *i. e.* doctrine of the fundamental properties of things, which formed the first part of metaphysics before Kant. The ontological demonstration had already been used by Sextus Empiricus *advers. Mathem.* ix. 88–91. The Schoolman Anselm of Canterbury, in his 'Proslogio,' c. 2 and 3, brought it into a better form. Besides, see Descartes, *Princip.* i. 18, and chiefly Moses Mendelssohn, in his 'Morgenstunden,' p. 306.

(*b*.) The Argument is wrong, because in the *Propositio* major we speak of *logical* or *ideal*, in the *Propositio* minor and in the *Conclusio*, of *real* Existence (see § 34). It is wrong also, because the *Propositio* minor is wrong; for Existence is not a Reality or Quality which adds to the Notion, but a mode of apprehending the Idea.

(*c*.) We perceive a gradual progression towards the last term of perfection, which, in the sphere of experience, is man. Reason however can follow up this progression to the highest perfection. As we perceive a part of the progression to be real, it is certain that all conse-

quent terms must be real also (= "the Unconditioned must exist, because the Conditioned exists").

(d.) The Idea of the "*Perfect*," which is the criterion of thought and reason, must contain a reality, else the existence of the Idea itself could not be explained (= "the Unconditioned must exist, because the Conditioned exists").

§ 58.

The *cosmological* (a) demonstration starts from the casualty (b) of the world, arguing thus:—That which is accidental must have its cause in something that is necessary: the world is accidental, therefore it must have its cause in something that is necessary ("the Unconditioned exists because the Conditioned exists"); that which is necessary must have in itself the cause of its existence, and must moreover be the cause of all existence. According to this conclusion God has been defined, "*Ens a se, natura necessaria, causa mundi*" (c).

(a.) *Cosmological*, because it rests upon the doctrine of the *contingentia mundi*, which used to be expounded in the "*rationalis cosmologia*," a part of metaphysical science. This demonstration was first clearly perceived by *Anaxagoras*; then exposed by *Leibnitz*, *Mendelssohn*, *Crusius*, *Bilfinger* ('*Dilucidationes de Deo, Mundo et generalibus rerum Affectionibus*,' Tübing. 1746, 4th ed. 3), *Eberhard*, *Dedekind*, *Kant* (Miscel. 2nd vol.).

(b.) *Accidental* is that which has the cause of its existence not in itself, but in something other than itself, and which might be different from what actually is. *Necessary* is what has in itself the cause of its existence, and cannot be otherwise than it is. We say that the world is accidental, because whatever we perceive within the sphere of our experience appears as result and effect, and consequently as accidental (§ 21). It has been objected that although all perceptible *parts* of the world are conceived as accidental, it does not follow that the *whole* also, which we do not know, should be so. The necessity however to consider the whole sphere of experience as accidental does not depend on our experience, but rather on the necessary form of Space and Time, under which we must conceive all that comes within the limits of experience.

(c.) It has been said that this is a barren Notion, which becomes the Notion 'God' only when the ontological demonstration is com-

bined with it. This however is not the case, for Reason itself, or rational Consciousness, conceives itself as originating in Time, and therefore cannot realize the necessary Being but as a rational and moral one.

§ 59.

The *physico-teleological* (*a*) demonstration starts from Teleology (*b*), and argues as follows:—As the suitability (*c*) which we perceive everywhere in the world cannot be the effect of casualty (*d*), nor belong to the nature of things themselves (*e*), but must flow (according to the law of causality) from a rational cause differing from the world; the world must have a rational Creator (*f*), to whom all the attributes must be ascribed which are required for forming and executing such a plan.

(*a.*) *Physico-teleological*, because it infers God from the arrangement of things (*φύσις*, *rerum natura*). This demonstration is often used in the Bible, being the most impressive and the most forcible one; *e. g.* Psalms viii., ix., and civ.; Job xxxvii.—xli.; Matt. vi. 25, sqq.; Acts xiv. 15, sq., xvii. 24, sq. Socrates, in Xenophon's *Memorabil.* i. 4, 5, sqq., iv. 3, 3, sqq. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 37, sqq.; *Quæst. Tuscul.* i. 29. Bonnet's '*Betrachtungen über die Natur*' (ed. 5, Leipzig, 1805). T. F. Dahlenburg, '*Philosophie und Religion der Natur*' (3 vols., Berlin, 1797). B. G. Walther, '*Betrachtungen über die Natur für Verstand und Herz*' (Weimar, 1800).

(*b.*) Teleology = doctrine of ends, purposes. Finality = conception of a rational Being intending to realize them. Suitableness (conformity to the end in view) of nature = such an arrangement of things by which the Conception of a Supreme Reason is formed.

(*c.*) The purposes are, life, duration, welfare. The suitability in the arrangement of things may be demonstrated in the following examples:—the *Earth*—rotation, inclination of the ecliptic, roundness, gravitation, mountains, valleys, etc.; *living beings*—their duration, abode, instinct, structure (fishes, birds, waders, and climbers), circulation of the blood, nutrition, plants, seed-production, variety of food, human body, senses, etc.

(*d.*) Accident, Casualty, does not explain anything, but shows that we are not able to find the connection between cause and effect. To the ignorant therefore most things appear to be accidental. Accident

cannot produce what is intentional and constant, *e. g.* difference of the sexes, lasting proportion of the number of births in each of them.

(*e.*) Rational purposes cannot emanate but from rational Consciousness, which Nature does not possess. The so-called "essential forces" (the force of gravitation, *e. g.*) act unconsciously even in man, *e. g.* in generation.

(*f.*) The Creator of the world must also be a moral Being, for the very reason that moral Beings exist. That the world has been created out of nothing; that the Creator is not a mere architect of the world—of an elementary Substance previously existing,—are consequences resulting from this demonstration. The various applications of the forms of sensibility, and the slow and gradual discovery of the laws of nature, are sufficient demonstrations of their objective validity. (Conf. § 23.)

§ 60.

The *moral* (*a*) demonstration, derived from the absolute prescription of the moral law, rests on the following propositions:—"Man's highest good (*b*) is his capability of morality and happiness. The one is a requirement of his mind; the other, of his sensible nature. Man can only realize (render real in his own person) morality, but not happiness, as this depends on certain external conditions, which he is often bound to sacrifice to morality. Therefore, either a Supreme Being must exist, who governs nature (which does not follow the moral laws) in such a way as to bring into harmony in man virtue and happiness, or the voice of Conscience (the commands of duty, marked by Reason with an absolute necessity) is unjust and irrational. The latter proposition being morally impossible, we are obliged to believe the former to be true, therefore to believe in God (*c*)."

(*a.*) So called from the moral principle on which it rests. It has first been thoroughly investigated by Kant ('*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*,' p. 620, sqq.); C. H. Jacob, '*Ueber den moralischen Beweis für das Dasein Gottes*' (2nd ed., Lieb., 1798).

(*b.*) According to Kant's expression, morality is the *supreme* (supremum) good; morality and happiness the *perfect* good (bonum

consummatum). The Being, in which the perfect good is absolutely realized, is the *highest* good (sumum bonum); morality and happiness combined in a world, the highest *derived* good (the best world).

(c.) Kant therefore called the belief in God a *postulatum* of the practical Reason. The next consequence drawn from his demonstration is, the immortality of the soul endowed with a new sensible nature. But this harmonization of morality and happiness could not be eventually accomplished, unless we suppose the existence of God. Besides, the Notion of happiness is rather vague and relative. Strictly speaking, we can only say, If the *Conditioned* (imperfect morality and happiness) is real, the *Unconditioned* (a holy and blessed God) must also possess a reality, being the reason of the former.

§ 61.

It has been considered as an *historical* demonstration of the existence of God (*a*), that the belief in his existence is to be found amongst all nations who have attained a certain degree of intellectual development, however small it may be (*b*). But this only shows (*c*) that the belief in God is natural to human Reason. If taken separately, there are none of the preceding arguments that may be considered as fully demonstrative, but to obtain a demonstration they must be combined together (*d*).

(*a*.) Already mentioned by Plato, De Legibus, x. Aristotle, De Cœlo, i. 3. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 16, sq.; De Legibus, i. 8; Quæst. Tusc. i. 13. Seneca, Epist. 117: "Veritatis argumentum est, aliquod omnibus videri, tanquam Deos esse," etc. Lactantius, Instit. Div. i. 2.

(*b*.) Not always in *one* God, but in supernatural powers in general.

(*c*.) For even an error may be general for a long time, *e. g.* the opinion that the stars revolve round the earth; that the representation of Space and Time is derived from the objects.

(*d*.) On all these demonstrations see 'Theocles; ein Gespräch über den Glauben an Gott,' v. J. A. H. Tittmann (Leipz., 1799); 'Ueber das Dasein Gottes,' v. Chr. Garve (Breslau, 1802); 'Pistevon, oder über das Dasein Gottes,' v. Sintenis (Leipz. 1807).

§ 62.

As Reason, in its demonstration of the existence of

God, is invariably led to the conception of one God, there is no ground to believe in more than one God (*a*); a proposition which we must firmly maintain, not only for the sake of the unity of science, but also on account of the practical consequences it carries with it (*b*).

(*a*.) *Evil* in the world having been considered as *absolutely* existing, has led to Dualism, or to the doctrine of an evil principle co-existing with the good.

(*b*.) Unity of the moral law, of the plan of the world, of Providence. Disadvantages of Polytheism. As only *one* God exists, we do not require a personal name for Him. A proper demonstration of the Oneness of God cannot be given by Reason; for it is not a divine attribute, and relates only to the Oneness of the divine Consciousness, where lies the highest power.

§ 63.

If we divide the Idea of the highest perfection into those parts which may be distinguished in our thought (for objectively they are inseparable), we arrive at the conception of the divine qualities or attributes, which are all necessary elements of the divine nature.

Our conception of the divine Perfection is formed by analogy, *i. e.* by borrowing from our limited Consciousness the perfections which, though real, are far from containing the fullness of the divine perfections, and are, as it were, a mere symbol of them.

There is no reason to believe that our finite Reason possesses the type of all perfections.—Anthropopathism, Anthropomorphism.

§ 64.

According to the manner in which Ideas are formed (§ 45) we divide the attributes of God,

1. Into *negative* or *general*, which refer at once to God's knowledge, will, and existence, and are general conditions of His essence; and

2. Into *affirmative* or *special*, which affirm the perfection of God's knowledge, will, and existence.

§ 65.

The general or negative attributes are—

1. *Timelessness*, *i. e.* that condition of the divine Being, according to which the Conception of Time—

2. *Spacelessness*, that condition according to which the Conception of Space—must be removed from His Knowledge, Will, and Existence.

3. *Independence*, according to which His knowledge, will, and existence are not determined by anything besides Him, but by Himself alone.

4. *Invariableness*, according to which His absolute perfection can be neither increased or diminished, nor its quality changed.

God's attribute of not being subject to the condition of space (=Simplicity) has been called His "Spirituality;" but in using this word, they have had only in view the Substance of God. His not being subject to time has been called "Eternity." *Infinity* is nothing but a negative expression for absolute perfection, and being a metaphorical one, ought not to be used. Incomparability and Incomprehensibility are no attributes, but relations to the human understanding.

§ 66.

By analogy we distinguish in God Intellect, Will, and Existence. Accordingly He possesses—

(1.) *The most perfect Intellect*, *i. e.* the most perfect knowledge (*a*) of Himself and of all things (= *Omniscience*), which therefore is not subject to the conditions of time and space, is independent and invariable, and consequently is the knowledge the most true and the most distinct (*b*).

(*a*.) Intellect, not as is the case with man, a *faculty*, but an *actus* = God Himself considered as a knowing Being. His Intellect there-

fore is identical with His Omniscience. His knowledge is the *most perfect*, because He is the principle of all knowledge.

(b.) *Timeless*, therefore eternal (neither *remiscentia*, nor *scientia*, nor *præscientia*); *spaceless*=not bound to images and intuitions; *independent*, nothing is imparted to Him, but all is an inherent necessity of his nature: He creates truth, and is the source of all real knowledge; *invariable*=always equal to Himself, therefore no abstraction, no discursive (§ 37) knowledge, but transcendental intuition.

§ 67.

God possesses—

(2.) *The most perfect Will,*

i. e. the power to do what is conformable to His perfection (a). It is only in our thoughts that Will is separate from the most perfect Intellect; in God both are the same power (b), and God can only possess the most perfect Will in as far as He possesses the most perfect Intellect. God's Will in relation to the particular effects of which it is the cause, is called God's *decree* (*decretum*), which, if formed with regard to a conditional, finite Will, is called a conditional (hypothetical) decree,—if not, an unconditional decree (c).

(a.) Therefore it is not an attempt, an inclination, a desire.

(b.) Will=the most perfect Intellect considered as acting with the most perfect knowledge; or, God Himself considered as willing.

(c.) It is called so only in relation to the moral world, or to the Will of moral Beings, which is created by God, and similar to his own Will. The divine Will is not thereby limited, for it is freely that it binds itself to a conditioned will, which exists only by the former. Nor does God's Will thereby become a double one, but it remains one and the same decree (*viz.* to rule the moral Beings according to the relation in which they stand to the divine Will=obedience, disobedience), alternating only in its execution (reward or punishment, granting or denying).

§ 68.

God's Will is (§ 65) also—

1. *Timeless*, *i. e.* eternal Will.

2. *Spaceless*, i. e. bound, neither in its nature, nor in its effects to the condition of Space, and therefore of means (operative *Omnipresence*) (a).

3. *Independent*; it cannot be determined by anything external to it; its power is spontaneous and absolute, and contains the absolute motive which determines all things (*Omnipotence*) (b).

4. It is *invariable*, i. e. it is always equal to itself, neither increasing, nor diminishing, nor changing (*Holiness*) (c).

(a.) God does not, like man, require to be present (near in Space) in order to act upon something; nor does He require any mediators. If He make use of such (Angels, men) it is not because He requires them, but in order to give them the opportunity of exercise and action. Immediate action = when He chooses He imparts to His conception the highest power: symbolically, "God spake."

(b.) No law can be prescribed to God by anything besides Him. The Question: Whether God can do what is impossible (= what is nothing)?

(c.) In God therefore there is no desire, no hesitation, no deliberation. Repentance is ascribed to God by an anthropological proceeding, namely by man altering his relation to a *conditional* decree of God.

§ 69.

The preceding general determinations are often comprised under the Notion of *Freedom* of God's Will, which, in relation to the origin of the divine Will, is called *Spontaneity*; in relation to the action of God (*extra se*), *Omnipotence*; and in relation to the motives of action, founded only on the highest perfection, *Holiness* (a).

(a.) *Holiness* (= the perpetual harmony between the divine Will and the most perfect Intellect, or the Perfection itself) is, therefore, a moral necessity. The expression, that it is God's love towards himself, contains the same meaning. By virtue of His Holiness God is the source of the moral law.

§ 70.

From analogy to the human mind, we attribute both to God's Intellect and Will,

1. *Omniscience* ; the attribute according to which God has the most perfect purposes, and chooses the most perfect (*a*) means for their execution. We must believe in this perfection on theoretical grounds (*b*), but it cannot be demonstrated by experience (*c*).

2. *Goodness* ; the attribute according to which God wishes the welfare of all creatures, and rejoices in it (*d*). It is universal and immutable.

(*a*.) Most perfect, *i. e.* in conformity with His perfection.

(*b*.) Because God possesses the most perfect Intellect and Will.

(*c*.) Because we cannot embrace the whole, nor can we know the aim of all developments and changes.

(*d*.) It follows from the Notion of the highest perfection, and is partly evident also from the contemplation of nature and of ourselves.

§ 71.

3. *Justice* ; or that attribute of God according to which His most perfect Intellect and Will are declared to the world by *law* and *requital* (*justitia legislativa* and *distributiva*). Divine *laws* are rules of life prescribed to created beings (*a*). *Requital* consists in this, that God retributes every creature according to its relation to the ends of creation (*b*). We may distinguish—

1. *Natural requital*, *i. e.* the good or evil consequences which, according to the natural arrangement of things, arise from obedience or disobedience to the divine prescriptions (*c*) ; and

2. *Positive requital*, which, without arising from the nature of things, is connected by God with the observance of, or the deviation from, His commandments (*d*). With regard to moral beings, the divine law is called

the *moral law*, and the requital is either *reward* or *punishment*. Happiness is a reward, evil a punishment; both springing from the dictates of conscience, which tells us that happiness is *attached* to obedience, evil to disobedience.

(a.) They extend as well over the physical as over the moral world.

(b.) God is just also to animals.

(c.) *E.g.* If the plant, the animal, do not develope themselves according to the law of God (which only takes place when they are prevented from doing so by external circumstances), they must perish. Natural consequences of temperance and intemperance, of veracity and falsehood, etc.

(d.) Positive requital applies only to moral Beings, especially in the future world, which brings forth a new arrangement of all *outward* circumstances, determined by the moral state of man. The natural requital to moral Beings is often too hard, often too mild, not always equal (without respect of persons), not even existing at all times; therefore a positive requital is required in order to compensate the natural one. The ultimate *cause* of requital lies in God—in His love of Perfection, and the highest *end* of requital is to give satisfaction to this love. The correction of the sinner is only a subordinate end of punishment, which is inflicted without always producing amendment.

§ 72.

Finally :—

(3.) *The most perfect existence or life* belongs to God. To *Exist* is to act; *living Existence*—and to act dynamically (not mechanically only)—is what constitutes a *rational Existence*, or a dynamical action with consciousness. The most perfect life or existence of God, therefore, is the most perfect consciousness (a) combined with the most perfect action (b).

(a.) It is immutable, the most vivacious, the most distinct, full, and comprehensive.

(b.) *I.e.* The relation of God's knowledge and activity to Himself. Human consciousness arises from the opposition of the Self and the Object. God is object to Himself: for if the object were the World, the World would be eternal. The World however *is* eternal in God's Intellect (Plato's Eternal Ideas).

§ 73.

God's existence is (§ 65)—

1. *Timeless, i. e.* God is eternal, never began, and will never cease.
2. *Spaceless, i. e.* there is nothing sensible in Him, like in man, but all is immaterial, transcendental.
3. *Independent, i. e.* He is Himself the cause of his existence (*aseitas*). He is therefore in need of no external cause; and
4. *Immutable*, always equal to Himself.

§ 74.

The Notion *Beatitude* expresses only that God is conscious of the fullness of His existence (by analogy); the Notion *Majesty* or *Glory*, the relation of His absolute Perfection to the world, of which He is the Creator, the Lord, the Governor, and Ruler.

2. *On God's Relation to the World.*

§ 75.

From the necessary existence of God, which carries with it the highest perfection, necessarily follows, that all things besides God (*a*) exist only by Him, *i. e.* have been created by Him (*b*). The Creation is an *Actus* of the Divine will, and as such is incomprehensible to our finite Reason (*c*). That God is the Creator of the World, not only as to its form, but as to its matter also, is implied in the Notion of Creation out of nothing (*d*). Creation did not take place in, but without Time, for Time began *with* Creation.

(*a.*) The World in the most general sense = the complex of all that exists besides God. World in the common and in the biblical sense.

(*b.*) To *create*, different from to *produce*, to *form*.

(c.) *Incomprehensible*, i. e. it cannot, like all God's operations, be conceived by any analogy. Equally incomprehensible is the action of man's will upon his body, the creative power of his mind. Biblical Symbol, "God spake."

(d.) *Creatio ex nihilo*; according to the Vulgate, 2 Maccab. vii. 28, ἐποίησεν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.) Eternity of matter, Hylozoism. Theory of Emanation.

§ 76.

The contemplation of nature (a) affords probable grounds for the opinion that created things (b) have entered, and will enter in future, into cosmical arrangements different from their original one, or that there are *periods of formation* in the creation. Indeed, it is probable (c) that there are *periods of creation*, when the number of beings is increased; for as there are materials which, having fulfilled their end, are destroyed, there may be others called into existence to serve the Creator's purposes.

(a.) *E.g.* What Geology says on the periods of formation of the earth, on the now extinct species of plants and animals, on the subsequent appearance of the human race; what Astronomy says on the nebulae, the appearance or disappearance of stars, on Comets, on Aerolites, etc.

(b.) *Matter of the world* = the primordial substances of which things consist: *Form of the world* = the *nexus cosmicus* which connects them (Cosmos, Mundus).

(c.) It is in accordance with the Omniscience, Omnipotence, etc., of God.

§§ 77, 78.

As our knowledge of God, of the World, of nature, and development of things, is but an imperfect one, we can neither say *what* the highest end of Creation is, nor can we *demonstrate* from experience that the world is the *best* possible one (a), i. e. that it is the most perfect means towards the end in view. The latter must be be-

lied on account of the perfection of God ; and it is in this perfection that the reason for the creation of the world (*b*), as well as its highest end, are to be sought, for God cannot be determined in His decrees but by Himself.

(*a*.) The *best*, not in the sense which the Eudemonists assign to the word, viz. such as bestows the greatest amount of *welfare* upon *man*.

(*b*.) This is the meaning, when we say God has created the world for His glory. The *Eudemonists* considered the happiness of man, and the *moral Eudemonists*, his moral education, as the end of Creation ; both opinions too narrow.

§ 79.

As we cannot tell what is the end of creation, God does not require a justification (*a*) for the existence of *physical* evil (*b*), (*i. e.* subjectively, the sufferings of living beings ; objectively, the things and arrangements which produce those sufferings) ; nor can Dualism, which is contrary to Reason, be deduced from it.

(*a*.) *Evil* = whatever interrupts or diminishes the happiness of sensible Beings,—physical, moral evil ; material, spiritual evil.

(*b*.) Theodicy (Θεός, δικαία), justification of God. This inquiry has only a *subjective* bearing and object, viz. to set our notion of evil in accordance with our idea of God's goodness. Leibnitz, 'Essai de Théodicée, sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal' (Amsterdam, 1747). Villaume, 'Ueber den Ursprung und die Absichten des Uebels' (aus dem Franz., 3 Theile, Leipzig, 1784-87). Kant, Ueber das Misslingen aller Philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicée, in der Berliner Monatsschrift (Sept. 1791) ; and again in his *Miscellaneous Writings*, vol. iii.

§ 80.

For besides that many evils could be avoided, and are brought upon us by ourselves (*a*) ; that others exist only in our imagination (*b*) ; that others, again, are the conditions of greater enjoyments (*c*) ; physical evil, in ge-

neral, exists only in the perception depending on sensation, which is not the same in all beings (*d*), and is therefore always transitory, *i. e.* forming the transition to another kind of existence (*e*) ; in a moral respect they are an important means of spiritual development (*f*), but hardly commensurate with the immorality of man (*g*), and lose all their power if borne with that resignation to the moral and physical laws of God which morality demands (*h*).

(*a.*) We distinguish *avoidable evils* (*e. g.* war, fraud, the consequences of vice) and metaphysical or *unavoidable evils*, as the natural limitation of things, which renders uninterrupted happiness impossible.

(*b.*) *Imaginary evils*, when our imagination shows us a better state, in comparison with which we consider our present state as an evil; *e. g.* want of riches, long life, unsatisfied claims, wounded honour.

(*c.*) *E. g.* Hunger, thirst ; work, rest ; sickness, health. (Dissonance raises the value of harmony.) A higher organization gives a higher feeling of joy as well as of pain.

(*d.*) Evil exists only in the sensation of living beings ; *e. g.* an earthquake is not an evil for the earth. Evil is also a relative notion ; cold, *e. g.*, is agreeable to the polar bear, painful to the lion. Different affections of the senses ; possibility of becoming accustomed to evil, hardness.

(*e.*) There is no absolute physical evil, none before God.

(*f.*) Of the mental and moral powers. Necessity is the mother of inventions ; moral field of performance of duty.

(*g.*) The Earth has much more numerous and more lasting enjoyments than man's morality deserves.

(*h.*) Every physical evil is to be referred, as a single case, to a general law of nature, to the law of opposition, according to which life springs out of death, joy out of grief. This alternating movement forms the existence of all finite being. It is only for our individual feeling that this opposition is an evil. But as piety demands an entire resignation with regard to our material welfare, the submission to the divine law of nature is a necessary consequence of it.

§ 81.

The world being a means for the Creator's purpose, and being created by His will alone, its duration is en-

tirely dependent on this will, and its history must be a gradual fulfilment of the ends of the Creator. Both, considered as depending on God's Will, are called *Providence* (*a*); the former *Preservation*, the latter *Government*, of the world.

(*a.*) *Πρόνοια, providentia.* Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 22: "*Πρόνοια, providentia, in his maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit, atque omnis ornatus.*"

§ 82.

Preservation is that operation of the divine Will by which the uninterrupted existence of the World is maintained; or the dependence of all created things on the Creator, with regard to their duration, in every moment of time (*a*). It refers as well to the form as to the matter of the world (*b*). Individual things are only preserved because they are the means for the accomplishment of the ends of creation; accordingly, it is not in contradiction with what we mean by *Preservation* that individual things, after having fulfilled their purpose, are destroyed (*c*).

(*a.*) It follows from the Creation of the world, and from its not having a *necessary* Existence (called *creatio continua* by the Schoolmen).

(*b.*) Especially the preservation of genera and species by continuous generation.

(*c.*) *E.g.* The genera of plants and animals; the heavenly bodies and solar systems.

§ 83.

The divine *Government* of the world is that operation of God by which all changes (*a*) that take place in the world are made subservient to the aim for which it has been created, in order that the world do not cease to be conformable to the perfection of the Creator, and to be

a reflex of His Omnipotence, Wisdom, Goodness, and Holiness (*b*). The *demonstration* of the Government of the world can, strictly speaking, be derived only from God's absolute perfection (*c*), and not so well from experimental considerations, though these also may produce a strong conviction (*d*).

(*a*.) They form the object of the Government of the World, they are the continuous "*feri*" of things; the things *themselves* are the objects of Preservation. Preservation and Government therefore are closely connected.

(*b*.) For some, this purpose is the welfare of the whole in connection with the greatest possible welfare of the individual; for others, it is the attainment of the highest good (§ 60); for others, the glory of God as it manifests itself in the happiness of His Creatures. We can judge of the ends of God, with a certain degree of certainty, only with regard to the human kind; this end being, for man, the development of all his faculties, preparing him for a more perfect state.

(*c*.) God being immutable, the end of creation is invariable also; and as the created things could not have determined this end themselves, the reason of all their modification, in conformity with this end, must be in God. The moral demonstration of the necessary Existence of a Governor of the World (see § 60).

(*d*.) A teleological demonstration would be, that nature shows that wise purposes are attained by it. (This demonstration is impossible, because we do not know the ends of Creation.) More important and more convincing is the one, that the history of men and nations clearly shows a guidance according to wise and good purposes.

§ 84.

The Divine Government of the world extends, without any exception, over all things, even over the most trifling (*a*), because they belong to the whole (*b*); "great" and "little" being only relative Notions, which are of no import before God. The question however, whether God governs the world mediately or immediately, *i. e.* either through the laws according to which it is arranged; so that everything is necessary therein, as in a work of Art, God preserving only the laws and powers, or so that

His being and operation themselves are the power that moves and regulates all things—this question has been answered in different ways (c).

(a.) This has been denied by Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* ii. 66, iii. 35), Bayle, and Voltaire. They thought to honour God in stating that, like a human governor, He only considered the whole, not the single parts.

(b.) The genera are nothing without their different species, the latter nothing without the individuals. Great effects from small causes.

(c.) The world has been considered as a machine, and accordingly an immediate action of God has been considered either as an improper assistance or as a disturbance of the laws of nature. It is on that ground that miracles have been denied, or, if admitted, have been considered as a necessity (*miraculum restitutionis, fatum*). Others have considered God as the immediate cause of all actions, and the *mediate* causes as opportunities for actions (*systema causarum occasionalium*). Others have assumed that God and the mediate causes act together, but in such a way as the efforts of the latter to be directed by God towards his ends.

§ 85.

According to what has been said in § 53, the conception of a physical mechanism of nature (a) is nothing but a subjective delusion. Consequently we must also assume that God, by virtue of His most perfect existence, is in a constant causal connection with the World. It is through this connection that not only the laws of nature and the human Reason are preserved, as well in their essence as in their regular operation, but the *separation* and *combination* of all created things are determined; which, in fact, constitutes the course of the world. We cannot understand the way in which God acts in this respect (indeed we do not understand *any* operation of God), but we can explain it by analogy (b).

(a.) Physical science, as the science of natural things, can never lead to a supernatural cause, nor even inquire for one. It is the science of the material world.

(b.) *E. g.* Notes and harmonies are *given* to the musician; but their

combination into a whole arises solely from the spontaneous activity of his mind, which determines the position and sequence of every note. Human reason, as an image of the Divine reason, is also self-acting ; it combines and separates (but does not preserve) the products of Nature, *e. g.* in cutting or planting trees, cultivating the soil, etc.

§ 86.

We have seen (§ 79 sqq.) that physical evils are not repugnant to a divine Providence ; and that this Providence does not abolish the self-activity (freedom) of the rational beings will be seen from a correct view of the relation in which God stands to the *rational* world.

§ 87.

The totality of Creatures which possess Reason, in as far as they follow the same law given to them by Reason, is called the *moral kingdom of God* (*a*). Our experience shows us only *one* such genus, *Man*. That there are however some other kinds of rational beings besides our own (*b*), is a supposition supported by the following considerations :—the innumerable multitude of worlds, larger and more perfect than our Earth ; the variety of kinds of beings destitute of Reason ; the gradual, undeniable progression of beings in Nature, which renders improbable that so wide a gap between God and man should not be filled up ; and finally, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

As to their nature and condition, however, Reason does not tell us anything.

(*a*.) Kingdom : which requires a Rule, and the Oneness of the Ruler. In general the *world* is the Kingdom of God.

(*b*.) Δαίμονες, δαιμόνια, genii ; in the Scripture, אַγγέλוי, מַלְאָכִים ; Zoroaster, Izeds, *i. e.* supplicaturi, intercessuri.

II. ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 88.

As regards man, we call Personality (*a*) the Unity of Consciousness, *i. e.* that by which we feel ourselves to be the same and identical beings, whatever be the apprehension and modification of our Consciousness. The *subject* which is the foundation of Consciousness, and connects into a Unity all the powers of our Being, is called the "*Ego*" (Self), or the *Soul* (*b*), the activity of which therefore consists in Consciousness (*c*).

Consciousness—incomprehensible as to its principle and nature—is the synthesis of Being and Knowing (*d*) in the Self, or the Knowledge of Being. It is double according as the Thinking Subject refers the object of thought either to himself (Self-Consciousness) or to something other than himself.

(*a*.) Whatever we think, suffer, etc., is accompanied by the Self, which conceives itself as different from his perceptions, volitions, and sensations. It remains also identical in the remembrance of the past (after sleep, fainting).

(*b*.) The manifestation of the Self are the products of faculties, and these must have a *substratum* (§ 39).

(*c*.) The more perfect the Consciousness, the more perfect the life (God's Consciousness).

(*d*.) This is the reason why neither Fichte's Idealism nor Schelling's Philosophy of Identity can be justified by demonstration. The origin of Consciousness cannot be explained, because it could only be done by reflection preceding Consciousness, whilst all reflective operation presupposes Consciousness. There is no demonstration beyond Consciousness (§ 49).

§§ 89, 90.

In man's consciousness a double system of faculties is found:—the *sensible* system, the basis of which we call *body*; and the *rational* system, the basis of which we call *mind* (*a*).

We do not know the nature of either, because Consciousness makes us acquainted with their manifestations, but not with their essence. As these manifestations are essentially different (*b*), and as Reason does not necessarily develop itself (as the sensible faculties do) (*c*), we must *conclude* that body and mind are principles essentially different from each other (*d*).

(*a*.) Πνεῦμα and ψυχή, שֵׁשֶׁת and נֶפֶשׁ, mind and soul. Soul, *i. e.* principle of life; in this sense we can speak also of the soul of animals. Soul is the mind, considered as animating the body.

(*b*.) Our sensible nature is the source of Intuitions; Reason, of Ideas. The one is the principle of propensities; the other, the principle of the moral dictates that check the propensities, and are not derived from experience. The Soul perceives in Consciousness the Body as its property, and is raised by reflection above the stream of sensible life.

(*c*.) See §§ 95, 145.

(*d*.) Therefore the Soul is simple, *i. e.* not material. May consciousness, identity of consciousness, thought and will, be attributed to matter? Opinions of the ancients on the Soul, see *Cicero*, *Tusc. Quæst.* i. 9, 10.

§ 91.

As to the connection between Mind and Body, Consciousness asserts that it is the *closest possible* (*a*), and that both have an immediate reciprocal action upon each other (*b*). Experience shows, that on the side of the Body, this connection is effected by the nervous system (*c*).

(*a*.) This is shown by the impossibility of separating them during life; by the necessity with which changes going on in the one are felt by the other; by the necessary connection of the forms of Sensibility and the forms of Reason, as also by the rapidity of their mutual action, *e. g.* in music or speaking.

(*b*.) In Consciousness Body and Soul appear as determined by each other without any interference of a third element; *e. g.* when Will moves our hand to write; when we feel a bodily pain. This has been called *influxus physicus*. The hypothesis of occasional causes (*i. e.* that God Himself takes the opportunity of the changes occurring in the body to produce the corresponding changes in the soul, and *vice*

versâ,—Descartes and his followers), and the hypothesis of the “*harmonia præstabilita*” (i.e. that God has originally determined both mind and soul to an entirely harmonical series of modifications, which develop themselves independently of each other, but come to the same result—Leibnitz) are unnecessary, unfounded, and explain nothing.

(c.) The nervous system is a condition of the human life. The two principal seats of the nervous system are the brain and the ganglia; consequently, insanity, as far as originating with the body, has its source in one of these two points.—Magnetism. The question as to the *seat* of the soul contains scarcely any sense, and is superfluous.

§ 92.

Consciousness cannot teach us anything with regard to the origin of the Soul, because it makes its appearance later than the Soul. But that the human Soul is called into existence, together with the body, by the act of generation (a), and that it has its origin in God only, as far as God is the principle of all power and activity and therefore of the generative also, is an opinion supported by experimental observations; namely the analogy between the origin of the Soul and that of all other created beings; the human monsters (b); the influence of the generating on the generated being (c); the hereditary disposition to certain arts, to mental habits, and insanity; the mental peculiarities of mongrels (d); the degeneration of whole families and nations (e).

(a.) This has been called Traducianism (*Traduciani*), because it teaches that the Soul is begot “*per traducem*,” by a graft. This opinion could only appear as a mere assumption when contrasted with the conception of “matter,” held formerly. *Creatiani* are those who pretend that the Souls are created by God, and united to the body at the time of conception. *Præexistentiani*, those who believe that all souls were previously created by God, and come into the human bodies either for punishment or by their own will (Plato, Philo, the Rabbins).

(b.) Imbeciles, Crétins; the appearance of the latter bound to certain countries.

(c.) *E. g.* If the two parents, or one of them, is in a state of

drunkenness, grief, cheerfulness, during the act of generation. (Hufeland, 'Die Kunst das Leben zu verlängern,' part ii. page 87.)

(d.) *E.g.* Half-castes, etc., who are distinguished by peculiar differences of mind and feelings.

(e.) *E.g.* Of the Romans at the time of the Emperors (Conf. Plutarch, *De sera Numinis vindicta*, p. 223 sqq., ed. Reisk). According to frequent experience it seems to be highly probable that marriages between consanguineous persons lead to the degeneration and extinction of the race.

§ 93.

Just as little does Consciousness tell us the origin of the human kind, which Reason however must refer to God (§ 75) (a). Experience does not decide the question, whether all men descend from one pair only, or from several, simultaneously created (b); but experience has hitherto shown that all men belong to *one* genus, being identical in the essential properties (c) of body and mind, and differing only by the degree of those properties, and in some inessential points (d).

(a.) *I.e.* It cannot be admitted that man is the product of a peculiar mixture of the terrestrial powers of nature. Nature does not produce anything of the kind. The difference and the relation of sexes cannot be explained by a chemical action of natural powers. But even if it were so, the natural powers would only be the means employed by the Creator.

(b.) *Blumenbach's* 'System der verschiedenen Menschenrassen.' *Kant's* Vermischte Schriften, 1 Theil, No. 7, 8. *One* pair would be sufficient to people the earth. History leads to Asia as the original seat of the human race. Our ancestors called themselves *aborigines*, *γῆγενεῖς*, *αὐτόχθονες*. Sometimes more, sometimes fewer human races have been admitted. The black colour of the Negro is produced by a black colouring of the "Malpighian net," which the White race does not possess. The Half-castes propagate their kind, which is not the case with animals (mules).

(c.) Interior structure of the body, limbs, senses, law of sensible perception, Reason and its laws, are the same everywhere.

(d.) The degree of bodily strength, of feelings, of intellectual powers. Non-essential points are colour, shape of lips, hair, nose, cheeks, bones, etc.

§ 94.

With regard to the body, man does not differ much from animals; what especially distinguishes him is his upright position, and the permanence of his sexual propensity (*a*). The nervous system, the propensities, and the perceptive faculties, are common to men and animals; and it cannot be disputed that the animals, at least some kinds of them (*b*), possess a sort of understanding which draws conceptions out of intuitions (*c*).

(*a*.) The inner parts of the human body are not essentially different from those of animals. The upright position is necessarily determined by the direction of the axis of the eye, the connection between the head and neck, the structure of the spine, of the hips, shanks, feet, and hands. Animals possess permanent sexual *organs*, of which plants are destitute; man possesses a permanent sexual *propensity*, which animals have not.—Influence on matrimony, on social and civil institutions.

(*b*.) Monkeys, elephants, dogs.

(*c*.) *E.g.* The fox, in outwitting his prey; the fear of guns, which arises in animals from experience; their faculty of distinguishing who is a sportsman and who is not; the structure of their nests, and the choice of their places, etc. (Whether animals have souls, *ψυχὰς*?) (Transmigration of Souls.)

§ 95.

What essentially distinguishes man from animals is *Reason*, or the *faculty of Ideas*; there is no trace of this faculty in animals (*a*). Accordingly they utter material (*vocem*, *φωνήν*), but not articulate sounds (*loquelam*, *λαλίαν*) like *man*; they do not follow a certain rule (which can only proceed from Reason) in their actions, but their propensities (*instinctus*), which are bound within invariable limits (*b*); they have sensible, but no mental feelings (*c*), and are not susceptible of any improvement, but become necessarily what they must become according to the nature of their species (*d*).

(a.) They do not improve their condition: their works, *e. g.* those of the bees, proceed from instinct, accordingly they have not improved since the beginning.

(b.) *E. g.* The sexual propensity, that of nutrition.

(c.) They do not perceive beauty in looking at a picture, a landscape; they do not possess the sense of honour, of the Good and Perfect; but they possess a musical sense.

(d.) All foxes are equally cunning; all tigers equally cruel; they are all equally skilful (hee, nightingale). (Influence of man on the development of animals.) When an animal is full grown it is perfectly developed. Animals have no history.

§ 96.

In consequence of his Reason, man possesses over the animals the advantage of—

1. The entire range of ideal knowledge, besides the faculty of reflecting on himself.

2. The faculty of acting in accordance with what his reason perceives and knows, or freedom; wherefore his natural propensities, being subjected to a higher rule, have no invariable limit.

3. The faculty of intellectual feelings; and, in consequence of all that,

4. Infinite perfectibility.

See § 95. Man therefore, even when full-grown, does not become what he possibly could be.—Difference of character, of feelings, of knowledge, in different persons,—gradations of progress. Necessity of education.

§ 97.

The whole human race is perfectible like the individual, and it certainly has improved since the beginning in knowledge (a), in morals (b), and feelings (c), as well as in the social institutions which depend on Reason (d). This progress is founded on the Ideas revealed by Reason (e).

(a.) Religion, knowledge of nature, arts, manufactures.

(b.) Necessarily follows from an increased culture of Reason, moral teaching, devotion, philanthropy, human dignity, abolition of slavery, education of the female sex. Value of asceticism and of external worship. (The complaints of old people on the decrease of morality are generally psychological self-delusions.)

(c.) Feelings :—taste, arts (music), sense of truth, right, human dignity.

(d.) Constitution of State and Church, laws, jurisdiction.

(e.) This progress towards perfection has often been denied,—

1. Because people did not consider *all* times (*e. g.* from Abraham to the present day), but particular periods only ;

2. Because they did not embrace all nations and the spread of culture ;

3. Because progress may for some time appear as regression ;

4. Because it has been argued from a premature degree of civilization among certain nations,—the Greeks, for instance, which, being an anticipation, could not continue,—on the development of the whole.

§ 98.

The natural destination of all beings can only be determined by their natural aptitudes ; the destination of man therefore must be to develop all his mental and bodily powers, and to use them according to the laws prescribed to him.

Man ought—

1. To *live*, *i. e.* to last according to the condition of his nature. (Life is sacred. He has a right to exist.—Suicide.)

2. To *act* ; to make use of the faculties, physical and mental. (Matrimony ; occupation.—Error of Ascetica ; their contempt of matrimony and of the world.)

3. To *enjoy* ; he has a right to rational recreation, and to gratify with moderation his natural wants.—Sexual propensity.—Ascetics.

4. To *suffer*, *viz.* what arises from the necessary limitation of his nature (illness, death), but not what petulancy or malice inflicts upon him. In this respect the principle of the Stoic School has a good sense, *viz.* τὸ τέλος τὸ δμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (Diog. Laërt. vii. 78).

§ 99.

Among those powers the mental faculties must come

first, being those which alone stamp man with the peculiar character of humanity (*a*). They ought to be developed to an equal degree, for exclusiveness (*b*) is to be avoided. It is because he possesses Reason that man is the *image* of God.

(*a*.) Intellectual, moral, æsthetical development.

(*b*.) Exclusive cultivation of Intellect produces cunning, malicious, and cold characters. Exclusive cultivation of the moral feelings leads to erroneous opinions, to obstinacy and fanaticism. Exclusive æsthetical cultivation leads to mysticism and fanaticism. On the spiritual nature of man depends his *dignity*, *i. e.* a condition according to which his destination is not relative, but absolute (he is not the means for a purpose, but a purpose in himself).

B. PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS IDEAS.

I. DIVINE LAW AND DUTY.

§ 100.

As man has a double nature, a sensual and a spiritual one, so has he, as Consciousness tells him, a double principle of action, *viz.* the impulse of his sensual and the impulse of his spiritual nature: they may both agree or be at variance with each other (*a*). The impulse of Sensibility is called *propensity* (instinct), which, naturally concentrating itself upon the external object, and not considering the rules of Reason, is called a *blind* propensity. The impulse of Reason is called *law*, *dictate* (*dictamen rationis*), and is the knowledge of the Good (*b*), together with the sense of its dignity. The Good, being unquestionably desirable, appears in Consciousness as a *duty* (a rule we feel bound to follow unconditionally).

(*a*.) *E.g.* The love of property and the duty of industry; the instinct and the duty of self-preservation. The propensities may thus receive the name of duties, *e.g.* the sexual propensity is, in matrimony, called the conjugal duty.

(b.) The *True* and the *Good* are essentially the same (see § 44). Morally good is what, from reasons which are equally valid for all rational Being, ought to determine our will.

§ 101.

The condition of the mind so determined is (active) *appetite* and (passive) *aversion*. Both are always combined. The object of propensity is always what is *agreeable* to the senses, and is induced to appetition or aversion by a sensation of liking or disliking. The moral determinations proceeding from this are called *appetites*, which when lasting are called *inclinations*, and when mastering exclusively the mind are called *passions*. The Good alone is the object of duty, which impels to appetition or aversion by moral knowledge and feelings. The lasting moral determinations founded upon this state of mind are called *habits* (*Gesinnungen*), and when they exercise an exclusive power upon the mind they are called *virtues*.

§ 102.

The law or commandment of Duty, as manifested by Consciousness, is *imperative* (*ein Sollen*, thou shalt), and claims an absolute obedience, and consequently the subordination of propensities, *imperativus categoricus*. Every intentional infraction of it is followed by an internal reproach to ourselves and an order to return to the normal state (a). The Idea of the Good (§ 77), like all Ideal, has its source in Reason (b), and cannot be derived from the world of phenomena, where nothing corresponding to the prototype of duty is to be found.

(a.) *Conscience* is not only the "*science*" (knowledge) of what we have done, but the *species* of this knowledge, the knowledge of the relation of our actions to duty. Where "*science*" is deficient, there *conscience* is deficient also (e. g. in the savage), and as the one increases, the other increases also. The *sense* resulting from this "*science*"

is often called Conscience. When our consciousness of the demands of duty is obscured by heedlessness or passion, it not seldom happens that the feeling produced by the half-extinguished knowledge *precedes* the full and clear knowledge.

(b.) This accounts for the moral law being invariably and necessarily the same. The same applies to the Idea of the *Beautiful*, which is not drawn from experience, and is nowhere to be met with in the world of phenomena. The law of duty often commands to oppose the course of the external world.

§ 103.

The truth of the law of duty is equal to the truth of everything that is ideal (a); it is a truth above all demonstration, declared as such by our conscience and by the necessity with which it determines our consciousness; whence it follows that we are unquestionably bound to obey the demands of duty, and to listen to our propensities only as far as duty allows us to do so. It is also evident from this that reason alone stamps man with the character of humanity (§ 99), whilst propensities are common to man and to animals; and that Reason alone also is able to perceive the universal laws and the universal truths, and to become conscious of them by the power of reflection.

(a.) The criterion for what is subjectively true is the necessity with which consciousness feels itself determined (see § 49). Reason being identical in all men, truth must have the same validity for all men. The True, as a motive, is good, because it is as imperative as the Good to all men, or because its nature is to be universal, either absolutely or relatively (in particular relation, *e. g.* in matrimony): the contrary of it is evil. (Seneca, Ep. 70: "Sapientia est semper idem velle et idem nolle, licet illam exceptiunculam non adjicias, ut rectum sit, quod velis. Non potest cuiquam semper idem placere, nisi rectum.")

§ 104.

The law is *Divine*,—1. On account of its origin, man with all his faculties being the product of the highest

causality. In this respect the law has no higher authority than propensity, because the latter is equally a law or an ordinance of God as much as the material world. Propensity therefore is not bad in itself (there is nothing absolutely bad), but only as far as it is at variance with the law of duty (§ 100).

2. On account of its *essence*; because it is (what propensity is not) a reflex and an image of the highest perfection, or of the Divine nature (see § 67), and because it is also the law of the Divine agency (§ 69; conf. Matt. v. 45, 48; Luke vi. 36). It is therefore by his Reason and by his obedience to the commandments of duty that man becomes the image of God.

3. On account of its *promulgation*; because it has been promulgated as divine law, which is not the case with propensity. (See Revelation.)

§ 105.

The most general law, the law which embraces all others, is, to act always according to such maxims (*a*) as are not at variance with what Reason acknowledges to be good, and are necessarily considered as a universal rule for all men, guiding them either absolutely or relatively, according to peculiar circumstances (*b*). Hence it is evident that all moral progress of mankind depends on the progress of Reason towards the knowledge of the True and Good (*c*), and that the Idea of the absolutely True and Good (the Idea of the Deity) must be the first developed in our mind.

(*a.*) *Maxim* = a subjective principle which directs the actions of individuals; *Law* = an objective principle of general import for beings of the same kind, existing under equal circumstances.

(*b.*) Reason, if once conscious of this principle, can never fall into an error as to its general form, but it may in its application to indi-

vidual cases. This principle may be expressed in different ways : the shortest is "Act in conformity with the human dignity."

(c.) An exception to this is the individual to whom the law of duty has been made known externally under the authority of a Divine (revealed) law. It is always an error leading to Fanaticism to believe that the moral education of man can be achieved without his reason being trained. Moral imperfection can only give way before a more accurate notion of things. (See also §§ 97 and 99.)

§ 106.

The general law of a rational mode of acting finds its application,—

1. With every *rational* being who bears a real and known relation to us, or with whom there may be some connection (a), *i. e.* with ourselves, with our fellow-creatures, and with God.

2. With all objects *destitute of Reason*, if they stand in the same relation to us as under 1 (b), with the addition of a peculiar interest which our Reason takes in them (c), *i. e.* with the organic creation and its products and with the works of man.

(a.) Therefore we have no duties towards the angels, nor the inhabitants of countries yet undiscovered.

(b.) Not towards the sun, the stars, rivers, natural powers, etc., but towards plants or animals.

(c.) *I. e.* Respect for Reason, its rational purposes and use, *e. g.* towards works of art, plantations, buildings.

§ 107.

With respect to their internal relation to each other, duties are either *general* (perfect, unconditioned), which are binding on all men as on rational beings (a), and *special* duties (imperfect, conditioned), which arise from particular circumstances into which we find ourselves voluntarily or involuntarily placed (b); according as those circumstances are variable or invariable, the spe-

cial duties may be divided into *variable* (c) and *invariable* (d).

(a.) *E. g.* To love God, man, ourselves; to act for the benefit of mankind; to work for our own perfection; humility before God, modesty before man; the duty of preserving our own life.

(b.) *E. g.* Duties towards magistrates, towards strangers—in time of war, of general calamity—towards the sick, the forsaken, or the persecuted.

(c.) *E. g.* In persecutions, sickness, war.

(d.) To those belong,—all official duties, the duties of husbands, parents, children, etc.

§ 108.

In applying the law of duty to single cases, a *collision* of duties may arise, *i. e.* such a relation of different duties to each other as will cause one duty to override the other partly or entirely (a). Two cases may ensue from this: we may be obliged, in order to fulfil *one* prescription, either to *omit* an action prescribed by another (b), or to *commit* one which is forbidden by another (c).

(a.) We do not speak here of the collision of rights and claims with duties; the former ought always to be subordinate to the latter. Fictitious collisions resulting from unwillingness to perform a duty.

(b.) *E. g.* If we ought at the same time to assist two different persons, one of whom only we possibly *can* assist; the duties of self-love, and of love towards others.

(c.) *E. g.* If a duty cannot be fulfilled but by immoral means; if we cannot save our reputation but by a falsehood at the bar.

§ 109.

If one command of duty must be *neglected* in order to fulfil another, we ought to prefer the invariable to the variable one (a); the more to the less urgent (b); the one of greater general use to another of less public importance (c).

(a.) A father therefore should not postpone the duty of educating his own children to the duty of educating other men's children. The

duty of denouncing a crime, or bringing an accusation at the bar, is not demanded from a man against his wife, or from children against their parents. The soldier, the physician, are always bound to observe the duty to expose their lives.

(*b.*) According to time and to circumstances. A person, *e. g.*, who having to attend two friends lying sick at two different places, goes to him who is most grievously afflicted, or, if both are in the same bodily condition, to him who is more in need of assistance, or to the nearest, or, if all those circumstances are the same in both, to whom he is most indebted. The duty of keeping our room when we are ill is more imperative than the one of going to church; the duty of extinguishing an extensive fire is more imperative than the one of giving consolation to a suffering fellow-creature.

(*c.*) If the one is not to be preferred as being invariable or more urgent. The duty of denouncing a thief is greater than the one of preserving his good reputation; the duty of paying taxes greater than the one of increasing our own comfort.

§ 110.

The second case, that we are obliged to act against one duty in order to fulfil another, can only happen when an action, forbidden by the law, becomes a means for fulfilling a higher and more important duty. If this means be an action immoral in itself and for all men, it can never be allowed, and is always a trespass (*a*); but if it be an action which, under certain circumstances, may be allowed (*b*), or which, being indifferent in itself, *becomes* immoral under certain circumstances (*c*), then it is only allowed if it be a smaller, remediable, and uncertain evil, serving to prevent a greater, irremediable (*d*), and certain (*e*) one, which cannot be prevented by any other means (*f*).

(*a.*) *E. g.* To commit perjury; to blaspheme God; to deny religion; to betray the State or the Sovereign; to assassinate a man (Sand's deed against Kotzebue); to steal in order to give to others; rebellion against legal authorities: deeds like these can never be in accordance with the will of God, however urgent the circumstances which command them may appear, and he who thinks them to be justifiable

blasphemes Providence, as if it were not able to attain its ends without human crime, and violates the duty of submission to the providence of God.

(b.) *E. g.* To beat a man (parents and children); to wound any one (surgeon, self-defence); to destroy a building.

(c.) *E. g.* Coition ; concealing one's conviction.

(d.) *E. g.* If a commander sets a village on fire in order to gain a victory, or in a retreat sacrifices the rear for the salvation of the whole army. Amputation of a limb, in order to save life.

(e.) If the evil be uncertain, or its being prevented by illegal means be problematical, then the action is not allowed.

(f.) *E. g.* If I cannot escape a murderous attack but by first attacking and wounding the murderer : and even in this case one ought not to mean to kill him, but only to prevent him from doing harm. These conditions are never to be lost sight of ; and therefore the Jesuitical principle, "that the end justifies the means," is a source of crime. In the same way, proselytism by presents, promises, or threats, is inconsistent with this rule ; for the end (supposing it to be good and urgent) may be attained in such cases by many other and *allowed* means.

II. MORAL FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND SIN.

§ 111.

The *manner* in which man is determined to his actions, either by propensity or by duty, is the same in both cases ; it is a knowledge having its source either in Sensibility or in Reason, of which he becomes conscious ; therefore there is no volition without knowledge (*b*), for no volition can be produced unless a representation—from Sensibility or Reason—takes hold of our Consciousness with such a power as to silence for a time all other motives, and to impel us to act according to it.

(a.) He therefore who is not capable of quick conceptions is dull ; he in whom one conception does not easily overcome the others is irresolute (wavering). Our feelings also do not impel us to action until we become conscious of them.

(b.) If knowledge remains doubtful (in suspense), no act of will results from it, but only an inquiry in order to complete the knowledge. If the inquiry do not bring any result, we look for a motive out of our-

selves, in the advice of others, or in drawing lots, etc., or there will be no volition.

§ 112.

Man has, as his Consciousness tells him, power over his thoughts (*a*). He can either call them into, or keep them from his Consciousness; he can either take hold of them, and, by intentionally fixing his Consciousness upon them, render them so vivid as to fill Consciousness with them; or remove them from Consciousness, and, by purposely turning away Consciousness from them, weaken them to such an extent as to suppress all their influence over him. This is called mental *Spontaneity* (self-power, or self-activity) (*b*), which however is imperfect in man, because of the imperfection of his nature (*c*).

(*a*.) Meaning of the expression “to banish something from our mind.” Relief from bodily and mental pain by directing our Consciousness on other subjects. In the hour of temptation we call to our assistance the consideration of duty and honour. Things of which we are not conscious do not exist for us; and as long as we keep them away from consciousness, it is as if they did not exist at all.

(*b*.) It is a spontaneous energy, by which the mind shows that its nature differs from that of the material world. It may be called *Freedom*, but it is an intellectual freedom,—a freedom of thought, not of will.

(*c*.) This Spontaneity is perfect only in God. The influences of the external world often force upon us considerations which we cannot remove, but to which other considerations may be opposed to counter-balance them, *e. g.* the consideration of a Divine wise government of the world,—to the thought of an injury inflicted on us.

§ 113.

Man, therefore, has also the faculty of removing from his Consciousness the thought of what is agreeable to the senses (§ 101), or at least to render it powerless, and thus prevent his actions from being determined by propensity; he can, on the other hand, awaken and establish in his mind the notions of the Good and Duty, and

the motives derived therefrom, and cling to them as to the rules that shall direct his actions. This spontaneous faculty has been called in Moral Science *freedom of will*, an improper and only negative expression, which has often caused the notion itself to be misunderstood (*a*). More properly it should be called *rational Independence*, which consists partly in this, that man finds in himself the rule of his conduct (the moral law), and therefore is governed by a rational legislation (*b*); and partly that he can determine his actions agreeably to this legislation, without being prevented from doing so by what there is fatal in the influence of propensity (*c*). Thus, not only we have a *personal* share in our actions (merit or guilt), but we acquire that dignity which attaches to personality, and, with regard to others, we become possessed of a well-defined sphere of rights.

(*a*.) Freedom, derived from positive relations, is nothing but the absence of external compulsion, consequently a negation. In applying this notion of freedom to the human will (*libertas arbitrii, liberum arbitrium*), it was thought that not only the external compulsion, but any internal and moral one also, had to be removed, and freedom was considered as the faculty of doing what we like,—the choice between propensity and duty, between evil and good, by the mere act of will, *i. e.* without the will being determined by motives. If this be the case, as the law of duty does not allow of any choice, virtue would be a resignation of freedom; the correction of others would be an encroachment on their freedom; the choice of evil would be necessarily connected with freedom and virtue; and, consequently, the foundation of sin ought to be sought in God. Will, in general, is that faculty by which the Soul determines its own inner state. But Will, considered in its external activity, is a Will always determined by some motive suggested by Sensibility or Reason.

(*b*.) Autonomy of Reason, which we obey, because we must need acknowledge it to be true and good. We submit willingly to the natural laws also, because we see that obedience to them is in conformity with the moral law.

(*c*.) That freedom is not the choice between Good and Evil, but the self-determination to the Good, is also expressed in the ancient

sentence, *μόνος δ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος* (Cicero, *Parad.* 5). The same is stated in the New Testament: conf. John viii. 37. A faculty producing immorality whilst its object is to produce morality, is a contradiction, whether we consider it as a notion or as a reality.

§ 114.

The readiness or habit to act according to law is *virtue*.

1. Its *material* element is the conformity of the action with the expression of the law (*a*).

2. Its *formal* element consists in this, that the obedience to the law proceeds from its knowledge (*b*), from the respect for its divine dignity, and from other motives which are in accordance with the law (*c*).

Man, and Man only (*d*), therefore, in the normal state of his Reason (*e*), is capable of virtue. When man acknowledges the law as a Divine law, and his submission to it proceeds from veneration, love, and gratitude towards God, virtue is called Piety (*f*).

(*a*.) This is *legality*, the "justitia civilis" of the Canon Law (see Bretschneider, *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, part ii. page 3). It is no virtue if it proceed from compulsion, chance, or immoral motives, *e.g.* the accidental coincidence of propensity and duty, as in the case of charity from vanity; the submission to the law from prudence, for the sake of profit resulting from it. If the motive is immoral, the action itself is immoral also, though it is materially in conformity with the law, *e.g.* to speak the truth in order to injure.

(*b*.) The child therefore, before its reason is awakened, has neither virtue nor vice. The same applies to the savages, if the law (*e.g.* not to kill those whom they have overcome) is not yet known to them. So far there is, in either case, no conscience.

(*c*.) This is *morality*, *justitia spiritualis*. Its difference from the "prudence" of the Eudemonists.

(*d*.) Animals and lifeless things have neither virtue nor sin,—do neither right nor wrong. In God also there is no virtue, because Holiness is essential to him.

(*e*.) An insane person has neither merit nor guilt, because he has no power over his thoughts. A man who is carried away by passion is

like the insane, inasmuch as he has lost this power ; but he is unlike him inasmuch as the loss is his own fault, for not having accustomed himself to submit to the law, which he could and ought to have done. Just as little as the *habit* of doing good does not, in particular cases, take away from the merit of the virtuous ; as little is the guilt of the wicked diminished by his having been accustomed to do evil, and his having acted under the influence of this habit.

(f.) The Notion of "morality" is not contained, originally, either in the word *virtue* (*virtus*), nor in the Greek ἀρετή; but it is contained in the word *piety* (*pietas*), as well as in εὐσέβεια.

§ 115.

Virtue therefore, as something moral, does not exist *absolutely*, but *relatively*, *i. e.* it exists only because and as far as God's law is known and followed by rational beings as the rule of their conduct ; or, an action which is in conformity with the Divine law can, *in the sphere of reality*, only be called virtue inasmuch as the author of this action is a moral being, determining himself with Consciousness and according to the Divine law. Absolute virtue is holiness, and exists only in God.

Virtue, as such, is not something absolute, but the relation of human actions to the law. This relation however does not alter the real relation of objective things. Whether the waves carry away a boat from the shore in such a direction as to save a ship wrecked, or whether a man detaches it and steers towards the ship wrecked in order to save her, does not make any difference in the sphere of reality. Nor does it make a difference in the objective world whether the poor are assisted from vanity or from benevolence ; whether an army gains a victory from love of their country or from ambition. The effect and the connection of consequences with the course of the world remain the same. It is only in its relation to the acting subject that the action is virtuous.

§ 116.

Hence it follows that Virtue is not a principle originally existing in the human kind, or in the individual, but is something *growing* (becoming)—

1. As to its *principle* ; the law first appearing as a

rule of prudence, or as a compulsory law under public authority; then as a Divine law of the powerful, or as a law given by God as the absolute Sovereign and Lord of man, and founded on fear and hope; and lastly, as a law absolutely good, claiming obedience for its own sake.

2. As to its *extent*; because virtue appears—

a. With regard to others, first as *justice* and reciprocity of right (in this case it is limited and negative, and confined to avoiding to do others injury); and then as a universal and active duty of *love*, which does not require any reciprocity.

b. With regard to ourselves, first as a prohibition against injuring ourselves; then, as a command to perfect ourselves.

c. With regard to God, first as external worship, in order to propitiate Him; then, as prayer and adoration in spirit, by which virtue itself is raised to the dignity of the highest worship of God. Virtue, or submission to the law, can be perfect only if the Idea of Immortality is added to it; because it is only then that sensual life ceases to be regarded as the highest object, and that the law appears as the universal law for all rational creatures, and more sacred than life.

This marks the degrees of moral progression, which, according to the Scriptures, Revelation itself has followed.

§ 117.

It is not every action at variance with the Divine law that is sin, but only that which a rational being, in possession of Reason and knowing the law, wills and does (see §115) in defiance of it (*a*). If man knows the law to be a Divine law, sin is called *ungodliness* (*b*).

(*a.*) Every action therefore which, though being in material con-

formity with the law, proceeds from motives condemned by the law, is sin; *e. g.* to assist a poor man, in order to induce him, out of gratitude, to bear false witness in our favour. (The other points will be explained in § 144.)

(b.) *Ἀμαρτία*, *peccatum*, fault, do not, properly speaking, imply a moral meaning, as is the case with the words *ἀσέβεια*, *παράβασις*, *impietas*, sin, ungodliness. *Sin* is no Idea, but a Notion; as Idea it would be the Conception of an evil principle: still less can *original sin* be an Idea; it is rather an historical Conception.

§ 118.

Sin therefore (also called *moral Evil*) is nothing *absolute*, but, like physical Evil (§ 80), something *relative*, *i. e.* it only exists because and in so far as God's law is known to, but not observed by, rational beings, although it might have been observed by them; or, bad thoughts and bad actions are, objectively, in the sphere of reality, sins only as far as their author is a moral being, who determines himself with consciousness according to the Divine law.

See § 115. If Sin, as such, were something absolute, and not merely one of the relations between the human will and the law, it would exist *necessarily*, and Evil would have its reason either in the Divine Will or in a specifically evil principle. In this case, also, the relation of the action to the law does not alter the real state of things. Whether a man is struck down by a tree or by a murderer,—whether a town is laid in ashes by an animal which drags the firebrand into a barn, or by the wretched hand of an incendiary,—gives the same objective result, and the connection of the result with the course of the world is the same in both cases. It is only in the relation of the action to the rational agent, who is aware of the law, that the fact becomes sin, and is acknowledged and judged as sin by all moral beings and by God Himself. A case of murder without intention, of arson against the will of the acting subject, either does not exist at all as sin, or exists as a different sin, *e. g.* as heedlessness, passion.

§ 119.

Sin does not originally exist in man, because the impulse of his sensual nature is neither good nor bad, and

because it only arises together with the knowledge of the law (a).

The existence of Sin is owing to this,—

1. That man is not born in the possession of virtue or of freedom,—not in a state of actual perfection, but only with the faculty of attaining it,—a faculty he is bound to cultivate by struggling against his sensual propensities, in order that he may have a personal share in his fulfilment of the law (guilt or merit).

2. That the growth of his sensual nature is a physical necessity, and coincides with the growth of his body (§ 95), while this is not the case with his Reason (§ 96 sq. and § 145), which requires to be trained. Thus man is first governed by sensual propensities. As Reason grows, these are gradually controlled by moral feelings, and consequently virtue does not require a lasting, but a transitory struggle with our sensual nature. Freedom is the termination of the struggle, by the victory of the moral feelings. The time of struggle is the time of Sin, *i. e.* of hesitation between propensity and duty, a hesitation which did not exist before the struggle, and disappears again with the victory or freedom.

(a.) See Rom. iii. 20, v. 13.

§ 120.

As this process of development begins anew with every human individual, and as a sudden transition from the knowledge of the law to perfect obedience is impossible, Sin must be *general*. As the mere training of the Understanding, unassisted by Reason, does not impart the knowledge of the moral law, the Understanding may be vanquished by the propensities, and lead a man, nay a whole age, to a greater degree of wickedness or to the immoral caution of selfishness. But Reason, being the

essence of the mind, can never disappear; and therefore a *continuous increase of evil* cannot, either with respect to the individual or to the whole race, be supposed, unless Reason be destroyed. On the contrary, a continuous *decrease* of sin *may* take place. For whenever an age is approaching to freedom, the younger generation has the benefit of the instruction and example, is early placed on a higher scale of freedom, and its development is secured and quickened by means of educational institutions, laws, etc. Moreover we may assume that as the physical and mental condition both depend on generation (§ 92), the offspring of a moral age is born with a higher capacity for freedom, and with less vivacious sensual propensities.

§ 121.

Sin therefore is not lasting, but transitory (*a*); it does not proceed from the nature of freedom, nor is it given at once or always connected with it (either as possible or as real) (*b*); but it precedes freedom, leads to it, and disappears. It is not a *being*, like freedom, but *something becoming*, a transition to freedom. The Evil therefore which follows Sin is likewise not absolute nor lasting, but leads to freedom and happiness (*c*), and is felt as a punishment only as long as our Conscience declares us guilty: on this account it is considered by the pious as a parental chastisement.

(*a*.) Sin could have a real and independent existence only if there were men or a class of Beings who never grew better, but who, though conscious of the law, were in a state of continual disobedience to it.

(*b*.) This would be the case if freedom were considered, according to common opinion, as not determined by motives or a choice, which would make of freedom a *double-sided* faculty.

(*c*.) If this were not the case, it could not be explained how God can at once punish and love the sinner.

§ 122.

Although man must contribute himself to his moral education, he does not thereby acquire *merit before God*, i. e. a claim to any reward but that which necessarily proceeds from the nature of virtue: he only becomes what he ought to become, and thereby only worthy of his existence and of his rational nature (Luke xvii. 7-10). It is only in consequence of mistaking the Notion of freedom (as a choice according to mere will) that the assumption of the meritoriousness of virtue could arise (*a*), which would at once take away the guilt of sin (*b*).

(*a*.) In this case we should consider it as very meritorious to resign our freedom of choice in order to please God.

(*b*.) If God had given man the choice between obedience and disobedience, and if obedience were a voluntary sacrifice of the right of choosing, then the alternation of obedience and disobedience would be a rule given by God Himself, and therefore not to be punished; and an exclusive disobedience only would make one liable to punishment.

§ 123.

As Sin is not lasting, but a transition to freedom, we do not need to justify God for its existence; it is quite in accordance with the law of development which we find in the whole universe (as far as we know it). The question therefore, why Sin exists among men, is identical with these—why men are born as children, and not as grown-up persons? why they are born as men, with a sensual body, and not at once as angels? in short, why there are periods of development and different stages among Beings? To ask this question would be foolish, as there is nowhere an answer to be found (see §§ 76-79).

§ 124.

Now we can easily answer the question, Whether God

knows the free actions of man beforehand ; which would necessarily have to be answered in the negative if freedom were a faculty of choosing between Good and Evil (*a*). But, according to what we have stated, the question comes to this—

1. Whether God knows that man, born unfree, will only gradually advance towards freedom, and will therefore commit sin at the beginning of his moral education ?

2. Whether He knows the progress each individual will make towards freedom, and how far he will advance in it (*b*) ?

3. Whether God knows how man will act in each particular case,—whether according to rational motives or according to propensity (*c*) ?

Those questions are plainly to be answered in the affirmative.

(*a*.) It has been answered in the negative by Cicero, *De Divinat.* ii. cap. 5-7 ; Socin., *Prælect. Theol.* cap. 8-18. If freedom were the faculty of choosing undeterminable by reasons, God could not infallibly know beforehand what would be the result of the choice ; for this is only possible when the will is in every case necessarily determined by reasons, and accordingly no choice is possible. Therefore if choice be admitted, either prescience or freedom must be denied.

(*b*.) This progress rests on two principles :—

1. On the whole natural constitution of man and on his mental power ; and

2. On the influence of the external objects on man (education, moral condition of the age, company, situation, events).

God, as Creator and Governor of the World, knows both, and consequently their result also.

(*c*.) It is an error to deduce single actions from single resolutions or from undetermined acts of choice by our will. They are rather results of our moral condition in general, as it happens to exist at certain periods of our life ; or the result of the general relation between our moral feelings and propensities at a certain period, and of the influence of the external world connected with that relation. The guilt or merit in particular actions arises from the guilt or merit we have in that ge-

neral relation (see § 114, *e*). The morality of our actions therefore is the morality of our moral condition in general, applied to the particular manifestations of our will. (In a metaphysical respect, the question of God's prescience is of no importance, as God's knowledge is not dependent on time: see § 66.)

§ 125.

Freedom, even if a false meaning be given to the word (*a*), cannot be in contradiction with a Divine government of the world, by which all is necessarily determined. For if freedom consists in this, that man determines himself according to God's law or will alone, setting aside every other motive, and if sin is nothing but a temporary, transitory companion of the development towards freedom,—if virtue and sin are only relative notions,—then the events occurring in the moral, are just as much determined by the will of God as the events occurring in the physical, world. The human will is unable to give to the course of the world a direction contrary to the will of God, because man has the control of his actions but not of their consequences, the latter being modified by the development of the whole; and this explains also how sin is brought into harmony with the Divine will by its consequences being turned in the proper direction. (Crucifixion of Christ by the Sanhedrim and Pilate.)

(*a*.) One might think that freedom (as the faculty of deciding for the one or the other course,—the faculty of acting or not acting) would establish, by this choice, a causality on which God could have no determining influence, and which therefore would render his prescience uncertain. But such a causality would be restrained within certain limits; and as it would determine the action, but not its consequences, God would be able to bring its objective result into harmony with His predestination, by giving the proper direction to the consequences.

3. *The Religious Community.*

(The Church.)

§ 126.

As all men possess the same Reason and the same aptitude for religion, and therefore also the same religious destination, religion can and ought to be common to all men. Those in whom the religious ideas have arrived at full consciousness and have become the ruling principle, constitute the *Kingdom of God*, i. e. a community which feels itself totally dependent on God and acknowledges the absolute authority of His law. The life and aim of this community must be the fulfilment of the law of God; for this is what renders it holy, and enables it to go beyond the bounds of Time and Space, and to embrace all Beings in the Universe who have arrived at the same Knowledge.

§ 127.

As the inward feelings manifest themselves outwardly, the religious community will have something external in common,—worship and virtuous life; and as there is always an attraction between kindred objects, those religious men who are connected by time and space will assemble to give joint utterance to their religious sentiments, and will gradually form a public religious community representing externally the idea of the kingdom of God. (Church.)

§ 128.

This religious community is moreover *necessary*, if religious ideas are to be universally spread and are to form the rule of life. For as they generally proceed from single individuals, taught or inspired by God, as from historical centres (§ 145), it is necessary—

1. That they should be promulgated as a *doctrine* (common belief), and thereby, if possible, tendered to the reason of every one.

2. That they should be fostered in our Consciousness, so as to become the rule of our actions, or to beget a religious *life*.

Thus the object of the religious community is given. But as the general medium of mental communication is language and external representation, *ministry* and *worship* are required.

§ 129.

In order to found and preserve both, the members of the community must assemble so as to form an *external* society, which is concerned in nothing else but the foundation and preservation of these two institutions, and which cannot have any control over the belief and the religious life, both being something internal. (*Liberty of Conscience*.)

§ 130.

The end of the *Ministry* is, first, to enlighten, by enlightening to amend, and, by means of both, to produce peace and comfort (*a*). As by its nature it has no connection with the government of the religious community, so it is independent of the same in the performance of its duty, listening to none but the spirit of truth. (*Liberty in teaching*.)

(*a*.) Any virtue or consolation that does not proceed from the knowledge of truth, or is not in accordance with it, is false and superstitious.

§ 131.

Worship is partly an expression of the perception of truth and of the influence of religious ideas (devotion, prayer, singing); partly a material representation of the

Ideal, for the purpose of vivifying the religious Ideas in the human mind (festivals, ceremonies); it can therefore be established only by common agreement (*a*), and can have no other object but to produce a moral effect on the individual, and not (as the Roman worship does) to act supernaturally in the world.

(*a*.) Right of the Church to fix its own Liturgy.

C. THEORETICO-PRACTICAL IDEA OF THE RELIGIOUS BEING, OR OF IMMORTALITY.

§ 132.

As there is a reality corresponding to all religious ideas (§ 47), we must admit that there is a life of perfection corresponding to the rational and religious life, which in these earthly relations is always imperfect,—a life consisting in the closest approximation to absolute Reason, or in a continually progressing duration of our mind, preserving its consciousness (*a*),—the immortality of the Soul (*b*). This is the necessary consequence of the considerations on Religion developed in the preceding sections.

(*a*.) It is on Consciousness that personality rests (§ 88). If the mind were to return to God or to the universe (Pantheism), consciousness being dissolved, future life would be of as little value to us, and as unimportant to our destination, as if a higher but totally different consciousness were bestowed upon us. In both cases the “Self” would be destroyed.

(*b*.) *Immortality* (*ἀθάνασία, immortalitas*) means only that the death (*θάνατος, mors*) of the body is not the termination of the spiritual life also; but it does not express that the mind is by its essence simple and indivisible, and consequently cannot be dissolved (*ἀφθαρσία, incorruptibilitas*). The most interesting writings on this doctrine are, Moses Mendelssohn, ‘Phædon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele;’ Ch. F. Sintenis, ‘Elpizon, oder über meine Fortdauer im Tode;’ Jean Paul Richter, ‘Das Campanerthal.’ Conf. Tiedgen,

‘Urania;’ Bretschneider, ‘Ueber Tod, Auferstehung und Unsterblichkeit’ (Sermons). On the history of the belief in Immortality see Flügge, ‘Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit, Auferstehung, Gericht und Vergeltung.’

§ 133.

Unless we believe in the Immortality of the Soul, we cannot believe in the Reality of the Absolute Being, whose image we are. For it would not be in accordance with God’s *Wisdom* that He should have ends in view which He does not accomplish, or that He should use nugatory means. He cannot therefore have given man faculties for a destination unattainable without Immortality. And, according to His *Goodness*, we must assume that He will gratify the longing for Immortality, inherent to the human mind, and will not deprive the soul of an existence for which it is constituted. According to His *Holiness*, it cannot be supposed that he would permit a rational and moral Being, an image of Himself, having an absolute value, to be annihilated. According to His *Justice*, we must expect that in a future life God will compensate the imperfection of requital we see in the present existence.

§ 134.

The human mind, which is essentially different from the body (*a*), cannot share its fate in death. Every earthly creature reaches its full development—its destination,—in the course of its earthly Existence; so does the human body. But the intellectual, moral, and æsthetical education of the Soul is, on account of the nature of the present existence (*b*), not accomplished; and does not therefore fulfil its destination, viz. Rationality, which is the condition of moral progress (*c*). Now as we see all classes of earthly creatures completely fulfil

their destination, we must conclude that to the human mind also, the noblest we know, the faculty is given to reach its destination—immortality (*d*).

(*a*.) See § 90. It is not from the body that Reason can be derived,—Reason, which apprehends the Ideal and all that is above the sensible perception,—Reason, the law of which is opposed to the propensities of the flesh. It is not this planet that can instil into our mind the desire of perfection and immortality. The demonstration of the immortality of the Soul or of its indissolubility by physical powers, drawn from its Immateriality or Indivisibility, has no value whatever. Such indivisibility of the Substance is not a religious Idea, but rather a physical notion belonging to Ontology.

(*b*.) *Ars longa, vita brevis*. Our life is not sufficiently long to *develope*, far less to *exhaust*, our spiritual faculties. When the spiritual life is in its full growth, the decay of the body begins. Could our mind explore other Worlds, there would be no limit to its development. Sleep, sickness, working for our sustenance, shorten still more the time of our spiritual culture.

(*c*.) Perhaps it will be said that if the spiritual faculties cannot be fully developed in the Individual, they may attain their full growth in the Kind. But, being limited by the body, the development must be imperfect in the whole Kind also. Man, a rational being, cannot be a means, but an end. If the Individual has a mere transitory existence, we cannot find any reason for the development of the Kind. Among animals and plants, the individuals, if not intentionally prevented, come to maturity. Among men there is not one who actually becomes what he might be. It is a law of nature that every being should attain its end; and this law will be still more absolute if we derive Nature from God.

§ 135.

The Moral Law reveals itself to our Consciousness as claiming implicit obedience; that is to say, as a law rising above the sensual life, and demanding that we should sacrifice all pleasurable feelings, and even the sensual life itself, to duty (*a*). This demand would be absurd and contradictory if the sensual life constituted the whole existence of man, because in this case the preservation of life would be the highest good and law. But

from the existence of the demand follows the possibility of meeting it; and as this cannot be accomplished without the Soul being immortal, Immortality must be admitted (*b*).

(*a*.) *E. g.* The soldier, the physician, the magistrate; the virtuous man, if he cannot save his life except by vice.

(*b*.) Kant founded his demonstration on this, That Reason, in requiring us to aim at the highest good, would demand something impossible and contradictory if Immortality did not exist; that Reason however cannot contradict itself (see Kant's '*Kritik der practischen Vernunft*,' p. 219 *sq.*). Without the Immortality of the soul, the same contradiction would be found in the Idea of a Deity (see § 133). Strictly speaking, from the propositions of this paragraph, we cannot derive an eternal duration of the soul, but only the necessity of a second life. The moral demonstration of Immortality may already be found in Lactant. *Instit. Div. lib. vii. cap. 9.*

§ 136.

As there are Realities corresponding to all Ideas, we must admit the existence of a spiritual kingdom of God, or of a community of rational beings, to which we belong by our spiritual nature, but from which we are excluded by our body. The dissolution of the latter cannot but produce a more intimate connection with that kingdom, which could not be conceived without the identity of Consciousness. The concretion of bodily elements into an individual form has only a relative and limited end. As soon as this end is attained, the form disappears, and the matter returns to the whole, to be used for similar purposes. But the formation of the *spiritual* principle into Individuality (the essence of which is Self-Consciousness) has an absolute value and an infinite object; therefore this Individuality does not cease, but, according to the law of development, continues advancing in the Knowledge of the Universe, as the growing Kingdom of God.

§ 137.

The belief in Immortality is confirmed—1. By the aspect of the universe, which displays a vast number of arenas for the activity of Beings who are to be educated to freedom, showing a *physical* connection in the world, that renders the existence of a *spiritual* one highly probable, and the knowledge of which, without Immortality, would be a useless labour. 2. By analogous phenomena in Nature,—larvæ, caterpillars, butterflies,—which show the possibility, at least, of a metamorphosis of beings, not to speak of the coming of man himself to this earthly existence. 3. By the fact that all nations, which have attained to a certain degree of civilization, possess that belief.—What has been said on the apparition of deceased persons, being a practical demonstration of Immortality, is a delusion (*a*).

(*a*.) See the following sections. The Resurrection of Christ has no relation to this question, being no apparition of a *spirit*.

§ 138.

Two principal objections have been directed against the belief in Immortality:—

1. That the dead never give any sign of the continuance of their spiritual existence. To this it may be answered—that such a *physical* demonstration of a *spiritual* existence is impossible; that, were it possible, we have no criterion by which to judge of the identity of the apparition with the spirit of the deceased; that such an apparition would be useless for our belief; and, even supposing it to have an influence on our belief, it would be injurious to our peace and virtue, and finally, incompatible with the condition of perfect spirits (Luke xvi. 19–31).

§ 139.

2. It has been objected that there is no perceptible difference between the death of man and that of animals (*a*); that, without Sensibility, it would be impossible for our mind to perceive the physical world and to act upon it (*b*); and that, from the close connection between the body and the soul (*c*), it is highly probable that the latter will be extinguished in death.

(*a*.) If we take both as external phenomena, there is no difference; but Immortality does not relate to man as a material phenomenon. Besides, there are some differences. The animal has become what it possibly could become, man has not; the one has no faculties pointing to a second life, the other has; the one dies without being conscious of its death and without any desire, both are observed in a dying man; the one has neither guilt nor merit, in man virtue remains unrewarded, vice unpunished.

(*b*.) This goes too far, and cannot be demonstrated.

(*c*.) The connection, it is true, is a very close one (§ 91); but the identity of their essence does not follow therefrom. There exists a similarly close connection between the foetus and the mother. Could not the soul receive a higher *organ* immediately after death? And could not this organ be developed out of the body, and form a distinct and independent existence? Or could not new senses, now latent, be developed, like the senses of the foetus in the mother's womb?

§ 140.

As to the *condition* of the future Existence, Reason can only say, that it will be freed from the bounds of the earthly life, dependent as it is on a mortal body (*a*), and that it will consist in a greater development of Reason (*b*), and in a higher activity (*c*).

(*a*.) Therefore no sickness, no hunger, no poverty, no death, no being bound to the same place, but the reverse of it, the conditions of which however we are unable to determine.

(*b*.) Consciousness and Activity form the Notion of Existence. Rational Consciousness, *i. e.* higher perception of what is true and good, and hereby higher freedom.

(*c*.) Internal as well as external activity. More than this cannot

be demonstrated with regard to this point ; anything that goes beyond this will be mere fancy, as may be found in Lavater's ' *Ausichten in die Ewigkeit* ' (Zürich, 1782).

§ 141.

The Goodness of God, the identity of the destination and culture of individuals (*a*), and the Idea of a kingdom of God, speak in favour of the hope that the dead will see each other again in the state of perfection, *i. e.* that they will recognize each other, and enter anew into mutual communication. This is an expectation, on the physical or moral possibility of which no doubt can be raised (*b*).

(*a.*) An extension of the mental culture is impossible in a state of seclusion. Longing for intercourse with beloved persons. Happiness without sympathy.

(*b.*) The difference in the mental development of various individuals appears wide only when compared with the shortness of life.

§ 142.

The transition to another life is not a reward deserved by man's virtue, but it is a gift of God (*a*). From the Idea of a moral requital and from the Notions of Freedom and Sin, it follows that this new state cannot be the same for all individuals, but must be different (*b*) according to their moral condition. Those who have not attended here to their moral education cannot experience happy consequences from this neglect—they must be punished. *Eternal* punishment however is at variance with the Goodness, Justice, Omnipotence, and Wisdom of God, as well (*c*) as with the nature of Sin (*d*).

(*a.*) In living according to the Will of God we only pay Him our thanks for granting us this earthly existence (see § 122).

(*b.*) God will love him who has become free, more than the Unfree ;

the former being similar to Him. Among the conditions of happiness, *subjective receptivity* for it is one, and this is not to be found in a sinful heart, which cannot become happy (feel itself happy) even in *this* world.

(c.) It cannot be the will of God that temporal trespasses should be visited by eternal punishment, for it would be inconsistent with his Goodness and Justice; nor would it be in accordance with His Wisdom and Power to see frustrated his purposes with regard to men. A continual increase of sin is impossible, and would lead to a total destruction of Reason.

(d.) Sin is not lasting, is nothing absolute; therefore punishment cannot be lasting either (§ 119).

§ 143.

The belief in Immortality makes the destination of this life (§§ 91 *sq.*) appear as a preparatory one for the future, or as an education; and this belief leads us to consider the law of duty as a universal law, extending beyond the limits of the earthly life, and bearing an absolute validity which is not conditioned by the present existence.

PART III.

ON THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE TO FREEDOM BY GOD, OR ON DIVINE REVELATION.

I. ON DIVINE ENLIGHTENMENT IN GENERAL.

§ 144.

The question, whether the human Reason attains to religious ideas and moral freedom by itself and without a higher instruction, or whether external assistance and higher instruction are required, is one which cannot be decided by our Consciousness. For as such knowledge has now become the property of mankind, and is tendered to all men by an early instruction, there is not one mind among the civilized nations which grows up without feeling the influence of verbal and written instruction.

§ 145.

Experience however seems to show that the human Reason has not been developed without external assistance, for,

1. In those individuals who, amidst civilized nations, grow up without education, and in savages who have no intercourse with civilized nations, the sensual nature

is fully developed, the Understanding to some degree,—both from their inward power,—but Reason is not developed at all (*a*).

2. Those nations which have preceded others in the culture of Reason have now been stationary or retrograde for some centuries. This would be impossible if Reason, like our sensual nature or like the germ of a plant, were able to grow by its own power (*b*).

3. All intellectual and moral progress has been produced by extraordinary men or circumstances (*c*).

4. All rational culture seems to be propagated by instruction, and when this fails, to decline,—a fact which leads us back to a first cause, from which this instruction was imparted to the human mind (*d*). Moreover Reason could not be considered as a free-acting and creative mental faculty, if its development and growth, like that of our sensual nature, were necessarily dependent on our physical development (*e*).

(*a*.) Example of children who have been neglected; of people who have grown up without instruction; savage nations of America, in the South Sea, in New Holland. A development of the Understanding can only take place with regard to Judgment and Reasoning based on external experience. Therefore they have perhaps a Fetish, but no God; an isle of the dead, but no Immortality; propensities, but no morality; *e. g.* love of children, as a natural propensity only (which animals have also), but not proceeding from the idea of duty and human dignity; their patriotism is like the attachment of a pigeon to its house, and does not proceed from the Idea of Fatherland. How many thousands of years may have passed away since the islands of the South Sea, New Holland, and the Interior of Africa have been peopled, without any advance having been made in the culture of Reason?

(*b*.) *E. g.* The Chinese, Indians, Russians in former times, Turks.

(*c*.) Namely as far as historical accounts go. History cannot lead us back to the starting-point of the culture of Reason, because history itself begins later than this. Abraham, Moses, Fohi, Confucius, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, etc. The invention of letters, of linen-paper, of the art of printing, etc.

(d.) The propagation of intellectual culture was the work of schools, or of verbal and written instruction, by which the spirit of great men was transmitted to others.

(e.) This would be the case if Reason were, as many think, only an organ for the perception of the Supernatural, an opinion contradicted by all the facts here quoted.

§ 146.

It does not follow from it that the awaking and training of Reason cannot take place without the operation of an external Causality ; for the data of history state only what has occurred, but neither what is possible nor what is necessary. Still we see that such instruction is *desirable*, and not at all superfluous to mankind (a). But as the highest aim of the culture of Reason is the greatest perfection and freedom, this education cannot proceed from the external, but from the supernatural world,—it must emanate from the most perfect Reason.

(a.) This supposition is supported by the numerous aberrations and follies into which man has in all ages been led by religion. Fetishism, human victims, superstition, unnatural torments, etc.

§ 147.

This operation of God, in rousing and educating the human Reason, is called *Enlightenment*, or, commonly, *Revelation* (a), and can be considered in two different ways, as *Manifestation* or *Inspiration* ; namely,—

1. God can endow single individuals with a considerably greater intellectual power than others ; so that their mind, partly by its own activity, partly awakened by extraordinary situations, circumstances, and events, which exercise an enlightening influence, is raised to the knowledge of religious ideas, and makes of them the teachers of their time and of their people. Such an enlightenment has taken place in all ages among many nations (b).

(a.) Revelation, ἀποκάλυψις, *revelatio*,—generally, disclosure of what is secret, hidden, unknown ;—better, Enlightenment.

(b.) To these belong the *wise men*, who *forethink* for ages and nations, and who show them the path of truth, and the founders of the religions of all nations, especially in ancient times (except those who, like Mohammed, have made up a new religious system out of previously existing elements). In these cases man *seeks* God, Acts xvii. 27 : Ζητεῖν τὸν Κύριον. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 66, “Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit.” The Ancients derived Art, as something Ideal, from Divine Inspiration. Lucian, Incyn. : Αὐτὰ τῶν τέχνων ἔργα δῶρα τῶν θεῶν ἐστί. 2 Mos. xxxv. 30 sq., xxxvi. 1 sq.

§ 148.

2. God, being the omnipotent Creator of men, can enlighten them and raise their minds to the knowledge of the ideal world (Inspiration) (a), and thus enable them to become the teachers and educators of mankind.

Inspiration is, by its nature, superior to Revelation, because it is not a discursive knowledge, as the latter is, and becomes the criterion by which Revelation itself is judged, and according to which we must separate from religion the false elements which the Understanding has intermingled with it.

(a.) The expression *inspiratio* (ἐμπνεῖν, θεοπνευστία, breath of God) is a symbol of spiritual action. That God *speaks* to man (ῥῆμα, λόγος Θεοῦ) is a similar symbol. The difference between instruction by men and inspiration by God is not to be found in the thing itself, but in the means ; because the former is given by means of words, the latter without words.

§ 149.

God, being the Almighty and a pure Spirit (a), can illuminate the human mind, although it is quite as incomprehensible to us how this may be accomplished as how the immediate activity of our mind takes place (b). Human Reason can, no doubt, *receive* such impressions ; for the objection, that the connection of the laws of thought would be destroyed by them, is of no value (c).

(a.) See § 85. God would have less power than the intermediate causes which act upon our mind, were He not able to exercise an immediate action on it; nor could he be the Creator of the mind.

(b.) How, *e. g.*, the will produces a movement of the body, sound excites a representation in the soul, etc.

(c.) Reason is not a machine; the laws of Understanding are mere forms without any contents, and can be filled up in very different ways without being destroyed. There is, it is true, a connection between the mental conceptions; but it is not a necessary one, and may be interrupted either by the mind itself or by external influence. Example of a teacher who instructs children; of a person who puts aside a series of ideas, and takes it up again at another period.

§ 150.

We may also assume that God wishes to enlighten the human mind, as the end of this operation. The training of man to freedom is in close connection with His holiness, and in accordance with His goodness and wisdom (a).

(a.) It has been objected that God could have created men in such a way as not to want His assistance. This objection is arrogant and unbecoming; it rests moreover on a supposition which is altogether unfounded, viz. that the spiritual world, like the germ of a plant, is ruled in its developments by necessity,—a thing which is not only contradicted by experience (§ 145), but would exclude God from all connection with the spiritual world.

§ 151.

On the other hand, it does not seem possible that he who is inspired can be immediately, without the help of reflection, conscious of the divine origin of the inspiration; for the Idea only, and not its cause, is apprehended by our consciousness. The agency of God in the moral world therefore will be just as little perceived by us as in the physical; this agency will always appear as a natural one.

(a.) The so-called *γνωρίσματα* of Revelation, started by the ancient theologians, are of no avail. Those only can be true which are

derived from the intrinsic value of the truth coming within the reach of our knowledge (see Bretschneider's 'Handbuch der Dogmatik,' 2nd part, 112). It is quite a delusion, which can only lead to Fanaticism, to see, as Mystics do, a divine operation in the sudden and unexpected apprehension of truth, or in the extraordinary feelings with which this apprehension is attended.

§ 152.

The Divine instruction can only find the proof of its Divine origin in its own nature, and in its relation to human Reason. On the one hand—positive side—it must irresistibly act upon our Consciousness by its ideal perfection, and by its accordance with the laws of Reason; and on the other—negative side—it should not contain anything inconceivable to our Reason and contradictory to its laws (*a*). The religious Ideas inherent to our Reason (§ 54) are the only principles possessing this intrinsic test; therefore whatever we may find in a positive revelation, or whatever may have been added to it by human invention, is to be judged agreeably to these religious ideas as its criterion (*b*). But on the other hand, it would be absurd not to admit any revealed doctrine unless it be established by demonstration founded upon experience, or the Understanding. For Revelation is given neither for the Senses nor for the Understanding, but for Reason, in which it has to start, or to prepare the disclosure of new truths. Revelation therefore can never be *against* Reason, though it may contain points which are beyond the reach of Reason, *i. e.* it may teach doctrines the nature, efficacy, and connection of which are not clearly perceived by Reason (*c*).

(*a*.) That which is against the laws of Reason is for us an impossible conception (*i. e.* nothing): *e. g.* God being holy, and still acting passionately. That many people believe things which are contradictory to each other is no objection to what we have said. Either they do not know the laws of Reason, or do not know the question; and in both cases they are not aware of the contradiction, or they omit, inten-

tionally, one of the contradictory characters of their conceptions. Misused passages of Scripture, 1 Cor. ii. 14; 2 Cor. x. 5; Col. ii. 8; Eph. ii. 3.

(b.) This right is acknowledged by Christianity in its warnings against false Revelation (Matt. xxiv. 4; Luke xxi. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 4; conf. Jer. xiv. 13, vi. 13); conf. § 283. Moses (Deut. xiii. 1-3) considers the Idea of God as the criterion for true prophets; Jesus and Paul (Matt. vii. 15-20; Rom. ii. 14, 15) refer to the Idea of Freedom and Divine law. This does not include too great a concession to Reason, because the Ideas are nothing arbitrary, but are given by God. In testing therefore an historical revelation by these Ideas, we only compare Divine with Divine,—something which is already acknowledged to be Divine with something the Divine origin of which is to be ascertained.

(c.) *E.g.* The conception of a creation by God, of an agency of God, His existence without Space and Time, His Government of the World, etc. These doctrines are called *Mysteries*; and, strictly speaking, all Religion, and man himself, as having Religion, are Mysteries.

§ 153.

Miracles (a), *i. e.* those phenomena in the external world which cannot be derived from a physical cause, but must be derived from God, and *Prophecies* (b), *i. e.* positive, distinct predictions of future and contingent events, can never be the main demonstrations of inspiration, but accessory and subsidiary arguments required only at the *introduction* of a revelation, till Reason is sufficiently trained by it to understand and feel the inner truth of the Divine word (see note f). For, on the one hand, there will be always some uncertainty, in more than one respect, as to their truth (c); on the other, miracles and prophecies cannot give a direct demonstration of a doctrine (d); and it is the truth, otherwise proved, of the doctrine in behalf of which they are performed, that affords the proper authority for their having been produced by a supernatural operation (e). Hence Luther and the older theologians attached no importance to such demonstrations (f).

(a.) Miracles, as well those which the interpreter of the Divine revelation performs, as those which are performed on him.

(b.) Prophecies, either told by the interpreter of the Revelation or fulfilled in him. (Difference from presage, prediction and fortune-telling, conjecture.)

(c.) The supernatural cause itself can never fall under the senses, we only infer it. The certainty of the inference however will rest on the supposition that we know all the laws and forces of Nature, which really is not the case. There always remains the possibility of a law of Nature still unknown to us, or of an undiscovered natural force (new discovery of Galvanism, etc.). If God himself would declare that a miracle has been performed by Him, this declaration, being a miracle again, would require the same demonstration. Besides, much depends on the trustworthiness and impartiality of the reporters, especially if they were not eye-witnesses. The whole antiquity is full of reports of miracles; they are still admitted by the Catholic Church. The same may be said of Prophecies.

(d.) The demonstration does not go further than to prove that God wrought the miracle; from which the inference is drawn that God would not have done so had the interpreter of the Divine revelation not spoken the truth. That the interpreter is a virtuous man, and that he teaches the truth, is what must be first ascertained, otherwise a miracle will have to be considered as an imposture. (Miracles were also performed by others: Matt. xii. 27; John xiv. 12; there are also *false* miracles: Matt. vii. 22, xxiv. 24 sq.; 2 Thess. ii. 9; Gal. i. 8; Deut. xiii. 2 sq.). The same may be said with regard to Prophecies. Here the demonstration, that originally the Prophecies were really declared with precision, and that their fulfilment is not accidental, nay, why man himself should not sometimes have a clear insight into the future, is particularly difficult.

(e.) Prophecies and Miracles, in support of that which Reason is obliged to consider as false and contradictory, can never be of Divine origin.

(f.) Luther says (in his 'Kirchenpostille, Himmelfahrt Christi'), "Those visible works are (as Paul says, 1 Cor. xiv.) signs only for the ignorant, unbelieving mass, and for the sake of such as are still to be converted; but we, who know and believe in the Gospel, wherefore should we want them? For the heathen, Christ had to give some external signs which they might see with their eyes and hold with their hands; but Christians must have much higher, heavenly signs, compared with which the former are but earthly ones. Therefore we shall not wonder that they have now ceased, the Gospel being proclaimed everywhere amongst those who did not know of God before, and whom he had to convert by external miracles, thrown out to them like apples and pears to children."

§ 154.

As the education of man for moral freedom was the chief end of his creation as a rational being, and as Reason requires instruction for its development (§ 145), it may be expected, nay it follows from God's wisdom and goodness, that the Divine enlightenment began with the beginning of the human kind. And as Reason follows the law of development, not only this instruction must have had a commencement, but must be gradually progressing, being only then complete when the doctrines of God, of Freedom, of Divine Law, and Immortality will be fully developed ; because then only every condition of moral freedom will be realized (*a*).

(*a*.) According to the Scripture, the Divine instruction began with the human kind, was continued through all ages, and has been fulfilled in its progress by Jesus Christ ; for it was by him that the religious Ideas were fully developed, especially the last Idea, that of Immortality. It is in the intrinsic truth of this development that we find the most certain demonstration, that the Holy Scripture contains the history of the Divine Revelation, or is the code of this Revelation.

II. ON THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, BEING THE CODE OF THE DOCTRINES AND HISTORY OF REVELATION.

§ 155.

The Holy Scriptures (*a*) may be viewed under two aspects :—1. The historical aspect, as the archives of the ancient Jewish and of the Christian religion ; and 2. The religious aspect, as having been written by divinely enlightened men, and as containing the authentic history and doctrine of Divine Revelation.

(*a*.) Ἡ γραφή, ἡ ἀγία γραφή, τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, τὰ βιβλία. The super-

scriptions, subscriptions, and division into chapters, and verses were not made by the writers themselves.

§ 156.

The Holy Scriptures consist of compositions belonging to different times (*a*) and various writers, and exhibit a great diversity of intellectual culture, of style and opinion, which, in using them, must be taken into account. They are divided into the *Old Testament* (*b*), which contains the archives of the Jewish religion, B.C.; and the *New Testament*, which contains those of the Christian religion. The division of the whole Bible into chapters and verses dates from the thirteenth century, and is often defective (*c*).

(*a*.) Moses lived B.C. 1500; and therefore if the latest book in the New Testament was written towards the end of the first century, the Bible embraces a period of 1600 years.

(*b*.) *Testamentum*, διαθήκη, ԴԴԳ. Language, contents, tendency, and religious culture, distinguish the two Testaments markedly from each other.

(*c*.) See § 182. The first printed Bible appeared at Mayence, in 1462; and the first complete edition of Luther's translation, in 1534.

1. *The Old Testament.*

§ 157.

The Old Testament is usually divided into three parts,—the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa (*a*). According to their contents, the books of the Old Testament may be divided into legal, historical, poetical, and philosophical compositions. The Rabbins and Talmudists say that these writings were collected by Ezra after the Captivity, with the aid, as is rather improbably pretended, of the Synagoga Magna, a College of one hundred and twenty learned men. According to 2 Macc. ii. 13, the collection was enlarged by Nehemiah; still later

the Hagiographa were added (*b*); and the whole may have been completed about the close of the persecutions by the Syrian Kings (*c*). Later writings were not received into this sacred collection, but several of them (*d*) were appended to the Greek translation of the Old Testament, which was made about fifty years after the death of Alexander the Great, and, by means of this translation, were admitted, under the name of *Apocryphal writings* (*e*), into the Christian Church and into our German Bibles.

(*a*.) This division is ancient, being found in Josephus, Philo, the New Testament (Luke xxiv. 44), and in Jesus Sirach (Prolog. 1). Sometimes, as in Matt. v. 17, the division is twofold, *νόμος καὶ προφηταί*. Besides the strictly prophetical books, those of Joshua, Samuel, and the Kings were also included under the designation of prophetical books, because they were understood to have been written by Prophets. Hagiographa, *ספרים קדש* is a title of still later origin: in Luke xxiv. 44 they are called *ψαλμοί*, in Sirach and Josephus *τὰ ἄλλα*. They contain the writings which were either the latest collected, as the Psalms and Job; or the latest composed, as Ezra, Nehemiah, the Chronicles, Daniel, and the writings of Solomon.

(*b*.) *Τὰ περὶ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ προφητῶν καὶ τὰ τοῦ Δαυὶδ, καὶ ἐπιστολάς βασιλέων* (the Persian) *περὶ ἀναθημάτων*, are stated to be the subjects of the collection.

(*c*.) The time cannot be exactly determined; perhaps 150 B.C.

(*d*.) The Maccabees, the third book of Ezra, Tobit, Wisdom, Sirach, Baruch, and parts of Esther (the Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament).

(*e*.) The word *apocryphal* first arose in the Christian church, and is opposed to *canonical*. Luther appended the apocryphal writings to his German translation, because they are "useful to be read." The books of Jesus Sirach and Wisdom are valuable for their morality, and the second book of Maccabees for its historical contents.

§ 158.

With the exception of a few passages in Chaldee, the language in which the Old Testament was written is the Hebrew (*a*), one of the most ancient languages known,

cognate with the Phœnician, from which its alphabet was borrowed (*b*), and one of the oldest daughters of the oriental mother-tongue. Its golden age was under, and immediately after, Solomon; about the time of the Captivity it degenerated, and under the Maccabees it ceased to be spoken by the people,—a new dialect, called the Aramean, having been formed under the influence of the Chaldee and the Syriac, and became the popular language (*c*).

(*a*.) The name *Hebrew* is usually derived from עִבְרִי, *qui transiit*, and is supposed to have been given to Abraham after he had crossed the Euphrates.

(*b*.) The Phœnician alphabet, which was preserved in the written characters of the Samaritans, had sixteen letters. Ezra transcribed the ancient manuscripts which he collected (and others followed his example) into the more recent Chaldaic rectangular character, which we still possess, and which has the following six additional letters, כ, ס, ע, ו, י, ד. The vowels, points, and accents are, at least for the most part, of later origin.

(*c*.) So also there is an ancient (Koran) and a modern Arabic, an ancient and a modern German, and a sacred language (Sanscrit). Chief work: 'History of the Hebrew Language and Character,' by Will. Gesenius (Leipzig, 1815, 8vo.).

(*a*.) *The Historical Books.*

§ 159.

Some of the writers of the Old Testament histories are altogether unknown (*a*); probably they were priests who, being the depositaries of knowledge and acquainted with the art of writing, wrote down the most important events of their times, and laid up these records in the Temple. The Old Testament histories contain partly still more ancient written narratives, sometimes entire and sometimes in extracts, and partly oral traditions, which were combined into one whole: they are all characterized by great simplicity (*b*), but particularly by the theocratical

principle, according to which God is regarded as the real though invisible King of the people, and the Interpreters (prophets) (*c*) as his representatives. On this principle, all political arrangements and events were referred to God as their author (*d*).

(*a*.) The titles of the books were assigned at a later period, and, with the exception of Moses, Ezra, and Nehemiah, are indicative, not of the authors, but of the contents.

(*b*.) The simplicity of these histories appears in the absence of all commentary on the events recorded, in their brevity, in the artlessness both of the style and the connection, and in the tone which pervades them. (Poverty of abstract terms, and abundance of symbolical expressions.)

(*c*.) מִשְׁנֵה, from מִשְׁנֵה, to interpret or expound; hence Joshua, the successor of Moses, was also a prophet. There arose afterwards a special prophetic order.

(*d*.) Hence the political command to root out the Canaanites was God's command; political ordinances were his statutes; every national misfortune his punishment; obedience to the Mosaic law was the chief means of procuring his favour; "the people were His people, and He was their God. (Meritoriousness of the external worship of God in the Temple, according to the theocratic law.)

§ 160.

The Mosaic writings (*a*) contain the history of the primitive ages of mankind, the history of the Patriarchs and the origin of the Israelitish Nation, their departure from Egypt, their march to Canaan, and the Mosaic legislation (*b*). In particular, the First Book of Moses contains the oldest recorded information regarding the first ages of the world and the beginning of all civilization (*c*). The Pentateuch comprises many single compositions (*d*) written by Moses himself, and deposited in the Ark of the Covenant, but also several pieces (*e*) written after the time of Moses, and deposited in the same place, which have been arranged in their present form by a later writer (probably in David's time).

(a.) Together, Πεντατεῦχος, *volumen quinque librorum*; the single books, in the Alexandrine translation, bear the names Γένεσις, Ἔξοδος, Λευιτικός, Ἀριθμοί (*Numeri*), and Δευτερονόμιον. The Hebrews call them חומשי, and designate the separate Books according to the first word of each.

(b.) *Genesis*: history of the origin of all things, of the first men, and the fathers of the Israelitish nation till the time of Joseph, B.C. 1750. *Exodus* gives an account of the Israelites in Egypt, the birth of Moses, the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, and the commencement of the legislation of Moses. Only parts of this Book are from the hand of Moses; the remainder was written at a later period from oral tradition. *Leviticus*: the principal contents of this Book are laws concerning the priests, and those services which belonged to their functions. *Numbers*: the numbering of the people, genealogical tables, religious and civil laws. *Deuteronomy* gives a concise repetition of the laws, exhortations of Moses, and his farewell to the people.

(c.) Cosmogony, Geogony, Paradise, the Deluge, the peopling of the earth. The Book of Genesis nowhere claims for itself the authorship of Moses. It contains primeval compositions by several writers (ch. i., ii. 4 *sq.*, vi. 1-7 and 11-24). The great simplicity of its statements, and of the idea which it gives of God, is a proof of its high antiquity.

(d.) *E.g.* Exod. xvii. 14, xxiv. 14 *sq.*; Kings xxxiv. 27; Numb. xxxiii. 2; Deut. xxviii. 58, 61, xxix. 19, xxxi. 9 *sq.* The titles of the single sections, Exod. vi. 14; Numb. xxxiii. 1. The concluding forms, Levit. vii. 37 *sq.*, xxxvii. 34.

(e.) *E.g.* The repetition, Deut. v. 2-6; compare Kings iv. 10-13. Numb. ix. 15-23, compare Exod. xl. 36 *sq.* The diversity of expression; for instance, the first three books for the most part use Sinai, Deuteronomy always Horeh. In the second book God is generally called Elohim; in the third to fifth, Jehovah-Elohim. The farewell and death of Moses; the law regarding the King, Deut. xvii. 14. As soon as a new statute was annexed to the constitution of the State, it was placed with the collection of standing laws in the Ark of the Covenant (see 1 Sam. x. 25).

(f.) According to 2 Kings xxii. 8, 2 Chron. xiv. 4, the Book of the Law, which had been forgotten, was *again* found. The Samaritans receive only the Pentateuch as *Holy* Scriptures, rejecting the other books of the Old Testament.

§ 161.

The Book of Joshua embraces the history of the

Israelites during seventeen years under his administration. This Book consists of several parts (*a*), and is composed partly from old records (*b*), and partly from oral tradition (*c*). It belongs probably to David's time.

(*a*.) The first eleven chapters are complete in themselves, as the concluding words of ch. xi. prove. Ch. xx. contains a separate statute.

(*b*.) A more ancient composition is quoted, x. 14, the poetical language (v. 12) of which the later author interprets according to a later view or tradition.

(*c*.) *E. g.* The taking of Jericho and the passage over the Jordan.

(*d*.) See ch. xxiv. This Book speaks, xii. 10, xv. 63, of Jerusalem (or Salem), and often describes the more modern condition of a later period.

§ 162.

The Book of Judges (*a*) (these mean, Leaders of the people) comprises the history of the Israelites in their heroic age, under the dominion of several chiefs, after the death of Joshua (B.C. 1444–1100); and also contains several ancient compositions (*b*) and more lately recorded oral traditions (*c*): when it was written is uncertain. Appended to it is the Book of Ruth, a domestic narrative, written in the spirit of the ancient times, probably preserved because, by containing the history of the ancestors of David, it was of especial value to the Jews.

(*a*.) Hebrew שופטים (*Suffetes* of the Carthaginians). Deborah, Jephtha (Iphigenia in Aulis), Abimelech, Samson (Hercules). It is the heroic age of the Hebrews; the unorganized Republic of the Twelve Tribes. The influence of the prophets and priests* as interpreters of the theocratic Head.

(*b*.) Ch. ii.–xvi. is in itself a very ancient part; xvii., xviii., and i. are later pieces.

(*c*.) *E. g.* The history of Samson.

* Judges i. 1, ii. 1, iv. 4–6, vi. 8 *sq.*, xx. 18.

§ 163.

The two Books of Samuel (*a*) continue (after some historical blanks) the history of the people under the rule of the High-Priest Eli and under that of Samuel. They give an account of the institution of the kingly government, with the histories of the first two kings, Saul and David, which are treated of especially in relation to the then existing theocracy, against which Saul rebelled, but which David (*b*) respected. Ancient writings and oral traditions have been used here also (*c*).

(*a*.) Originally the two Books were in one; the present title is of later date; in the Alexandrian version they are called the Book of the Kings. Schools of the Prophets.

(*b*.) David, a man after God's heart.

(*c*.) 2 Sam. i. 18. The twofold narration, that David was admitted to the court of Saul as (ch. xvi.) a player on the harp, and, according to ch. xvii., as the conqueror of Goliath.

§ 164.

The two Books of Kings (*a*) continue the history of the nation, which, after the death of Solomon, was divided into two kingdoms until the Captivity (nearly 570 years B.C.). They contain partly extracts from the lost annals of the two kingdoms (*b*), and partly oral traditions (*c*). Their author, and the time of composition, are unknown.

(*a*.) These books were also originally one; the division is of later date. They treat especially of the kingdom of Israel.

(*b*.) *E.g.* 1 Kings xiv. 19, 29, and other places.

(*c*.) *E.g.* The history of the Prophets Elijah and Elisha. According to the tradition of the Jews, Jeremiah is the author.

§ 165.

The Books of the Chronicles (*a*), which commence with David and conclude with Cyrus, are extracts from the same annals (see § 164) and from other ancient writings,

and relate particularly to the destiny of the kingdom of Judah. According to the Talmud, Ezra was their author.

(a.) These were originally but one book, *דברי הימים* (*Ephemerides*); the Alexandrines, *Παραλειπόμενα* (*Supplementa*).

§ 166.

The Book of Ezra takes up the history where the Books of the Chronicles leave it, and relates the rebuilding of the Temple, the opposition to the work, and the administration of the State under Ezra. It is probable that from the seventh to the tenth chapter only it was written by Ezra. The Book of Nehemiah contains the memorable occurrences of its author's age and administration. The Book of Esther records a highly adorned legend from the time of the Captivity; it is of modern date, and is unsanctioned by profane history. It appears to have gained its place among the Holy Scriptures as the history of the origin of the Feast of Purim, which the Jews still celebrate. Amongst the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament, only the First Book of Maccabees is authentic, and of historical value. The Books of Judith and Tobit are traditions, written for religious and moral purposes.

(b.) *Poetical Books.*

§ 167.

Hebrew poetry, which is not to be measured by theories derived from the Greeks and Romans, is distinguished by its religious character (*a*) and by the parallelism of the phrases which compose it (*b*): it comprises the Prophetical writings, the Psalms, the Song of Songs, and, in respect of its form, the Book of Job. The prophets in particular (*c*) were necessary members of a theocracy, mediating between the nation and their ideal Head,

whose will they announced oracularly ; they had great political influence, but were also often persecuted (*d*). They gave counsel, warned against unsound political measures, and rebuked idolatry, vice, and transgression of the law. Hence their oracles are often political, and not quite intelligible to us.

(*a*.) *I. e.* Their contents are chiefly religious, and their inspiration is attributed to the Spirit of God.

(*b*.) Parallelism is when sentences consisting of two members are such that the second member expresses the same as the first, only in other words, or expresses an idea cognate with that contained in the first member, or more nearly defines it. Had the Hebrews the knowledge of verse? The rhythm in the style is unmistakable, and is felt even in Luther's masterly translation : see Psalms ii., civ., and cxxxix. ' Vom Geiste der Hebräischen Poesie' (The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry), von J. G. Herder (Dessau, 1782) ; also in his entire works, parts 1 and 2.

(*c*.) The Prophets are divided into four major and eight minor, according to the amount of their written remains : viz. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel ; Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi.

(*d*.) They formed the opposition to tyranny and unsound policy : Elijah, Jeremiah, Isaiah. See their authorization, Deut. xviii. 18-22.

§ 168.

According to the superscriptions, which however are of later origin and not always to be depended on, most of the one hundred and fifty Songs in the Book of Psalms (*a*) are from the pen of David, who, partly as a sacred minstrel, partly as founder of the Temple music (see 1 Chron. xxiii. 25-32, xxv. 1-31), marks an epoch. Asaph, the Sons of Korah, and others who are not named, also contributed. The Psalms comprise hymns (הַלְלוּ), didactic poems (לִמְנוּחַ), elegies (תְּהִינָה), prayers (תְּפִלָּה) (*c*), alternative (*d*) and processional songs, with others composed on various occasions ; embrace a long period (nearly a thousand years), and may have been first collected, *i. e.*

written upon a roll, after the Captivity. Their value as religious and poetical compositions, is various, but for the most part it is very high (*e*).

(*a*.) Hebrew, סֵפֶר תְּהִלִּים; the Alexandrian translation, *Ψαλμοί*.

(*b*.) Moses, Psalm xc. David, to whom seventy-two Psalms are expressly ascribed. Assaph (1 Chron. vi. 24, xv. 17, xvi. 5), twelve Psalms. Hiram, Psalm lxxxviii. Ethan, Psalm lxxxix. The Sons of Korah (a company of minstrels, 2 Chron. xx. 19), eleven Psalms, etc.

(*c*.) Many superscriptions relate to the music and the mode of execution, and are unintelligible to us. מִקְרָם, monumental poems, which were engraven on stone and metal, and hung up in the Temple (Luther, 'Güldenes Kleinod,' golden jewel). שִׁיר הַמַּעֲלוֹת, Luther, 'Lied im höhern Chor,' Song in the loftier Choir; properly, Song of Degrees, *i. e.* either hymns for the journeys to Jerusalem, or hymns in a certain rhythm.

(*d*.) *Selah*, which occurs fifty-one times, is explained to be the abbreviation of the formula indicated by the initial word הָשִׁב לִמְעֵלָה כֹּה, *i. e.* 'Turn back, singers,' *Da capo*. Processional songs: Psalms lv., lxviii., and xxiv.

(*e*.) There are eight alphahetical psalms: Psalms xxv., xxxiv., xxxvii., cxl., cxii., cxix., cxlv.; cursing Psalms, *e. g.* Psalm cxxxvii. 8, 9: distinguished Psalms, ii., xxix., xlv., lxv., civ., cxx., cxxxiv., cxxxix.; Psalms xxii., xlii., xliii., lxxxix., cxxvi.; Psalms l., lxxv.

§ 169.

Isaiah lived under the reigns of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah; was sprung, according to tradition, from the royal family; wrote the annals of the kingdom (מְזִמֵּר); and, which however is very uncertain, is said to have been sawn in pieces in the reign of Manasseh. His writings contain several compositions (*a*) of high value (*b*); they were collected after the Captivity, but not chronologically arranged, and from the fortieth chapter onwards have been augmented by the oracles of later prophets.

(*a*.) Also ch. xxxvi.–xxxix., an extract from his annals of the kingdom.

(*b*.) *E. g.* Ch. xi., xiv., xxi., lii., liii. His life of Hezekiah has been lost (see 2 Chron. xxvi. 22).

§ 170.

Jeremiah, the weeping prophet, who gave warning in vain of the impending ruin of the State (the Cassandra of the Hebrews), and whose urgent calls to righteousness and reformation brought down upon himself persecution (*a*), lived towards the end of the Jewish State and in captivity; and, after being liberated by the Chaldeans, went to Egypt, where history loses sight of him. His Lamentations (תְּהִלָּה, *θρῆνοι*) are elegiac wailings over the ruins of Jerusalem and the sufferings of the people.

(*a*.) He employed Baruch to write out his compositions, which were burnt by order of King Jehoiada, but Jeremiah once more replaced them. His funeral songs for Josiah (2 Chron. xxxv. 25) have been lost.

§ 171.

Ezekiel, a native of Palestine, and of a sacerdotal family, lived under the Captivity (*a*), and sang on the banks of the Chaboras. His language is not so pure as Isaiah's, but he excels all others in fancy; he goes too much into particulars, and is everywhere fond of symbols. Besides predictions relative to his own time, his writings contain moral passages (ch. xiii., xxxiii. 8–20), and exhortations to the people that they should endure their condition, and hope for better times.

(*a*.) He was one of the ten thousand Jews whom Nebuchadnezzar removed at the second carrying away into Babylon (ch. i., xxxvii. 1–11, xl.–xli.).

§ 172.

Daniel, of a distinguished family, was taken to Babylon when a youth, and there educated for the service of the State on account of his beauty and talent. He lived under the Mede Cyaxares II. and the Persian Cyrus, became Minister of State and president of the Magi, and

may have contributed much to the return of the Jews. His death is unknown. The book which bears his name treats of the fortunes of the Jews and Babylonians, and the prophetical parts of it of the fate of the Macedonian kingdom under Alexander the Great (*a*). It is not by Daniel, but belongs to the time of the Maccabees; it has received a mass of fabulous additions, founded on tradition, some of which have been preserved in the Alexandrian translation (*b*).

(*a*.) Ch. vii. 11. From our ignorance of the then state of things, much is unintelligible; but nothing is applicable to modern times.

(*b*.) *E. g.* The Prayer of Azariah, the history of the three men in the fire, the history of Susanna, of Bel and the Dragon.

§ 173.

Hosea lived under Uzziah and Hezekiah, in the kingdom of Israel, which, torn by intestine factions and disgraced by deeds of violence, always sought foreign aid; and against this the prophet declaimed. His writings possess a moral, but no poetical value. Joel probably lived about the time of the downfall of the kingdom of Israel; we have only a fragment from his pen, a description of Sennacherib's campaign, and of his fall, which wholly belongs to the golden age of Hebrew poetry.

§ 174.

Amos, a contemporary with Isaiah, lived in the kingdom of Israel, and, from being a shepherd, appeared publicly under Jeroboam II. as the denouncer of idolatry, despotism, luxury among the great, and prevailing vices; on this account he was persecuted, and is said to have been put to death. His writings, which he collected himself, are rich in maxims and images, chiefly borrowed from pastoral life. Of Obadiah (*a*), whose personal his-

tory is entirely unknown, we have only an oracle against the Idumeans.

(a.) *I. e.* Servant of God, prophet: it is perhaps not a proper name (*nomen proprium*) at all.

§ 175.

The Book of Jonah is ranked with the poetical books, merely because the history and fortunes of a prophet (a) are its subject. The Chaldaisms in it prove that it must have been written after the Captivity. That it is not purely historical is certain (b); but it may be doubted whether it is merely a moral fiction (c) or an oral tradition exaggerated into the miraculous, subsequently committed to writing, and founded upon an historical fact, viz. Jonah's journey to Nineveh (d).

(a.) See 2 Kings xiv. 24 *sq.*

(b.) Apart from the consideration that a man cannot live in the belly of a fish, it is well known that the *Ricinus*, רִיקִין, does not grow up to a shady bush in one night, but in half a year; and history makes no mention of Nineveh having ever worshipped Jehovah.

(c.) *E. g.* To destroy the favourite notion of the Jews, that God hated the Gentiles.

(d.) The latter is probable. Had his journey to Nineveh a political object? Was he an ambassador from King Jeroboam II. to the Assyrian King Phul, for the purpose of averting the intended invasion? Was the "great fish" a ship, distinguished by the sign of a sea monster? (Similar stories of Hercules and Hesione, of Perseus and Andromeda.)

§ 176.

Micah, of whom we have only a few oracles, lived under Ahaz and Manasseh, and denounced idolatry and unrighteousness. Nahum, distinguished for his noble language and creative genius, lived under Hezekiah or Manasseh, and prophesied ruin to the Assyrian kingdom on account of the oppressions to which it subjected the nations. Habakkuk, of whom we merely know that he

lived under the Captivity, bewails the misfortunes of his people, and points to divine retribution and better times : as a poet, he occupies a high rank (ch. iii.). Of Zephaniah (Sophonias) we have only two orations, one against the idolatry of the Jews, and another against the vices of Jerusalem. Haggai returned from the Captivity and saw the building of the Temple, which is the theme of his orations.

§ 177.

Zechariah and Malachi (*a*) lived after the Captivity. The Book of Zechariah consists of two parts, of which the former (ch. i.—viii.) relates to the Restoration of the Kingdom and Temple ; and the latter (ch. ix.—xiv.), which of itself forms a work apparently of older date than Zechariah himself, contains orations against the nations hostile to the people of Judah, and promises better times. Malachi's orations relate to the then condition of his people, and to the constitution of the restored State. In both prophets the hope of a Messiah is remarkably prominent.

(*a*.) Malachi, *i. e.* ambassador, prophet : is it an official designation?

§ 178.

The Song of Songs (*Canticum Canticorum*) is a collection of amatory songs of great beauty, in which love and fidelity are commended. These were admitted among the sacred writings by the collectors of the Old Testament, partly because they were ascribed to Solomon (*a*), and partly because the old prophets had compared the loving relation which subsists between God and his people to that which subsists between the bride and her lover. An allegorical interpretation of these Songs was already at hand when the writings of the Old Testament were being collected.

(a.) Some Aramean words, and the prefix *w*, suggest a later origin.

(b.) See, *e. g.*, Hos. i. 2, ii. 2 *sq.*, particularly v. 16, 19 *sq.*; Ezekiel xvi. and xxvi.; Isaiah l. 1, liv. 1-8. Compare Matt. ix. 15, xxii. 2, xxv. 1-12; John iii. 29.

(c.) *Didactic Books.*

§ 179.

To the didactic or philosophical writings belong, in respect of their contents, the Book of Job, and the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes of Solomon. The Book of Job, of which the author is unknown (a), and the story of which seems to be founded on real events, is of great value, whether regarded as a religious or as a poetical work, inasmuch as it shows how man, incapable of comprehending the higher wisdom of the Creator, must yet, in the most painful dispensations, maintain his faith in the wisdom and goodness of God. The apocryphal Book of Wisdom is the counterpart of Job, showing that God's retributive justice punishes the wicked and rewards the good with equal certainty.

(a.) It is even doubtful whether the author was an Israelite or an Arabian; history rather points to the latter. It is probably very ancient, and the Arabians still venerate Job as a saint.

§ 180.

The Proverbs* are a collection of sayings to lead man to wisdom,—to the just contemplation of Divine and human things. As the author himself says (i. 1, x. 1, xxv. 1, xxx. 1, xxxi. 1), they are the sayings of various wise men, although many of them may have originated with Solomon, particularly those in chapters x.—xxiv. The value of these Proverbs is various, and their application must be determined by the principles of Chris-

* מִשְׁלֵי, Παροιμίαι.

tianity. The apocryphal Book of Jesus Sirach contains a still richer collection of such wise sayings, which are, in like manner, of unequal value.

§ 181.

Ecclesiastes, or *Kohalath* (*a*), as the Aramean words in it and the complaint against voluminous authorship (xii. 12) indicate, is not by Solomon, and must have been written after the Captivity. The vanity and transitoriness of all that on which men ordinarily set a high value is the theme. It is often doubtful whether certain sceptical passages should be considered as expressing the author's own sentiments or those of the adversaries whom he controverts (*b*); hence the Jews regarded the use of this book as perilous, and it is not once cited in the New Testament.

(*a*.) חִכְלָת, the Orator, Preacher, or the Collection; "Der Schatten aus der Versammlung der Unterwelt" (the spirit of Solomon; for the author speaks in the name of this king): the meaning is uncertain. The Vulgate translates it Ecclesiastes, and the Alexandrine version, Ἐκκλησιαστής.

(*b*.) *E. g.* ii. 1-10, 16; iii. 12, 19 *sq.*; v. 17-19; ix. 3-10. The close of ch. xii. xiii. xiv. contains very religious sentiments, many of which are as true as beautifully expressed, *e. g.* iv. 1 *sq.*, vii. 2-6, xii. 12 *sq.* The Lutheran translation is rather defective. Concerning the places in which the belief in immortality is omitted, see § 245, remark (*b*).

2. The New Testament.

§ 182.

The New Testament is divided into historical (the four Evangelists and the Acts of the Apostles), epistolary (the letters of the Apostles), and prophetic writings (the Revelation of John). It contains the records of the religion of Christ, and embraces the writings of the

Apostles and their immediate followers. These writings are declared by the Christian Church to be canonical (*a*), *i. e.* genuine, and written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and should consequently be the rule (*κανών*) of faith and life to Christians. The collection of these writings was made by degrees (*b*), and not without great circumspection. The authenticity of all the books we now have of the New Testament was not unanimously admitted until the end of the fourth century.

(*a.*) *Κανών*, Measure, Rule. Only the writings of the Apostles themselves, or such as, like the Gospels of Mark and Luke, were approved of by the Apostles and written under their superintendence, were admitted by Christians into the Canon.

(*b.*) At first, the Old Testament alone was used in the public worship of the Christians; the New Testament was admitted later and by degrees, as its several parts came to be known. The collection of the New Testament began in Asia Minor between the years 110 and 130, and at first contained two parts, *Εὐαγγέλιον* and *Ἀπόστολος*: the former probably the Gospel of Luke, the latter the Epistles of Paul: they were by degrees augmented and more widely disseminated. In consequence of the state of the book-trade at that period, it needed time before a work, especially a letter, could, by means of transcription, be widely circulated.

(*c.*) There were many counterfeit writings falsely attributed to the Apostles (Apocrypha of the New Testament, the greater part of which are lost; the few now extant were collected by Fabricius, in the *Codex Libr. Apocryph. N. T.*). According to Eusebius (*Ecc. Hist.* vol. iii. ch. 25), who flourished in the early part of the fourth century, the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen Epistles of the Apostle Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the first Epistles of John and Peter, were universally received as genuine in his time; but the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third of John, the Epistles of James and Jude, and the Revelation of John, was still doubted by several communities and teachers.

(*d.*) The division into chapters was made by Hugo S. Caro (+ 1262). The first division into verses appeared in the Greek text of Robert Stephens's edition (1551).

(a.) *Historical Writings.*

§ 183.

The Gospels (*a*) are relations of the acts, fortunes, and doctrines of Christ, drawn up for the exigencies of that time, to show the Jews and Greeks who Jesus was, and why he was to be held as the Christ, *i. e.* the Saviour promised by God. As eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus (Matthew and John), or as having been in the closest intimacy with eye-witnesses (Mark and Luke), the Evangelists were qualified to relate the truth (*b*); that they also wished to give a true account, and really have done so, is evident from their agreement in the main, and their variations in trifling details, from the honesty with which they relate what they might so easily have concealed, and from the minute correctness of their delineation of the character and doctrines of Jesus, which could not possibly have been their own invention.

(*a.*) Gospels, *i. e.* glad tidings; namely that the Messiah has appeared, and that Jesus of Nazareth is that Messiah.

(*b.*) The first three Gospels agree in forty-two paragraphs so very closely as to facts, and even in words, that there is every reason to believe in the existence of an earlier treatise on the doings and fortunes of Jesus (original Gospel). According to Luke i. 1, there was a biography of Jesus prior to his.

(*c.*) According to Luke, only one of the malefactors reviled Jesus on the cross; according to Matthew and Mark, both did so. Mark speaks only of one lunatic in the country of the Gergesene, the others, of several. Impostors would have avoided either the preconcerted agreement or these contradictions.

(*d.*) They relate the frailties of the apostles, and the reproaches which the Jews directed against Jesus (see also Matt. xxvi. 39-45, xxvii. 63, xxviii. 17).

(*e.*) Neither the wholly ideal character of Jesus, nor parables such as Luke xv. sq., xvi. 19 sq., nor delineations of the soul's condition, as in Matt. xxvi. 36 sq., could have been created by men wholly unac-

customed to literary pursuits. Nothing makes this so palpable as the wretched quality of the apocryphal Gospels.

§ 184.

Matthew, previously called Levi, a Galilean, and, before he became an apostle, a tax-gatherer at the Lake of Tiberias (Matt. ix. 9; Mark ii. 13, 14; Luke v. 27 *sq.*), wrote his Gospel (according to Irenæus, Adv. Hær. iii. 1) A.D. 66, for the purpose of convincing the Jews that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. Accordingly he gives the genealogical descent of Jesus from David, to show that in him were fulfilled the prophecies of the Old Testament; and he points to the miracles and prophecies of Jesus himself, and to the excellence of his doctrine. Of Matthew's subsequent fortunes nothing is positively known. Chapters i. and ii. have a special title, and perhaps formed small compositions by themselves. The history of the youth of Jesus, which was not familiar to him, is, in his Gospel, as also in those of the other Evangelists, very short and incomplete; particularly remarkable is the collection of the maxims of Jesus, chap. v., vii., of his parables, chap. xiii., and of his prophecies, chap. xxiii., xxv.

§ 185.

Mark, a disciple of the Apostle Peter (1 Pet. v. 13), who was formerly called John (Acts xii. 12), and for a short time accompanied the Apostle Paul (Acts xiii. 3), was the son of Mary of Jerusalem (Acts xii. 12); and, according to the ancient traditions (*a*) of the Church, acted as Peter's interpreter to the Greeks, and wrote his Gospel from data furnished by that apostle (*b*). It appears to be the oldest Gospel, and is eminently worthy of belief.

(a.) According to Papias, Irenæus, Origen, and Jerome.

(b.) On that account sometimes called Peter's messenger. Peter probably gave Mark the use of his Gospel, written in Aramean: it is shorter than that of Matthew, but independent of it; ch. xvi. 9, 20, appears to be an addition, and is wanting in several ancient manuscripts.

§ 186.

Luke, probably a Gentile by birth, and a physician (Col. iv. 14), was an intimate friend and companion of the Apostle Paul. He wrote his Gospel for a distinguished Italian (Theophilus), probably A.D. 63, and compiled his narrative partly from then existing written documents, i. 1-3, and partly from oral traditions. It is distinguished by a better arrangement of the subject matter, by a more detailed account of the youth of Jesus, and by a more careful exposition of various occurrences on which the other Evangelists but slightly touched.

§ 187.

John, a son of Zebedee, a fisherman on the Lake of Tiberias (Matt. iv. 21; Mark i. 19, iii. 17), who was an unlearned man (Acts iv. 13), remained in Palestine (Gal. ii. 1 *sq.*) after the death of Jesus, and, according to the Church tradition, removed to Ephesus, where he, after his return from banishment at Patmos (i. 9), died at a great age, in the reign of Trajan. His Gospel, which differs in its spirit and expression from those of the other three Evangelists, and in which is found another selection of facts (a), has also a dogmatical purpose; namely, that Jesus by his words, deeds, and prophecies, and by the testimony of God and man, has proved that with him the Divine *Logos* has been combined, and that He is to be acknowledged as the Messiah (b).

(a.) He has not related any of the many parables of the first three Gospels, nor noticed the healing of demoniacs; but relates chiefly the

conversations of Jesus with his disciples, with the Jews, and with the Apostles. The style of the discourses of Jesus bear the stamp of the Evangelist himself. Has John written this Gospel as a supplement to the foregoing three, or against Gnostics or John's disciples?

(b.) The genuineness of paragraph ch. viii. 3-11, and the twenty-first chapter, is doubtful.

§ 188.

The Acts of the Apostles, by Luke, is the continuation of his Gospel. It embraces a period of thirty-three years, and reaches to A.D. 65. This book comprises two parts; the first of which, ch. i.-xii., states, from Aramean sources, the events which happened at Jerusalem after the death of Jesus; the second, ch. xiii.-xviii., contains the history of the Apostle Paul, related after his own account, until the time of his being led to Rome, xxviii. 30. As Luke was with Paul in Jerusalem, and always accompanied him, his work is worthy of the highest credit, and is of great value as the oldest authentic record of the first establishment of the Christian Church.

(b.) *The Epistolary Writings.*

§ 189.

Paul, a Jew of the tribe of Benjamin, born at Tarsus in Cilicia, and therefore (a) possessed of the rights of a Roman citizen, studied the theology of the Pharisees under Gamaliel at Jerusalem (Acts v. 24). At first he persecuted the Christians (Acts vii. 58, xxii. 3 *sq.*, xxvi. 9 *sq.*), but became suddenly a friend to Christianity through a fact not quite clear to us. From this time he, as an Apostle, served with steadfast fidelity the Christian cause, and to disseminate its doctrines undertook the most dangerous journeys (c). He was persecuted by the Jews and arraigned before the governor of

the province (Acts xxii. *sq.*), but being a Roman citizen he was led to Rome, where for some years he remained as a prisoner at large (Acts xxviii. 30), and, according to the Church's account, suffered martyrdom at the time of the Christian persecution under Nero. He was the most learned, and, regarding the spreading of Christianity amongst the Greeks, the most valuable Apostle. He viewed Christianity as the specific cure for all mankind, and principally brought about the separation of the Christians from Judaism and the Mosaic ordinances.

(a.) Augustus had presented to the inhabitants of this city, as a reward for their tried fidelity, the privileges of Roman citizens (Plin. v. 27, Appian liv. 5). Tarsus was at that time the chief place in Cilicia, noted for Grecian learning and philosophy.

(b.) See the narrative of Luke (Acts ix. 1 *sq.*, xxii. 6 *sq.*, xxvi. 12 *sq.*). Paul himself, although he had inducement for it, does not mention these events, 1 Cor. xv. 8, ix. 1. If on his way to Damascus lightning struck near him? or if the recollection of Stephen's conduct and discourses worked on his mind? or if the account, 2 Cor. xii. 1-7, is to be placed in connection with it? The conversion of the persecutor to a zealous friend and professor of Christianity, will remain always eminently remarkable, and can only be regarded as the effect of an extraordinary cause.

(c.) He was obliged to fly from Damascus, and, at a later period, from Jerusalem. He lived some years concealed in Tarsus (Acts ix. 29 *sq.*); journeyed in Asia Minor, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Pisidia, Isauria, Phrygia, Galatia, Mysia, Bithynia, Greece (Athens and Corinth), and Macedonia. Concerning his sufferings, see 2 Cor. xi. 23 *sq.*

§ 190.

We have thirteen of Paul's Epistles, which had been already collected in the second century. The following is most probably their chronological order (a):—1. The first Epistle to the Christians of Thessalonica (Acts xvii. 2 *sq.*) in Macedonia, probably written from Corinth about the year 54. It contains a commendation of the community, exhorts to an upright and Christian life,

and sets before them the hope of the resurrection and immortality. 2. The Second Epistle to the same (about the year 55–57) warns of the abuse of the expectation of the speedy second coming of Christ. 3. The Epistle to the Galatians (*b*), written at Ephesus, probably A.D. 57 or 56. It vindicates the authority of the Apostles, and combats the opinion which was spread at this place by Jewish teachers in opposition to the Apostle's doctrines, that the Gentile converts should be circumcised and be compelled to observe the Mosaic ordinances.

(*a*.) In the New Testament they are placed in order as to the importance of the Churches to whom they were addressed.

(*b*.) Galatia—Gallo-Græcia. A mass of people of Pannonia and Illyria had, under the name of Galli, vanquished Thracia and the country by the Propontis long before the birth of Christ. Nicodemus, the first king of Bithynia, called them to Asia Minor to his assistance against Antiochus Soter; they remained in that country, and became mingled with the Greeks. Augustus made (B.C. 26) this country a Roman province (Liv. xxxviii. 16, Hor. ii. 11). Paul visited Galatia three times.

§ 191.

4. In the first Epistle from Paul to the community founded (Acts xviii.) by himself at Corinth,—which was composed of Jews and Greeks, and which had fallen into disorder from party divisions (1 Cor. i. 10 *sq.*, iii. 3 *sq.*, iv. 6 *sq.*), immoral conduct of some (1 Cor. v.), and litigious disposition (ch. vi.),—he wrote against these disorders, and answered different questions of the community (ch. vii. *sq.*), especially concerning the value of celibacy (ch. vii.), the partaking of meat offered in the idolatrous sacrifices (ch. viii.–x.) of the Gentiles, the unveiling of women during Divine service (ch. xi.), the inspired discourses in the congregation (*a*) (ch. xii.–xiv.), and gives an exhortation and rules respecting the maintenance of religious teachers (ch. ix.), the feast of the Lord's Supper

(ch. xi.), and the resurrection of the dead (ch. xv.). He wrote it from Ephesus in the year 59.

(a.) To which the Apostle is not favourable. His knowledge of it was not from personal experience, but from the report of the Corinthians alone.

§ 192.

As the party of Jewish Christians had been displeased with this Epistle, and had calumniated it, he, in the year 69, wrote (5.) another Epistle to the same community (a), in which he defends himself against the reproach laid on him, especially drawing attention to the fidelity and disinterestedness with which he had fulfilled his office, and exhorts to charity towards all fellow-believers.

(a.) On his journey into Macedonia; therefore the style of writing is more negligent, and not so clear as in other writings of the Apostle.

§ 193.

6. The Epistle to the Christian community at Rome, which community, though its origin is uncertain (a), we know to have consisted partly of Jewish Christians zealous for the Mosaic law, and partly of heathen converts, more especially from amongst the Jewish proselytes,—was written from Greece A.D. 60, and had for its main object the confutation of the notion of the Jewish Christians, that the Christian could not become a partaker of Divine grace and eternal life unless he kept the law of Moses (ch. i.—xi.). General directions for Christian deportment form the conclusion (ch. xii. *sq.*).

(a.) There is no evidence that Peter founded it, although he probably had been in Rome. The Jews were numerous there, and the Romans frequently attended their synagogues (Juvenal, Sat. xiv. 100).

(b.) The argumentation is partly didactic and partly polemical, and starts from the principles of the Jewish Christians, according to which

no Christian could be saved without obedience to the Mosaic law. The course of thought is the following :—"The heathen are indeed vicious, although they might have known God by reason (ch. i.); but the Jews are also vicious (ch. ii.), and have therefore no better right than others to reward from God; for not the outward circumcision, but the inward sanctification, is pleasing to God (ch. iii. 25-27). The Jews have indeed the advantage (ch. iii. 1 *sq.*), that the scheme of salvation through Christ originated amongst them; but if the Jew does not accept this remedial scheme and sins like the Gentile, then he cannot thereby become acceptable to (righteous before) God (ch. iii.). Is it objected (ch. iv.) that Abraham could not then have been acceptable to God? it is answered, that Abraham believed in the Messiah promised to come (Gen. xv. 6), and through this faith, not by keeping the Mosaic law, which was not given till long after, became acceptable to God, and at the same time the spiritual father of all who should believe, even among the heathen (ch. iv. 14). Further, since (ch. v.) Jesus abolished death as the punishment of sin, and purchased everlasting life, and yet death befell Gentiles and Jews alike, notwithstanding the Mosaic law of the latter, it follows that the redemption through Christ must be destined for the Gentiles also, and cannot be made dependent on the observance of the Mosaic law. Should any one conclude from this (ch. vi.) that neither is the Christian bound by the moral law of the old Covenant, and that, being redeemed, he may sin in security, the folly of this is shown; for as Christ died for sin, so we must die to it, and we do not become partakers of Divine grace until we have put off our sins. By the redemption of Christ (ch. vii.) the Christian Jew is also dead to the law of Moses, and (v. 6) comes under the authority of the Divine Spirit. These laws alone, the dead letter (v. 7), without the Holy Spirit, serve only to awaken and stimulate the tendencies to sinful resistance (v. 7-25) which lie in the sensual nature of man, and consequently lead to sin and eternal death, not to life. When therefore (ch. viii.) the Christian (should he even not keep the law of Moses or be a Gentile convert) is guided by the Spirit of God and of Christ, and is freed from sin, he attains to that piety (v. 6) which the law requires, and to eternal life (v. 4-14). His obedience under the guidance of the Spirit is not slavish, constrained, unwilling, and therefore worthless, like that which is yielded to the threatenings of the law; but childlike, free, and proceeding from love to God (v. 15-47), so that he feels (v. 17-27) justified in entertaining that hope of immortality* after which every human being ardently longs. For whom

* *Θάνατος*, according to Jewish conceptions, the death-like condition of the soul in Hades: *ζωή*, the blessed life with God.

God has (v. 28-39) once called to Christianity and made pious (righteous) through the Spirit, those he has destined to eternal life, whether they adhere to the Mosaic law or not, and nothing can separate them from God and Christ, and their salvation. It is true that the Israelites received (ch. ix. 4) the promise of the Messiah, and that, as man (v. 5), this was descended from Abraham; but all the natural descendants of Abraham (the Jews) are not therefore, as such, God's children (and heirs of eternal life); for Ishmael (v. 7-13), although a natural son of Abraham, was excluded from the promise. Besides, it depends (v. 14-33) on God's good pleasure whom he will call to salvation in Christ; therefore he may call the heathen, especially (v. 30-33) as the Jews reject Christ. If then (ch. x.) the Jews contend for the law of Moses, as if its observance alone could make acceptable in the sight of God, they do it from ignorance, though with a good intention; for not the Mosaic law, but faith in the mission and resurrection of the Messiah, leads to eternal life,—a faith this which the heathen also may receive, and in which therefore they ought to be instructed. The conclusion however (ch. xi.) must not be drawn, that because God accepts the Gentiles he rejects the Jews. Rather out of free choice (v. 5) God has brought a part, though a small one, of the Jews to Christianity, not because (v. 6) they observed the Mosaic law, but according to his own grace, whilst he has left the others (v. 7-10) to their blindness. This last he does, not as having rejected them (v. 11 *sq.*), but in order that the preachers of the Gospel might be necessitated to turn to the Gentiles. You, heathens, must not boast of your call to salvation, nor despise the Jews; for if they (v. 23-26) did not continue in unbelief, they would also obtain salvation, and I suppose (v. 25, *μυστήριον*) that God will allow them to continue in unbelief only till all the Gentiles shall have been brought into the kingdom of God. Honour therefore God's plan; but be not proud of his benefits."—The rest of the Epistle (ch. 12 *sq.*) contains exhortations to Christian behaviour, particularly with reference to heathen magistrates, and to things indifferent in themselves, but reckoned sinful by others.

§ 194.

7. The Epistle to the Ephesians, written from Rome (A.D. 63 or 64), describes the former sad condition of these Christians when they were Heathens, shows that God destined salvation in Christ not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles, and had chosen Paul to be the

Apostle of the Gentiles, and exhorts to Christian behaviour and to the avoidance of former vices.

8. The Epistle written from Rome to the Christian community which the Apostle's disciples had founded at Colosse, in Phrygia, displays the Apostle's joy at their conversion and the great value of Christianity; exhorts to steadfastness and fidelity in respect of Christianity; warns against errors, particularly those of Judaism and Gnosticism (ch. ii. 8-23), and summons to the discharge of Christian duties.

§ 195.

9. Paul's letter to his Colossian convert, Philemon, is a letter of recommendation with which he sent back the slave Onesimus, who had run away from his master Philemon, and had been converted by Paul in Rome; it was written from Rome A.D. 64. The Epistle to the Christians at Philippi, in Macedonia, thanks the church there for the pecuniary contributions with which they had assisted the Apostle in his journeys, and exhorts the Jewish and Gentile converts to mutual harmony and to the Christian virtues (written from Rome A.D. 65), ch. xi.-xiii. Both Epistles to Timothy, bishop of the church in Ephesus, and the Epistle to Titus, bishop of the Christians in Crete, contain directions to these men how they should discharge their office, how they should teach and insist upon good morals, and what qualifications they should require in the office-bearers of the church.

§ 196.

It is uncertain whether the Epistle to the Hebrews, *i. e.* to the Christian Jews, was written by Paul or not: and even the ancient church doubted regarding it. It was written in Alexandria, in the first century, and its

main object is to reconcile the Christian Jews to the abolition of the Jewish priesthood and Temple service, by showing how abundantly these are replaced in Christianity, and how far Judaism is behind Christianity in respect of essential dignity and power.

(a.) The author enters completely into the conceptions of the Jews, and conducts his argument, which is admirably adapted to his readers, in the following manner:—"Christ (ch. i. and ii.), as the Son of God, is highly exalted above Moses and all angels; therefore we are more guilty if we do not follow him, than the Israelites were (ch. ii. 7 *sq.*) when they did not follow Moses. They who resisted Moses were deprived only of the temporal rest in the promised land (v. 17-19), but they who oppose Christ (ch. iv.) lose a higher, a heavenly country. The Christian does not need Jewish sacrifices and high-priests, for Jesus Christ is (ch. iv. 14 *sq.*, v. 1 *sq.*) also a high-priest after the order of Melchisedec, who (ch. vii.) also belonged not to the tribe of Levi, but, being at once priest and king, was a type of Christ. Abraham, the father of Levi and of the Levites, paid tithes to him, and received his blessing. Had the Levitical priesthood been perfect, then would there have been no prediction (Psalm cx. 4) of an everlasting high-priest after the order of Melchisedec. The priesthood of Christ however is everlasting, since he lives for ever; he is (ch. viii.) the heavenly high-priest, discharging his functions in the heavenly sanctuary,* as the Mediator of a new, perfect Covenant. However glorious (ch. ix. 1-10) the sacrifices in the Jewish temple might be, the sacrifice of Christ is still nobler (ch. ix. 11 *sq.*), for he offered his own blood, and entered not into the earthly Holy of Holies, but into the presence of God; his sacrifice also needs not to be repeated, but is of everlasting efficacy. The Levitical sacrifices may therefore (ch. x. 1-18) be dispensed with, since they could not purchase the forgiveness of sins like the sacrifice of Jesus. It is our duty consequently (ch. x. 19-39) to faithfully adhere to this perfect high-priest, and not to fall away; for if he was punishable with death who despised the law of the earthly priesthood, how much guiltier must he be who despises the Son of God, this sacrifice! Rather we must believe with fidelity in him as the ground of our eternal salvation, and so we shall save our souls, even

* From Exodus xxv. 40, xxvi. 30, Numbers viii. 4, the Jews believed that in heaven there was a counterpart of the Holy City, the Temple, and all its holy places. See also Acts vii. 44; Heb. ix. 23, 24, xii. 21, 22.

as (ch. xi.) the pious under the Old Testament wrought righteousness in faith, and thereby became worthy of God's love." Here then follows (ch. xii.) an exhortation to steadfastness in Christianity during persecution, and (ch. xiii.) general instructions conclude the whole.

§ 197.

The Epistle written by the Apostle James the Less, son of Alphæus and bishop of Jerusalem (Acts xv. 13, 22), to the converted Jews beyond Palestine (probably in the year 52), is a circuit epistle, for the greater part of moral contents, in which those parts are especially remarkable where he declares that the temptation to commit sin comes not from God, but from the nature of Man (ch. i. 13 *sq.*); that the merely outward worship of God is worthless (ch. i. 22 *sq.*), and that Christian charity does not regard any difference of external advantages; that therefore the rich ought not to despise the poor (ch. ii. 1-13), as Faith without works of charity is valueless (v. 24, 26) (*a*).

(*a*.) Nominal contradictions between Paul and James concerning the doctrine of Faith: on this account the genuineness of this Epistle was by many in the ancient church quite unjustly doubted.

§ 198.

The Apostle Peter, originally Simon (Matt. iv. 18, xvi. 17; Luke v. 5; John i. 14),—who in the early Church stood in high repute (Acts ii. 14, v. 1, ix. 32), and who at a later period removed from Jerusalem on account of persecution (Acts xii. 1-12), visited the Churches in Asia Minor in the year 53, visited Antioch (Gal. ii. 11-21), and went, according to the tradition of the Church, to Rome, where he is said to have been crucified,—has left behind a circuit Epistle addressed to Christians, in which he exhorts the same to constancy under the existing and the yet threatening persecutions, and therewith combines

many useful instructions for the conduct under particular circumstances (servants, masters, rulers, magistrates). The time and place of the composition are unknown. The Second Epistle of Peter, which contains exhortation; warning against false doctrine, defence of the expectation of the speedy coming of Jesus to judgment, is scarcely from the hand of Peter (*a*); but its author and the time of its composition are unknown.

(*a*.) Origen is the first who speaks of this Epistle; it met with much contradiction in the Church, and was only admitted as genuine in the fourth century; its style is very different from that of the First Epistle (ch. iii. 2).

§ 199.

Whether the Epistle of Jude is by the Jude mentioned in Matt. xii. 55, Luke vi. 16, Acts i. 13, is uncertain; it contains an exhortation to fidelity to Christianity, and a warning against immorality and the misleading of false doctrines, and was not generally received as genuine until the fourth century. In conclusion, we have from the Apostle John three Epistles: the first is addressed to Gentile Christians, exhorts them to fulfil their duties, and warns them of those apostate Christians who had become the enemies of Christ; the next two are private letters to several persons, and are not of particular importance. These were known at a later period, and were not commonly accepted as genuine before the fourth century.

§ 200.

(*c*.) *The Prophetic Book.*

The Revelation of John (*a*), or the Book of Visions, had probably its origin in the first century, and was received (132, by Justin Martyr) as the composition of John, but was by many pronounced as counterfeit, espe-

cially for its Chiliasm. It does not refer to *our* time, but speaks throughout of the then time, for which reason it has for us many obscurities, and celebrates by song in visions, which are copied from the older Prophets, especially Ezekiel and Isaiah, the triumph of Christianity over Judaism and Paganism, symbolizing Paganism, or Rome, by Babylon; Judaism, by the earthly Jerusalem; and Christianity, by the heavenly Jerusalem.

(a.) It is the only prophetic poetic book of the New Testament, and declares itself (ch. i. 1, 2, 9, xxii. 8) to be the work of John. Abuse of the same. Luther declares it to be counterfeit.

PART IV.



REVEALED THEOLOGY.

§ 201.

According to the Scriptures, Divine Revelation began with the origin of the human race (§ 154), and continued till the Christian Church was founded. We may distinguish three periods in this Revelation:—1. The *Patriarchal* period (before Moses); 2. The period of *Moses and the Prophets* (from Moses to Ezra and Nehemiah); 3. The *Christian* period (Jesus and the Apostles). In each of these periods one of the three religious Ideas (§ 154) was particularly, though not exclusively, perceptible, and essentially constituted the character of that period; viz. in the first, the Idea of the Deity; in the second, the Idea of the Divine Law; in the third, the Idea of Immortality.

I. THE PATRIARCHAL PERIOD.

§ 202.

It is in this period that the Idea of God first appeared in the human consciousness, and is represented as having been awakened by God himself through the means of symbols and words. But the idea of God could only appear in such a form as the imperfect state of human

knowledge, and the simplicity of all relation among men at that time, would allow. God, therefore was known as the Creator of all visible things (Gen. i. 1), who has made all things well (Gen. i. 31); who, surrounded by angels (Gen. xxviii. 12), has His throne in heaven, *i. e.* is the Most High (Gen. xi. 5, ix. 10-17, xvii. 22, xxviii. 12), and to whom the worship of thanks, of offerings, and humility is acceptable (Gen. iv. 3, iv. 7, xvii. 1, xxxv. 14). As heralds and preservers of this faith appear the *Sethites* (Gen. iv. 26), *Melchisedec* (Gen. xiv. 18), especially *Abraham* and his tribe (Gen. xii. 8, xxvi. 24 *sq.*, xxxiii. 20, xxxv. 1-7), whose descendants, as the depositaries of the belief in God (Exod. iii. 6, 13, iv. 5), are separated from other nations (Gen. xvii. 1 *sq.*), and distinguished by the circumcision as an outward sign (Gen. xvii. 10 *sq.*).

Hence all important events, which occurred in nature or amongst men, were considered in a *religious* point of view, as we find in Gen. vi. 7, 11, 18, and other places. God's Government of the World always appears as a direct one. After Abraham we find no sensible manifestation or word of God till Moses. We find such events mentioned of those men only who had a marked influence on the development of the Idea of God.

§ 203.

Man is considered as a creature of God (Gen. i. 26, ii. 7), in God's stead; and, as His image, is made the lord of the earthly Creation (Gen. i. 27, 30, ii. 19, 20), endowed with the principle of life (Gen. ii. 7), which the ancients sought in the blood as the condition of animal life (Gen. ix. 4; Lev. vii. 26, xvii. 24). All men descend from one pair (Gen. x. 1-32).

§ 204.

From God's wisdom and goodness it was to be ex-

pected that the created man, as father and prototype of the whole race, should possess every human *faculty*; and therefore that faculty also which fits him for freedom, though the Mosaic records are silent on the subject. On the other hand, there could not be in the first man any of those perfections which can only be developed by life itself and its various conditions. To our consciousness also the idea of a morally free existence presents itself, not as something past, but as something to come, as the aim of our efforts (*a*).

(*a*.) The narrative of Gen. ii. 9, 17, and Gen. iii., as the history of the first eclosion of freedom, is quite in accordance with the nature of freedom. Sin being something relative (§ 118), it can only originate by this, that man becomes conscious of the difference between good and evil (symbolically represented by the tree, Gen. iii. 5-7, xi. 22), and of the contradiction of sensual propensities with the Divine law (represented by the command not to eat of the tree). But as man has not yet sufficient energy, nor has he been sufficiently accustomed to silence these propensities which have already acquired a preponderating influence upon him, he feels guilty in his conscience; and loses the peace of mind (the Paradise), until the internal conflict between the flesh and the spirit is terminated by the victory of the latter, *i. e.* until he has become free (conf. § 234).

§ 205.

The Idea of a Divine law, as the summary of duties prescribed for the various human relations, could only very imperfectly exist in the beginning, when all relations between men were so very simple. Accordingly we only find general directions concerning the feelings of veneration and the obedience to God (Gen. iv. 7, xvii. 1); and besides this, the positive command not to murder (Gen. iv. 11, ix. 5), and not to eat raw meat (Gen. ix. 3, 4).

§ 206.

The Idea of Immortality, or of a life of the Soul after

death, did not yet make its appearance in the human Consciousness. We only find the conception of a continuation of the bodily life on earth (Tree of Life, Gen. ii. 9, iii. 22), connected with the notion (which also at later periods is often met with) that sin leads to the loss of life. Gen. v. 24 is represented as an exception from the general rule.

II. THE PERIOD OF MOSES AND THE PROPHETS.

§ 207.

The belief in a Deity, hitherto a family belief, became through Moses (1500 B.C.) the belief of a nation. Under him, and through the religious and political constitution established by him, the Israelites were formed into a separate nation, firmly adhering to the Idea of the Deity (*a*); idolatry was most rigidly prohibited (*b*), and the whole constitution assumed the form of a Theocracy, God appearing as Ruler and Governor of the nation (*c*), the High-Priests and Prophets being His agents (*d*). Everything therefore that took place in the State was represented, according to the theocratical principle, as God's will; all events in the history of the nation, as God's sending (*e*); and the Idea of the Deity was identified with the notion of a national Lord or God (*f*). God being the invisible head of the State, Moses thought it proper to clothe Him with terror (*g*), to inspire the rude people with veneration for Him and the holy things. As to His *nature*, God still appears the same as He did in the Patriarchal period (*h*); and the Idea of the Deity was further developed only in this one respect, that the name of Jehovah (*i*), attributed to God, expressed the eternity and immutability of his essence; and that by

the conception of the Spirit of God (*k*), God's spiritual activity was brought into relief.

(a.) Exod. iv. 22, vi. 2-4, xix. 5 *sq.*; Deut. iv. 20, vii. 6 *sq.*

(b.) Exod. xx. 3, 4, 23, xxxiii. 13. In consequence of this separation of the Israelites from the idolatrous nations, the Polytheistic nations of Canaan were to be expelled, any contact with them to be avoided, their sacred places to be destroyed: Exod. xxxiii. 23 *sq.*, 32 *sq.*, xxxiv. 12 *sq.*; Deut. vii. 9 and 12.

(c.) The whole Constitution therefore appears as a law of God, and the interdiction of Polytheism as the fundamental law of the State. This was the only means to preserve Monotheism in those times, and to make it the national religion of the people.

(d.) The tabernacle was the place where God answered the questions put to him, Exod. 25 *sq.*, xxxiii. 7-11; High-Priests, Urim and Thummim, Exod. xxviii. 30; Lev. viii. 8; Num. xxvii. 21; Prophets, Deut. xiii. 1-5, xviii. 15-22. Conf. § 167.

(e.) We therefore must not be surprised at seeing that whatever happened to the enemies of the nation, whatever they did, and all commands of Moses and the other visible heads of the nation, was referred to God as its author, *e. g.* God (Moses) led the people, Exod. xiii. 17 *sq.*; God caused the east wind to blow, Exod. xiv. 21, xv. 10; the people inquired of God (Moses), Exod. xviii. 15 *sq.*; God went before them in a pillar of cloud and in a pillar of fire, Exod. xiii. 21 *sq.* A different expression is often used, *e. g.* Exod. iii. 21 *sq.*, comp. with Exod. xii. 35 *sq.*; Exod. vii. 3, x. 1, 20, 27, xi. 10, comp. with Exod. vii. 13, 14, 22, viii. 15, 32, ix. 34; Exod. xxxi. 1 *sq.* with xxxvi. 1; Exod. xxxii. 16 with xxxiv. 27 *sq.*

(f.) Exod. ix. 1, x. 3; Numb. xiv. 13-17; Josh. xxiv. 1-25, x. 10 *sq.*; Judges xi. 23 *sq.*; 1 Sam. x. 18 *sq.* God's Government of the World also is here considered as only relating to the fate of the Israelites, and those nations with whom they are in conflict.

(g.) Exod. xix.; Deut. v. 24 *sq.*; Numb. iv. 15; 1 Sam. vi. 19.

(h.) Exod. xix. 5, 9, 11, xxxi. 17, Deut. iv. 39, x. 14, 17. It is doubtful whether the expression "Holy," used of God (Levit. xi. 44, xx. 7, 8, xix. 2; Numb. xvi. 5, 7), means *pure, faultless*, or merely refers to the separate relation in which God stands as protecting God of the Israelites. The thirty-second chapter of Deuteronomy is evidently written after Moses.

(i.) Exod. iii. 14, vi. 3, יהוה, *sempiternus, qui semper est idem*; in the New Testament τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ὅ: Rev. i. 8, xxi. 6, xxii. 13.

(k.) Exod. xxxi. 3, xxxv. 31; Numb. xi. 17, 25.

§ 208.

The doctrine of God has been further developed, especially in and after the time of David. God was more and more acknowledged to be the only Creator of the world (Psalms viii., xix., xxxiii. 6 *sq.*, civ.; Isaiah xlv. 6, 24, xlv. 12 *sq.*; Job xxxviii.—xli.), and the source of all life (Psalm civ. 29 *sq.*, Job xxxiii. 4); the highest Sovereign and Governor, not only of the whole nature and its powers (Isaiah xlv. 27, xlv. 7, 8; Psalm civ.; Job xxxviii.), but also of kings and nations (Isaiah xl. 22 *sq.*, xlv. 22; Psalm xxxiii. 8, 13–17, ciii. 19); who determines the fate of every man (Job x. 8–12, xiv. 5; Psalm xxii. 10, cxxxix. 16, xxxi. 16). He is described as sitting in *heaven* (Isaiah xl. 22, lxvi. 1; Psalm ii. 4, cxv. 3, 16) surrounded by angels, who execute His commands (Psalm ciii. 20 *sq.*; Isaiah vi. 1 *sq.*; 1 Kings xxii. 19). His essence became likewise more understood: He is described as a Being of light (Psalm civ. 2), who is eternal (Isaiah xlv. 6; Psalm xc. 1–4, cii. 26–29; Job xxxvi. 26), pure, and holy (Deut. xxxii. 4; Psalm v. 5, 6); of unwearied power (Isaiah xl. 28), infinite wisdom (Isaiah xl. 28; Psalm civ. 24; Prov. viii. 22–30; Job xxviii. 23–25); omniscient (Psalm cxxxix.; Isaiah xli. 21–24; Job xi. 7–9); omnipresent (Psalm cxxxix.; Jer. xxiii. 23 *sq.*; 1 Kings viii. 27); omnipotent (Psalm xxxiii. 9, cxlviii. 4–6, cxxxv. 6; Isaiah xl. 25 *sq.*); good, and merciful (Psalm civ. 31, cvi. 1, cxxxvi., cxlv. 8 *sq.*, ciii. 8–10, cxvi. 5); just (Psalm xxxiii. 5, ciii. 6, cxi. 7; Job xxxiv. 10–12); true (Psalm xxxiii. 4; Isaiah xl. 8; Psalm lxxxix. 2 *sq.*). The evils also are derived from him and considered as punishments (Psalm vi., xxxviii.; Isaiah liii. 4–12; 2 Sam. xxiv. 1), and it is only later that Satan is mentioned as the author of evil

(1 Chron. xxi. 2, compared with 2 Sam. xxiv. 1; Zech. iii. 1-9).

The passages, Job i. 6 *sq.*, ii. 1 *sq.*; 1 Sam. xvi. 14; 1 Kings xxii. 23 *sq.*, are not quite certain. The הַמִּשְׁפָּט, Levit. xvi. 5, 8, 10, 26. On the Theodicy of the Book of Job, see § 179.

§ 209.

We do not find in this period any more accurate views of the spiritual nature of man. But it is the idea of the *divine law* that here first appears with certainty. Just as the Idea of a Deity has, from being the property of individual wise men, passed into the faith of the nation by means of the conception of a *national God*; so the Idea of the *divine law* was to be introduced and confirmed by the conception of a *national law* (*a*). This was done by the Mosaic law, by which all those duties (*b*) which, in a well-arranged State, must necessarily be performed, were represented as God's commands; but, just on account of its being a *national law*, the Mosaic law could not contain any prescriptions on the duties towards men in general (*c*). As freedom had to begin with the subjection of the sensual propensities, the law, in a moral respect, was especially of a *prohibitive* character (*d*); and Reason yet being incapable of understanding the intrinsic value of the law, this law had to appear as the absolute command of a stern Ruler (*e*), and obedience to it had to be effected especially by *sensible* motives (by the dread of temporal evils, and by the hope of temporal rewards) (*f*), and by basing it on the feeling of national gratitude (*g*). Outward cleanliness (Levit. xi. *sq.*) was partly necessary in those climates, and partly meant to excite the feeling for the Pure and Holy. External worship (Levit. i. *sq.* 16) was intended to strengthen the Idea of the Deity in the minds

of the people, and to nourish the veneration for God. The meaning of the sacrifices was, that sin and punishment do not exist absolutely, but are dependent on God's Will, and that the way to freedom and life is open for him who amends.

(a.) The Mosaic law appears throughout as a national law; all its single commandments, and also the Decalogue, are civil laws; the first and second Commandments are laws of State in a Theocracy. There is no difference between moral and civil laws in the Mosaic legislation, scarcely between a civil and an ecclesiastical law.

(b.) *E.g.* Veneration to the parents, Exod. xx. 12, xxi. 15, 17: security of persons and property, Exod. xx. 13-17, xxi. 22: matrimony and sexual propensity, Exod. xxii. 16, 19; Lev. xviii. 20: private vengeance, Lev. xix. 18: foreigners, widows, orphans, Exod. xxii. 21 *sq.*, etc.

(c.) Levit. xix. 18 only means the love towards the fellow-countrymen, although in the New Testament this passage is applied to the love towards all men. In the Mosaic law, the Book of Joshua, and the Book of Judges, God always appears as gracious only to the Israelites, but as ungracious to other nations, on account of their idolatry.

(d.) "Thou shalt not" is the common form, and the laws generally point to the subjection of propensities, as selfishness, passion, vengeance, sexual propensity, etc.

(e.) The law is always pronounced as a positive one, proceeding from the Will of the theocratic sovereign. God therefore is said to be jealous with regard to obedience: Exod. xx. 5, xxxiv. 14; Deut. iv. 26, vi. 15. Hence this obedience is in the New Testament called a slavish one.

(f.) As to punishments, see Exod. xxii. 24, xxiii. 22; Levit. xviii. 25, 28, 29, xix. 8, xx. 2-5, 10-13, xxvi. 14-41; Deut. vii. 10, xi. 16 *sq.*, especially xxviii. 15-68. As to rewards, see Exod. xx. 6, 12, xxiii. 25; Levit. xxvi. 6-13; Deut. iv. 40, v. 16, 29, vii. 12-15, xi. 13-15, especially xxviii. 1-14.

(g.) See Deut. x. 20 *sq.*, xi. 1 *sq.*; Levit. xxvi. 42.

§ 210.

In the Prophetical period especially, the following points were more clearly elucidated:—That God loves only those who keep clean from sin and are pious

(Psalm i., v. 5-7, xxxiii. 18 *sq.*; ciii. 11-13, 17, 18); that sacrifices do not please God by themselves, but only by the pure mind with which they are offered (Psalm xl. 7, l. 8 *sq.*, li. 18 *sq.*; Isaiah i. 11-18; Jer. vi. 20; Hos. vi. 6); that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of all wisdom (Psalm cxi. 10; Prov. i. 7; Job xxviii. 28), and the practical worship of God is the main point (Isaiah lviii. 1 *sq.*; Micah vi. 6 *sq.*). On the other hand, we still find the same motives for obedience (Psalm xxxiv. 10-23, xxxvii. 73; Prov. ii. 21, iii. 7-10, x. 27), the same want of knowledge of the general duties of man (Psalm vi. 11, xxxv., xciv. 1, 2, 13, 23; cix.; cxxxvii.); morality is still identical with the observation of the Mosaic law (Psalm cxix.); and only in Ezekiel (xviii. and xxxii.) we find an opinion expressed, that the misfortune of the descendants cannot be a punishment for the faults of the fathers.

§ 211.

The idea of the Divine law, and of a perfect obedience to the same, could not possibly be fully appreciated in this period, the Idea of *Immortality* not yet having come into existence. A beginning of it may be found in the conception of a subterranean abode of Shades (Psalm xviii. 5, 6; 2 Sam. xxii. 5, 6; Job xi. 8), without life, joy, or movement (*a*), whence nobody will return (Job vii. 9; Psalm xlix. 8 *sq.*; 2 Sam. xxii. 6) but by a miracle (2 Kings ii. 1). The true conception of Immortality was still entirely wanting (*b*).

(*a*.) הַשְּׁמַיִם, the subterranean Empire of Darkness, often, but erroneously, translated "Hell" by Luther, a notion not yet known in the Old Testament. See Psalm cxv. 17 *sq.*, vi. 6, lxxxviii. 11; Jer. xxxviii. 18; Job xiv. 7-12, x. 18 *sq.*; Psalm xlix. 6-16. In some of the later writings this empire (though only in the form of a poetical fiction) is considered more animated: Isa. xiv. 9-15; Ezek. xxxii. 21, 31.

(b.) The following passages, Eccl. ii. 16 *sq.*, iii. 18–22, iv. 2, 3, vi. 4, ix. 1–6, and others, show this clearly; they contain not so much doubts on the Immortality of the Soul, as rather lamentations on so many inexplicable questions, which are only to be solved by the doctrine of Immortality. The passages Joh xix. 25, Psalm xvi. 11, xvii. 15, do not mean the resurrection of the dead; and Isaiah xxvi. 19, Ezek. xxxvii. 1–10, mention it only as a poetical image. But in the Book of Daniel, which belongs to the time of the Maccabees, the doctrine of Immortality is to be found (see Dan. xii. 1–3 and Macc. vii. 28 *sq.*)

III. THE REVELATION OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE APOSTLES.

1. *Of the Christian Revelation in General, and its Founders.*

§ 212.

As introductory to Christianity, there was found in the prophetic writings of the Mosaic period the anticipation of a golden age of the Jewish nation, under the dominion of a descendant of David, the Messiah; from whom a blessing on the Jews, the conversion of the Gentiles, the promulgation of God's laws amongst all people, and a perfect revelation, were expected. If all the passages in the Old Testament which point to a Messiah cannot be considered as Messianic (*a*), yet in some passages the expectation is so certainly expressed (*b*), that we have to acknowledge in them a dispensation of God's providence preparatory to the introduction of Christianity.

(*a*.) The expression "that the Scripture may be fulfilled," and expressions of a similar kind, are only explanations and references for the Jewish readers, who were accustomed to this usage. The passages Gen. iii. 15, xii. 3; Psalm ii., viii. 5, xvi. 10, xl. 8 *sq.*, cx., and many others in the Psalms, as well as in Zech. xi. 12 *sq.*, xii. 10 *sq.*, xiii. 7, and in Isaiah vii. 14–16, are not Messianic. The passages

in Gen. xlix. 10 ; Hos. iii. 5 ; 2 Sam. vii. 16 ; Amos ix. 11 ; Joel iii. 1 *sq.* ; Zeph. iii. 9 *sq.* ; Zech. viii. 1 *sq.*, are doubtful.

(*b.*) Isaiah ii. 1 *sq.*, ix. 2-7, xi. 1-16, xlii. 1 *sq.*, lx. 1 *sq.* ; Jer. xxiii. 5-8, xxxi. 31 *sq.*, xxxiii. 14 *sq.* ; Dan. vii. 13-28 ; Mich. iv. 1 *sq.*, v. 1 *sq.* ; Haggai ii. 6 *sq.* ; Zech. ix. 9 *sq.* ; Mal. iii. 1, 4. Whether in Isaiah lii. 1-15, and in the fifty-third chapter, we find the description of the suffering Messiah, is uncertain ; in the time of Jesus these passages were explained as descriptive of him.

§ 213.

The Christian revelation announced itself as the perfect and last one (*a.*), and therefore (what from its nature it can also be) appointed for all times and all people (*b.*), as it is evidently suited to the nature of mankind, in all nations essentially the same, is compatible with every form of government, and is neither bound to a holy place nor does it prescribe actions (*e. g.* pilgrimages) or ceremonies which could not be observed in all parts of the world.

(*a.*) Matt. xxi. 37, xxviii. 18, 20 ; 2 Cor. iii. 11 ; Heb. i. 1, vii. 17-28. The kingdom of Christ is also described as one which will endure until the end of this world, *e. g.* 1 Cor. xv. 24-28, John v. 24.

(*b.*) Matt. xxviii. 18 *sq.* ; Luke xiii. 28-30 ; 1 Tim. ii. 4 ; therefore the benefits of Christianity are described as being universal.

§ 214.

A *perfect* revelation could not be given until some part of mankind was prepared to comprehend the idea of one God and to renounce idolatry, nor could a speedy and continuous propagation be expected until the civilized nations, by means of commerce and politics, were brought into closer connection, and language and literature had so far progressed as to render a quick interchange of ideas possible. These conditions only commenced, and kept a continued course, under Augustus Cæsar, after the

formation of the great Roman Empire. Before this time a universal revelation could not have been made.

§ 215.

Christianity, during the course of eighteen hundred years, has approached nearer and nearer, and is still progressing towards its destination, that of becoming a universal religion (*a*). No religion has at any time flourished in so great a variety of country and climate, in nations so differently civilized, and maintained so peaceable a union with such various governments, as the Christian. As all things, including mankind and liberty, are submitted to the law of gradual evolution, and further, as Christianity is not alone an external but an internal change of man, its spread could be only gradual, and dependent partly upon the spiritual education of the people, and partly upon the given probability of an external spreading of the Christian Church (*b*).

(*a*.) According to the calculation of the British Bible Society, there existed in the first century 500,000, in the second 2,000,000, in the thirteenth 75,000,000, and at present there are existing 200,000,000 Christians, 140,000,000 Mahometans, 2,500,000 Jews, and 675,000,000 Heathens. Another calculation states 175,000,000 Christians, 9,000,000 Jews, 150,000,000 Mahometans, and 656,000,000 Heathens (compare paragraph 9). Of the Christians it is calculated 90,000,000 are Roman Catholics, 35,000,000 belonging to the Greek Church, and 75,000,000 Protestants, or members of other religious sects. Mahometanism, which is suited only to warm climates, and only accords with despotism, has, by means of successful wars alone, disseminated its doctrines only in warm countries.

(*b*.) The external spreading of the Christian Church depended on the discovery of the mariner's compass, the invention of gunpowder, of printing, and the commencement of ocean navigation and universal commerce; before these events, the spread of Christianity in distant lands was not possible.

§ 216.

Not only was the time of the introduction of Christianity well chosen for a perfect revelation, but equally so was the people through whom the same was given, as the Jewish nation, unlike any other, then had as their national faith the belief in the true God, were filled with the expectation of a coming Interpreter of the Divine revelation, spoke and wrote the universal languages (the Semitic, or Aramean, and the Greek), treated religious subjects with zeal and reverence, and, though living dispersed in all the three parts of the world, yet stood in connection at all times with Jerusalem (*a*); they were therefore the most fitted to be the first bearers of the revelation. The geographical position of Palestine also made it a suitable country for the appearance of a general revelation. Viewed in this connection, the former separation of the Jews from other nations, their settlement in Palestine, and their captivity, appear an intentional preparation of the Divine wisdom.

(*a*.) Jerusalem was at that time one of the largest commercial towns of the East, and commerce had then, as now, led the Jews into all countries near the Mediterranean; but all attended the Temple service at Jerusalem.

§ 217.

The Divine origin of the Christian revelation, shown in the preceding paragraphs, is placed beyond a doubt; but the effect of Christianity on the mind and heart, and its internal nature, must be to us the most decisive proofs of its truth. It gives to all who faithfully obey it (*a*) that for which revelation exists (moral liberty), and declares itself as a means of education of men in Freedom or Rationality (*b*). If then the ideal which Christianity aspires to, namely the formation of mankind into one

family, in which shall reign wisdom, peace, law, and morality (*c*), like other ideals, is not reached, it has yet in the course of time drawn nearer and nearer to this ideal, and where it has not been corrupted or counterfeited (*d*), its effects have been only beneficial to mankind (*e*).

(*a*.) This Jesus himself said, John vii. 17. It draws our attention to the ideal of an all-perfect God: Matt. v. 48; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Eph. iv. 23, 24; Col. iii. 9 *sq.*; 1 Peter i. 15 *sq.*

(*b*.) John viii. 31–34; Rom. vi. 16–22; John i. 12, 13. This lies also in the doctrine that Jesus has redeemed us from sin, which is mentioned as the chief purpose of his mission: Matt. xviii. 11; Luke xix. 10; John x. 10. Hence his name Jesus, σωτήρ.

(*c*.) Christianity represents mankind as equal in origin and descent, equally beloved by God, having one Redeemer, one Law, one Salvation. The duty of universal charity; the dignity of man; slavery, tyranny, etc. See ‘Das Leben und dessen höchste Zwecke in ihrer allmählichen Entwicklung und in ihrer Vollendung durch das Christenthum,’ von C. C. W. Stark (2 parts, Jena, 1817).

(*d*.) The best is liable to abuse. Evils not proceeding from the essence of Christianity, as Hierarchy, Inquisition, religious wars, cannot be attributed to it, but to human passions. Christianity from the sixth to the fifteenth century.

(*e*.) The extermination of idolatry, diminution of national animosities, misanthropy, slavery, tyranny; the education of the female sex, the awaking of cosmopolitanism, erection of schools and colleges, freedom to science, abolition of the traffic in slaves. See ‘Die Wirkungen des Christenthums auf den Zustand von Europa,’ durch J. Rothe (aus dem Dänisch., 4 parts, Copenhagen, 1775); ‘Ueber das Verhältniss des Christenthums zur Entwicklung des menschlichen Geschlechts,’ von J. A. H. Tittmann (Leipzig, 1817).

§ 218.

No other proofs of the divinity of the religion of Jesus than the foregoing are needed. The wonders performed by Jesus, which certainly allow the inference that to him was granted an extraordinary power (on which however the metaphysical idea of a wonder (§ 153) is not with certainty to be placed, and on which Jesus himself (*a*)

set only a relative value, like the prophecies (*b*) explained by him, which, according to the ideas expressed, § 153, cannot with full certainty be argued, with the exception of that of his resurrection, which from its result alone obtains its importance), are only subjective evidence, serving more to uphold the already established Faith than to establish it.

(*a.*) See Matt. xii. 39 *sq.*, xvi. 1-4; Mark viii. 12; Luke xi. 29; John ii. 18 *sq.*, iv. 48: compare 1 Cor. xiv. 22; Matt. xii. 27; Luke xi. 19; John xiv. 12.

(*b.*) See Matt. xvi. 21, xii. 38-40, xx. 18 *sq.*, xxvii. 63 *sq.*; Luke xiii. 28-30, xviii. 32-34, xix. 42 *sq.*, xxi. 6 *sq.*; John x. 16.

§ 219.

The life of Jesus, as illustrative of man freed from sin (John viii. 46; Heb. vii. 26 *sq.*; 2 Cor. v. 21; 1 Peter i. 19, ii. 22; 1 John iii. 5), shows what the Christian should become (*a*). The conception of the plan of leading the whole human family to such freedom shows the deepest wisdom, the greatest strength of soul, and the highest benevolence towards all mankind (*b*), and would, were there no other proofs (*c*) existing, show most clearly that Jesus was no self-deceived enthusiast.

(*a.*) The history of Jesus displays the Divine idea in his mission and in the outpouring of the Spirit; the idea of liberty, in his personal morality, which compelled him to sacrifice his life to obedience; his immortality, in his resurrection and ascension to heaven.

(*b.*) This subject is beautifully treated in 'Versuch über den Plan, welchen der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der Menschen entwarf,' von S. V. Reichard (Wittenberg, 1708). Whether this idea has been conceived by any of the sages of ancient times? The comprehension of this idea was difficult especially to the Jews.

(*c.*) No criterion of enthusiasm is suited to Jesus. The enthusiast is obscure and inconclusive; he looks for the criterion of truth in fancy and feeling, despises learning, the written word, and the worship of his fellow-citizens; he places the essence of piety in feeling and ceremonies, makes for himself an individual morality, and considers the

end to justify the means; he is prone to persecute all who differ from him in opinion, is attached to particularities and to an isolation of himself.

§ 220.

Jesus Christ (*a*), the Son of God, called with this predicate sometimes in a theocratical (*b*), and at others in a physical (*c*), metaphysical (*d*), and moral sense (*e*), was born, according to the general or Dionysian calculation, in the year 753 A.U.C., and in the forty-fifth year of the reign of Cæsar Augustus (Luke ii. 1) (*f*). The Gospels of St. Mark and St. John give no account of the birth, childhood, and education of Jesus; the two first chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke, which contain the relation of his birth and infancy, appear to have been separate small writings. According to them Jesus was conceived (*g*) by the Spirit of God, born at Bethlehem, of Mary, a virgin, of the house of David (Matt. i. 6–17; Luke iii. 23–31), brought up at Nazareth (*h*), and, as it appears, educated for a rabbi, or doctor of the law, whilst he, according to Jewish custom, learnt a handicraft (Mark vi. 3).

(*a*.) Jesus, *i. e.* the Saviour, Redeemer (Matt. i. 21), Christ, *i. e.* the Anointed, King, משיח, the Messiah, is called in the Gospels *Χριστός*: with few exceptions by the *nomen appellativum* Messiah; but in the apostolic writings mostly by the *nomen proprium* Jesus. (Where the Lutheran translation has “the Christ,” “the Messiah” is always understood.)

(*b*.) “Son of God” is used in a theocratical sense in the Old Testament, regarding kings either as representatives of God or as chosen and selected by him (Psalm ii. 7, lxxxii. 6), and is thus applied to the Messiah, in whom the Jews expected to find a king. Thus, *e. g.*, Matt. xvi. 16, compare with Luke ix. 20; Matt. xxvii. 40, compare with Luke xxiii. 35; John i. 50. The title “Son of Man,” taken from Dan. vii. 13 *sq.*, also denoted the Messiah.

(*c*.) Son of God, *i. e.* created by God (directly, as Adam), Luke i. 35; compare Matt. i. 18, 20.

(*d*.) Only by John and Paul was there united with Jesus, in a degree, an essence of the Divine Logos (John i. 1, 14), or eternal spirit (Hebrews ix. 14), a ray of the Nature of God (Hebrews iii. 12), pre-

existent to the world (John i. 1, 2; Hebrews i. 10-12), and of a Divine origin (Phil. ii. 6 *sq.*). This gave occasion for framing the subtle theory of the person of Jesus declared in the Church's Athanasian creed. Whether Jesus receives (John i. 1-14, xx. 28; 1 John v. 20; Rom. ix. 5; 1 Tim. iii. 16) the predicate God? The system of the Subordinator (Arius), which declared Jesus to be God in a subordinate sense, rests upon John xiv. 28, xvii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 23, viii. 6, xi. 3, xv. 27 *sq.*; Acts iii. 14. In the Old Testament used for angels (Gen. vi. 1; Job i. 6 *sq.*, xxxviii. 7).

(e.) In the moral sense of God pleasing men, whom he loves and regards as children (2 Sam. vii. 14). This title is conferred upon God's people (Exod. iv. 22; Hos. xi. 1; Rom. ix. 26; 2 Cor. vi. 18), and on Christians (Matt. v. 9, 45; Luke vi. 35; Rom. viii. 14, 19; 1 Cor. vi. 18; Hebrews xii. 6-8); on Christ, as the beloved of God (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5, xxvii. 43; Mark i. 11, ix. 7, xii. 6; Luke iii. 22, ix. 35; Col. i. 13; 2 Peter i. 17), who, as free from sin, is therefore the exact likeness of the absolute Being—of God (John viii. 32-36, xiv. 9 *f.*; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15; compare Eph. v. 1; Col. iii. 10).

(f.) The generally received calculation, made by the Roman abbot Dionysius the Less, probably placed the birth of Christ some years too late; because, according to that, he was not born until after the death of Herod the Great. Neither the time of the year, nor the day, of the birth of Christ are exactly known. The ancient Church entertained very different opinions on the subject. The Greek Church kept the festival of the birth of Christ on the 6th of January; the Western Churches kept Christmas as the universal festival of the birth of Christ only from the fourth century. Probably it took the place of the Saturnalia, which concluded with the feast of the Solstice (25th December), and was applied to the rising of the spiritual luminary.

(g.) Luke i. 35; Matt. i. 13, 20. The Jews considered Jesus to be the son of Joseph and Mary: Mark vi. 3; John vi. 41 *sq.*

(h.) According to Luke, Joseph and Mary, before the birth of Christ, lived at Nazareth (Luke i. 26, ii. 4, 39); according to Matthew, at Bethlehem, and did not reside at Nazareth until a later period (Matt. ii. 1, 22).

§ 221.

After John, a near relation of Jesus, had through the not unusual rite of baptism admonished the Jews to moral improvement, and had announced the approach of the Kingdom of God (*a*), Jesus, in his thirtieth year,

came forth publicly as a teacher, and declared himself, as he was obliged, in order to find entrance to his nation, to be the promised Messiah (Matt. xvi. 13, xxvi. 64; Mark viii. 27; John iv. 16), and the founder of the Kingdom of God (Matt. iv. 17, x. 7; Mark i. 15; Luke iv. 43, x. 9); but at the same time he corrected the earthly expectations which the Jews had of this kingdom, and took no part in any political designs (*b*). From the people he gained applause and belief, partly on account of the doctrine which he taught, partly on account of the miraculous cures wrought by him. He was the most hated by the Pharisees, Sadducees, lawyers, and priests. The first were the defenders of the Jewish traditions, the greatest zealots for the ancient creeds and ceremonial services, and were the most powerful party in the state; the Sadducees upheld strictly the Mosaic ordinances and representations, but rejected traditions and the doctrine of the resurrection, and denied the existence of spirits and freedom. It appears (*c*) that Jesus escaped their snares for three years, chiefly because he avoided Jerusalem; but was taken by them when, according to religious duty, he celebrated the Feast of the Passover with his disciples: he was accused of uproar (*d*) before the Roman prosecutor, Pontius Pilate, and was by his order crucified. On the third day after this event, he showed himself to his friends again alive,—an occurrence the truth of which is sufficiently warranted (*e*); was then separated from this earthly sphere, and exalted to the land of perfection (*f*).

(*a*.) John belonged probably to the school of the Essenes; according to John i. 31, he did not know Jesus before he taught; and even at a later period (Matt. xi. 2-6, Luke vii. 18-21) was doubtful in him. The Essenes rejected the taking of oaths, abstained from matrimony, despised riches, had a community of possessions, various classes

of the initiated, and lived in retirement from the world. (For an Account of the Jewish sects, see Josephus, *Antiquities*, xiii. 5 and xviii. 1, and *Wars of the Jews*, ii. 8.) It has been supposed that Jesus also belonged to the Essenes; but Jesus taught the belief in a Providence and Resurrection, both of which the Essenes denied; he blamed the rigorous observance of the Sabbath, which they extolled; he permitted the liberal use of various foods (Mark vii. 18), they made use only of bread, water, salt, and hyssop; he allowed the use of oil,* they rejected it; he placed but little value on fasting (Matt. xi. 9, Mark ix. 14-16), they a great one; Jesus preferred friendly intercourse with society, the Essenes loved retirement from it.

(b.) Matt. xi. 14 (Luke xvii. 20 *sq.*); John xviii. 33-37; see also John vi. 15. He also intended his kingdom for Gentiles as well as for Jews (Matt. viii. 11 *sq.*, xxi. 33 *sq.*, xxii. 2 *sq.*; Luke xiii. 23 *sq.*; John x. 16, xvii. 2); promoted moral improvement as the main condition of prosperity (Matt. v. iii., xvi. 23 *sq.*; Mark i. 1-8; Luke iii.; John i. 2-29); foretold the fall of Jerusalem and the Jewish States (Matt. xxiv.; Mark xiii.; Luke xxi.); taught his followers to renounce all earthly recompense (Matt. xx. 27, 28; Mark ix. 30 *sq.*; Luke ix. 23, xviii. 31 *sq.*); and declared that the design of his mission related to spiritual things alone (Matt. ix. 12 *sq.*, xi. 28 *sq.*; John xviii. 37).

(c.) This rests merely upon St. John in his Gospel mentioning only three Passovers, which Jesus kept. Has John not left some unmentioned?

(d.) Matt. xxvii. 11, 17, 22, 29, 37, 42; Mark xv. 2, 9, 12, 18, 26, 32; Luke xxiii. 2, 3, 37, 38. According to John, they accused him of blasphemy, because he had called himself the Son of God; John xix. 7, 8; compare ch. v. 18, and Levit. xxiv. 15, 16.

(e.) The doubt in the first instance, and the after firm faith of the Apostles, their frank appeal to this fact, their sorrow for Jesus, the number of Jews who became Christians (Matt. xxviii.; Mark xvi.; Luke xxiv.; John xx. *sq.*; Acts ii. 22-41; 1 Cor. xv. 14-18). The slight variation in the narrative only enhances yet more its credibility.

(f.) *I. e.* After that demonstration, he was exalted to heaven. The Apostles generally considered that Jesus, after his Resurrection, ascended to God in heaven: Mark xvi. 19; Acts i. 21; 1 Peter iii. 22; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Thess. i. 10; Rom. viii. 34; 2 Cor. v. 8. Luke only relates a visible ascension, ch. xxiv. 50; Acts i. 9-12. But he, as well as Paul, was not an eye-witness of it. On the dogmatical importance of this fact, see § 241.

* Matt. vi. 17, xxvi. 6 *sq.*; Luke vii. 38.

On the life of Jesus, see J. J. Hess, *Lebensgeschichte Jesu* (2 vols. Zürich, 1794); Herder's *Christl. Schriften*, 1ste and 2te Saml.; *Das Leben Jesu von Nazareth*, von J. C. Greiling, Halle, 1813; *Geschichte des Christenthums und der Periode seiner ersten Einführung in die Welt durch Jesum und die Apostel*, von G. J. Planck (2 parts, Göttingen, 1818).

2. *Christian Doctrine of Faith.*

§ 222.

The Christian revelation, as the last and therefore perfect one, fully developed the ideas of God, of liberty, and the Divine commandments, in as far as they had not yet been promulgated, and added the idea of the redemption, or an immortal consummate life after death, thereby essentially defining its character in relation to the earlier revelation (*a*).

(*a*.) Others consider the idea of the Propitiation as the fundamental idea of Christianity, whilst they grant man to be in a ruined condition, and submit to the Divine punishment, which Jesus, through the atonement, has abolished; but in that case the idea is too narrow, as here also the salvation from a state of sin must precede the redemption from punishment. The Propitiation will be always considered as a part only of salvation, as an acquisition of Life and freedom from death, since it declares partly that immortality cannot be claimed as the reward of virtue (§ 122), and partly that in the evolving circumstances of life occurrent sins do not hinder the execution of the Divine purpose (Grace of God). Compare § 245 *sq.*

§ 223.

Concerning the idea of God, Jesus and the Apostles confirmed the doctrine of the earlier revelation (§§ 236, 242), especially that of the unity of the Divine Nature (John xvii. 3; 1 John v. 20; 1 Cor. viii. 5 *sq.*; Eph. iv. 6), but further taught that God is an invisible spiritual Being (*a*) and entirely perfect (*b*), possessing in himself

his origin and counsel, and needing nothing out of himself (*c*), therefore the happiest (1 Tim. i. 11, vi. 15), upon which most consummate life the existence and life of the universe depends (*d*); also a Being of absolute innate goodness, from whom good only proceeds (*e*), and who only imposes affliction in order to better (*f*). But as through Jesus belief in God should become the property of all men, so (in opposition to the Mosaic law) Christianity lays particular stress upon the goodness of God, exhibiting him as Father to all men, watching over all people, not excepting the wicked (*g*), and willing that all should be brought to freedom and immortality through Jesus (*h*).

(*a*.) Rom. i. 20; Col. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 17. The same, together with that expressed by the image of light, according to the Scriptures, the symbol of inner purity; 1 Tim. vi. 16; John iv. 24, πνεῦμα δ Θεός. "A spirit" (πνεῦμα) is therefore also ascribed to him which differs from any other, his Spirit (πνεῦμα Θεοῦ) or that called the "Holy" Spirit: Luke iii. 21 sq.; Matt. iii. 16; John xv. 26; 1 Cor. ii. 10 sq.; Acts v. 2-4; 1 Cor. iii. 16; compare 2 Cor. vi. 16.

(*b*.) If this is not signified by τέλειος (perfect), Matt. v. 48, it is certainly signified by the word "alone" frequently placed before the Divine attributes, as μόνος ἀγαθός, Matt. xix. 16; μόνος ἀληθινός, John v. 44; μόνος σοφός, Rom. xvi. 25 sq.; also 1 Tim. vi. 16.

(*c*.) Acts xvii. 24 sq.; John v. 26; 1 Tim. vi. 16; Rom. ix. 6-24; Eph. i. 5; 1 Cor. i. 21, 27; Acts xv. 18.

(*d*.) John v. 17, 26; Acts xvii. 27 sq.; Eph. i. 11.

(*e*.) 1 Peter i. 15 sq.; 1 John iii. 3, i. 15; James i. 13, 17.

(*f*.) 1 Cor. xi. 32; Heb. xii. 5-11.

(*g*.) Matt. v. 45; Luke vi. 25; Matt. vi. 9, xxiii. 9; 2 Cor. i. 3; 1 John iv. 8, 16; Titus iii. 4, φιλανθρωπία.

(*h*.) 1 Tim. ii. 4; Titus ii. 11. He caused all to be called, including the Gentiles: Matt. xxii. 2-10; Luke xiv. 16-24; Matt. xxi. 33-43, viii. 11 sq.; John x. 16; Luke xv. 1-10, and the same, v. 11-32, the beautiful narrative of the Prodigal Son, the symbol of an apostate people, as the son of the house is of the Jewish people: further, Acts x. 23, 34 sq., xi. 18. Respecting Paul, see § 220.

§ 224.

As the Scriptures often mention the Spirit of God, and St. John and St. Paul often make mention of the Son of God, in a metaphysical sense, as uniting themselves in Jesus, and making the idea of God, as a *Spirit*, clear, whilst they represent him working in his most high power as "*Father*," making and teaching the world according to his most high reason as "*Word*" (*a*), and sanctifying mankind according to the unrestricted benevolence of his will as "*Holy Ghost*:" this (*b*), in union with the dispute (*c*) which arose in the fourth century, gave grounds for the forming of the Church's theory of the Trinity (*d*), which, through the medium of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, has become the universal doctrine of the Christian Church, from which only the Anti-trinitarians or Unitarians dissent (*e*).

(*a*.) *Λόγος*, John i. 1-3, 14. St. Paul uses only the expression "Son." *Λόγος*, according to the Hebrew signification, "*Word*," creative teaching; according to the Greek, Reason: both are derived from one.

(*b*.) The placing together of the Father, Son, and Spirit in the passages Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15; 1 Cor. xii. 4-6; 2 Cor. xiii. 13; 1 Peter i. 2. The passage 1 John v. 7, "There are three that bear record in heaven," etc., is decidedly a later and counterfeit addition. Only a single edition, and that a modern one (the Dublin or Montfort) has this passage; in all others it is missing, and therefore is not to be found in the early editions of the German Bible.

(*c*.) The Arians, then Macedonians, Pneumatologists. Before the Council of Nice (325), no unanimity existed respecting the doctrine of the Son and the Spirit.

(*d*.) The essence of this doctrine is the assertion of the oneness of the Divine substance, but at the same time of the threefold nature of the subject, distinguished by the name of persons. Neither the expression "Trinity" nor "Persons in God" are to be found in Scripture (comp. § 343).

(*e*.) Chiefly the Socinians (Poles and Transylvanians) and the Subordinators (Arians, England).

§ 225.

Concerning the creation, preservation, and government of the world, the Christian doctrine only precisely determines that God either created the materials of the world or created it from nothing (Rom. iv. 17 ; Heb. xi. 3) ; and only St. John and St. Paul use the ancient expression in regard to the Son of God (Heb. xi. 3 ; Rev. iv. 11 ; John i. 2, 3, 10 ; Heb. i. 2 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; Col. i. 16 *sq.*), that the world was created by his Word, the government and preservation extending even to the most insignificant (Matt. x. 28-31).

§ 226.

Christianity likewise teaches the existence of higher spirits, Angels (messengers), and describes them as spirits (Heb. i. 14 ; compare Col. i. 16), and therefore without sensual necessities (Luke xx. 36 ; Matt. xxii. 30) ; as spirits of light (Matt. xxviii. 3 ; Luke ii. 9 ; 2 Cor. xi. 14 ; Mark xvi. 5), creatures of God (Col. i. 16), of high intellectual and moral perfection (Luke ix. 26, xv. 10 ; 1 Tim. v. 21 ; compare Matt. xiii. 41, 49, xxiv. 31, xxv. 31 ; 2 Thess. i. 7) ; and therefore as taking an actual share in the foundation of Christianity (Luke i. 11, 26, ii. 9 *sq.*, xxii. 43 ; Matt. xxviii. 2 ; Acts i. 10, v. 19 *sq.* ; Heb. i. 14), but not perhaps being creatures worthy of Divine worship (Rev. xix. 10, xxii. 9 : compare Col. ii. 18). The names which have been attributed to some of them are only symbolic ; to us they are typical of the freedom of man in a state of perfection.

§ 227.

The Jews, during their captivity in Babylon, also generally accepted the belief in evil spirits (James ii. 19 ; Matt. x. 1, xii. 43 ; Luke xi. 24 ; 2 Cor. ii. 11 ; Eph.

vi. 11 *sq.*; John viii. 44) inimical to mankind, which they considered to be under the dominion of Satan or the Devil (Matt. ix. 34, xxv. 41), but yet in subjection to God (James ii. 19); some even considered them as fallen angels (*a*). They were described as determined enemies to the Redemption (Matt. iv. 1; John xiv. 30, xiii. 2, 27; 2 Cor. ii. 9-11; Eph. vi. 10-19; 1 Peter v. 8 *sq.*). It was also believed that they, under the form of idols, suffered themselves to be worshipped, and worked the oracle (Acts xxvi. 18; Eph. ii. 2, vi. 12; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 26); and it was thought also that they existed partly as bound in the nether world (2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6), partly as working freely amongst men (1 Peter v. 8), partly as in the air (Luke x. 18; Eph. vi. 12, ii. 2), and partly as sojourning in desert places (Matt. xii. 43 *sq.*). All diseases in which man was not quite master of his body or mind were attributed to their influence (demoniacal). But while Jesus and his disciples agreed in the then popular opinion, they deprived them of all power over the souls of Christians by these means, pointing them out as the cause of sin in the sensual nature of men (James i. 14; Rom. i. 21-24, vii. 14, 25; Gal. v. 19-24; compare Matt. xv. 19, 20), teaching that Satan has no power over such as withdraw themselves from the dominion of sin, and that Christ has destroyed the power of the Devil (John xii. 31, xvi. 11; 1 John iii. 8-10, iv. 4, v. 18 *sq.*; James i. 14, iv. 7). To us evil spirits are typical of captivity, particularly those who cloak their obedience to sensual inclination with the appearance of wisdom (*δαιμονιώδης σοφία*, James iii. 15; compare John viii. 44), and serve sin not from ignorance, but from systematic irreligion.

(*a*.) See Jude 6; 2 Peter ii. 4. But this was not the universal opinion, as Josephus declares them to be the departed souls of bad

men ('Wars of the Jews,' book 7, ch. vi. § 3). But Satan is nowhere represented as a self-existent principle of evil, independent of God, like Ahriman in the religious system of Zoroaster.

§ 228.

Christianity agrees with the Old Testament in representing man as a creature of God (Matt. xix. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 9, 15), and the whole race of mankind descending as a family from one pair (Matt. ix. 4; Rom. v. 12, 15 *sq.*; Acts xvii. 26), possessing dominion over all other earthly creatures (1 Cor. xi. 7; James iii. 9). But it also teaches that the spiritual part of man, the independent principle of all reasonable knowledge (1 Cor. ii. 11) and all moral freedom (Rom. vii. 14 *sq.*; Gal. v. 17), differs (Luke xxiv. 39; Matt. x. 28; Luke xxiii. 46) from that of the sensual body, and that the aim of mankind is conformity to the image of God in knowledge and virtue (Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 9; 1 Peter i. 15; 2 Peter i. 4; 1 John v. 18; Acts xvii. 28 *sq.*; compare 1 Cor. xiv. 20; Matt. v. 48; 1 John ii. 3-6); therefore the most important care of man is declared to be that for his spiritual, and particularly his moral improvement (Luke ix. 25, xii. 31; Matt. vi. 33; John vi. 27).

§ 229.

In man is found a twofold principle, which determines him to action,—the carnal nature (the flesh), which is ignorant of Divine law, and the spiritual or reasonable nature (the soul), by virtue of which he has knowledge of Divine law, and by that fixes his own sentiments (Matt. xxvi. 41; Rom. vii. 14-25; Gal. v. 17-25); therefore the Gentiles also, as possessing reason, recognize the law in the conscience (Rom. ii. 14 *sq.*, 25 *sq.*). The Christian throughout must not permit instinct, but

the law of the Spirit, to predominate in himself (Rom. vi. 6, 12, viii. 4–10, xiii. 14; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Gal. v. 16; 1 Peter i. 15, ii. 11; 1 John ii. 15 *sq.*),—what, in regard to the early immorality of the Christians, was denominated a new birth (Gal. vi. 15; Eph. ii. 10, 21, iv. 22; John iii. 3 *sq.*).

§ 230.

In reference to the Mosaic dispensation, Christianity has these peculiarities:—1stly, That it releases the Divine law from the nature of a national law; and therefore the whole Mosaic law, with but few exceptions, is declared as cancelled to Christians (*a*); but, on the contrary, the moral precepts present a universal law for all reasonable creatures (*b*), written by God in their minds (Heb. viii. 10 *sq.*; Rom. ii. 14 *sq.*, 25 *sq.*). 2ndly, That Christianity considers these moral precepts, not merely as the law of a sovereign power, but as in themselves good and holy (Rom. xii. 2, compare vii. 12), and obedience to it to proceed from love of goodness, especially of God as the prototype of all perfection, thus promoting not a servile but a childlike obedience (*c*). 3rdly, That Christianity not only opposes the law to the workings of instinct, but extends itself to the hallowing of the whole internal disposition (*d*). 4thly, That Christianity declares the Divine law as absolutely valid, and extending beyond this life (*e*). 5thly, That Christianity acknowledges nothing as virtue that does not proceed from motives agreeing with the law (*f*). 6thly, That Christianity entirely separates moral duty from the ceremonial service and external worship of God, unconditionally promoting morality (*g*). 7thly, That Christianity imposes on its followers an imitation of the example of Jesus as a pattern of perfect morality (Rom.

xiii. 14; Eph. iii. 17); and 8thly, That Christianity extends the duty of charity beyond the narrow limits of a nation to the whole human race.

(a.) This happened through the remarkable resolution of the Apostle (Acts xv. 1, 5-29). Exceptions are only, 1st, the eating of things offered in sacrifice to idols, of blood, and the flesh of strangled animals; the two last were rather rules of diet for hot climates, than moral laws: 2ndly, the *πορνεία*, *i. e.* incest (1 Cor. v. 1 *sq.*), or the marrying within such degrees of blood-relationship as were prohibited by the Mosaic law. Matt. v. 17: the words here used concerning the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies in the person of Christ do not contradict what Jesus himself declared (Matt. ix. 14-17; Mark ii. 21 *sq.*; Luke v. 36 *sq.*), *i. e.* that he would not found his doctrine upon the Mosaic law. The Decalogue, as early recognized by Luther, is regarded by us not as a Mosaic but a Christian law. The Sabbathical laws were declared, in the early times, as not binding on Christians (Matt. xii. 1-8).

b.) This lies in Luke xv. 10; compare 1 Tim. ii. 4.

(c.) John xiv. 31; Rom. xiii. 5; 1 John ii. 3-6; Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 4-7; 1 John iv. 18 *sq.*, v. 3; compare § 243; James iii. 13-18.

(d.) It is not merely of a prohibitory nature, like the Mosaic, of which 1 Tim. i. 9 therefore speaks: it is given to sinners as a counteraction to the impulses of instinct, and only by threats (2 Cor. iii. 9; Gal. iv. 5) and prohibition overthrows them (Rom. vii. 7, 8); against which see Matt. v. 21-48; Luke xviii. 11 *sq.*; compare Eph. v. 1.

(e.) Matt. xvi. 21-23; Mark viii. 31 *sq.*; John xiv. 31; Matt. xviii. 8 *sq.*; Mark ix. 43 *sq.*; Luke xv. 26 *sq.*; Acts xx. 23 *sq.*; 2 Cor. xiii. 8. These particularly show the example of obedience towards God in the death of Christ.

(f.) Matt. vi. 1-8, v. 16-18; Luke xiv. 12 *sq.*

(g.) Matt. ix. 13, xii. 7, xv. 7 *sq.*; Mark xii. 33; concerning Levitical purity, see Matt. xv. 11-20, xxiii. 25; Acts x. 11 *sq.*; Rom. xiv.; Titus i. 15 *sq.*; Matt. xxiii. 5, 27; Luke xx. 46 *sq.*; against which see Matt. vii. 21-27, xix. 17; Rom. ii. 13, 25 *sq.*, vi. 22 *sq.*; Matt. xii. 47-50; James i. 22 *sq.*, ii. 14 *sq.*

§ 231.

Christianity lays down no universal form for moral actions, since it is not a system, and announces itself as Divine law in general as well as in particular; still it

gives general rules, which the law, stated in § 105, pronounces in particular; and there are references to God's moral perfection as an ideal for our attainment (§ 226); the precept of love to God (Matt. xxii. 36-40; Mark xii. 29 *sq.*), *i. e.* to the Perfect One, because God being the most perfect is the only object for the highest love of reasonable beings; the precept of love to ourselves and others, which agrees with the esteem of the worth of the rational nature of mankind (Matt. xxii. 36-40; James i. 9), in relation to the other commandment, to show to others the respect and charity we expect from them (Matt. vii. 12; Luke vi. 31).

§ 232.

An arbitrary choice between good and evil (§ 113) is nowhere in the New Testament attributed to man, and still less is Freedom named; but it calls him who obeys instinct a slave, and only he who acknowledges the truth and regulates himself according to the law a freeman (John viii. 32 *sq.*; Rom. vi. 16-22; 2 Cor. iii. 17; James i. 25; 2 Peter ii. 19). But it is evident that all the actions of men are dependent on knowledge (§ 111), and virtuous actions on the knowledge of good (*a*); and that man has in himself the power to call up the example of good and duty (§ 113), and thereby to determine his will to moral actions (*b*).

(*a*.) Matt. vi. 22, 23, "The light of the body is the eye," etc. The sense is, that as the knowledge of all bodily actions is limited to the bodily eye, so the knowledge of all moral actions is limited to the light that is in you. Compare Luke xi. 34-36; John xi. 10; Eph. iv. 17 *sq.*, where the wickedness of the heathen is traced back to their ignorance; John i. 12, where it is said that all who have received the Divine illumination become children of God, *i. e.* free.

(*b*.) This is shown by the example of Jesus in the history of the Temptation (Matt. iv. 1 *sq.*; Luke iv. 1 *sq.*), where the spirit of evil

calls up each time a contradictory duty. "Moral degeneration and improvement can only be the results of the formation, or of the obscuring and destruction, of certain trains of thought" (Reinhardt, *Moral*, vol. i. p. 344).

§ 233.

It is expressly said that sin, or disobedience to the law, are only relative (§ 118), and not arising before man knew the law and referred his actions to it (John ix. 41, xv. 22; Rom. iii. 20, iv. 15, v. 13 (*a*); James iv. 17); therefore St. Paul rightly maintains (Rom. xiv. 23; 1 Cor. viii. 7) that indifferent actions become sins when regarded by the actors as sinful (*b*).

(*a*.) Rom. v. 13 is to be translated, before the promulgation of the law by Moses, there were materially sins in the world; *i. e.* men acted against the law, but without recognizing the action as sinful, or themselves as guilty.

(*b*.) Rom. xiv. 23. The sense is, he who sinfully indulges in forbidden foods, with the doubt whether such indulgence is permitted, commits a fault, because he lacks the condition of permission; and where this condition is wanting, the action (in itself indifferent) is always sin. But it is impossible to pervert this passage and say, all I do, if I consider it right, is not punishable; for this passage has authority only in regard to indifferent actions, not in respect to such sins as are forbidden by the law; thus a murder, though its motive may be a noble one, ever remains a crime.

§ 234.

The manner and way in which sin originated is, according to the New Testament, exactly as described in § 119, and its root is placed in the combat in which man has to oppose his moral formation for freedom, to the strength of the early awakened and ever-active instinct of his sensual nature (Rom. ii. 5; Gal. v. 19 *sq.*; James i. 13-17). It is consequently taught that sin is universal (Rom. iii. 9, 23), and likewise that it originated in the first man (*a*). The state of perfect freedom is

placed before us only as attainable in the future, after the conquest of sin.

(a.) This lies in the passage Rom. v. 12 *sq.*, where Paul does not say that the first man possessed and lost freedom, *i. e.* perfect virtue, but only that he, like all his descendants, has sinned. The meaning of the Apostle is this, that "the Divine grace, which vouchsafes eternal life through Christ by God, is not merely, as the Jews imagine, confined to themselves, but plainly extended to all mankind; for it will revoke the punishment of sin (everlasting death), see § 239. Sin however is universal; for since Adam sinned and his descendants likewise (although before the promulgation of the law their deeds were not recognized as sin), all fell under the same punishment. But like as sin and punishment are universal, so must grace (by the redemption of Jesus) be also universal to abolish sin and its punishment." (Comp. § 193.)

From this passage and the account in Gen. iii. (concerning which compare § 204), the Church has derived its doctrine that Adam was in a state of perfect Freedom (=State of innocence, the image of God), in which, had he not sinned, he would have remained; but through the eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree, he lost the Divine image and became sinful, in which originated the lasting transmission of moral corruption (*i. e.* original sin), according to which man, from that time, has become naturally incapable of moral perception and inclination, and naturally capable only of sin; from which follows of itself that each individually can be illuminated and bettered by no other means than through an immediate operation of God (work of Grace). As a part of the Christian Church (Austin, Calvin) holds the opinion that man can neither promote nor oppose the operation of Grace (the Lutheran Church maintains that man can oppose, and thereby seeks salvation, though an imperfect one, in the self-efficacy of man), it therefore follows that they only whom God has chosen will become illuminated and bettered, which is called Predestination. But the passages of Scripture, quoted for this doctrine, are partly such where, according to the theocratical context of the Old Testament (see § 207, e), the account is given of the obstinacy and blindness of the enemies of God's people, partly such (as Rom. viii. 28-30, ix. 11-22, vii. 11, 25) as give an account, not of God's election of certain Christians to happiness, but of His Goodness in calling the Apostles and the first believers in Christianity from the Jews and Gentiles. (Compare the discussion on the Epistle to the Romans, § 193.)

§ 235.

As it needed Divine illumination to conform the human race to liberty, so Christianity considers all knowledge of good amongst the human race as proceeding from this illumination, or the Spirit of God. And although man, when once enlightened, can and will by his own efficacy continue therein (John viii. 32; Matt. xiii. 23, xxii. 3; Acts ii. 41; Rom. x. 13-17), yet acquisition of moral Freedom requires of the Christian great self-exertion (Matt. iii. 2; Eph. i. 17, iii. 16; see passages quoted in § 228).

§ 236.

Sin therefore (§ 121), according to the New Testament also, is not abiding, but transient, and should be no longer found with the freed Christian (*a*); all general evils, as well as those which befall the improved Christian as the consequences of his renounced sins, lose their character of punishment and become fatherly guidances to good (*b*).

(*a*.) This say the phrases, "To put off the old man, and put on the new, created after God," see § 228; compare John i. 12 *sq.*, iii. 3, 6; Phil. iv. 8. And this also is included in the idea of a moral kingdom of God, in which the Holy Ghost dominates.

(*b*.) Heb. xii. 4 *sq.* Guilt only remains and retains its punishment with those who sin against the Holy Ghost, and despise the Divine illumination and commandments (Matt. xii. 31 *sq.*; Mark iii. 28 *sq.*; Luke xii. 10 *sq.*).

§ 237.

If the human soul were not immortal (*a*), the sensual life, and not the Divine law, would appear as the highest rule for man's conduct; the Divine revelation therefore, of necessity, perfectly develops the *idea of immortality*, and makes it the common property of all men; and

Christianity, in regard to the earlier Divine revelation, exhibits, as a distinctive feature, this idea under the conception of redemption from the power of death and sin.

(*a.*) Matt. x. 28, xvi. 26, 1 Cor. xv. 29-32, where St. Paul expresses the idea. It would be foolish to suffer much or to sacrifice life for those who are not immortal; foolish in such a case to sacrifice life to duty, as the rule for life would then be, "Let us eat and drink (enjoy pleasure), for tomorrow (soon) we die." "*They who are baptized for the dead*," should have been translated—they who devote themselves to destruction for those who are really dead and live not again,—those who expect no immortality.

§ 238.

The idea of immortality (§ 132) was, by means of the revelation (called *manifestation*, § 147), certainly not wholly unknown to the people, although not understood by them in its purity. They certainly believed in a life after death, but imagined it only as a sensual life, and did not comprehend (*a.*) the idea of a spiritual existence with God, the resurrection of the soul to heaven. This is shown in the idea of the resurrection of the dead (*b.*), promulgated in the religious system of Zoroaster (B.C. 600), with which system the Jews became acquainted during their exile, and partly adopted it (*c.*), and also in the idea of the transmigration of souls, so prevalent amongst the ancients (*d.*).

(*a.*) Ideas of the Greeks and Romans: C. L. Struve, '*Historia Doctrinæ Græcor. et Romanor. Philosophorum de Statu Animarum post Mortem*' (Altona, 1803). It was believed that only a few men were raised (in their bodies) to the Gods; these were then worshipped as gods or demigods. The purer idea of Socrates was an exception to the rule, and did not change the faith of the people.

(*b.*) The '*Zend-Avesta*' contains a twofold idea, *i. e.* the idea of a resurrection to a life on the perfect earth, and to a life elevated to Grotoman (the sphere of heaven, *i. e.* the more refined and purer parts of ether). The second idea seems to be the later, as the '*Zend-Avesta*' in its present form can scarcely date its origin from Zoroaster, espe-

cially the book 'Bun-Deheseh,' which was written many years after Zoroaster. See C. W. Flügge, 'Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit,' etc., part ii. p. 250 *sq.*; 'Zend-Avesta, oder Zoroasters lebendiges Wort,' etc., von J. F. Klenker (Riga, 1776-77, 3 parts), and the extracts from it, 'Zend-Avesta im Kleinen,' etc., von Klenker (Riga, 1789).

(c.) This is proved from what Josephus says about the representations of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. The Pharisees believed the soul destined to a *subterranean* place of reward and punishment, and only partly believed in the metempsychosis. The Sadducees denied the Immortality of the Soul; the Essenes believed that pious souls went into an Elysium on the other side of the Ocean, and the wicked into a subterranean Tartarus. Still there were in Josephus's time some philosophers among the Jews (like Philo, after Plato), who expected a resurrection of the soul to heaven (into the pure ether).

(d.) The doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls (*μετεμψύχωσις*, *μετεμψύχωσις*, *transfiguratio*), "metempsychosis," teaches that departed souls enter successively into other bodies, either of men or animals. See 'Schicksale der Seele, Wanderungshypothese unter verschiedenen Völkern and in verschiedenen Zeiten,' von C. Th. Conz (Königsb., 1791). Believers in this doctrine are to be found in India, Egypt, among the Greeks (Pythagoras), Jews, etc.

§ 239.

In order to awaken the true idea of immortality, it was necessary, firstly, entirely to destroy the conception of a continuous or renewed life of the soul on or under this earth; and secondly, to establish the idea of the transition of souls from an earthly to a super-earthly habitation (heaven). The ancient opinion of the Jews respecting the nether world (*a*) had, in the time of Jesus, become modified, inasmuch as they held it to be divided into two parts, Paradise and Gehenna (*b*), the first being the abode of good, the second of wicked souls (Luke xvi. 22, xxiii. 43; Acts ii. 31-34; 1 Peter iii. 19, iv. 6); this state was however believed to be so imperfect and joyless as to be called death (*c*), and was regarded as the consequence of sin (*d*). The foundation of this opinion rested

on the belief that the unregenerate man who continued in sin could not attain the transition to a higher and more blissful existence.

(a.) *Vide* § 22. In Luther's translation of the Bible, the expressions are not distinctly enough marked : the word *Hell* stands usually for the Hebrew word *Scheol* and the Greek *Hades*, but it should only be used where *Gehenna* is meant in the New Testament.

(b.) *Gehenna*, Γέεννα, the Hebrew עִמְלֵקִים *"the valley of Hinnom,"* where children were sacrificed to Moloch (1 Kings xi. 7 ; 2 Kings xvi. 3, 4, xxxiii. 10). In later times the bodies of criminals, unclean animals, etc., were burned there ; hence the term "*Gehenna*" was likewise used to denominate the place of punishment for wicked human souls. Its figurative description has been derived in part from the Dead Sea (hence the description of Hell as a lake burning with fire and brimstone, fire-torment, Matt. xiii. 42 ; 2 Peter ii. 6 ; Acts xiv. 10), and in part from the ancient notion of Hades (hence as a place of darkness, Matt. xxv. 30 ; Jude 6, 13), and in part from the grave (hence the picture in Mark ix. 44-48).

(b.) In the New Testament death (*θάνατος*) is everywhere placed in opposition to eternal life, and is there considered as the continuing punishment for sin. In these passages the mortality of the body is not understood, but the deprivation of life, especially eternal life, by God. Thus John v. 24, when he says, "He that learneth my words, and believeth in me, shall not come into condemnation (into judgment, *i. e.* death in consequence of sin), but is passed from death unto life." Parallel passages appear in this Epistle, and in Rom. v. 12 *sq.* ; 1 Cor. xv. 21 *sq.*, 54-57 ; 1 Thess. iv. 13 *sq.* ; 2 Tim. i. 10. The bodily death is considered as a natural thing : *vide* 1 Cor. xv. 38, 42-50 ; 2 Cor. v. 1-4 ; Heb. xi. 13.

(d.) This is proved by Rom. v. 12 *sq.*

§ 240.

Jesus and the Apostles, in reference partly to the just-mentioned views of their Jewish contemporaries, and partly to those of the Greeks and Romans, teach that there is after death a *resurrection* to a new life (a), as the soul, after the death of its earthly body, shall be newly clothed (b) with a body composed of the purified elements of the natural one, and capable of knowledge

and feeling; that it shall be entirely separated from this earthly life (*c*); that with this entrance into a new life there will commence a state of retribution (*d*), when they who continue in sin shall be separated from the good, and go for amendment (*e*) into a world full of sufferings (*f*); but those who are freed from sin shall be received into a more blessed and perfect sphere (*g*), where, by mutual intercourse (*h*), they shall attain to a state of still higher perfection and happiness (*i*). Furnished with enlarged powers of perception, these beings will appear in an entirely new (*k*) world, of which we have no conception.

(*a*.) Although the Resurrection and the Ascension to heaven is described, 1 Cor. xv. 52, 1 Thess. iv. 16 *sq.*, and in other passages, as but *one* change which will happen but *once*, yet other passages may be found where the heavenly life is represented as beginning directly after the death of the individual. Thus, even if the statement of Luke xvi. 22 *sq.* and xxiii. 43 is not taken into consideration, it is yet plainly expressed in John v. 24: "And shall *not* come into condemnation" (in Luther's translation, "into judgment," "in das Gericht"), *i. e.* he shall not come into the state of death in Hades, but has received the assurance that on his death he will rise to eternal life (comp. 1 John iii. 14 *sq.*). In his Epistle to Philemon, i. 23, St. Paul views "the departure" and "the being with Christ" in heaven, as two states closely allied. A similar idea is also expressed in 2 Cor. v. 8, Heb. ix. 27, iv. 1, where this life is compared to the Israelites' pilgrimage through the wilderness, and the felicity of heaven to their rest in the Land of Promise, and the entrance into the eternal as intimately connected with the departure from this earthly life. In Heb. xii. 22-28 the souls of the departed, and in Rev. vi. 9-11, vii. 13-17, the souls of the Martyrs, are described as already dwelling in heaven: John v. 28, also Acts xxiv. 15, refers to the general resurrection.

(*b*.) This idea is expressed by Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 51 *sq.*; 2 Cor. v. 1-4; Phil. iii. 21. This new body is called angelic, heavenly, spiritual, glorified, immortal: Luke xx. 35 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xv. 42, 44, 47, 48, 52, 54; Phil. iii. 21.

(*c*.) *Vide* the passages Note (*a*) and John xiv. 2, 3, "In my Father's house are many mansions," etc.; Phil. iii. 20, "Our conversation (better, *home*) is in heaven;" Heb. iii. 1, x. 34; compare Acts ii. 31-34. Men are strangers and pilgrims on the earth, and heaven is their country, Heb. xi. 13-16.

(d.) The final retribution is described as a judgment and a sentence, John v. 20, 29; Acts x. 42, xvii. 31; 1 Thess. iv. 16; compare Matt. xvi. 27 sq., xxv. 31 sq.

(e.) The separation of the good from the wicked, Matt. vii. 22, xiii. 41 sq., xxv. 31 sq. The world of suffering is represented, like Gehenna, as second death (return to the state in Hades), Rev. xx. 6, 11-14; xxi. 8; 1 John iii. 14 sq. The state of the wicked is the opposite to everlasting life (John iii. 16, v. 29). The wicked will be excluded from the community of the just, and will suffer great pain in Gehenna (Matt. xiii. 48 sq.; 2 Thess. i. 9). The punishment therefore will not consist in the torment of a wicked conscience alone, but also in the state of that world which they will inhabit. That their condition has grades may be concluded from Matt. x. 15, xi. 22-24; Luke x. 12, xii. 47 sq. Causes of damnation are mentioned in the New Testament, as, continuing in immorality of life (Rom. ii. 6-16; Matt. vii. 21, xxv. 41 sq.; 1 Cor. vi. 9); constant and wilful rejection of the Divine revelation (John iii. 18; 2 Thess. i. 8, ii. 12), and apostasy from Christianity (Mark viii. 34 sq., xvi. 16); for "but he that believeth not," should be "but he who turns apostate" (Heb. x. 26 sq.; 2 Peter ii. 1-3).

(f.) The state of the wicked is hypothetically eternal, *i. e.* if they do not repent. That repentance may and can happen, is taught not alone by the nature of the matter itself, but also by Luke xvi. 27 sq.; moreover *vide* § 142. The overruling of sinful action to the furtherance of Divine purposes, stipulates the possibility of the repentant sinner renouncing his sins, *i. e.* he can by this means become quiet in his conscience.

(g.) This is contained in the expressions 'heaven,' 'paradise.' The deliverance from the corruptions of the sinful nature, Rom. viii. 21 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 1-9; 2 Thess. i. 7; 2 Cor. iv. 17. That grades of happiness will exist, is found in Luke xii. 47 sq., xix. 16-19; Rom. ii. 6; 2 Tim. iv. 8.

(h.) John xvii. 24; 1 Thess. iv. 13-18; 2 Thess. ii. 1; Heb. xii. 22-24.

(i.) Matt. v. 8, xxv. 21; 1 Cor. xiii. 9-12, 13. The idea, verse 12, "For now we see through a glass darkly," would be more correctly expressed, "Now the future appears to us dark and obscure, as though looking at it in a speculum (ἑσπεριον):" verse 13, "Now abideth faith, hope, charity."

(k.) 2 Peter iii. 7-13; Rev. xx. 1. As to the man born blind, this world would, if he received eyesight, appear as a new sphere; even so to the spirit endowed with enlarged faculties will be the appearance of the next world (1 Cor. ii. 9).

§ 241.

The overthrow of the ancient theory, that the departed remained on earth, was especially effected by the resurrection and ascension of Jesus, as the emblem of that which should happen to every Christian after death (*a*). To comfort the then living respecting the fate of their pious forefathers, who were (especially by the Jews) believed to be in the nether world, the Apostles taught that redemption from the state of death was not alone extended to the Living, but also to those departed prior to the time of Jesus, and that He, when his soul rose from Hades, had at the same time liberated from thence the souls of their pious forefathers (*b*).

(*a*.) Jesus himself, and especially his resurrection, are not considered as the only pledges of immortality (1 Cor. xv. 21 *sq.*; John iii. 15 *sq.*, vi. 27, 29, 40, viii. 51); but the Holy Spirit also, or rather its operation, namely the enlightenment and sanctification of the soul for a better existence, which Paul calls the earnest of the eternal life (Rom. viii. 11-17; 2 Cor. v. 5 *sq.*; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30).

(*b*.) Christ's descent into Hell: *vide* Eph. iv. 9; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Peter iii. 19 *sq.* All these passages are dark, and, when they plainly teach a descent into Hades, can only be considered as consolatory to the Jewish readers, but not as a doctrine of Faith for us.

§ 242.

It was the especial calling of Jesus to redeem man from sin and the fear of death, or to lead him to freedom and the hope of immortality (Matt. xviii. 11; John i. 12, 13, iii. 15 *sq.*, 36, v. 24, viii. 51, xi. 25 *sq.*, xvii. 2, 3). Christianity therefore is throughout described as the institution of Salvation, and Jesus, as his name signifies (*a*), the *Saviour* (Σωτήρ), Prototype and Father of the free, spiritual man, as compared with Adam, the Prototype and Father of the natural, sinful man (Rom. v. 14 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xv. 45 *sq.*).

(a.) Jesus, according to the Hebrew, Saviour, Redeemer, Deliverer, one who brings blessings : Matt. i. 21 ; Luke i. 31, ii. 21 ; John iv. 42.

§ 243.

Jesus proved himself a Saviour from sin, firstly, by his doctrine, in which he not only instructed man in a true knowledge of God, the Divine law, and immortality, but also intended this knowledge to be the common property of all, and, by this, enlightened and prepared men for, and led them to freedom and to deliverance from the dominion of sin (a), which is also to be regarded as a reconciliation of man with God, since sin is a state of enmity with God.

(a.) Luke iv. 18–21 ; John i. 12 sq. ; 1 John iii. 3–10 ; Eph. ii. 1–5, iv. 20 sq. ; Tit. ii. 11, 12 sq. Christianity therefore is called, James i. 25, the perfect law of liberty ; Jesus, therefore a prophet (Matt. xiii. 57), teacher (Matt. xxiii. 8, 10), the light of the world (John viii. 12, xii. 46).

§ 244.

Jesus proved himself a Saviour from sin, secondly, by his life ; his being the perfect model of a life of the purest morality (a), which places before us, even in very difficult duties (b), the possibility of attaining to the moral aim, and still further urges us to its imitation by the symbol of retribution, consisting in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus to God (d), consequent on his virtuous life ; thus holding forth to us a powerful motive for the imitation of his example.

(a.) Heb. vii. 26 sq. ; 1 John. iii. 5 ; 1 Peter i. 19, ii. 22 ; 2 Cor. v. 21. The value of these apostolic testimonies.

(b.) In placing before us the duty of loving our enemies, of sacrificing worldly advantages and life for duty, the suffering of wrong without revenging it or redressing it by unlawful means.

(c.) *Vide* § 282. The objects for our imitation are not so much the several actions of Jesus, as the motives which formed the foundation of his actions. To put on Jesus Christ, Rom. xiii. 14 ; Eph. iii. 17.

(d.) Philipp. ii. 8, 9.

(e.) Rom. iv. 25, "was raised again for our justification" (Redemption from sin); 1 Peter i. 3; compare John xii. 50; Luke x. 25 sq.

§ 245.

Jesus proved himself a Saviour from sin, thirdly, by suffering death on the cross, which act is placed in connection with the work of salvation for a threefold reason: firstly, because it was the death of a sinless man; secondly, that of the Son of God; and thirdly, because it was a death determined by God, by the accomplishing of which Jesus showed a perfect obedience to the Divine command (a). The general opinion of Christ's death is, not only (b) that he suffered for the best of men, but more especially as a sacrifice for the sinner (c), and for the atonement of sins committed prior to conversion to Christianity (d); that this sacrifice cleanses from all sin, and awakens to a holy life (e); and that it laid the foundation of the Christian Church, by means of which mankind will be led to Freedom and be emancipated from the dominion of sin (f).

(a.) That Jesus died innocent, without sin, Heb. vii. 26 sq. That he died as the Son of God, *vide* John and Paul, *e. g.* Rom. viii. 32; John iii. 14, vi. 10, 17, 18. That he died in obedience to the Divine law, Matt. xvi. 21-23; Mark viii. 31 sq.; John xiv. 31; Rom. v. 19; Phil. ii. 8; Heb. x. 5, 6.

(b.) John x. 11 sq., iii. 14 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. iv. 25.

(c.) John, etc. In these passages it is not declared how their sense is to be understood, neither is there any mention of those sins for which this sacrifice was offered.

(d.) This rests on the time being stated, Rom. v. 8, 11, "when we were enemies with God," unconverted Christians. Comp. 6, 8; Heb. vi. 6; 1 Peter ii. 24; and probably also John ii. 2.

(e.) 1 John i. 7. "The blood (*i. e.* the sacrificial death) of Christ cleanseth from sin," *i. e.* from all unrighteousness, from the further commission of sin as verse 9 shows. From the death of Christ it is frequently concluded that the Christian should no more commit sin, *e. g.* 1 Pet. ii. 24; 1 Cor. vi. 20; Tit. ii. 14; compare v. 12; Heb. ix. 14.

(*f.*) Matt. xxvi. 28 ; compare xx. 28 ; Luke xxii. 20 ; John xi. 50-52 ; 1 John iii. 6 ; 1 Cor. vii. 23 ; 1 Peter i. 18 *sq.*

§ 246.

The doctrine of the Atonement should partly destroy the Theory of the state of death in the nether world, as a punishment for sin ; because this theory, in its subjective consequences upon the human mind, weakened the eagerness for moral freedom, since no mortal man can feel himself perfectly innocent ; partly too it should abolish the elder and more deeply rooted conception which regarded sacrifices as reconciliatory equivalents for obedience to the Divine law, which conception destroyed the idea of the holiness of the law, and of the absolute necessity of virtue ; but these (ideas) should be so abolished as to assure the mind of the perfect holiness of the law ; and that the substitute provided (*a*) satisfied that holiness, and took on himself the punishment of those only who amended. Therefore the Christian revelation was by these means connected with the ancient religious ideas, in a manner the most conformable to them, without occasioning a difference so wide as to endanger morality.

From the doctrines specified in § 245 we therefore draw the important lessons :—1. That, according to God's will, punishment and sin shall be transitory ; that therefore, when the sinner truly repents, the grace of God and the way to eternal life shall not be closed to him ; for without this conviction the sinner would not have courage to strive to amend his life. 2. That sacrifices and other reconciliatory works are unnecessary and useless, since they abolish neither guilt nor punishment, nor can replace the want of obedience to the Divine laws. The obedience to the will of God (*b*), shown by Jesus, teaches, 3, That life is not our most valuable possession,

but that the moral law, as a universal law, ranks higher than life, and can demand life as a sacrifice to it; that liberty consists in obedience to the Good, and is not the choice which may be made between good and evil; and that the destiny of man is not to enjoy the pleasures of the world, but to execute the will of God. In conclusion, 4, The death of Jesus, as it stands in connection with his resurrection, is a confirmation of the truth of his whole doctrine, upon which the early Church of Christ, as an institution of Salvation, was founded, and which we have still as a valuable pledge for our Faith in the Christian doctrine in general, and especially in that of immortality.

(a.) It was a general opinion in the *first centuries* that the death of Jesus as a ransom had liberated men from the power of the nether world, and procured for them a life with God (Immortality). But a clearer idea was soon received, which was perfectly developed by the schoolman Anselm (Archbishop of Canterbury, in the beginning of the eleventh century), namely that by sinning man dishonours God, and, since the majesty of God is eternal, brings on himself eternal guiltiness, and therefore that the sacrifice of a mere mortal was insufficient, and that nothing less than the sacrifice of an incarnate God could be accepted as of sufficient worth to satisfy and re-establish the blemished honour of the Deity, and to blot out the eternal guiltiness. This was the work of Jesus, whose voluntary sacrificial death, as being the sacrificial death of an incarnate God, was of eternal worth, the merit of which God transfers to man, on that account regarding him as innocent.—*Justification*.—This theory is followed by Luther, and the symbolical books of our Church. On the other hand, the opposition of the Socinians induced Hugo Grotius ('*Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione Christi adversus Faust. Socin.*,' Lugd. Bat. 1617–8) to receive this doctrine in the following manner:—Not God himself, but the Divine law, is offended by sin. Without infringing the holiness of the latter, God cannot *remit* the punishment of eternal death, incurred by original sin, unless this sin is atoned for by a substitute. Christ, the sinless, offered himself to suffer the punishment for man, if by this means man might be pardoned. God agreed to accept this death as a satisfactory equi-

valent for the sin of man, and in consequence of this now pardons him.

(b.) *Vide* John xiv. 31.

3. *Christian Ethics.*

§ 247.

Virtue, in the Christian sense (*a*), consists in the constant striving to assimilate our minds to a likeness with God, or, which is the same, to Perfection or Liberty, or, to use the words of the New Testament, to pay a child-like obedience (§ 230) to that which must be acknowledged, either from Holy Scripture or from Reason and Conscience, Rom. ii. 14, 15, to be the general (*b*) will of God. This striving must be always progressive, and have for its highest and noblest foundation love to God (*c*) (or, in other terms, to Perfection): Gal. vi. 9; 2 Thess. iii. 13; Col. i. 10; Phil. i. 9 *sq.*; Matt. xxii. 35 *sq.*; 1 John ii. 3–5, iii. 24, v. 3.

(*a*.) The word virtue in its moral sense is not to be found in the Holy Scriptures, but other equivalent expressions, as observance of the laws of God, *δικαιοσύνη* (Matt. v. 6, etc.), perfecting holiness, *ἀγιοσύνη* (2 Cor. vii. 1), *εὐσέβεια*, Godliness, Piety, and others.

(*b*.) Care must be taken in studying the Holy Scripture not to confound general duties with those that regard the individual alone; and of the latter, those only are to be taken which, as general sentiments, concern every man; *e. g.* the demands of Jesus (Matt. xix. 31) only concerned those who would be followers of His earthly life: for us, its general sentiment is, that the higher blessings are to be preferred to low and transitory possessions; that he who desires to be a true Christian must hold love for earthly things as subordinate to the love for perfection or heavenly things: it is therefore an abuse of these passages to infer from them that voluntary poverty was a part of Christian perfection.

(*c*.) Reinhardt explains the love of God in the New Testament acceptance of the expression ('Moral,' vol. ii. p. 34), as the ruling endeavour (arising from the full approval of all institutions founded by God for our welfare and mental improvement) to become, by as exact a fulfilment of his laws as possible, more and more worthy of His approbation, and more and more like Him.

§ 248.

Agreeably both to reason and law, there exists but one virtue, because all law arises from *one* holy will of God, namely the continuous and entire submission of our will and actions to the commands of duty or the will of God. But in regard to this matter there exist several virtues, or individual duties (according to the difference of the subject to which duty and its purport relate), which will, according to § 106, be now more closely explained.

(a.) *Man's Duties towards himself.*

§ 249.

Man's duties to himself are restricted, according to § 105, to this general rule,—treat thyself according to thy dignity as man, or according to such rules as must be regarded as general laws for all rational beings; or, strive to conform thyself, as far as thy nature or circumstances permit, to the likeness of God.

§ 250.

As it is designed that every man shall develop his talents and powers agreeably to his nature, so the greater the talents he possesses the more will duty require of him to accomplish (a) (Matt. xx. 1 *sq.*, xxv. 14 *sq.*; Luke xii. 47 *sq.*). But all men must be satisfied with the gifts received from Nature, because God has distributed them (Rom. xii. 3–8; 1 Cor. xii. 7 *sq.*). Therefore it is the duty of every man to become acquainted with himself (Matt. vii. 3–5), *i. e.* with the natural talents he has received, and his mental development in each period of his life.

(a.) In opposition to this endeavour, stands *Idleness*, the fault which fears and shuns every exertion of power. *Loitering*, which flies from

a purposeful activity when attended with exertion, and wastes time either by doing nothing or by aimless doing, dreaming, playing. Value of time; consequences of a wise use of time, especially to students: *Ars longa, vita brevis*. Importance of *variety* of knowledge, especially in *science*; duty of becoming acquainted with every science which one has ability and opportunity to learn. (Study for a maintenance.)

§ 251.

We must especially esteem the dignity of our rational nature, and show this esteem in all our actions (James i. 9, iii. 9) (*a*); we must also cultivate our mental, which are our nobler powers, and on which our dignity rests (Mark viii. 36; Luke ix. 25, xii. 31, x. 40-42), and, as they are capable of perfection, we must develope (*b*) them more and more, till they approach the ideal of perfection (Matt. v. 48), remembering our immortal destination (Heb. xiii. 14). But as the aim of perfection is endless (1 Cor. xiii. 9-11), it is necessary to combine with the consciousness of our acquired perfection and our merits, true humility (*c*) (2 Cor. x. 12 *sq.*; Rom. xii. 3, 16; Phil. iii. 12 *sq.*), *i. e.* to possess a lively consciousness that we are still at a distance from our pattern (Jesus Christ).

(*a.*) Self-esteem, that feeling which reminds us in all our actions of the dignity of a rational and free being. In opposition to this stands abjectness and servility. A servile nature cares so little about human dignity that it suffers this dignity to be wounded by others, and wounds it carelessly in others; that is, a being of such a nature suffers himself to be treated as a something lower than man, and extends the same treatment to his fellow-men.

(*b.*) This development should extend to all the mental powers proportionally, as far as the natural talents and circumstances of the individual allow (comp. § 98). Partial education of those especially intended for certain stations, *e. g.* Philologists, Theologians, Jurists.

(*c.*) In opposition to humility, stands pride, immodesty, self-sufficiency.

§ 252.

We must seek to enrich our intellect with useful knowledge of every kind, especially such as belongs to our profession, and carefully use for this purpose those years exclusively devoted to the acquisition of knowledge (*a*). The *True* in every relation, but especially the rationally true (Rom. xv. 14), being always the Good, should be regarded by us as holy (*b*), and we must not only zealously seek for it (Eph. iv. 13 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xiv. 20; Heb. xiii. 9), but also respect it above everything (Luke xiv. 26 *sq.*; Acts xx. 23 *sq.*; 2 Cor. xiii. 8), and profess and further it (Matt. xxvi. 69 *sq.*; Acts iv. 19 *sq.*, v. 29). Condemnation and persecution of the *True* is a great moral crime (Matt. xxiii. 37; Luke xiii. 34 *sq.*).

(*a*.) Special duty of students. It is impossible to retrieve that which is lost in school or college.

(*b*.) The "*love of the True*," *i. e.* the constant striving to bring our knowledge more and more into harmony and certainty, and, by acknowledgment and representation, to maintain the dignity of a rational being. To the lover of the True, therefore, not only is the *quality* of the True and the freedom of his ideas from contradictions of importance, but that the *material* of the True, the substance of his ideas should be real, *i. e.* "perfectly conformable to his wants and his position in this world" (Reinhardt's 'Moral,' vol. ii. p. 184) is equally important. Opposed to the love of Truth, stands a lying disposition, which delights in spreading deception, and goes as far as in the end to belie itself (John viii. 44). Stubbornness of opinion, delusions of selfishness respecting truth.

§ 253.

But knowledge raises itself above mere self-serving prudence to wisdom (Matt. x. 16), because it combines, with the culture of the intellect, a formation to true morality. It is our duty to endeavour after a perfect subordination (*a*) of our instinct to reason or Divine law (§ 229), to make every moral perfection our own, and

to avoid all immorality (Phil. iv. 8; Matt. vi. 19–22, v. 29 *sq.*); for as the whole Divine law rests on *one* holy foundation (James ii. 10, 11), all the commandments, not alone the easy, but the difficult, should be held sacred by us (Matt. xxiii. 24; Luke xi. 41 *sq.*). We must therefore endeavour after a perfect knowledge of the moral law, as well in regard to the nature as to the amount of its commandments; and at the same time strive after such stability of moral character (Heb. xii. 4, xii. 13; comp. Matt. x. 28) as that virtue should become a *habit* (*b*), and we should prefer the Divine law to every human will (Matt. xv. 3, 6; Acts v. 29) and every earthly advantage (Matt. xviii. 8; Mark ix. 43 *sq.*), fulfilling this law from pure motives, and consequently without venality (Luke xiv. 12 *sq.*) (§ 230 *sq.*).

(*a.*) *Subordination* of instinct to the Divine law is not, as monkish asceticism commands, a destruction of instinct, which is unnatural and in most cases impossible. Instinct in itself is not sinful, but only becomes so when it stands above the law.—Self-control.

(*b.*) Virtue consists in victory over instinct, and is only in its embryo (§ 110) when it struggles with sin. It is only from a wrong idea of moral freedom (§ 113) that it can be believed that the performance of every duty involves a struggle with the inclination to do the opposite. The opinion that the fulfilling of duty from habit is no virtue in the eyes of God is also false.

§ 254.

As duty requires the whole spiritual nature to be drawn near to the pattern of perfection, it is necessary to awaken a *taste* for the perfect; and therefore not only a taste for the True and Good, but also for the *Beautiful*, must be aroused. For the Beautiful (§ 44) (or the perfection of the Form) is a reflection of the intrinsic excellence of the Creator, and a consequence of His perfection, as well as the True and Good. From

the internal order also, and moral beauty which arise in man by the dominion of the True and Good, the feeling for the Beautiful must awaken and show itself in our external conduct. It is therefore our duty to animate and exalt in our nature the taste for the Beautiful, and thus to impart to our activity the *Form* of perfection. We must bring order and connection into our knowledge, and learn to communicate (*a*) it to others in a pleasing, clear, and convincing manner. Our actions must be conformable not only to morality, but to propriety (*b*), or the law of harmony and beauty. Thus things in themselves allowable may, by their want of propriety and decency (1 Cor. vi. 12, x. 23, 25), become disallowable. As language is a product of reason, and the means by which the spiritual education is exhibited, we must endeavour to speak not only correctly, but well and amiably (Col. iv. 6; James i. 26, iii. 1, 18; 1 Pet. iii. 10), and avoid all obscure, false, and even useless talking (Eph. iv. 29, 31, v. 3 *sq.*) (*c*). The taste for order and perfection must be visible in our works, in the arrangement of our household, in our outward conduct, attitudes, and attire, and in the choice of our amusements and pleasures (*d*). The habits of our external life, regulated according to the rule of perfection, react beneficially upon the moral regulation of our minds.

(*a*.) Herein Jesus, by his mode of teaching, exhibits to us an instructive pattern. To acquire the art of communicating our ideas in a clear manner is a duty towards our fellow-men (misunderstandings and their disadvantages). Combine truth with clearness.

(*b*.) Propriety is the skill which unites the principles of a virtuous mind with the claims of right conduct and good breeding, in such a way that by it both are satisfied. There are many duties where the suitable and pleasing manner in which we fulfil them is very essential, *e. g.* in exercising charity, speaking truth, blaming, praising, where frequently all good effect of the action is destroyed by the defective manner in which the same was performed.

(c.) This is an especial duty for students : they must early accustom themselves to speak correctly and well (talk with propriety, avoid swearing, low expressions, vulgar abuse, common grammatical errors, etc.). What politeness and good education here require, duty also claims. The tongue is, still more than the countenance, a mirror of the soul.

(d.) Cleanliness, decent attire, attitudes, dress (use simplicity, avoid singularity or offensiveness, overdressing, and uselessness in dress). Faultiness of rude and boisterous outbreaks of joy, of roaring, drinking, joking, ribaldry, etc.

§ 255.

The educated man, who lives conformably to duty, has a claim on the respect of others or on their good opinion, and to a treatment, *i. e. honour* (a), corresponding with it. As we ought always to act according to principles which have validity with every rational man, the judgment of men wiser and better than ourselves, ought not to be indifferent to us. Their esteem is not only an assurance of the correctness of our conduct (b), but an important and allowable means for the furtherance of our welfare and moral progress. It is therefore our duty to have a regard for our honour (1 Cor. ix. 15; Phil. iv. 8), to shun all appearance of evil (1 Cor. x. 23-29), and to defend and restore our injured honour by lawful and dispassionate means (Matt. xii. 22 *sq.*; John viii. 12 *sq.*) (c).

(a.) This is our natural honour; the *honour belonging to rank* is that which is awarded by the laws to us as members of the community. These species of honour are essentially different. The desire for honour is called ambition,—immoderate ambition, if it longs passionately to be honoured before men only for the honour's sake, and especially for civil honour. Love for natural honour preserves us from evil; ambition to gain civil honour easily leads to abjectness.

(b.) Especially for youth during the period of education, who must trust to the judgment of enlightened and right-thinking men.

(c.) We should check our emotion and anger, and put off their expression until we are calm; we should examine ourselves whether

we are the guilty party, or whether an insult was intended, etc. (irritability, quarrelsomeness). Our *duel* was not known to the ancient civilized nations, much as they valued honour and bravery; it is a remnant of the middle ages, transmitted to us through the nobility and military,—a mockery of legal protection, a crime against the State, our families, and ourselves, but no means of restoring honour except in the opinion of a small class of men blinded by prejudices, to whom, if they will not renounce it, we should leave it exclusively.

§ 256.

As sensitive life is the negative motive to our whole earthly activity and human development, it is our duty, 1st, *to preserve our life*, and not to shorten the earthly term permitted us for education, either by direct (violent) or indirect (gradual) destruction of our lives (*a*); 2nd, by judicious means to *restore our health*, if it has suffered; 3rd, to maintain our body in *integrity* (*b*), to exercise its powers and organs in *useful* (1 Cor. xiv. 1–19, 26) arts; and to honour the body as the work of the wisdom and goodness of God by cleanliness (Matt. vi. 17), by a decent and judicious dress, and by accustoming it to gracefulness and propriety (§ 254). As a chief means for preserving health stands temperance, especially in eating and drinking (Tit. ii. 1–6; 1 Tim. ii. 9; 1 Pet. iv. 3); in amusements (Rom. xiii. 13), particularly in dancing and other pleasures, allowable in a moderate degree (John ii. 1 *sq.*; 1 Thess. v. 16) as a beneficial excitement of the powers of our bodies (Eph. v. 18; Rom. xiii. 14; Luke xxi. 34).

(*a*.) But we may adventure life for a higher possession. “Life is not the highest possession” (Mark viii. 34–38; 1 John iii. 16). According to Reinhardt’s ‘Moral,’ vol. ii. p. 521, it is right to venture or sacrifice life under the following circumstances: in cases of collision; if we cannot save life but by a faithless denying of truth; if we must purchase it by crimes plainly against conscience; if a lawful duty calls to an undertaking attended with great dangers, or to death for the

general good or for that of individuals ; or when extraordinary events call to duties which involve evident risk of life.

(b.) *Mens sana in corpore sano.* (Dangerous professions, or dangerous and rash deeds of vanity which risk life, health, and integrity of the body.) Usefulness of judicious and moderate gymnastic exercises.

§ 257.

The duty of chastity is of especial importance, since nothing (especially in youth) destroys the powers both of mind and body more effectually than an early and immoderate indulgence of the sexual impulse, particularly unnatural lusts (Rom. i. 24, 16 ; 1 Cor. vi. 12, 20 ; 1 Thess. iv. 3 *sq.* ; Gal. v. 19 *sq.*). Hence arise nervousness and injury to the cheerful development of the whole life (a). The consequences of early excess produce social disadvantages which it is frequently impossible to remove, take away the power of exertions demanded by duty and honour, lead to shamelessness and abjectness, and generally unfit for the pleasures of a future happy married life.

(a.) Nothing emasculates man and a whole age more than excess of lust. Effeminacy, disgust for solid learning, disposition to loitering and sensual dissipations, overstrained sentimentality, morbid imaginations, and with these an inclination to superstition, riotousness, and bigotry, are the consequences as well as the symptoms of a deterioration produced by the abuse of the generative powers. We would strongly advise all youth to read Hufeland's remarks on the consequences of lust ('Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern : 'The Art of prolonging Human Life, first part of the 2nd volume.)

§ 258.

It is our duty, for the preservation of life, for the furtherance of independence of action, for the formation of character, and for the fulfilment of social duties, to strive after a certain degree of prosperity (2 Thess. iii. 12 (a), but without passion or covetousness (1 Tim.

vi. 6-10; Heb. xiii. 5; Luke xii. 15; Col. iii. 5), and only by lawful and reputable means (Tit. i. 7), especially by honest industry in our employments and by prudent management of our gainings (1 John vi. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 6) (*b*).

(*a*.) Voluntary poverty (*e. g.* religious orders) is therefore not meritorious, but contrary to duty.

(*b*.) Avarice, extravagance; danger of the latter to youth; immorality of the same, especially in regard to parents, brothers, and sisters. Games from thirst of lucre; games of chance.

(*b*.) *Of Man's Social Duties.*

§ 259.

The general law for our feeling and action towards our fellow-men is, according to § 105, "Feel and act towards others on such principles as thy reason acknowledges to be binding on all men;" a law which Matt. vii. 12, Luke vi. 31, has expressed in a popular manner; or, as duty to ourselves and others rests on the same foundation, namely respect for human nature, always act towards others in the way which the feeling of respect for human nature dictates. Christianity expresses this law in the words "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Matt. xxii. 36-40; Mark xii. 29 *sq.*); and in this law is comprehended our whole duty to man (Rom. xiii. 8, 10; Gal. v. 14; James ii. 8); a love which not only urges to the performance of every social duty, but (§ 254, *b*) gives also the most beneficent and suitable form to the fulfilment of duty (1 Cor. xiii. 1, 8). It is clear that this love is to be understood as of a moral (*a*), not of a sensual (pathological) kind, because it springs from love to God (1 John iv. 7, 8, 11), and extends itself to strangers, enemies, offenders, and wicked men.

(a.) This love proceeds from a knowledge of, and respect for, human dignity, and therefore extends itself to all mankind, and is not mere natural kindness or inclination to benevolence. It is one of the great merits of Jesus that he has made this love the fundamental law of his practical doctrines.

§ 260.

Respecting the spiritual welfare of others, love requires that we not only raise no obstacle to the full development of their spiritual powers, but that by every lawful means we further it. We must therefore (1) lead their intellect to the knowledge of truth (Matt. v. 16; Luke xv. 1 *sq.*), but only by allowed means, conformably to the liberty of conviction in others, without importunity, blind zeal (Matt. xxiii. 15), or force (Matt. xxiii. 34 *sq.*; Luke ix. 54 *sq.*; Acts viii. 3; Gal. i. 13) (a). Veracity is therefore a social duty from which, when truth is demanded or expected of us, we ought never to swerve; further (2), it is a duty to educate their will for the love of the Good, and their *taste* for the perception of Propriety (Mark ii. 17; Rom. xiv. 19, xv. 2), and for this purpose to lead them to the Good by example, and to avoid giving offence, to say nothing of intentional seduction to vice (b) (Matt. xviii. 6; Luke xvii. 1; Mark ix. 42; Rom. xiv. 13).

(a.) No proselytism, intolerance, *pia fraud*, inquisitions, obscuring system, nor the least persecution of the higher knowledge (Matt. xxiii. 37; Luke xiii. 34 *sq.*).

(b.) Offence, anything by which we either mislead the moral judgment of others or induce the domination of instinct. Seduction by youth of each other to laziness, excess—their great immorality.—Value of example.

§ 261.

Philanthropy will generally be shown in the respect paid to human nature, or the habit, under all circumstances, of feeling and acknowledging its dignity (Matt.

xviii. 1-11, xxv. 40); a habit which stands opposed to pride, misanthropy, and contempt of mankind (James ii. 1-9, iv. 6, i. 10; 1 Peter v. 5). Philanthropy is further shown by a benevolent sympathy in all the affairs of mankind (*a*); in the zeal for all that concerns public benefits, and in a lively regard for the welfare of others (Rom. xii. 18; 1 Peter iii. 8), which, according to the example of Jesus, ought not to be extinguished by suffering or injury. In opposition to Philanthropy are, selfishness, hard-heartedness, rejoicing at the misfortunes of others, envy, cruelty, etc.

(*a*.) "Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto" (Terent. Heaut. i. 1, 25). Cicero, De Offic. i. 9; De Legib. i. 12.

§ 262.

In regard to the health and life of others, love demands that we preserve the same; that therefore when their life is in danger we endeavour to preserve it; that we nurse the sick (Matt. xxv. 35 *sq.*; 1 Thess. v. 14), and procure advice and means to save their life or to restore their health (*a*); and it equally forbids us to take life by our own hand or to employ others in such a service (Matt. v. 21; Rom. xiii. 9; James ii. 11) (*b*), or purposely to expose others to a risk of life; to undermine (*c*) their health by maliciously grieving or vexing them (Matt. v. 21 *sq.*; 1 John iii. 15); to mutilate their bodies, or, from frivolity, to act in such a way towards them as to endanger (*d*) their lives.

(*a*.) It is therefore important, especially for those educated for the Church, to acquire some knowledge of medicine; but they must avoid mistakes, and, in doubtful cases, take the advice of a physician; the practice of recommending household medicines in doubtful cases, or contrary to the opinion of a physician, is dangerous and reprehensible. —Care against burying living persons.

(*b*.) Except in self-defence or in war, when the State defends itself

against the encroachments of other States, and in capital punishments, where the State legally defends itself against individuals.

(c.) This is especially to be borne in mind by children and scholars in their conduct towards parents and teachers.

(d.) Belonging to this is the *penalismus** in schools, the compelling to immoderate drinking, making dangerous jokes, especially by exciting terror, imprudent use of arms, gunpowder, poison.—Duelling, especially of the quarrel-seeker.

§ 263.

Regarding the just claims others have on us, duty and love require that we fulfil them faithfully and willingly (Matt. vii. 12, 21; James v. 5 *sq.*), for conscience' sake, and neither from compulsion nor fear of the punishment attendant on their non-performance; on the other hand, love requires that we demand from others services due to us with equity (moderation of strict right) (Matt. vii. 12, xviii. 21).

§ 264.

Respecting the *property* of others, love requires not only that we abstain from all encroachments on it, either by violence or cunning (Eph. iv. 28; 1 Cor. vi. 10), but that we, without envy, further their prosperity (Gal. v. 20). In regard to their honour or reputation, we must neither exaggerate nor publish their faults (Matt. ix. 3-6), nor rashly put a disadvantageous construction on their actions (Matt. vii. 1; James iv. 11), neither spread false reports (aspersions) (Matt. xii. 37; Rom. i. 30; Eph. iv. 27), nor be guilty of intentionally derogating from their honour, nor of insulting them either by word or deed (Matt. v. 22; Eph. iv. 31; Col. iii. 8), but rather act in opposition to these, and maintain and

* Absurd and shameful treatment of freshmen by elder students in colleges, etc. in Germany; now nearly abolished.—ED.

defend our neighbour's honour exactly as if it were our own (1 Cor. xiii. 5-7).

§ 265.

Towards the indigent, love requires our services, or readiness to use our powers for their good, without regard to compensation (Col. i. 12 *sq.*, xxii.-xxiv.), and *benevolence* (Rom. xii. 13, xv. 26 *sq.*; Matt. xxv. 35 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xvi. 1 *sq.*), by which we give willingly, according to our power (Luke xxi. 1 *sq.*), to alleviate their sufferings; it requires a loving interest and compassion, or such a tender sympathy with their condition as shall urge us to their relief (Luke x. 30 *sq.*; Matt. xix. 20 *sq.*, v. 7). In the bestowal of benefits, love requires that we shun ignoble motives, reproachful giving; that we spare the feelings of the receiver, and do not boast in our charity, nor demand a slavish dependence or a return of services from those we aid (Matt. vi. 1-4, v. 46; Luke vi. 32). Love binds the receiver of benefits to a reciprocal love or gratitude, *i. e.* a conduct by which is shown a lively sense of the value of the benefit (*a*).

(*a*.) Gratitude shows itself by word (*gratias agere*), by sentiment (*gratias habere*), or by deed (*gratias referre*); by the last however only so far that no higher duty suffers. *Ingratitude* (Luke xvii. 11-19)—which does not acknowledge the benefit, soon forgets it, attributes it to base motives or denies it, and assails and grieves the benefactor,—is a vice of which few, even of the inferior animals, are guilty. The basest ingratitude is that shown by children towards their parents, or scholars towards their teachers; because the benefits received by them are the most numerous, unrequitable, and almost always connected with great sacrifice.

§ 266.

The duties of Friendship (John xv. 12, 17, xiii. 23, xi. 1 *sq.*) (*a*) are, that we choose friends with caution, that we treat them with candour, trust, and faith; that we

have a zealous care for their welfare, and do not forsake them in misfortune, but strive to aid their intellectual and moral improvement by love, caution, and fidelity. True friendship must always be founded on esteem (*b*). Secret fraternizations are to be shunned, especially by youth (*c*).

(*a*.) Krug defines Friendship ('Tugendlehre,' p. 303), "a connection of two individuals founded on a high degree of mutual regard, to the common furtherance of their perfection and happiness." Reinhardt ('Moral,' vol. iii. p. 528), "where two persons who feel pre-eminent esteem and affection for each other, mutually show all the duties of Christian brotherly love, as far as circumstances allow, and who in everything share equally, with a confidence only possible in the closest relationship." The weaker the laws, the more imperfect the public security, and domestic life of the ancients, so much higher was the value laid on friendship.

(*b*.) Intercourse with wicked or immoral people is always dangerous, but especially for youth. A due equality of age, mode of living, rank, education, and fortune, if not absolutely necessary, is generally requisite to (perfect) friendship.

(*c*.) You cannot know with certainty beforehand the spirit and tendency of such societies; you engage yourself to an obedience, the extent of which you cannot foresee, and lose part of your natural liberty; you incur a certain loss of time and power; you come in contact with those of whose good conduct you are uncertain; expose yourself to the danger of becoming the tool of the prejudices and passions of a few, and of sharing in the contempt and punishment which, by the faulty or unlawful conduct of single members, may befall the whole community; it is often dangerous to separate again from such societies; they are against the laws of the State. These remarks refer especially to the orders and fraternities of Universities, which have rarely benefited any, but which have proved mischievous to most. Nearly the same may be said of religious societies and orders.

§ 267.

Love must also extend to our *enemies*, *i. e.* those who endeavour to injure us (*a*) (Matt. v. 44-46; Rom. xii. 14, 20 *sq.*; the example of Jesus, Luke xxiii. 34; compare Acts iii. 17, vii. 60). We must not only fulfil the du-

ties of humanity towards them, and treat them as well as other demonstrable duties and true prudence allow us, but must also do them justice, entirely suppress the feelings of revenge (Rom. xii. 17, 19 ; 1 Thess. v. 15), and generously pardon offences which do not demand resistance, or defend ourselves without wantonly irritating or wounding them, and at all times be ready to be reconciled with them (Matt. v. 25, vi. 14 *sq.*, xviii. 21–35; Luke xii. 58, xvii. 3 *sq.*).

(*a.*) The Greeks and Romans, especially the Stoics, also taught this duty. Woolf's 'Comment. Quid de Officiis et Amore erga Inimicos Græcis et Romanis placeat?' (Halle, 1789). "One who by allowed means strives to obtain a possession after which we also seek, but which can only be gained by *one* of us, is our *rival*; one who, in our way to the attainment of our (allowed) object, designedly places hindrances, is our *adversary* or *opponent*; one who does so from unrighteous purpose, and whose actions prove disadvantageous to us, is our *injurer*, and if he continue to be hurtful to us, he is our *enemy*." —Reinhardt's 'Moral,' vol. iii. p. 254 *sq.*

§ 268.

Love commands us to be useful and benevolent to *strangers* and *foreigners* (Luke x. 15 *sq.*; 1 Tim. v. 10), and hospitable (Heb. xiii. 2; 1 Pet. iv. 9); this we owe to the honour of our country and our countrymen in foreign parts. Towards *age*, Love requires that we show respect, modesty, affectionate care, attention to the advice of its experience and wisdom, and forbearance with its weaknesses (1 Tim. v. 1, 2). Towards the dead, that we commit their bodies with respect and decency to the grave; that we preserve their memory, defend their character from unjust attacks (Luke xxiv. 10 *sq.*), and fulfil their expressly declared or understood last will, unless it be contrary to duty and the real well-being of the living. These last duties derive their special interest from the prospect of immortality and reunion after death.

§ 269.

The duty of children, especially in their early years, towards *parents* (guardians) is to obey (Luke ii. 51; Eph. vi. 1; Col. iii. 21), when the latter require nothing immoral; to bear with meekness their faults and weaknesses, to imitate their virtues, and, by an affectionate attention, industry, good conduct, and, when requisite, by pecuniary assistance, to manifest the gratitude they owe them as the authors of their being, the fosterers of their childhood, and their most faithful friends (Matt. xv. 4-6; Mark vii. 9-13). Duties similar to these, though in a lesser degree, are owing by pupils to their faithful teachers. Ingratitude towards parents and teachers has been considered base, even by uncivilized nations (comp. § 265). To servants we owe, not only the esteem which, as human beings and Christians they are entitled to, but justice, equity, patience, and kindness (Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. 1).

§ 270.

As the purpose of matrimony is not alone to propagate the human race, but to develope it fully, and as those who can maintain a family are bound to marry, it follows that a youth should pay an early regard to this important relation. He should acquire that amount of knowledge and skill which will place him in a position to maintain a family, and render himself worthy of a loving wife and conjugal felicity, by chastity and temperance; he should also carefully refrain from entering into early matrimonial engagements, since experience teaches that these generally terminate unhappily (*a*).

(*a*.) A youth undertakes duties which he is not certain he will be able to fulfil; he does not possess sufficient knowledge and experience to

choose prudently; he places fetters which may be galling for his whole future life, or can only be broken by a despicable perfidiousness. He generally acts contrary to the will of his parents; and, when he finds himself in a position to marry, discovers the object of his premature choice, in consequence of the early fading of women, to have lost the bloom and freshness of youth. (Disadvantages of the fanciful, romantic love of youth; comparative difference in the age of the sexes.)

§ 271.

In social intercourse Love requires, 1. *Veracity*, or the candid communication of our ideas, feelings, and will (Eph. iv. 25 *sq.*), unless restricted by the duty of discretion (John xvi. 12), which is stipulated for partly by certain duties, partly by the rights and well-being of others, especially when, either by testimony or oath, a positive duty exists to speak the truth (*a*). 2. *Politeness*, by which we pay to every one that respect which his circumstances and the established rules of propriety demand from us (Rom. xii. 10; Phil. iv. 8; Col. iv. 6) (*b*). 3. *Modesty*, which teaches us not to assert the merits and superiority which we believe we possess unless from a sufficient cause; never to overrate them, and readily respect and acknowledge the merits and superiority of others (Phil. ii. 3) (*c*). 4. *Sociability* (peaceableness), by which we so conduct ourselves as to live on good terms with every one (Rom. xii. 18; Matt. v. 9; Heb. xii. 14), to preserve peace between ourselves and others (Eph. iv. 2 *sq.*; Phil. ii. 2 *sq.*), and heal rising dissensions (1 Cor. iii. 3, 11, 18; James iii. 14 *sq.*) (*d*).

(*a*.) This occurs to youth when examined as witnesses to the bad habits or offences of others. Here veracity is required as a duty towards the Teacher, Schoolfellow, and those who have done wrong. This differs from giving information, especially of a malicious kind. Opposed to *veracity* is falsehood, or an utterance against our better knowledge of that which may hurt others. Dissimulation, deceit, false witness, perjury (Matt. xv. 19; Rom. i. 29, 31; Eph. iv. 25), flattering (Col. iii. 22; Eph. vi. 6), boasting, swaggering, etc.

(b.) Politeness is not opposed to candour, as no one is deceived by it, and such conduct is required by all from us. We should acquaint ourselves with the rules of conventional propriety, and accustom ourselves to their observance. The opposite to politeness is rudeness, rusticity (manners which lay the foundation of many disagreements and quarrels among youth).

(c.) Modesty is highly becoming in youth ; it raises their merits, and disposes others voluntarily to acknowledge them. Impudence is generally the fruit of ignorance.

(d.) Censoriousness, positiveness, irritability, anger.

§ 272.

As a social duty, love for the common weal, the choice of a fixed and useful employment, and faithful industry in the same, is required from us (Rom. xii. 11 ; Eph. iv. xxviii. ; 1 Thess. iv. 11) ; *defence* of our native country in times of danger ; a ready performance of all that is necessary to the preservation of the public good (Matt. xxii. 21 ; Rom. xiii. 6, 7) ; *respect* for the civil ranks and offices (Rom. xiii. 7 ; 1 Cor. xii. 14, 25 ; 1 Pet. ii. 17), and obedience to (Rom. xiii. 1-5 ; Tit. iii. 1 ; 1 Pet. ii. 13 *sq.*) authorities and laws for conscience' sake ; an obedience which should not cease even when the laws and constitution of the country either are or appear to be defective (Matt. xxvi. 51 *sq.*, xvii. 25-27) (a).

(a.) Christianity therefore does not recognize a right to cause revolutions ; and experience also teaches that these are more destructive than the evils they may redress.

§ 273.

Special duties for a youth who devotes himself to science are,—1. *Industry* in all branches of learning, but especially in his chief study ; a zealous use of his *irreparable time* and never returning opportunities. 2. *Earnest endeavour* for his moral education, especially in his transition from school to college, where youth, inexperience, the strength of inclination and feeling, the separation

from parents and tutors, make the greatest attention and self-command necessary. 3. Ardent desire for æsthetic improvement, which excludes immodesty, rudeness, and all other bad habits, often foolishly considered by the student as liberty (*a*). 4. *Chastity*, that health, honour, and conscience may not be injured. 5. *Thriftiness*, especially on account of the sacrifices made by parents. 6. *Moderation* in all pleasures, and avoidance of all pernicious diversions, especially gaming and drinking. 7. To be cautious in *Friendship*; to refrain from duelling and secret societies. 8. To show *respect* towards *teachers*, and *obedience* to existing *laws*. These duties are hallowed not only by performing the general moral duties, but also by paying regard to those owing by a youth to his parents, country, and himself.

(*a*.) Rudeness, coarseness, bluntness, and rusticity are not liberty, but that which their name imports. Liberty in social life cannot exist independently of all authority, because without authority no commonweal is imaginable. Liberty consists in obedience to that Law alone which is the expression of the real or presumed public will, but not in obedience to arbitrariness. To demand for ourselves the protection of the law, and to refuse our own obedience to it, would be a gross inconsistency. Modesty, politeness, and a pleasing behaviour agree well with social liberty.

(*c*.) *Duties towards God, the Divine Doctrine and the Church.*

§ 274.

The perfections of God, and the love shown by him to us in the creation, preservation, and government of the world, is the foundation of that love to Him which Christianity requires, according to which we worship in him the highest essential Good, and acknowledge his will (Law) not only as the will of the Almighty, which can enforce obedience, but as the will of the most Perfect

(wisest and most beneficent), which we find pleasure in obeying (*vide* the passages § 230, c).

§ 275.

Forasmuch as this love refers to God as our Judge, and as the highest Lawgiver of the moral world, it is called *veneration* (Heb. xii. 28; 1 Peter i. 17). Infractions of this duty are, misuse of the name of God (Matt. vi. 9; Luke i. 49); frivolous swearing or appeals to the name of God (Matt. vi. 34–37; James v. 12); and perjury (*a*).

(*a*.) An oath is a given assurance of the truth of a matter, joined to an express appeal to God, the Omniscient and Just (*juramentum assertorium* and *promissorium*). The passages Matt. v. 34–38, James v. 12, do not treat of oaths before magistrates, but of swearing in common life. Every one should thoroughly understand that which he has to confirm by oath. *Perjury* is committed when we confirm by oath that which we know to be false (Matt. v. 55, 37; 1 Tim. i. 10); it is the grossest offence against the common welfare, the deepest degradation of the moral dignity of a human being, and blasphemy against the omniscience and justice of God. Every *reservatio mentalis* is highly blamable. (Comp. Matt. xxiii. 16–22.)

§ 276.

This love, referred to God as the Ruler of the world and our destinies, is called *Trust*, or firm faith that God governs according to the highest wisdom and beneficence (Matt. x. 29 *sq.*; Heb. x. 35, xi. 1 *sq.*; Rom. xii. 12; James i. 6, 7). In our actions this trust is the faith that God, if our intentions entirely conform to his wisdom, will do that for us which we are unable ourselves to effect by permitted means (Matt. vi. 26–33); but this trust differs as much from that *superstition* which does not use the means at its command, but relies upon (*e. g.* in illness) the direct interposition of God (Acts xxvii. 26–38), and does not remove hindrances or prevent calamities

under its control, but considers them to be the will of God,—as from that daring bigotry which foolishly and presumptuously runs into dangers, expecting at the same time assistance from God (Matt. iv. 5, 7).

§ 277.

Love manifests itself in suffering and adversity:—

1. As *Patience* (James i. 12; Rom. xii. 12; 2 Cor. iv. 16 sq.), in so far as it suffers under the conviction that suffering is the wise and beneficent dispensation of God, thus moderating the feeling of displeasure, and showing obedience to and trust in God (1 Cor. x. 13) by a calm and patient endurance of trials (1 Pet. iv. 19), and by using them as a means of correction (Heb. xii. 5, 11).
2. As *Resignation* (Matt. xxvi. 39–42), which, after fruitless use of allowed remedies, considers the sacrifice of some blessings, or the acceptance of affliction, as the will of God, to which it resigns itself with trust and tranquillity. Love manifests itself as *Gratitude* to God in the acceptance of gifts (Eph. v. 20; Col. iii. 17), with the lively feeling that all possessions proceed from Him (James i. 17), and with the zealous endeavour to use the same according to God's will (*a*).

(*a*.) The Scripture often calls upon us to thank God by words or praises, not because God needs them, but as a natural expression of our lively feeling of gratitude, which enhances this feeling in ourselves, awakens it in others, and adds strength to it by obedience.

§ 278.

In regard to our actions, Love exhibits itself as obedience to God; respecting the matter, it comprises all Divine commandments and makes all duty to God; but, respecting the mode, it consists in fulfilling all, even difficult duties, with ardour and cheerfulness, thus satisfy-

ing the feeling of love to God (veneration, trust, and gratitude) (John iv. 34, xiv. 31 ; 1 John v. 2-4). By this obedience arising from love man co-operates with God to the realization of the highest good, and makes his will *one* with God's will (John xvii. 22, 23 ; 1 John iii. 24).

§ 279.

The predominant feeling of our dependence on God is *religiousness*,—*internal*, in as far as it is a feeling manifested by our actions, bearing a constant regard to God (pious life) ; *external* (or worship of God), when this feeling is exhibited by corresponding outward signs (Col. iii. 16 ; Eph. v. 19). Internal religiousness should be the foundation of the external ; the latter, unless combined with the former, is valueless (John iv. 24 ; James i. 26, 27, ii. 26). Still the external should not be neglected, as it is the *natural* expression of our internal feeling of admiration of God, and of trust and gratitude towards Him ; a worthy prerogative of rational beings, conformable to our dependence on God, commanded as a duty, and not only in itself, but especially by mutual intercourse, exceedingly effective to awaken in ourselves and others internal religiousness. Jesus therefore observed external religiousness (Matt. xiv. 2, 3 ; Luke vi. 12, ix. 16-18).

§ 280.

Religiousness, in as far as the internal feeling is expressed by an internal act, is called *adoration* (*adoratio Dei*), which is due to God only (Matt. iv. 10 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6). Adoration is called, 1. *Devotion*, when it shows itself in an intentional turning of the soul to God from a pious feeling ; 2. *Prayer*, or devotion in its true sense, when this feeling is precisely expressed either by thought or word (*a*).

(a.) The external expression of devotion by bodily attitudes (kneeling, folding of the hands, etc.) is unnecessary; but, as a natural sign of lively devotion, it is animating and edifying to others (Luke xviii 13; Matt. xxvi. 39).

§ 281.

Prayer should be devotional, *i. e.* arising from internal feeling, and therefore not loquacious (Matt. vi. 6, 7); we should address it frequently and willingly to God (Rom. xii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 17), for spiritual blessings especially (James i. 5-8; Matt. vi. 9-13); not in blind trust (2 Cor. xii. 8, 9), but with confidence in and resignation to the higher will of God (Matt. xxvi. 39, 42). Such a prayer is either one of *praise* of Him who is the highest Good (Eph. v. 18-20; Col. iii. 16), or of *thanksgiving* for benefits received (Eph. v. 20; 2 Thess. ii. 1-3), which sanctifies every enjoyment (1 Tim. iv. 3 *sq.*), or of *supplication* for that which others or ourselves stand in need of (1 Tim. ii. 1; Luke xi. 2, vi. 23) (a).

(a.) The reasons for prayer are the same as those for external religiousness mentioned in § 279. That there is an objective as well as a subjective effect of prayer (*i. e.* that God grants prayers) could only be denied when the course of the world was considered as originally regulated by God, and as continuing by necessity according to a sort of mechanical contrivance, etc., or, when every direct influence of God in the world was regarded as a wonder, and an interruption of the regular course of nature. Prayer in the name of Jesus, *i. e.* for the propagation and success of his cause (John xiv. 13 *sq.*, xvi. 23 *sq.*).

§ 282.

As a Divine revelation exists, so likewise exists a relation of man to the same, or duties towards the revealed religion, its Founder, and the institutions for the preservation and propagation of the revelation (or the Christian Church). Our duty to Jesus is to honour him as the ambassador of God and interpreter of the revelation,

because in him we honour God (John xiv. 7-10, xvii. 21, xxiii. 25; Heb. i. 4-14); to acknowledge him as the Saviour or the temporal and eternal Benefactor of man (Phil. ii. 9 *sq.*; Rom. xiv. 9, 10; 1 Tim. ii. 5 *sq.*) and the highest ambassador of God; to hear and obey the doctrine he has communicated to us (John i. 18; Matt. xvii. 5); to love him (1 Cor. xvi. 22; John xiv. 15, 21); to imitate his moral example (John xiii. 15; Phil. ii. 5; 1 John ii. 6; 1 Peter ii. 21), and to be grateful to him (1 Cor. xvi. 22), with a gratitude which manifests itself not only in the promotion of Christianity, but in the observance of the festival of the Holy Supper, as an institution made in remembrance of His merits (*a*).

(*a.*) Luke xxii. 19, "This do in remembrance of me;" compare 1 Cor. xi. 24 *sq.* This is the only proof of gratitude which the most meritorious, remarkable, and influential mortal Being has required from posterity.

§ 283.

To the interpreter of Divine revelation—if, after examining the subject ourselves, we acknowledge him as such—we owe *faith* (John xii. 46, 48, xx. 29) (*a*). But since the purpose of revelation is truth (John xviii. 38, comp. viii. 32, 42-47); since it requires constancy in faith (Eph. iii. 17; Col. ii. 4-8), which can only be gained by examination; since it warns from error and delusion in religion (Eph. iv. 14; Matt. vii. 15), and from mixing up truth with error (Matt. ix. 16 *sq.*; Luke v. 36 *sq.*); since it pronounces every action, which does not spring from the conviction that it is right, to be sin (Rom. xiv. 23); since it warns from deceitful revelations, and calls upon us to examine all which announces itself as Divine (1 John iv. 1; 2 Thess. ii. 9, 12); and since it requires not a blind faith (1 Thess. v. 21), but a conviction based on

reason (John xiv. 10, 7, 17), it becomes not only allowable but conformable to duty, to rest our faith in Christianity on well-examined reasons.

(*a.*) Neither the incredulity of the heathen, to whom Christianity has not been announced, nor the disbelief of those to whom it certainly was announced but who were not fit to receive it, nor the want of faith in the explanation of the Christian doctrine as laid down by a Church, nor the doubts into which we may fall by an honest searching after truth, are punishable. But guilt exists in the indifference which does not inquire into the difference between the True and False in religion (Luke xi. 23, and the denunciations of the Apostle, Gal. i. 5), in blamable ignorance (John iii. 10, ix. 39-41; Matt. xxiii. 37 *sq.*), wilful blindness to truth, and intentional persistence in error (John ix. 40 *sq.*, iii. 18, 19, xii. 48). In examining Christianity, we should pay especial regard to its practical designs (1 Cor. xiii. 1-13; Tit. iii. 8-10), as this is its main feature (James ii. 17; Matt. vii. 21, 22). Hence the avoidance of logomachy (2 Tim. ii. 14, 23; Tit. iii. 9 *sq.*), and every useless quarrel disturbing unity (Rom. xvi. 17; 1 Cor. i. 10 *sq.*; 1 Tim. vi. 3, 5; Heb. xiii. 9), especially on doubtful or trifling subjects (Rom. xiv., xv. 1; 1 Cor. vi. 12, viii. 10 *sq.*, x. 23 *sq.*).

§ 284.

We must endeavour to preserve and promulgate acknowledged religious truth by every lawful means (Luke xi. 52; Matt. xxiii. 14), to acknowledge it openly before men (Matt. x. 32 *sq.*; Luke ix. 26), even before scoffers (Rom. i. 16), and never to deny it either from regard to men or from hope of gain (John xii. 42 *sq.*; Acts iv. 19 *sq.*; Matt. xxvi. 69 *sq.*), still less to turn apostate (Mark xvi. 16; Matt. x. 32-38; 1 Cor. xvi. 13; Gal. i. 6; Phil. iv. 1); be ready to suffer for truth (1 Pet. iv. 14-16), and to honour Christianity by a moral life (1 Pet. ii. 12, iii. 15 *sq.*). Towards his fellow-Christians the Christian should show a tender, brotherly love (John xiii. 34 *sq.*; Rom. xii. 10; 1 Cor. xvi. 14; Gal. v. 6; 1 John ii. 9 *sq.*). He should respect his teachers (1 Tim. v. 17), and afford them suitable maintenance (Gal. vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 37 *sq.*;

1 Cor. ix. 7 *sq.*), follow their exhortation (Heb. xiii. 17), but not embrace their dogmas of faith (2 Cor. i. 24; 1 John ii. 27).

§ 285.

As the Church is the means of preserving, promulgating, and making the Divine revelation effective, it is our duty to respect and support it, to fulfil our duties towards it, and especially to join a public Church (Christian festivals and worship of God) (Col. iii. 16). The last duty, which coincides with the external worship of God (§ 279), is our duty towards the Christian community, an important means for enlightenment and amendment.

(Ueber die Unkirchlichkeit dieser Zeit im protestantischen Deutschlande, den Gebildeten der protestant. Kirche gewidmet, von Dr. K. G. Bretschneider; Gotha, 1822.)

§ 286.

With regard to the *special Church* to which the Christian belongs, his duty is the same as towards the Catholic Church and Christianity in general. He must especially acquaint himself with the peculiarities of his Church, and its superiority over others, and adhere steadfastly to it (which follows from duty to truth itself), if he be convinced that it answers the intention of Christianity. As in religious matters no force of any kind should be used (*a*), the members of the various Christian communities ought to show a kindly tolerance of each other (1 Cor. iii. 5–15; Matt. vii. 1; Rom. xiv. 19 *sq.*), and abstain from intolerance and a spirit of persecution (1 Cor. xiii.; Rom. x. 2 *sq.*; John xvi. 1–3), from all proselytism (Matt. xxiii. 15) and creeping into families (2 Tim. iii. 6), and as much as possible to avoid all intercourse with factious men (2 Thess. iii. 15; 2 John 10, 11).

(a.) Lactantius, *Divinar. Inst.* v. 19, 23, "Nihil tam voluntarium quam religio est, in qua si animus adversus est, jam sublata, jam nulla est." Jesus and the Apostles used neither craft nor force. This is found also in *Matt.* xxiii. 34 *sq.*; *Luke* ix. 54 *sq.*; *Gal.* i. 13; *1 Tim.* i. 13.

(d.) *Duties towards Animals and Inanimate Objects.*

§ 287.

As it is the design of God that animals should have their peculiar enjoyments (*Matt.* vi. 26, x. 29), and that life and happiness should overspread the earth in the richest degree, we have duties to observe towards animals (a). It is certain that we may use them (*1 Tim.* iv. 1-3; *1 Cor.* x. 25 *sq.*), and consequently limit their increase; but man, as the image of God, must rule over them with justice and kindness, save them from excessive labour, and bestow on them food and care (*Matt.* xii. 11), abstaining alike from tormenting or from bestowing an inordinate regard on them (*Matt.* xv. 26).

(a.) This the Stoics denied.—Conduct of the Hindoos to animals on account of their faith in the doctrine of the Metempsychosis. Holy animals. Mildness of the Mosaic ordinances (*Deut.* xxii. 1-7, 10, v. 14, xxv. 4; *Prov.* xii. 10; *Sir.* vii. 20).

§ 288.

As the *Beautiful* is a reflection of the internal perfection either of the Creator or of man, and the taste for it is a part of our duty, it is incumbent on us to respect and preserve the beautiful both in the works of the Creator and of man; and, by studying them, to awaken and cherish the taste for it in ourselves. Monuments of human wisdom and art, and those erected to merit, should be inviolable to us, from respect to man, for their rational purpose, and as a means of improving the æsthetic taste. We have the same duty to observe

towards the *Useful*, from regard to duty towards others, and, if at the same time it is beautiful, to preserve it, for the before-stated reasons. The spirit of malicious destruction is just as much opposed to the dignity of man, as it is contrary to the spirit of Christian Ethics (John vi. 10).

PART V.

THE ORDER OF SALVATION AND THE MEANS TOWARDS IT IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

A. THE ORDER OF SALVATION.

§ 289.

The way in which Redemption from sin to Liberty, and thereby to Salvation, is accomplished in each individual, gives the idea of the Christian order of salvation. To this change (*a*) belong, 1st, acquaintance with the True and Good, as it is revealed in Christianity (enlightenment, Acts xxvi. 18; Eph. i. 13, 17); 2nd, full approbation (Faith), because then only can knowledge influence the conduct (*b*); 3rd, acknowledgment of former shortcomings and repentance (true sorrow); 4th, confidence that freedom is possible (*c*), and that former sins will not prevent the attainment of the everlasting end (saving faith) (*d*); and, 5th, a really free style of action (new obedience, good works), with perseverance and progress in the same. The state of Freedom is felt in the mind as peace with God (Rom. v. 1, xv. 13).

(*a.*) Called in the New Testament "new birth" (see § 229; John iii. 3-6). As by the first, or natural birth, comes the first or natural man into existence (*σάρξ*, the flesh); so by the second, or spiritual

birth, comes the freed, spiritual second man (*πνεῦμα*, the spirit), who as such belongs to the Kingdom of God. *Μετένοια* is not called penance, as Luther has translated it, but change of heart; also *ἀνακαίνωσις*, the building up of the new man (Rom. xii. 2; Tit. iii. 5).

(b.) Faith, *πίστις*, with the fundamental idea of trust. In the New Testament therefore the whole redemption is often made to depend on Faith; this however cannot at all be admitted to exist without practice (Mark xvi. 16; John xii. 46; Eph. i. 13).

(c.) Is grounded on the moral nature of man, the example of Jesus, and the promise of the assistance of God's Spirit (John iii. 5, 6; 1 Cor. vi. 11, 19; Eph. iii. 16-19).

(d.) See what has been said respecting the design of the death of Jesus (§ 246).

§ 290.

The external means for the working of this change is a life of religious communion (Church), in which each individual refers himself to the redemption through Christ, and by which the Divine doctrine is sustained and brought home to the feelings, and the redemption is exhibited as individually realized. The internal bond of this fellowship, and at the same time the spiritual meaning of the "New Birth," is the word of God; the outer bond of the same, and the external means of promoting redemption, are the ministry and worship (comp. § 178).

B. OF THE CHURCH.

§ 291.

Under the title of *Christian Church* (a) is especially understood the whole body of Christians, who are united in one body; who acknowledge Christ to be sent by God as the teacher of religious truth, and as the Redeemer from sins; and who are bound to the observance and respect of the precepts given by him and the Apostles. This is the *empirical* notion of the Church. Viewed

ideally, according to what the Christian Community will become, the Church is that body of Christians which will, by means of Christianity, be truly led to Freedom. As the criterion of the latter is something internal (acknowledgment and consciousness), the ideal Church is called the invisible Church (*b*) ; in the Scriptures, the Kingdom of God (*c*).

(*a.*) Church ; the German word "Kirche" is derived sometimes from the abbreviation of the word ἡ κυριακή, namely *oikía* ; at others, from the ancient song of the Church, "Kyrie," with which it was customary for Divine service to begin. In the Lutheran translation it stands for ἡ ἐκκλησία, *i. e.* the multitude called together ; then especially the multitude collected in one place ; then the congregation of Christians in one place, in one province, or the church universal on earth. To the Church belong—1st, plurality of members ; 2nd, the bond that unites them, which in the universal Church is Faith in Jesus, and to which are added, in the invisible Church, genuine Christian opinions and life.

(*b.*) This idea is often found in the Scriptures (1 Cor. iii. 16 ; Eph. i. 22 *sq.*, v. 25 *sq.*). The Augsburg Confession therefore defines the Church, *congregatio sanctorum*. The Church, according to the opinion of the Catholic Church, is the community of Christians standing under the dominion of the Bishop of Rome, or Pope. This definition, considering the Romish Church as a particular Church, is correct ; false and arrogant, if considered as the definition of the Universal Christian Church.

(*c.*) Kingdom of God, the kingdom of the Messiah ; in a Jewish sense, the earthly kingdom of power and blessedness which the Jews expected from the Messiah ; in a Christian sense, sometimes the whole body of Christians ; at others, all true Christians, whether living or dead. In a general sense, God's kingdom is the universe.

§ 292.

The universal Church has divided itself into many parts,—particular Churches, *i. e.* separate Christian societies (*a*), which have united themselves into one particular whole by means of an external bond. They are divided into two principal classes, the Traditional and the Evangelical. To the former belong the Greek and Roman ;

of the latter, the Lutheran and Reformed Churches (*b*) form a principal part.

(*a*.) In a political sense, the predicate *Church* does not belong to a religious party until it is publicly acknowledged as a lawful society, as the Evangelical party since the Peace of Westphalia, 1648.

(*b*.) The points common to the Greek and Roman Church are the Traditions in the writings of the Fathers and decrees of Councils, which they accept in addition to the Holy Scriptures, and extend to moral doctrines and Church constitution. The grounds of the division which exists between them rest upon the traditional supremacy of the Roman Church, according to which the Bishop of Rome is the Primate in the Church. The union of the Evangelical Church is negative, consisting in the positive rejection of all tradition,—the maintaining that the Scriptures alone are the guide for faith, morality, and Church government. Their separation rests upon no principle, and is only founded upon a different construction of the Scriptures in some points of faith. Easy and desirable therefore as it may be to unite the two Churches, yet it is impossible, without the destruction of its whole spirit, to blend the Evangelical with the traditional Church.

§ 293.

The question, which of these particular Churches is the true Church, can only bear the sense (*a*), which of them is *the best*; viz. that, *negatively*, it does not contain anything which contradicts revelation and its purpose (*b*); and, *positively*, that it most truly receives Divine revelation, and is so regulated that the aim of Revelation, moral Freedom, may be the most rapidly and securely reached. All other criterion (*c*) is inadmissible.

(*a*.) Historically conceived, the expression “true Church” can only point to those which had received their present arrangement from Christ or the Apostles themselves. In this sense none is the true Church; least of all are the traditional Churches so, with their creeds, their Popes or holy synods, their seven sacraments, their festivals, their confessionals, their priesthood,—things which took their rise gradually about the third century, when there were no apostles living. Thus, the expression “true Church” can only apply to the relation of a particular Church to the ideal Christian Church of the New Testament.

(b.) This is the case with the Indulgences, the supremacy of the Pope, the withholding of the cup from the Laity, the sacrifice of the Mass, etc.

(c.) Bellarmine (lib. iv. De Eccles. c. 3 *sq.*), and after him many Roman authors, give the following criterion of the true Church:—
 “*Ipsium Catholicæ Ecclesiæ nomen; antiquitas; diuturna neque unquam interrupta duratio; amplitudo seu multitudo vere credentium, episcoporum successio ab Apostolis deducta; conspiratio in doctrina cum ecclesia antiqua; unio membrorum inter se et cum capite; doctrinæ sanctitas; doctrinæ efficacia; sanctitas vitæ auctorum, seu magistrorum et populorum; gloria miraculorum; lumen propheticum; confessio adversariorum; infelix exitus adversariorum ecclesiæ; felicitas ecclesiæ temporalis.*”

§ 294.

The foundation of a Church was indispensable for the Divine revelation (comp. 128), because it needed a community, a school, and mutual creed in order to receive the revealed doctrine, to spread it wider, and to make it effectual to the soul of man (Rom. x. 17), and because religion must by the means of symbols (*a*) be brought nearer to the feelings. Jesus, although in his own person he remained in union with the Jewish Church, yet desired that a Christian Church should arise (Matt. xvi. 18 *sq.*) that it should become universal (Matt. xxiv. 14; John x. 16), that it should be possessed of Faith in the one true God and in Jesus as his ambassador, and have Baptism and the Eucharist as symbols. After the death of Jesus, the Apostles formed a separate religious community (John xvii. 3), and solemnly renounced the Jewish Church (Acts xv.).

(*a*.) Symbols, a representation of one thing by means of another, different in their substances, but bearing analogous relation in their signification. Oral symbols are all metaphors, as, the storm of his anger; representative symbols, as bread and wine in the Eucharist, the folding of the hands, the looking towards heaven in prayer; they must be judged according to their intrinsic worth, their moral and

æsthetic effects, and especially according to their conformity to the idea indicated by these acts.

§ 295.

That the risen Christ is the only head of the Christian Church (Matt. xxviii. 18; Eph. i. 22 *sq.*, iv. 5, 15 *sq.*; Col. i. 18), and his representative on earth is the doctrine laid down in the New Testament (1 Cor. iii. 11; Gal. i. 8), according to which, as to Divine authority, the Christian Church must direct itself: the pretended supremacy of the Bishop of Rome is without any foundation (*a*).

(*a*.) Matt. xvi. 18, John xxi. 15 *sq.*, are generally appealed to, but no mention of supremacy is found amongst the Apostles; compare also John xx. 21; Matt. xxviii. 19 *sq.* Jesus blamed all ambition (Matt. xviii. 1-12, xx. 25 *sq.*; Luke xxii. 24-28, ix. 46; John xiii. 14 *sq.*). The conduct of St. Paul and St. Peter (Acts xv.; Gal. ii.; 2 Cor. xi. 15). Still, if Jesus had conferred the supremacy on Peter, it was but a personal preference, which ended with his death, and which Peter, even had he been Bishop of Rome, which he was not, could not confer on the succeeding Roman bishops. There also exist no historical data to prove that he made the supremacy to devolve on the Roman Bishops. Had Jesus willed a general supremacy in the Church, then at the death of Peter it must have passed to John, the only Apostle living at that time. The ancient Church never acknowledged this supremacy. Neither has the Primate been able to sustain unity and peace in the Romish Church. It is impossible that Christianity can be governed by one man from one place; nothing in the Scriptures contradicts Popery more than the whole of Matt. xxiii. and 2 Thess. ii. 3.

§ 296.

As an external community, the Christian Church requires a regulated and managed power; all Church dominion, *i. e.* the right to make and execute laws, rests with the Church itself, which she has to administer according to the New Testament, or, when this fails, according to the design of revelation, or the exigencies of the Church determined by the latter. The State, or the adminis-

trator of the same, has no power on *jus in sacra*, but *jus circa sacra*, i. e. he cannot ordain, but can only inspect in the Church, and (with the exception of that which is determined by the revelation itself, and which, as a Christian, he must likewise obey) forbid ecclesiastical arrangements if he consider them inconsistent with the commonweal of the State; he has also the right and obligation to protect the Church against external power.

§ 297.

To Church power belong, 1st, the right of public creeds, or the right to explain the constitution-book of the Church (the New Testament), to acknowledge and sanction (*a*) the explanation as a system; 2nd, the *jus sacrorum*, or the right to regulate the whole worship and the sacraments; 3rd, the *jus sacerdotii*, or the right to appoint teachers and Church officials; 4th, the *jus disciplinæ*, or the right to insist on the fulfilment by individuals of ecclesiastical duties, and, on their failing to do so, to excommunicate them (*excommunicatio*); 5th, the *jus reformandi*, the right to improve the public system, worship, and constitution of the Church (*b*); 6th, the *jus regiminis*, the right to govern herself by chosen officers. The Church can only entrust the executive power to the head of the State, when that power belongs to the Church. The legislative power rests with the Church alone, because she has laid down in the Gospels and their spirit a principle of Legislation (*c*).

(*a*.) Communion is the basis of the Church; above all, the communion of religious conviction. Symbols, Books. Each individual stands alone however, because each is personally responsible to God for his actions, free to read the code of Revelation, and, according to his conscience, to understand its meaning; each has also the right to separate himself entirely from ecclesiastical union.

(*b*.) This right proceeds from the necessity of regulating the empi-

rical Church conformably to the ideal of the Christian Church. When the empirical Church has departed from this ideal, and constantly rejected all improvement, those who perceive this have the right to form for themselves a new and improved ecclesiastical community.

(c.) The Church exercises the legislative power by representative assemblies (synods); they however must submit to the decision of Jesus and the Apostles. The Church delegates the executive power either directly or indirectly to the head of the State, where this head belongs to the Church.

C. OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, OR THE WORD OF GOD.

§ 298.

As a merely oral tradition could neither preserve revelation nor keep it from corruption, nor secure its wide diffusion amongst the nations, it was necessary to have the Revelation faithfully transcribed in the Holy Scriptures. As the Holy Scripture is the keeper of Revelation, so likewise is the Christian Church the keeper of the Holy Scripture; and even if there were, in addition to the Holy Scripture, an orally transmitted doctrine (tradition), this would necessarily be subordinate to the Scriptures (a).

(a.) Παράδοσις, *traditio*, in ecclesiastical language, the oral doctrines of the Apostles in the Christian communities, gathered from the teachers, transmitted, and by degrees written, by the Fathers of the Church. Whether however only oral teaching of the Apostles existed is not discovered; whether the doctrines written in the Fathers is the doctrine of the Apostles or not, is not only indemonstrable, but it is impossible to deny that what is found written in the Fathers approaches to anomaly and contradiction. An especial inspiration was not needed in the drawing up of the Biblical writings if the authors were *in statu inspirationis*. There is not found in the New Testament any proof for that, which can be in this case taken particularly into consideration.

§ 299.

As the Holy Scripture contains, credibly recorded, the revelation—the word of God, it has in religious matters

the authority of a rule (*a*), and with posterity stands in the place of Jesus and the Apostles, or interpreters of revelation (*b*). As it gives complete information respecting that which, according to John xvii. 3, is requisite to the salvation of man, it is sufficient for this purpose. The authority of a rule does not belong to the Bible as a book, but only to the word of God (*c*) contained in it.

(*a*.) That is, the word of God alone is the judge of the faith and life of Christians; or it can only be decided by this what Christian doctrine and precepts are. This authority belongs to it because it alone contains authentic information respecting the doctrines of Jesus and the Apostles.

(*b*.) The Apostles, viewed in this light, were equal with Jesus, partly because they were the constant hearers of his doctrines, partly because they were especially educated as teachers of his religion, and partly because they stood under the inspiration of the Divine enlightenment (John xiv. 16 *sq.*, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7; Luke xxiv. 49).

(*c*.) The word of God points out each declaration of the Divine will; it now takes place either in the heart of man (Heb. viii. 10; Rom. ii. 15, i. 19 *sq.*) or externally, by the mouth of men enlightened by God. The Scriptures contain more than the word of God. To the last therefore is only to be ascribed what is by Jesus and the Apostles represented as religious doctrine, and by them pointed out as the true Faith. The authority of a rule belongs only to the critically corrected original text, not to a translation (such as the Vulgate).

§ 300.

For the Christian indeed is the whole Bible highly edifying and important, since it contains the history of the education of man, through Revelation, in moral Freedom; but the above-stated (§ 230) determines the relation of the Christian to the earlier revelations; the relation also of the Old and New Testaments; and that the New Testament alone has the authority of a rule, the Old Testament only where it is confirmed by the New, or where in chief points (*a*) it agrees with the same.

(*a*.) *E.g.* In the doctrine of Faith, of one God, the Creator, sus-

tainer, and governor of the world; not however in the doctrine of Hades. In Ethics, the greater part of moral precepts, but not all motives, as hate against enemies and the despising of foreigners. It must be remembered that most of the Biblical books were written for the necessities of their times, and therefore those parts must be distinguished which are only of local and temporary use from those which are of a general one; and that the Lutheran Bible is a translation; its words must not therefore be relied upon without reference to the original text; the age of the books must be likewise considered, as well as the oriental style and mode of speech; care must be bestowed on their various definitions, and the fact itself must not be confounded with the mode of relating it. In obscurity and contradictions the student of these writings should attend to the counsel of some judicious and learned friend.

§ 301.

Every Christian is not only permitted to read the Holy Scriptures, but it is his duty to do so, for his own enlightenment and improvement (*a*). The Laity should pay the utmost attention to those parts of the Scripture which are most instructive to them and the most easily understood.

(*a*.) The Gospels are for general use, and especially for baptized persons. The Epistles extend to all, are addressed to the whole community of Christians, and were publicly read (in the first Christian congregations). All Christians should be able to give a reason of their faith (1 Peter iii. 15; Col. iii. 16; 1 Thess. v. 21). All are in their conscience personally answerable for their obedience to Revelation (Rom. xiv. 23); finally, all Christians were in the Ancient Church permitted to read the Bible. Hieronymus (Apolog. 1, contra Ruffin.) praises Pamphilius, "Quod Scripturas quoque Sanctas non ad legendum tantum, sed ad habendum tribuebat promptissime, non solum viris, sed etiam fœminis, quas vidisset lectioni deditas." The withholding of the Bible from the Laity was introduced by Gregory VII. The Council of Tolosa, 1129, attested the same, and the Tridentine Council (1546) advanced it to a law. (Bible Society Extracts.) The Parent of all Bible Societies is the British and Foreign Bible Society, instituted in England in 1804: since 1813 it has spread itself over the Continent. This Society has, from 1804 to 1824, distributed 3,444,328 Bibles. The Muscovites distributed in eleven years 79,500 Bibles. In 1816, Pope Pius VII.

prohibited these societies in Catholic countries, denouncing them as disgraceful undertakings and defilements of the Faith.

D. OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL ORDERS.

§ 302.

According to § 128, the Church has two requirements, 1st, a ministry; 2ndly, a worship. The Minister is the servant of the Divine Word (*ministerium verbi Divini*), and to him belong the religious instruction in schools and churches (*a*); the conducting of public worship (*b*); the administration of the Sacraments, and the special care of souls (*cura animarum*) in the community. The first servants of the Word were the Apostles themselves (Acts vi. 2, 4); their successors were chosen partly from the Apostles and partly from the community (*c*), and were consecrated for their office by the imposition of hands (*d*). Before the servants of the Word (pastors) can be consecrated, they must be lawfully called to the service (*e*). Although the Apostles did not institute any particular clerical order, yet in the natural course of things it soon arose. The representation of it as a priesthood (hierarchy) is however false (*f*), and the opinion of the necessity of the celibacy of the clergy wholly unfounded (*g*).

(*a.*) The schools were founded by the Church (ancient Vestry Schools); this institution was necessary, in order that youth should not only be instructed in religion, but also learn to read and write. Schools therefore were not alone Government institutions, but united the interests of the Church with the State. It is at the Colleges and Universities however that the interest of the State must predominate.

(*b.*) Not only the conducting but the arranging of public worship belongs to the ministry (Augsburg Conf., art. 28): "What opinion then is to be held respecting Sunday and other like Church ordinances and ceremonies?" To that is answered, "that the Bishop or principal Pastor may establish ordinances, in order that the Church may proceed without confusion. Such ordinances are requisite, that love and peace

may be kept in the Christian congregation; in those cases obedience is due to the Bishops and head pastors."

(c.) The Apostle: see Acts xiv. 23; 1 Cor. xii. 28 *sq.*; Eph. iv. 11 *sq.*; 2 Tim. ii. 2; Tit. i. 5. The communities: see Acts i. 15 *sq.*, vi. 1 *sq.*; compare 1 Tim. iv. 14.

(d.) The imposition of hands is an old Jewish custom, and indicates the transmission of property from one to another, as a blessing (Gen. xviii. 14 *sq.*; Matt. xix. 13 *sq.*; Acts viii. 14 *sq.*), a crime, and a punishment (Levit. i. 4, iii. 2, iv. 18, xxiv. 14), or a dignity (Num. xxvi. 18-23), or a healing power (Luke iv. 40; Mark v. 23, xvi. 18; Acts ix. 12, xxviii. 8). The servants of the Word were consecrated by this symbol (1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6), not only by the Bishop, but by the community likewise (Acts vi. 1-6, xiii. 1-3). This ceremony was sometimes omitted (Acts ii. 38, 41, xviii. 8, xiv. 23). Jesus himself, according to John xx. 22, made use of another symbol.

(e.) Pastor (*parochus*), guardian of souls of a community. Preaching expressed only a part of their office. The right of calling rests with the Patron of the Church; the right of sanctioning, with the Sovereign, as the chief director of the Church; only the latter therefore has the power to dismiss the minister of the Word, who, as a person, is subject to the civil power, and whose immunities are free grants of the same.

(f.) The imposition of hands created no distinct order, it was practised on all who became Christians (Acts viii. 14-17, xix. 6, 7). All had liberty to speak in the congregation (1 Cor. xii. 7-13, xiv. 1-40); every Christian is called a priest of God (1 Peter ii. 5-9), since they, according to the fulfilled prophecy (Jer. xxxi. 33; Joel iii. 1 *sq.*; Heb. viii. 10 *sq.*), are all filled with the Spirit of God (1 John ii. 20, 21, 27). *Priests*: mediators between God and Man, to present prayer and sacrifice to God, and to communicate to man forgiveness and mercy from God. According to the Romish Church, the Priests are a class (hierarchy) who from the gifts of the Holy Ghost received by them in consecration are, in cases of religion, infallible, entitled to dominion over the Laity, and are alone competent to the administration of the Sacerdotal Sacraments.

(g.) See Matt. viii. 15, 1 Cor. ix. 5, and the formulary, "Let a bishop be the husband of one wife" (1 Tim. iii. 2, iv. 3; Tit. i. 6), which, however it may be explained, speaks against the celibacy of the clergy. Until the end of the third century, not only the lower clergy, but the bishops and presbyters, married. Bishops refrained from marriage: celibacy was only enforced as a law upon all the clergy of the West during the latter half of the eleventh century, by Pope Gregory VII.

§ 303.

Worship includes all solemn actions, by which religious ideas are exhibited, awakened, and can be made effective in life. Ceremonies and religious Festivals belong to the public worship of God. The doctrine of the Catholic Church, that worship is a saving work (*ex opere operato*), has with justice been rejected by the Evangelical Church (see John iv. 24; Matt. xv. 8) (*a*).

(*a*.) The difference of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches is by this distinctly determined. The former aims at extraordinary effects of an external nature; the latter, at producing internal effects on the spirit. The former ascribes the effect to the power given to the Priest by consecration, and to the mysterious nature of the work; the latter, to the moral power exhibited in Divine truth and worship, and the influence of the same on the disposition. Between the Reformed and Lutheran Church there exists, as regards public worship, no essential difference. The former has only studied a greater simplicity than the latter, and has abolished many things, such as Church ornaments, organs, etc., which the Lutheran Church has retained.

§ 304.

In regard to public worship, the Apostles and Jewish Christians for a long time retained the holyday of the Jewish Sabbath, which was celebrated (*a*) by prayer, singing, reading, and explaining of the Old Testament. But in the first century the Apostles allowed the substitution of the first day of the week for the seventh, in honour of the resurrection of Jesus (*b*). The festival of Sunday, as the day for the public worship of God, is therefore (*c*) an Apostolical command, which it is incumbent on the Christian however to obey on other grounds (*d*). The parts of Divine Service are preaching, prayer, and singing.

(*a*.) This is to be seen in many parts of the Acts, also in the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

(b.) It is therefore called (Rev. i. 10) ἡ κυριακή scil. ἡμέρα, where the Κύριος is not God, but Jesus (see also Acts xxi. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Col. iii. 16).

(c.) Much of the Mosaic Law is here transferred, namely the omission of all work (rest-day, whereas many make it a day for sensual pleasures). This is retained, not on account of the Mosaic commandment, but that none should be prevented from participating in Divine worship.

(d.) On account of the effects on the community, nothing else can compensate for public worship (see § 279). A religious and moral revival is required by all, the greater part requiring even teaching. So, as members of the Church, the partaking of the public worship of God is a social duty; but no member must expect too much, nor require a spectacle in public worship—Through preaching, song, prayer, and ceremonies, public worship advances equally the knowledge, feeling, and religious life of the worshipper.

§ 305.

Of Ceremonies, Jesus ordained only two symbolical services or religious rites in his Church—Baptism and the Lord's Supper (a); which have become the ambiguously termed Sacraments (b).

(a.) The Church by degrees added five other Festivals, the so-called sacraments; since the twelfth century she has increased their number to seven, namely—3. Penance, or absolution, according to John xx. 22 sq. 4. Confirmation. 5. Extreme unction (*unctio extrema*), by which the dying are prepared for death, according to James v. 14 sq., which passage however relates to the curing of the sick person, oil at that time being used as a universal medicine. 6. Marriage, because, Eph. v. 32, *μυστήριον* is translated in the Vulgate *sacramentum*, although this rite is neither symbolical nor of Christian ordination. 7. The ordination of Priests (*sacerdotium*), or the imposition of hands; this rite however was not confined to the clergy, but prevailed equally amongst the laity.

(b.) *Sacramentum*, taken from the so-called Vulgate: it is used for *μυστήριον*, and by the Fathers for all sacred things; the precise meaning is therefore very uncertain. If therefore it is asked what are the symbolical rites Jesus himself ordained, the reply is, only two Sacraments.

§ 306.

Baptism (*a*) is the symbolical rite (*b*) by which, according to the injunction of Christ (*c*), consecration to Christianity is accomplished (*d*), by the dipping of the person to be baptized into water, by means of which not only he becomes entitled to all the privileges, but also takes on himself (*e*) all the liabilities of the Christian. Infant baptism took its rise in the Apostolic Church, and is retained (*f*) on other grounds, as well as for its agreement with the New Testament.

(*a*.) *Βάπτισμα*: religious ablutions were customary amongst the Greeks and Romans: see Matt. xxvii. 24; Ovid, Fast. ii. 25; Virg. Georg. ii. 147; Æneid ii. 719. We find also lustrations by water cited as religious acts amongst the Egyptians, Persians, and Israelites (2 Mos. xxx. 18, xix. 10-14; Levit. xiv. 7; 3 Mos. xv.). The Essenes had likewise a consecration by water: Joseph. De Bell. Jud. ii. 8, 7. The Jews baptized the so-called Proselytes of the Gate. John Baptist, *εἰς μεράνοιαν* (Matt. iii. 1; Luke iii. 1 *sq.*; Joseph. Ant. xviii. 5, 2); his disciples (Acts xix. 5 *sq.*) therefore were baptized prior to Christianity; and the Anabaptists refer to this passage erroneously.

(*b*.) This rite becomes a festival when accomplished according to the command of Christ, and as a religious action. To this the use of the word of God is requisite, *i. e.* partly in the prescribed formulary "In the name of the Father," etc., partly in the words of the promise (Mark xvi. 16; compare the fourth article in Luther's Catechism).

(*c*.) Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15 *sq.*; John iii. 5; Acts ii. 38, 41, viii. 12, 36; Eph. v. 25 *sq.*

(*d*.) Immersion was generally used, and had a symbolical meaning (see Rom. vi. 3 *sq.*). It was at first a single immersion, afterwards threefold. In the twelfth century, in the Eastern Church, the *ad-spersio*, instead of immersion (retained by the Greek Church), became customary. Water is the symbol of purity and entire freedom from sin, to those who desire to conform themselves to Christ.

(*e*.) Compare the passages under (*c*.); compare Eph. iv. 5; Gal. iii. 27 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xii. 13). The hope of eternal life is especially joined to it, if the Christian, through a godly life, be made worthy of it. In the third century exorcisms were used at the baptism of Gentiles and heretics, because they were supposed to be under the dominion of the Devil. About the fifth century exorcisms were extended to all who

were baptized, on account of the universality of original sin. Baptism was applied for remission of original sin and everlasting damnation. The Catholic Church taught that all unbaptized persons were damned. The baptism of bells in the Romish Church first used in the eighth century.

(*f.*) The expression of Jesus (Matt. xix. 15 *sq.*; Mark x. 14 *sq.*; and Acts xvi. 15, 33, xviii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 16) mention the baptism of whole families. By baptism children can lay claim to considerable privileges, can demand a Christian education; they become bound to acquaint themselves with the Christian religion, and are most specially the object of brotherly love (*sponsores, susceptores, propatres*). The duty of the Christian education of the baptized belongs to their sponsors.

§ 307.

The Lord's Supper (*a*) is the festival (*b*) of Christ's ordaining (*c*), celebrated by the partaking of consecrated (*d*) bread and wine (*e*), by which we remember Christ's body given up to death for the salvation of the world, and his blood shed for the same purpose, *i. e.* a remembrance and solemn commemoration of the death of Jesus, by which we strengthen our faith and animate our hopes of eternal life (comp. § 246).

(*a.*) Δείπνον κυριακόν, *cæna Domini* (1 Cor. xi. 20); εὐχαριστία, προσφορά, κοινωνία, *communio* (1 Cor. x. 16); ἀγάπαι, correctly, *love-feast* (Jude, verse 12); where the rich gave food to the poor, with which almsgiving the early celebration of the Lord's Supper was connected. On account of prevailing abuses, this practice was in the fourth century abolished. *Missa*, because the Catechumens were dismissed before the administration of the Lord's Supper.—*Ite, missa est ecclesia*.

(*b.*) The festival consists, first, in the recitation of the formula in which is expressed that man, resting on the appointment of Christ, intends to accomplish a religious action; secondly, in prayer (εὐλογία).

(*c.*) Matt. xxvi. 26–29; Mark xiv. 22–25; Luke xxii. 19–21; 1 Cor. xi. 23–25. In the early Church they feasted daily; in the fourth and fifth centuries, only on Sundays; about the seventh century, three times yearly; in the Catholic Church, chiefly at Easter.

(*d.*) The consecration which, through the formula and prayer, shows that bread and wine are applied to a religious purpose.

(*e.*) Bread and wine are symbols of the body and blood of Christ;

Jesus had unleavened bread. The Host used in the eleventh century, at which time breaking the bread grew out of use. The withdrawal of the cup from the Laity first customary in England in the twelfth century. It was first made lawful in the Romish Church by the Council of Constance (1415) and the Tridentine Decrees.

(*f.*) The symbolical meaning of the breaking of bread and the pouring of the wine is the breaking of the body and shedding of the blood of Christ, both betokening his crucifixion. The words of Matt. xxvi. 28, "for the remission of sins," refers not to the act of the Lord's Supper, as if this feast served for the forgiveness of sins, but to the blood which is shed for sin. The expression, "This is" (my body, my blood), is frequently used in the Scriptures to explain symbolical discourses and actions (*e. g.* Luke xxii. 20, "This cup is the New Testament," etc.; Exod. xxiv. 8; Gal. iv. 24; Ezek. xii. 10). This expression, and many of the parabolic discourses of Jesus, were afterwards taken singly, and the Lord's Supper viewed as a sacrifice (sacrifice of the Mass), in which the priest presented (the symbols of) the body and blood of Christ as a sacrifice to God, by which means he procured bodily or spiritual benefits from God for the person for whom he offered the sacrifice (soul masses). According to Heb ix. 12, vii. 23 *sq.*, Jesus has offered one only sacrifice (himself), neither can religious actions (good works) be transferred. The opinion that by consecration the bread and wine become changed (Transubstantiation) was adopted by Paschasius Radbertus, 831, and is still the doctrine of the Roman Church. Luther rejected transubstantiation, but at the same time taught that by a mysterious means the body and blood of Jesus were enjoyed by the partaking of bread and wine; Zuingli, that bread and wine were only tokens of the body and blood of Christ. Calvin struck out a middle course, and taught that while partaking of the bread and wine the communicant, by faith, would be sensible of the blissful inspiration of the body and blood of Christ. This last became the public doctrine of the Reformed Church. It is indispensable that the Christian should, by the observance of this rite, commemorate the death of Jesus: "This do in remembrance of me;" and (1 Cor. xi. 26) "So often as ye eat this bread," etc. The beneficial effects of the Lord's Supper depends on the pious frame of mind of the receiver; therefore each of the before-named representations can exist, and all have full liberty to take their own view of the subject.

§ 308.

Of the five festivals which the Church has annexed to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, the Evangelical Church

has retained, 1st, the religious rite of Marriage, which certainly is not commanded in Scripture, but is still very conformable to it; 2nd, the Confirmation of baptized persons in their thirteenth or fourteenth year, which is not merely a voluntary acquiescence in the obligations taken for them in their baptism, but is a solemn admission of the Catechumens into the Evangelical Christian Church, through which they undertake all the duties of an adult member of this Church, and receive all the privileges of the same (*a*); 3rd, Confession (charge of the keys), including absolution, which is not founded on the passage Matt. xvi. 19, John xx. 21 *sq.*, but is simply a proper preparation for the Lord's Supper (1 Cor. xi. 28). The confession is an admission given before the clergyman that they, as sinful men, need the grace of God, and are desirous of amending their lives; whereupon follows the declaration of the clergyman that, according to their frame of mind, the forgiveness of their sins is certain (*b*).

(*a*.) It was customary in the ancient Church that the baptized members (they baptized chiefly at Easter) should on Quadragesima Sunday receive imposition of hands and be anointed on their foreheads, by which means confirmation was solemnized by the Bishop in his diocese. The Greek Church united this ceremony with Baptism, and anointed the Catechumens with the holy oil (Chrism) on the forehead, eyes, breast, etc. Confirmation became general in Pomerania in 1534; later in Hesse; and, at Spener's instigation, in 1677, in Frankfort. From thence it became customary in other countries (Saxony, 1723).

(*b*.) The confession is placed on the so-called *Lapsorium*, that must be confessed before the Bishop and congregation before absolution could be given, *i. e.* before a person could be again received into the ecclesiastical congregation. As the communities increased, confession was made merely to the priest. In later times the priests taught that they held the power to truly forgive sins, and therefore required in confession that every sin should be explicitly declared (auricular confession commanded by Innocent III., 1215), because otherwise priestly absolution would have been ineffectual for secret sins. (Dangers and abuses of this mode of confession.)

§ 309.

In respect of ecclesiastical Festivals in the ancient Church, from the festival of Sunday proceeded that of the birth of Christ (*a*), Easter (*b*), and Whitsuntide (*c*). Good Friday was also in the early Church held sacred, and on that day fasting (*d*) was observed. All the other Festivals are of a later date:—the Circumcision, first in the sixth and seventh century (*e*) ; the Feast of the Epiphany about the fourth century (*f*) ; Advent at the same time (*g*) ; Candlemas in the sixth century, by Pope Pelagius ; Maundy Thursday, 602, by Leo II. (*h*). The Ascension dates probably from the fourth century ; the Trinity first probably from the fourteenth century ; the Feast of St. John from the third century ; Michaelmas, or the Feast of all Angels, was ordained by Pope Gelasius in 493. The Annunciation was first introduced in the sixth century. The Visitation of Mary was ordained in 1389, by Pope Urban. Penance and prayer-days for public calamities were in the sixth and seventh centuries first held annually, at stated times. The most important festivals are, without dispute, those which point out the most remarkable passages in the Life of Christ, and those which awaken a religious idea.

(*a*.) The 25th December was chosen by the Eastern Church about the fourth century. The Western Church, until the foregoing century, celebrated the birth of Christ on the 6th of January. For the rest see § 220.

(*b*.) *Ostern* (Easter), from *urstand*, to rise (resurrection). The Christians in Armenia and Egypt very long kept the Jewish Passover. The Christians in Asia Minor ate it, with the Jews, on the fourteenth day of the month, after the first new moon succeeding the vernal equinox ; the Eastern Christians, on the evening preceding the feast of the Resurrection, which they observed on the first Sunday after the first full moon. The Council of Nice made the last custom legal.

(*c*.) Pentecost (perhaps a corruption of Πεντηκοστή), according to the Jews the Feast of Harvest and the giving of the Law from Sinai ;

according to the Christians, the Festival of the Commencement of the Church. It was first ordained as a feast in the eleventh century, and was to be kept during three days; it falls fifty days after Easter.

(d.) *Charfreitag* (Good Friday), ordained as a general Feast by Constantine the Great, but had been customary much earlier. Probably derived from *carena*, because on this day, in the ancient Church, the Fast began; it was a penance and fast-day, in which, according to the example of Jesus, solemn prayer was made for enemies and persecutors, but no knee was bent or kiss given. The fast in the Apostolic Church was kept for forty hours—from Good Friday 12 A.M. until Easter 4 A.M. Since the third century the fast was made voluntary for thirty-six days, and in the sixth or eighth century it began forty days earlier; hence *Quadragesima*, *Jejunium quadragesimale*. The Carnival is a remnant of the old Bacchanalia (Carnival, from *caro vale*). Pope Celestine III. in the twelfth century ordained that on Wednesday in Passion Week the ashes of burnt olive-branches and other consecrated trees should be strewed over the congregations in the churches, with the words *Memento, quod cinis es*: from this called Ash Wednesday.

(e.) The Christians commence their civil year with the heathen; their ecclesiastical year with Easter. The Feast of the Circumcision was first ordained in 1222.

(f.) On this day the Western Church for a long period kept the birthday of Christ.

(g.) It is uncertain when Advent was first considered as the commencement of the ecclesiastical year. During Advent a fast was kept, and all pleasures denied. In England the ecclesiastical year begins with the Annunciation.

(h.) Pope Sergius, in 690, ordered the burning of consecrated tapers, hence the name Candlemas. Maundy Thursday: in many places the feet of twelve persons are washed on this day.

PART VI.



HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

§ 310.

The History of the Christian Church (*a*), which to all, and especially the learned, is of high importance, will be here related, as far as such history is necessary to the understanding of the present state of the Christian Church. This history arranges itself into three great periods, namely, 1. From its foundation until its entire division into the Latin and Greek Churches (from A.D. 33 to 1053); 2. From that period to the Reformation (A.D. 1053–1517); and, 3. From the Reformation up to the present time. In each period the special view taken is, 1, the external state of the Church; 2, its social constitution; and, 3, the state of its religion and doctrine.

(*a*.) Those desirous of gaining an instructive view of the whole are strongly advised to read Lud. Tim. Spittler's 'Grundriss der Geschichte der christl. Kirche, fortgeführt bis auf die neuesten Zeiten von T. T. Plank' (Göttingen, 1812). T. F. W. Thym, 'Historische Entwickelung der Schicksale der christlichen Religion und Kirche für gebildete Christen' (Berlin, 1800). H. Ph. C. Henke, 'Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Kirche nach der Zeitfolge,' 1788–1802; continued by T. S. Vater up to 1817.

FIRST PERIOD.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH,
UNTIL ITS ENTIRE DIVISION INTO THE LATIN AND
GREEK CHURCHES (A.D. 33–1053).

§ 311.

The history of the Church in this period, in consequence of the following facts, ranges itself under three subdivisions:—1st, From its foundation until Constantine, or, until the public acknowledgment of Christianity in the Roman Empire (A.D. 33–312); 2nd, from Constantine until the invasion of the Mahometans into the Christian world (A.D. 312–634); 3rd, from that time until the entire separation of the Greek and Latin Churches (A.D. 634–1053).

1. OF THE EXTERNAL STATE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

§ 312.

The Christian Church arose on the first Pentecost after the death of Jesus (A.D. 33); at that time (Acts ii.) the Apostles commenced their public teaching of Christianity, and received by baptism into the Church nearly 3000 converts. The bonds which united the Christian Church at Jerusalem were, unity of faith in Jesus as the Messiah, unity in religious ceremonies, the festival of the Eucharist, its brotherly love, and a community of goods: on these principles the Mother Church was formed and conducted by the Apostles John, Peter, and James (Acts ii. 41 *sq.*). The Christians spread throughout the neighbouring cities, especially after the death of the almoner Stephen (the first Christian martyr, Acts vi. 7) and the first great persecution of the Church at Jerusalem (Acts viii. 1); in consequence of which the Christians (with the exception of the Apostles) dispersed

themselves into Phœnicia, Cyprus, and Antioch, in which places they founded new communities (Acts xi. 19). After this, Christianity was peaceably propagated in Judæa, Galilee, and Samaria (Acts ix. 31). Peter visited the communities (Acts ix. 32 *sq.*), and became convinced that the Gentiles also might be admitted into the Church (Acts x., xi.). A Church was formed (Acts xi. 20 *sq.*) for the Gentiles, the Greeks especially, at Antioch, at which place the followers of Christ were first called Christians (Acts xi. 26).

§ 313.

This admixture of Jews and Greeks in the Church would have easily led to a dangerous separation (Gal. ii. 11 *sq.*), if Providence had not raised up the Apostle Paul in the Church (§ 189). He and his assistant Barnabas promulgated the Christian doctrine in Syria, Asia Minor, and Macedonia (Acts xiii. *sq.*). A second persecution, but of a trifling nature, arose at Jerusalem (Acts xii. 1, 2). On the whole, Christianity spread undisturbedly in Judæa, Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Armenia; there were flourishing communities in Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Thessalonica, and even in Rome, where the monotheistic doctrine found a ready hearing, and where Paul lived as prisoner at large and taught for two years (Acts xxviii. 30 *sq.*). In A.D. 66, under the Governor Gessius Florus, the Jewish war broke out, which terminated in the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the people (A.D. 70). By this means the Mother Church of Jerusalem was destroyed (*a*), and the separation of Christianity from Judaism was effected. Some time after, the remnant of the Palestine Christians reappeared under the derisive title of Ebionites or Nazarenes, who were distinguished by their regarding the Messiah only as a man.

a.) A small number took refuge at Pella, in Perea.

§ 314.

The persecutions continually arising under the Emperors, or their provincial governors, could not stop the propagation of Christianity in the Roman Empire, partly from their not being either consistent or lasting, partly from these seasons of persecution being always followed by periods of tranquillity (*a*), partly from Christianity being frequently protected by the most powerful men in the State (*b*), and also by the superior morality of its followers ; but especially because, as a Monotheism, it was welcome to the better part of the moral community, who deeply felt the want of a new foundation for a religious life, since Polytheism had fallen into entire disrepute amongst the educated (*c*).

(*a*.) Cominodus, Caracalla, Heliogabalus, had a relish for vice only.

(*b*.) Severus (A.D. 222–235) favoured the Christians, allowed them to build churches, to acquire landed property, to elect church officers. Philip also (A.D. 244–249) befriended them. After the death of Galerius, the Christians had as many as forty churches in Rome.

(*c*.) This explains the cause of the numerous proselytes from Judaism at that time, who, without accepting the Mosaic law, embraced Monotheism. How welcome to them must that Christian Monotheism have been, which did not enforce on them obedience to the Jewish law !

§ 315.

The persecution in Rome, under Nero, would have been but of trifling consequence to the Christians (who at that time were often confounded with the Jews), had not the two Apostles Peter and Paul (according to Church tradition) lost their lives in it. The persecution under Domitian (A.D. 96) (*a*) fell more heavily on the Christians ; still more those under Decius (A.D. 249–251) (*b*), and Diocletian (A.D. 284) (*c*) ; and the rising Church would have fallen into the greatest danger had the steps

taken against it been continued on a rigorous system. Other persecutions were mere ebullitions of a heathenish mob, or the malice of single governors; the cause of these being the opinion that the Christian sect was dangerous to the State (*d*). Christianity found adversaries too among the heathen philosophers (Celsus, Lucian, Porphyrius), who attacked it with the weapons of sophistry and ridicule; and therefore it was not without reason that the Christians defended their cause by writing (Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Melito).

(*a*.) Respecting the state of the Christians at that time see the remarkable letter of Pliny, Epist. x. 97 *sq.*, written about A.D. 104.

(*b*.) The Christians were forced, by dread of capital punishments, to idolatrous sacrifices, to a renunciation of their faith before magistrates. Many turned apostate, some only feigned to do so; many suffered death, others took refuge in desolate places, where they for a time remained and lived as anchorites (Paul of Thebes).

(*c*.) Diocletian, who at first favoured the Christians, was, by his fellow-ruler Galerius, moved to severity against them. Churches were destroyed, Bibles burned, Bishops killed. (Martyrs and their authority. *Confessores, traditores, delatores*.)

(*d*.) This opinion originated in the firm refusal of the Christians to worship the statues of the Emperors, or to sacrifice or burn frankincense before them. From their hatred to idolatry, they also appeared to be enemies to the state religion; some also refused military service to the heathen Emperors. To these must be added their rebukes of the sensual idolatries, gladiatorial amusements, combats with beasts.

§ 316.

Christianity at length, under Constantine, reached the throne: he, in conjunction with his fellow-ruler Licinius, granted an edict of toleration (A.D. 312 *sq.*) to the Christians, by which they enjoyed equal rights with other religious sects; and had the churches and possessions, of which they had been formerly deprived, restored to them, and the clergy released (A.D. 313) from all civil service and taxes. When Constantine became monarch (A.D.

324) he declared himself in favour of Christianity, and in every way furthered its propagation amongst his subjects, built splendid churches, and endeavoured to render Byzantium, to which place he removed his seat (A.D. 330), an entirely Christian town, and in many instances reformed the laws to a nearer agreement with Christianity (*a*).

(*a*.) He abolished the combats of gladiators, crucifixion, and concubinage; ordered the discountenance of labour on the Sabbath; abolished punishments for celibacy, and rewards for fruitful marriages; limited the power of fathers and slaveholders over their children and slaves, prohibited their taking their lives. Though he may not have introduced the worship of relics and saints, he supported it by his example. He was buried in the Apostolic church at Constantinople, and thus introduced the custom (contrary to that of the Romans) of burials in and close to churches within towns. It is not true that he was baptized (A.D. 324) by the Roman Bishop Sylvester, or that he bestowed on him the *Patrimonium Petri*: the record of this is forged.

§ 317.

The sons of Constantine (A.D. 337–361) were as zealous Christians as their father had been; and though after their death Julian (A.D. 360–363) apostatized and used every effort to restore Heathenism, and attacked Christianity by writing, yet his reign was of too short a duration, and the old Polytheism too deeply sunk, for him to effect any change of importance. His successors were most zealous in furthering the Christian cause; and Theodosius (A.D. 379–395) issued a strict prohibition of all idolatry (*a*), granted civil power to excommunications, and by a decree of the Senate caused Christianity to be declared the religion of the State; he inflicted also severe civil punishments on the followers of Arius. Thus Polytheism rapidly disappeared, and was only to be met with occasionally in the country (*b*).

(a.) Milder laws, respecting the poor, prisoners, debtors, slaves, widows, etc., were owing to the Christian spirit.

(b.) Hence the name Paganism, *Religion of the villages*.

§ 318.

Christianity now took exclusive possession of all the Roman provinces. Christian churches were already founded on the Rhine and in the south of Gaul. In the latter country the Christian doctrine was promulgated principally by Bishop Martin of Tours (A.D. 400); in England converts were made by the Roman Abbot Austin (A.D. 396 *sq.*); in Scotland, by Palladius (430); in Ireland, by Patricius (432). The Emperor Valens (A.D. 376) allowed the Goths, only upon condition of their embracing Christianity, to cross the Danube on their way to Dacia, Mœsia, and Thrace (Ulphilas). The Vandals, Alani, etc., who dispersed themselves over the Roman empire about the year 400, as well as the Franks, Anglo-Saxons, and Lombards (A.D. 596) (*a*), were also converted. Christianity had advanced from Egypt (327) to Ethiopia by Frumentius, and had spread through Persia, Armenia, and Iberia. Missionaries from England, Scotland, and Ireland bore it to the German forests; Columban (A.D. 610) to Suabia, Bavaria, Franconia; and Gallus (613) into Switzerland.

(a.) Their king, Autharic, obtained the hand of a Bavarian princess in marriage only upon the condition of becoming a Christian.

§ 319.

In the meantime Mahomet, a most dangerous adversary of Christianity, had been born in Mecca, in Arabia (A.D. 570), had announced himself as a prophet, and, by teaching the strictest Monotheism and by the extermination of all unbelievers, had laid a firm foundation for

his religion and dominion in Arabia (*a*). After his death (632) his disciples (the Kaliphs), proceeding from Arabia, conquered (634 *sq.*) first Syria and Palestine, then Persia and Egypt (640), and, advancing to India, vanquished Northern Africa (697) and Armenia (706); then proceeded (711) to Spain, and, with the exception of a few mountainous regions, conquered that country and Portugal, and were only prevented from conquering France by a defeat they suffered near Poitiers under Charles Martel (732). They also gained a footing in Sicily; and wherever they prevailed the Christians were obliged to profess Mahometanism or to become slaves.

(*a*.) His religious doctrines he published in the Koran. His chief dogma was, "There is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet." He prohibited the drinking of wine, permitted polygamy, commanded prayers to be made five times daily, and an annual fast (*Ramadan*) to be kept in the ninth month, and very strictly commanded an annual pilgrimage to Mecca. He enjoined circumcision, inculcated fatalism, and gave a very sensual description of the pleasures of Paradise. He acknowledged Moses and Jesus as divine ambassadors, but announced himself as the last ambassador of God, sent to finish the work they had begun, and to re-establish their religion in its purity. His followers reckon from his flight from Mecca to Medina (A.D. 622).

§ 320.

Christianity received in Europe some compensation for the losses it had sustained in its infancy. Kilian (A.D. 692) taught it in Wurzburg; Willebrod at the same time in Batavia, Friesland, and Westphalia. In 696 Rudbrock taught it in Bavaria, where, in 717, the bishoprics of Saltzburg and Friesingen were founded; but Winfred, or Boniface, especially rendered great service to the Germans: he introduced Christianity into Thuringia and Hesse, and in 740 founded the Monastery of Fulda, and appointed bishops for Wurzburg, Eichstadt, and Erfurt, while he took for himself the archiepiscopal chair at

Mentz. He died A.D. 755. Charles the Great, after his conquest of the Saxons (785, but more effectually in 803), compelled them to be baptized, and manifested his regard for the preservation of Christianity by the erection of various bishoprics (*a*).

(*a*.) Osnaburg, Bremen, Verden (780); Paderborn, Minden, Münster (803).

§ 321.

Ansgar, or Anscher, the apostle of the North, a monk of the Monastery of Corva, in 822 announced Christianity in Denmark, and its king, Harold, was baptized in 826. From thence Ansgar travelled into Sweden, and in 831 became Archbishop of Hamburg, and the whole of the North became subject to him. Christianity visited Norway as early as 830, and from thence extended to Iceland and Greenland. In Germany Otho the Great (A.D. 936) was its especial promoter amongst the Slavonic nations (*a*). The Normans, who had settled in France, became Christians after Duke Rollo, in order to marry Gisella, daughter of Charles the Simple, had been baptized. The monk Methodius (820) converted the Bulgarians. The Moravians, who had already received some instruction from Bavarian missionaries, were converted, in the middle of the ninth century, by the Greek monks Methodius and Cyrillus, the latter of whom had invented a Slavonic alphabet, in order to complete a translation of the Bible. From thence Christianity entered Bohemia and Poland (in the year 1000 the Archbishopric of Gnesen was founded). It was admitted in Russia in 670, and became predominant there (988) when the Grand Duke Vladimir, on account of his marriage with the sister of the Emperor Basilus, was baptized. In Hungary Christianity began to flourish about 972,

under the Duke Geysa, and in 997 under the King Stephen. The latter propagated it in Transylvania.

(a.) He founded the bishoprics of Misnia, Zeitz, Merseburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Magdeburg.

§ 322.

Up to this period the Christian Church formed one united body. The cause of its division arose partly from the partition of the Roman dominions (A.D. 395) into the Eastern and Western Empire; partly from the fall of the Western Empire (476); partly from the jealousy of the Patriarchs of Rome and Constantinople respecting the pre-eminence of their patriarchates (a), in which the contending parties taxed each other with differences of doctrine and usage (b). The dispute (c) at length ended in a complete and lasting breach; and in the year 1053 the Patriarch Michael Cerularius solemnly excommunicated the Pope Leo IX., together with the whole Latin Church, and the latter excommunicated the Patriarch of Constantinople, together with the whole Greek Church. From that time until the present day these Churches remain separate.

(a.) The Roman Patriarch took upon himself the title of *Episcopus Œcumenicus*, i. e. universal Bishop, and asserted his precedence over the Patriarch of Constantinople, who would concede neither. It was respecting Bulgaria especially, where Greek and Roman missionaries had worked together, that the two Patriarchs contended. The Greek Emperor had assigned to the Patriarch of Constantinople Illyria and Epirus, which had otherwise belonged to the Roman diocese.

(b.) The Greeks denied the proceeding of the Holy Ghost from the Son, rejected the Saturday's fast, the celibacy of the clergy, the eating of animals which had not been slaughtered.

(c.) Especially the litigation between Pope Nicholas I. and the Patriarch Photius (858 sq.).

II. THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH CONSTITUTION.*

§ 323.

Determinate ordinances in regard to the constitution of the Church are not to be found in the New Testament, but these were gradually formed by circumstances and necessity. The single communities received wardens, Elders (*πρεσβύτεροι*), amongst whom, even in the earliest times, one seems to have been distinguished as superior, by the title of Bishop (*ἐπίσκοπος*) (Acts xiv. 23, xx. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 1 *sq.*; Tit. i. 7). Deacons (Acts vi. 1 *sq.*, 1 Tim. iii. 8 *sq.*) were also ordained, who acted as almoners to the poor, and who probably ranked next to the Elders. Deaconesses were also appointed, to take charge of the needy among the female sex, but they were not allowed to preach (Rom. xvi. 1; 1 Tim. v. 9). The members of the community willingly committed the decision of civil lawsuits to the Elders (1 Cor. v. 1–5). The Apostles or the communities themselves exercised the right of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (1 Cor. v. 5, xvi. 22; 1 Tim. i. 20). In important decrees the Elders and the whole community had a voice as well as the Apostles (Acts vi. 2–5, xv. 2, 6, 22, 23, xvi. 4). The intercourse of the several communities was maintained by the travels of their members and the Apostles, and especially by circular letters (Col. iv. 15; 1 Peter v. 1, 2: catholic epistles). It was natural that the communities of the most important towns should gain, by number and riches, a superiority over the neighbouring smaller communities,

* A chief work about the same is 'Geschichte der christlich-kirchlichen Gesellschafts-verfassung,' von Gr. T. Planck (Part V., Hannover, 1803–1809; im Auszuge von A. Overbeck, Stuttgart. 1823–8). 'Ueber die apostolischen Gemeinden: Ueber die Urverfassung der apostolischen Christen-Gemeinden,' von T. E. Greiling (Halberst. 1819).

which superiority devolved also on their wardens, *e. g.* those of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Corinth.

§ 324.

In the second century not only the Bishops ranked more decidedly above the Elders (Presbyters), but the subordination of the other church-servants to them was also more furthered. The Bishops of the rural communities (*Chorepiscopi*, from *χώρα*) ranked considerably lower than those of the larger towns. In the third century the church offices were increased by Sub-deacons, Exorcists, Ostiarii, Catechists, Cantores, Acolytes, and the authority of the Bishops through these was considerably augmented; among whom the Bishops of Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria obtained pre-eminent authority; but a subordination of Bishops under one or a few did not yet exist. The use of the Old Testament led to the comparison of the Bishops with the Jewish Priests, and paved the way for the opinion which regarded their order as one especially holy.

§ 325.

The further improvement of the Church constitution was accomplished by the institution of Synods, or public meetings, in certain districts, of the wardens of the Church, especially Bishops. The disputes with Marcian (who entirely rejected the Old Testament) and Montanus caused the Asiatic Bishops (A.D. 160–170) to hold Synods, or Councils, which for the first time opposed to false doctrines their authority as representatives of the universal or catholic Church to heretics, and the traditional system of religion. This example was followed in other provinces when disputes arose; and particularly the African Church and Cyprian asserted the authority of Synods,

the judicature of Bishops, and the necessary unity of the Church, in the quarrel about heretical baptism. The originating of the discipline of penance also caused the authority of the Bishops to be raised, since persons excommunicated on account of some given offence were only readmitted into the Church gradually, and through various degradations, in which the Bishops and Priests had always the chief voice; and this authority in the course of time greatly increased.

§ 326.

The conversion of Constantine to Christianity was a memorable event in the formation of the hierarchical system. He gave from the State treasuries rich stipends to clergymen, presented to the Church a part of those possessions which had belonged to the idol temples, and permitted it to receive legacies and acquire property (*a*). The clergy itself he made a privileged class, freed it from civil charges, gave it the *privilegium fori* (*b*), and even granted to it a kind of jurisdiction in civil matters (*c*). The ecclesiastical offices were further increased by Arch-presbyters, Notaries, Stewards, Defensores; the occupations of these latter were more strictly defined (*d*); subordination to the Bishops was more stringently observed (*e*); and the clergy were still further elevated by external marks of distinction (*f*). The idea of an especial power of ordination, and holiness of the whole Order, more and more extended (*g*), and, according to the existing spirit of the age, was further strengthened by the general increase of celibacy among the higher ecclesiastics (*h*). The clergy had also jurisdiction in matrimonial affairs; and from this the people became accustomed to regard matrimony as a sacrament (*i*).

(*a*.) The practice of bequests to the Church spread so much, that

scarcely any one died without leaving it some legacy ; and at the end of the fourth century the Church was in possession of the tenth part of all territories, so that the State was obliged to limit its acquisitions. The income of the Church was divided into three parts,—one third the Bishop received, one third fell to the other clergy, the remainder was intended for alms and the maintenance of the Church (*fabrica ecclesiæ*). The Bishops were the administrators of the Church property, and distributed it ; and although the Synod of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) had appointed special administrators, the distribution still remained with the Bishops.

(b.) Constantine and Marcian ordained that disputes between clergymen should only come before a *forum ecclesiasticum* ; Justinian, in the seventy-ninth of his 'Novels,' ordained that Monks, and soon added all clergymen, could only be accused before a Bishop. From their sentence however an appeal to the Emperor was allowed.

(c.) The Bishops were allowed to accept and decide all lawsuits freely brought before them by the parties concerned, and the civil authorities were obliged to execute their decisions.

(d.) The Bishops alone had the power of ordination, confirmation, and making the holy Chrism. The Presbyter had advantages above the Deacons, being privileged to baptize, to administer the Lord's Supper, to give the blessing, and to absolve. The church-servants, of lower rank than Deacons, were obliged to attend them at the altar, but they were to keep at a respectful distance from it and the Sacristy.

(e.) No Clergyman was allowed to travel without a permit, or letter of recommendation, from his Bishop. From the fifth century the higher clergy alone appeared in the Synods.

(f.) The wearing a particular dress by the clergy during church service originated in the fourth century ; the Bishops, Archdeacons, etc., wore distinct dresses. The tonsure was also usual in the fourth century.

(g.) In the fourth century it was still determined that clergymen could never be excommunicated, but that their most severe punishment should be expulsion from the clerical order ; no clergyman was allowed a voluntary return to the ranks of the laity, for by ordination an indelible character arose, which could not be effaced by deposition.

(h.) The Monks, originally laymen, received ordination about the fifth century, and were gradually mingled with the clergy.

(i.) In matrimonial causes it had been usual (*professio matrimonii in ecclesia*) to give information to the Bishop, by whom it was publicly announced in the Church ; the nuptial ceremony (*benedictio*

sacerdotalis), after the fourth century, became a religious ceremony, and its legitimacy was by Charles the Great made to depend on this observance.

§ 327.

The division of the Roman Empire into four parts (A.D. 332) was also the cause of a similar division of the Church; and the Bishops of Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria were called Metropolitan Bishops and soon after Patriarchs, under which title the Bishop of Constantinople was included, and which was likewise honorarily bestowed on the Bishop of Jerusalem (*a*). The Patriarchs had equal rights, and the superiority of the Roman Bishops had arisen only from the superior dignity of the town (*b*). Hence arose a hitherto unknown subordination of the Bishops, and the rural Bishops entirely ceased (*c*).

(*a*.) There arose the order of Patriarchs (with equal rights), Metropolitans (afterwards called Archbishops), *i. e.* Bishops of a Metropolis, Bishops, Archdeacons, etc. The title of Patriarch was first acknowledged at the Synod of Chalcedon (451). Prior to this they were called Primates, *Exarchæ*. The extent of their dioceses was not at the beginning strictly determined, but they soon learned how to enlarge them.

(*b*.) The superiority was adjudged to him by the Synods of Constantinople (381) and that of Chalcedon (451).

(*c*.) The Synod of Laodicea (360) entirely abolished them. The Churches in the country were attended by clergymen from the towns, whom the Bishops appointed and paid; for this they retained however the whole income of the former Rural Bishops. Fees for baptism, marriages, etc., had been usual since the second century, and from custom grew into law. The Church of the town, of which the Bishop was the head, was called *Cathedra Episcopi* (Cathedral church); the others, subordinate to the Bishops, *Ecclesiæ Plebanæ*.

§ 328.

In the same proportion as the power of the Bishops increased under Constantine and his successors, did the Emperors assume power over the Christian Church.

After becoming Christians, they considered themselves as heads of the Church (*a*). They filled the more important episcopal chairs according to their will; ruled in and summoned the hitherto free Synods, and were the first who gave authority to their canons, not only in cases of discipline, but in matters of faith. They also gave cabinet commands concerning not only ecclesiastical affairs, but dogmas, and theological phraseology (*b*); and even when they permitted the Councils to decide, they frequently directed the decision (*c*), and reserved to themselves the punishment of criminals—of the so-called heretics (*d*). The Bishops at this time favoured the Imperial power, and often appealed to it to act as umpire in their disputes; and but a few Roman bishops protested against it. Simplicius and Gelasius, at the end of the fifth century, said to the Emperors Zeno and Anastasius that they went too far.

(*a*.) In Rome the Cæsars had made themselves *Pontifices maximi*, heads of the College of Augurs, which superintended the State religion, and the Christian Emperors retained this title, until it was at last laid aside by Gratian. It was therefore but natural that they should consider themselves as heads of the Church.

(*b*.) Thus Heraclitus ordained (630) that it should be believed and taught that only *one* will existed in Christ.

(*c*.) Thus Leo (726) abolished image worship, and Irenæus restored it (787).

(*d*.) The Emperor Maximus gave the first example, by the execution of Priscilian (385), which act was blamed by Bishops Ambrose of Milan and Martin of Tours, not on the ground of the action, but because it had been done by the Emperor.

§ 329.

The Laity gradually lost all influence in ecclesiastical matters, partly from the power of the Emperors and partly from that of the Priesthood. As early as the fourth century they had no influence in the appointment

to ecclesiastical offices; and in the choice of Bishops, in which their voice was still obliged to be heard, their will was rendered less and less effective by the influence of the Emperor and the decree that the choice of a Bishop was void unless ratified by the Metropolitan. Their participation in the legislative power ceased entirely, as this power was exclusively exercised by the Emperors and the Synods, where only the higher Ecclesiastics appeared, and as the Synods succeeded in establishing the idea that their canons were of universal authority, not on account of their being the delegated organs of the community, but because they were inspired by the Holy Ghost, and, as priests, infallible, their decisions thus lost the nature of laws, and gained that of oracles, to which the laity were obliged to submit, otherwise they were excommunicated or regarded as rebels against God. The ban, when it ceased to be decreed by the communities, and was pronounced by the clergy alone, who became also possessed of the civil authority, was another means of terrifying the laity into obedience.

§ 330.

The barbarous nations (Goths, Franks, etc.) who invaded the Roman Empire accepted Christianity and its ecclesiastical government as there established, and their Kings acted in regard to the Bishops of their realms, as the Roman Emperors had acted and still were acting towards their Bishops. These Bishops became more nearly connected with the realm by the feudal system, as they were at the same time vassals of the crown; while this increased their political influence, it made them more dependent on the regal power.

§ 331.

A hierarchy already existed, but without an ecclesiastical head, being under subjection to the Emperor. None of the Patriarchs, with the exception of the Roman, could arrive at supremacy. All circumstances tended to effect this. He in rank was the first, his opinion was frequently consulted, and from thence there was but one step to his arbitrary authority (*a*); still, as long as the Greek Emperors held Rome in subjection, the Roman Patriarchs (until the middle of the eighth century) remained their subjects, their patriarchates were ratified by them, and for their possessions the Emperors exacted imposts. The Patriarch Vigilius in the sixth, and Martin I. in the seventh century, were expatriated to Constantinople for disobedience; and it was not until the decay of the Imperial power in Italy that the endeavour for supremacy in the Church made by the Roman Bishops became effective.

(*a*.) The celebrated Constitution of Valentinian III., A.D. 445, ordained the Roman Bishops to be a Court of Appeal; but as Valentinian held the office of Emperor only in some of the Western provinces, this Constitution was valid in those places only. The Papal jurisdiction appears from this to have been conferred by the Emperor, and consequently revocable. Some provincial synods, as those of Sardis, attributed the supreme right of judgment to the Roman Bishops.

§ 332.

This progress in supremacy was assisted, 1st, by the favourable relation into which the Roman Church entered with those of England and Germany, with the latter especially, through Boniface (*a*). These Churches, founded by the Roman Bishops, were the first to acknowledge the Roman Patriarchs as the real supreme authorities in the Church (this relation extended to a part of

the Gallic Churches) (*b*). 2nd, by the connection of the Roman Church with the Regents of France, when Pepin caused the Patriarch Stephen, A.D. 751, to ratify his usurpation of the French throne, and Boniface to consecrate him as his legate; still later (A.D. 754) caused the Patriarch Stephen II., when he personally visited Gaul, to reanoint him. On the other hand, it was probably disadvantageous to the progress of the Papacy that Charlemagne, who had been called upon by Hadrian I. to assist him against the Lombards, was crowned by Leo III. as Emperor of the West (800) (*c*).

(*a*.) Boniface felt himself honoured by being made Legate of the Roman Patriarch, and he moved the German Bishops to sign an act of submission to the Patriarch (743). On this subject he wrote as follows to his friend Ludbert, in England:—"Decrevimus subjectionem Romanæ Ecclesiæ servare velle Sancto Petro, et vicario ejus velle subjici, et per omnia præcepta ejus sequi canonice."

(*b*.) The Gallic Bishops, perceiving from the Germans the value of Rome as a protection against regal power, vowed nearly the same obedience to it as the Germans had done, and took the insignia of their dignity (*pallium*) from Rome.

(*c*.) It might certainly appear as if the Patriarch had the power to make a present of the Empire; but by this he called a dignity into existence which since the fourth century had been accustomed to be viewed as the head of the Church and Roman Patriarchs. Charlemagne treated the Roman Bishops as his vassals and subjects, hence the Popes would have reached their aim much more speedily if the Western Emperors had not been re-established.

§ 333.

The advancement of the Papal power was assisted however more than anything else by, 3rd, the forged collection of Decretal Epistles called the Pseudo-Isidorical Epistles (*a*), which appeared in the middle of the ninth century (830–840), first in Mayence, where they probably had been fabricated. They contain pretended canons of the Councils, and judgments and decrees of

the Roman Bishops, of which however few are genuine. Among those which are fictitious, the most unprecedented assertions are made respecting the supremacy of the Roman Bishop, *e. g.* that he is vicar of God and Christ over all Christendom; the *only* Bishop, and all other Bishops therefore only his vicars, whom he alone may appoint, remove, and dismiss; that he is the only judge of all Bishops, and declare it to be an encroachment upon the rights of the majesty of God for a layman to judge a Bishop, whom he is not allowed even to accuse; the Roman Bishop alone can found new bishoprics, summon Councils, and ratify their decrees; he alone can be umpire in all religious matters.

(*a.*) About the middle of the sixth century, a Roman Abbot, Dionysius, collected the Canons of the Councils and the Decrees of the Roman Patriarchs, and his book was a chief source of the then existing ecclesiastical laws. They were enlarged from time to time, and the enlarged collection made by Isidore, Bishop of Seville, was especially celebrated. There suddenly appeared an altogether different collection, under Isidore's name, that was very soon extensively circulated by the Romish and other Bishops, to whom it was very welcome; still, gross as the deceit was, in the then uncritical times they were accepted as genuine, and supplanted the true writings of Isidore. This collection contained sixty epistles of the earliest Roman Bishops, and a multitude of forged decrees, in which these Bishops, while speaking in the ecclesiastical language of the eighth and ninth centuries, refer to writings of the seventh, etc.

§ 334.

The theory of the Popedom existed in the collection of the Pseudo-Isidore, and the Roman Bishops soon found means to establish the same in practice. The new rights adjudged to them in the Pseudo-Isidore were however only carried out or acknowledged in their patriarchates. Nicholas I. annulled the judgment of the Bishops of Lorraine (who had in two synods, 860, 862,

divorced King Lothaire's Queen Teutberge, and expelled her from the throne), and caused Lothaire to solemnly reinstate her (*a*). When the Frankish Bishops had dismissed the Bishop Rothart of Soissons, by a synodical decree (861), Nicholas reinstated him, proving from the Pseudo-Isidore that he alone had the power to convene synods and judge Bishops (*b*). The temporal princes applied more frequently to the Pope respecting the founding of new bishoprics. The conferring of the pallium,—formerly a mere ceremony, which had been performed first by the Emperors, and afterwards by the Patriarchs as their substitutes,—now became the sign of the real collation to office, and the Popes usurped to themselves alone the privilege of conferring it. In the disputes of Bishop Arnolph of Rheims, whom Hugo Capet (991), in a synod at Rheims, caused to be dismissed, for rejecting the exclusive right of the Roman Patriarchs to judge Bishops, Pope John (who, 992, had by a decree dismissed the Bishops, of which that synod was composed, conquered, the Bishops being forced by the mob to obey this decision.

(*a*.) Nicholas laid down for the first time as a rule that all who did not obey the decrees of the Roman Bishops should be excommunicated; that subjects owed no allegiance to those kings who did not obey the will of God (the Pope).

(*b*.) These were two novel and unprecedented assertions, which certainly were spiritedly contradicted, but which the Roman Bishops persisted in repeating until usage sanctioned them.

§ 335.

The Roman Bishops also usurped the right of dispensation; and Gregory annulled (998), in a synod at Rome, the dispensation granted to Robert of France, by his Bishops, for his marriage with Bertha, and commanded the royal pair to separate, on pain of excommu-

nication, which command was obeyed. They also laid exclusive claim to the right of penance, and turned the canonical punishments into money, so that there were in the tenth century penance-dues. The monks and monasteries hitherto submitted only to the Bishops in whose diocese they were planted, became less subject to their jurisdiction, and, from the middle of the ninth century, fell more and more under the immediate authority of the Pope. As the Roman Bishops had made themselves masters of the people, they had gained power in all countries, by which they terrified and compelled Bishops and Princes to act according to their will. At this time (875), Pope John VIII. attained his aim, by inducing Charles the Bald to accept the Imperial crown at Rome from his hands. He now, for the first time, asserted that the bestowal of the Imperial crown was a prerogative of the Apostolic Chair, which acted therein by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. The Roman Bishops would have gained their aim earlier, if it had not been that in the middle of the tenth century the choice of the Pope depended on internal factions (Theodora and Marozia), through which very worthless Bishops (John XI. and XII.) were elected to the Papal chair, and the Emperors (*a*) resumed their ancient right of appointing and dismissing the Roman Pontiffs.

(*a*.) Otho the Great dismissed John XII. and caused the election of Leo VIII. Henry III. dismissed, in the Synod of Sutri (1046), three Popes who claimed that dignity, and caused Clement II. to be elected.

§ 336.

But all the power obtained by the Roman Bishops only extended to their own patriarchate (*a*). The Eastern Church neither had nor would acknowledge the Pseudo-Isidore, or the usurped authority derived from it. At that

time (1053) the solemn separation of the two Churches and the oppression of the Eastern Christians by the Mahommedans took place: but Rome had Hildebrand, and from that moment the power of the Roman Bishops rapidly rose to the Papacy.

(a.) This Patriarchate only gradually increased. In the fourth century it only comprised the *ecclesiæ suburbicaræ*, or the Churches of Central Italy. Pope Leo (A.D. 440) first included Gaul in his diocese, and moved the Western Emperor Valentinian III. (who governed but a few provinces) to add, by the constitution of 445, the Western provinces to the Roman Patriarchate. Lower Italy long remained dependent on Constantinople.

III. HISTORY OF THE RELIGION AND DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

§ 337.

It is clear from the New Testament that, until the death of the Apostles, a precise system of religious doctrine was not thought of, and only a commencement of this idea is to be found in the writings of the Apostles John and Paul. The Practical was still the main point. Short and simple was still the confession required from Catechumens (Acts viii. 37, xvi. 31 *sq.*); and disputes respecting Faith were held in abhorrence as mischievous (Rom. xvi. 17; 1 Cor. i. 10 *sq.*, iii. 1 *sq.*; 1 Tim. vi. 3–5; 2 Tim. ii. 14, 23). Divine worship, modelled after that of the Jewish Synagogue, consisted in the festivals of the Agapæ and Eucharist, in prayer, song, and the reading and explaining of the Old Testament (Col. iii. 16; 1 Tim. ii. 1, iv. 13). Mutual brotherly love (Rom. xii. 9 *sq.*; 1 Cor. xiii. 1 *sq.*; 1 John ii. 9 *sq.*; Heb. xiii. 2; Acts xi. 28, xii. 25), propriety of life, peaceful industry, chastity, and civil obedience, were especially inculcated.

§ 338.

Nevertheless a further development of religious doctrine was inevitable. Before the time of Jesus, the Jews and Greeks had formed a philosophy respecting religious matters, which was higher than the doctrine held by the mass of the people, and was often concealed from them. This bore the general undefined name of *γνώσις*, *science* (*a*), which especially concerned the relation of God to the world, the nature of physical and moral evil, and appeared in the so-called Eastern religious Philosophy (Zoroasterism, Rabbinism, Gnosticism, Manichæism) (*b*), as Natural Philosophy, and in Platonism more especially as speculative Theology (*c*). This religious Philosophy was also by neophytes applied to Christianity, and hence arose the necessity of more precise rules of Christian doctrine.

(*a*.) In the New Testament, *γνώσις* is used, not only in regard to the higher *Christian* knowledge (1 Cor. viii. 1, 7, 10, 11; 2 Cor. xi. 6), but also to the Jewish (Luke xi. 52; Rom. ii. 20; 1 Tim. vi. 20). The term *Γνωστικοί* is therefore vague, referring to all who possess, or profess to possess, a religious knowledge superior to the popular belief, and which is unknown to the mass of the people (compare Col. ii. 8, 18).

(*b*.) The doctrine of Emanation and Æons was the foundation of this philosophy; and in morals, the conception that matter (the body) was corrupt, and the source of all sin and wickedness. Many Gnostics therefore attributed the creation of the material world to an evil spirit (Demiurgus). Cerinthus, Saturninus, Basilides, Valentinian, Tatian.

(*c*.) The nature of this we see from Philo; the Divine Logos is the firstborn son (Thought) of God, the Creator and Teacher of the world; the body, a prison of the immortal soul, the liberation of which from the influence of the body is the way to Perfection.—Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Origen.

§ 339.

The first occasion for a public declaration of what was to be held as Christian doctrine of Faith, probably arose

from the confession required from Catechumens (Matt. xxvi. 19), which was gradually increased, until, probably in the second century, it received the form it now has in the Apostolic Symbol (*a*). An ecclesiastical theology could only be formed by the institution of Synods (§ 325), which could not extend over the whole Church until the Emperor Constantine and his successors had rendered it possible to hold general synods, *i. e.* synods of the Empire. Ecclesiastical dogmas therefore, properly speaking, commenced with the disputes of Arianism, or in the Council of Nice (A.D. 325).

(*a*.) The Apostolic Symbol was certainly not drawn up by the Apostles themselves, but it has the highest claim of any to antiquity. All Christian Churches accept it, and it forms the text of the second part of Luther's Catechism.

§ 340.

Towards the end of the second century, they had already in the ceremony of baptism spoken of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as of the Hypostases, or persons which composed the Divine Trinity (Tertullian). But although towards the end of the second century Praxeas, and in the third (250–260) Sabellius, and Paul of Samosata, rejected the Hypostasis, and both the latter had pronounced Jesus to be a man endued with Divine power; yet no determinate doctrine was formed on this point until the time of the Alexandrian presbyter Arius (317 *sq.*), who found fault with the expression (understood in a Platonic sense) (*a*) that the Son was “begotten by the Father” (out of His Substance), and therefore of the same substance with the Father (*ὁμοούσιος*), and taught that the Son was a mere creation of God. Constantine therefore convened the First General Council at Nice, in Bithynia (325), where, principally at the desire of the

Alexandrian deacon Athanasius (+ 373), the opinion of Arius was condemned, and he was banished. Still the dispute continued: Arius found many followers in Constantinople and other places. A synod at Antioch (341) condemned Athanasius, and Arianism flourished in the court of Constantinople, under Constantius; while in the West, under Constantine, the Nicene Creed prevailed. After Constantius (350) had become sole monarch, Arianism extended to the West, to the Eastern and Western Goths, the Suevi, and Vandals. When Theodosius declared himself for the Nicene Creed, the Arians were punished as heretics, and their meetings forbidden. In the General Synod held at Constantinople, and convened by Theodosius, the Nicene Creed was again victorious, and was without difficulty resanctioned (*b*). The Emperor now enacted the strictest penal laws against the Arians, who, by this means, gradually became extinct, and the Goths, Suevi, and other nations, by degrees renounced the doctrine.

(*a*.) According to the Platonic idea of the Fathers, the Son was the external idea of God, essentially (as Hypostasis) proceeding, from eternity, from Him.

(*b*.) Our Nicene Confession of Faith is that of this Synod, and holds universal authority in Christian doctrine, and is only rejected by the Anti-trinitarians. The third general Creed, *Symbolum Athanasianum*, or *Symb. Quicunque*, is not by Athanasius, but from the sixth century; it however contains the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has remained from that time, and forms the public confession of the Church.

§ 341.

From the disputes caused by Arius, others arose respecting the union of the Divine and human nature in Christ. Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, held that though Mary could be called the Mother of Christ, as man, she could not be called Mother of God (430 *sq.*).

He was on this account accused of heresy, and his opponent, Cyril, by intrigue procured his condemnation and banishment by the Synod of Ephesus (*a*). His adherents remained principally in Persia, received from Barsanious definite regulations (+485), and exist at the present day.

(*a*.) They now prefer the title of Chaldaic Christians, from their use of the Chaldaic language in their services. They are to be found in Syria, Cilicia, Bithynia, as well as in India, etc. They number about 400,000 souls. In their Church they allow no pictures, have three sacraments (Baptism, the Eucharist, and the consecration of priests), and consider Jesus as two persons in one.

§ 342.

Eutyches, an abbot in Constantinople, asserted, in the Nestorian dispute, that in Jesus (after his birth) there existed but one nature (Monophysites). Although his opinion conquered in the Council of Ephesus (449), yet in the fourth Œcumenical Synod of Chalcedon (451) it was condemned; and it was there determined that there were in the person of Jesus two distinct natures united. The Monophysites however formed a sect, still in existence (*a*). The question now arose, had the human nature in Christ a distinct will (Monothelites)? The sixth Œcumenical Synod at Constantinople (680) affirmed two wills in Christ. But the Monothelites still exist, under the title of Maronites (*b*). As to the opinion of Elipandus and Felix, Bishops of Tolosa and Urgel, in Spain (782), that Christ was the Son of God through adoption (Adoptionists), Charlemagne caused it to be condemned by the Synods of Ratisbon (792) and Frankfurt-on-the-Maine (794), and this opinion soon disappeared.

(*a*.) The Monophysites remained in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Armenia; they number perhaps eight and a half millions. They are subdivided into four Sects: 1st, Jacobites, from Jacob Baradaus, Bishop of Edessa

(+ 578), who gave them a definite Church in Syria and Asiatic Turkey, under the Patriarch of Antioch; 2nd, the Copts, in Egypt, under the Patriarch of Alexandria; 3rd, the Abyssinians, under their own Patriarch; 4th, the Armenians, in Turkey, in the Caucasus, Russia, and other lands (about two millions), under the Chief Patriarch of the monastery of Etchmiadzin, near Erivan.

(b.) They derive their name from their founder, John Maron (seventh century). They live in Lebanon, and are in number about 150,000.

§ 343.

The question naturally arose from these disputes, "What then is the Holy Ghost?" Some (Macedonius, Pneumatomachites) pronounced it to be a creature and messenger of God; others considered it as a power and effect of God; until the Œcumenical Synod of Constantinople (381) adjudged to the Holy Ghost personality and equal worship with the Father and the Son. From these disputes the Church formed the doctrine of the Trinity, or of three equal eternal Persons in one Divine Being, as it is contained in the Athanasian Creed (a).

(a.) This is the public doctrine of the Greek Church, and (with the exception of one formula) of the Roman and Evangelical (English, Lutheran, and Reformed) Churches.

In the Nicene Creed, where the Spirit is spoken of as *qui ex Patre procedit*, the addition of the single word *Filioque* had been made in Spain, and this confession of Faith gradually became generally used in the West. The Greek Church took umbrage at this addition, and asserted that the Spirit proceeded, *i. e.* derived his personality, from the Father alone,—a doctrine which it has since retained.

§ 344.

Whilst keeping by these doctrines carefully at a distance from Polytheism, yet, by the worship of the Virgin and the Saints, they drew near to it. In the fourth century the immaculate purity of the Virgin and efficacy of her intercession with Jesus was asserted; and at the end of that century the assertion was ventured that she had

borne *clauso utero*. The worship of Saints arose from respect to the martyrs and the conception of the holiness of monks. Temples and altars were erected, feasts were dedicated to them, and they were regarded as tutelar deities of countries and towns, and as powerful intercessors with God. From this arose the usage—and the custom became general in the sixteenth century—of ornamenting churches with pictures, especially of the Virgin, Martyrs, and Saints, to pray near them, and to observe other signs of worship. This iconolatriy, after long and violent struggles (726 *sq.*), was at length, by the influence of two imperial women (*a*), permitted in the Church; and it was laid down as a rule that the images of Saints were to be adored by genuflexions, kisses, illuminations, and incense.

(*a.*) The Empress Irene won over the Council of Nice (787), and the Empress Theodora that of Constantinople (847), to iconolatriy. The Emperor Leo the Isaurian (726), and Leo the Armenian (813) rejected and prohibited this worship.

§ 345.

Respecting the idea of moral freedom, a bitter dispute arose (412 *sq.*) between Pelagius and Cœlestius on one side, and the illustrious Bishop of Hippo, Austin, on the other; since Austin, who understood neither the Hebrew nor the Greek text of the Scripture, but only held to the Latin, taught (comp. § 234) that by Adam's fall mankind had been punished, in the body with death, in the soul with the loss of knowledge and desire for good, so that man could only by the grace of God become enlightened and ameliorated; therefore the amelioration and blessedness of man is only the result of an unavoidable Divine decree (predestination). The ideas of Austin were modified by the Monk Cassianus and some others at

Marseilles (Semipelagians), in as far as they allowed man a compliance with and inclination towards the Divine grace; a modification which was gradually accepted generally in the Latin Church, whilst in the Greek Church the doctrines of Austin never found an entrance (*a*).

(*a*.) The elder Church Fathers ascribed to man a general Freewill, and taught that original sin was blotted out by baptism, that nevertheless after baptism the Christian should sin no more if he would escape condemnation. The origin of Sin they asserted to be less the result of the fall of man than that of continual demoniacal influence, and ascribed idolatry to the same source.

§ 346.

The doctrine, highly injurious to morals, gradually arose of a Christian perfection or piety which performed more than the Divine law required,—a supererogatory virtue which, as it was not the direct duty of all, acquired therefore an especial merit before God. Those who attained this perfection were called Saints; and the idea was soon formed, that their superabundant merits were bestowed on others who had sinned against the Divine law, and that by these the defective moral worth of others could be compensated (*a*). The component elements of the Christian perfection, called also good works (*bona opera*), which were believed to be partly confirmed by the New Testament (*b*), were celibacy, voluntary poverty, almsgiving, voluntary fasts, and every kind of mortification of the body, prayer, blind obedience to the priesthood and to superiors of monastic orders, retirement from the world, its business, works, and enjoyments, which were considered dangerous, and apt to corrupt man (*c*).

(*a*.) It was asserted later by the Popes that the Church was in possession of all these superabundant merits, and had the power to bestow them upon any one, by which means the moral guilt contracted by moral crimes was removed. These were called Indulgences (*indulgentiæ*), and the written certificate of this imputed merit, a Letter of Indulgence.

(b.) It was believed that they were not strict commandments (moral laws), because they could not be kept by all men, but counsels (*consilia evangelica*). The recommendation of celibacy was founded on 1 Cor. vii. 1-9, although verses 26-29 clearly demonstrate that the Apostle only dissuaded from marriage on account of the imminent hard times; and he (1 Tim. iv. 3) very much blames those who wish to hinder marrying. Prayer and alms are founded on Acts x. 4, 31, Heb. xiii. 16, although both passages only assert that the exercise of this duty is pleasing to God. Voluntary poverty is founded on Matt. vi. 19; Mark x. 21-24; Luke xii. 33, xiv. 33, xviii. 22, xvi. 9 (see § 247, *b*). These opinions were greatly upheld, because the Old Testament was used for a longer time among the Christians than the New, and the former was held to be as binding as the latter. The rights of the priests (Tithes), Fastings, Alms, condemnation of heretics. Matrimonial laws were chiefly based on the Old Testament.

(c.) This perversion of morality arose partly from the Eastern philosophy, which considered all matter, including the human body, as something corrupt and sinful, and therefore placed the highest merit in a severe treatment of it; partly from the Platonic Alexandrian philosophy, which regarded the body as the prison of the soul, and therefore placed the same value on abstinence (*ἐγκρασία*) and contemplative life. Strict fasting, contempt of worldly employments, abstinence from second marriage and carnal intercourse in matrimony, were taught; and great value was laid on mortification of the body, perpetual virginity, and childless marriages. The eating of meat and drinking of wine were regarded by Tatian as incompatible with perfection. His disciples were called *Enkratites*, *Severiani*. Cyprian highly praised, and pronounced as expiating from sins after baptism, almsgiving, especially offerings to the Church, celibacy, and the vow of abstinence in matrimony. Ambrose (397) praised perpetual virginity. Salvianus (430) knew no higher virtue than generosity towards churches and monasteries, by which all sins were cancelled. Monastic life was called particularly religious, and was considered the true regeneration of a Christian. Gregory the Great (+ 604) asserted that prayer and good works did everything.

§ 347.

A product of this morality was Monachism, which first originated in the East (*a*), and was afterwards transplanted, though in a better form (*b*), into the West, by which celibacy (*c*) also was gradually forced on the clergy,

and which assisted very greatly to disseminate bigotry and prejudice, and to destroy true morality (*d*).

(*a*.) Prior to the third century, ascetics (austere livers) and anchorites, who practised abstemiousness, existed, especially in Egypt and the Theban Desert; persecution limited their number, especially under Diocletian. Anthony and Pachomius gave them a regular institution (*Monachi*). Monachism extended through Syria and the West, and from thence travelled into Italy and Gaul. Still the vow for remaining in this state was not at that time made binding for life; this was first introduced by Basilius (370), Bishop of Neocæsarea.

(*b*.) Benedict de Nursia gave (515) a strict rule to the Monks living in Italy, according to which they were bound to prayer and other devotional exercises, to hard work, especially agriculture, to study, and the instruction of youth (Benedictines); he introduced a novitiate and solemn vow, to which belonged also blind obedience to the head of the Order, and a compulsory continuance in the same. He erected his chief monastery in Monte Casino (529). This monastery was superintended by an Abbot, invested with supreme authority, and assisted by a *senatus seniorum*, afterwards the Chapter of a monastery. The reformation of these monasteries by Odo, Abbot of a Benedictine monastery at Clugny, in Burgundy.—Order of Clugny, Cluniacenses.

(*c*.) In the fourth century the Provincial Synods advised celibacy to the clergy; the Popes Ciricius and Innocent commanded it, but without success. The Council of Constantinople (692) permitted clergymen, with the exception of Bishops, to continue in, but not to contract, marriage. When the Monks (fifth century) also received ordination, their example and authority constrained the clergy still more to celibacy. Clergymen often entered the monastic life, and imitated at last monastic regulations. Austin had already founded an establishment intended as a common residence for the clergy. Chrodegang, Bishop of Metz (+ 769), perfected this, and lived with his clergy according to the mode pursued in the cloisters; these were now called Canonici, and from this arose the Chapters.

(*d*.) Regarding the monastic virtues, Henke says (Kirchengesch. vol. i. p. 234), "A virtue, which stood superior to the world, was preached, the austerity of which affrighted, and from which men fled; on the one hand it was proud; on the other, cowardly, ungrateful, unfeeling, and idle." Concerning the state of morals, the same writer says (vol. ii. p. 76), "The corruption of morals (in the tenth century) spread like a pestilence, chiefly from Rome, through Italy. Impudence and shameless contempt of every law of decency appeared to become

the character and fashion of the age. The cloisters were asylums of debauchery and voluptuousness."

§ 348.

From the time of Constantine (300 *sq.*) the previously simple worship of the Church became more magnificent and multifarious in its forms. The burning of incense, holy water, and the use of pictures in churches became customary; the festivals were multiplied, and became more brilliant. Ambrose (+ 397) introduced chanting into the Latin Churches; Gregory the Great especially (+ 604) rendered the liturgy more solemn, particularly the Communion service; and, by his influence, the Mass became the chief part of Divine worship (*a*). In the eighth century likewise the practice commenced of celebrating Divine worship, especially the Mass (even beyond Italy), in the Latin tongue. Baptism was blended with exorcism, and it was held (in consequence of the doctrine of original sin) to be absolutely necessary to salvation. The Eucharist, from the time of Ambrose called the Mass, was degraded, particularly by the canon of Gregory on the Mass, to a mere ceremony; and from this time it was considered to be a bloodless sacrifice, offered for the forgiveness of sins of the departed (soul masses) and living (*b*).

(*a*.) Gregory's 'Sacramentarium;' see in Muratori, *Liturg. Rom. Vet.*, tom. ii.

(*b*.) Previous to the Eucharist being considered a sacrifice, Boniface had celebrated masses, without communicants, for the departed, for the sick, and in order to obtain fine weather. These conceptions were further strengthened by the doctrine of Transubstantiation, propounded by Paschasius Radbert (831), a monk of Corve, which doctrine was subsequently generally accepted in the West.

§ 349.

The ideal of immortality was at first contaminated by Chiliasm, or the doctrine of a Millennium, which, in the first centuries as well as in the following, found many friends; but it was still more contaminated by the doctrine of 'Purgatory, or the belief in a purifying fire for souls after death, in which (in the second half of the sixth century) in connection with the Mass, originated soul-masses, or masses for the redemption of souls from purgatory; these soon became a prolific source of profit to the clergy.

SECOND PERIOD.

FROM THE ENTIRE SEPARATION OF THE GREEK AND LATIN CHURCHES UNTIL THE REFORMATION. 1053-1517.

I. THE GREEK CHURCH.

§ 350.

Several attempts were made for the reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches (*a*), but they were unsuccessful, because the Roman Patriarchs (who in the meantime had become Popes) required the acknowledgment by the Greeks of that claim to supremacy, which the Greeks firmly refused, although the danger from their Mahometan enemies still increased, and they frequently applied for aid to the West.

(*a*.) The attempts commenced in 1097 only widened the breach. The ambassadors sent by Michael Palæologus to the Council of Lyons (1274) accepted all that was required by Pope Gregory X., but the Greek Church did not approve of their steps, and the Council of Constantinople annulled (1285) all. The like occurred with respect to the union established from fear of the Turks in the Synod of Ferrara

(1438) ; to which the Greek Emperor Palæologus had consented, but which was not accepted by the Greek Church.

§ 351.

The principal levers which set in motion the Crusades, or the wars for the liberation of the Holy Land from the Saracens (*a*), were, the cry for help of the Eastern Christians, the interest of the Popes, the doctrine of the time, which considered pilgrimages as the surest road to heaven, the sufferings to which the Western pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem were exposed from the enemies of Christianity, pious enthusiasm, and the adventure-loving spirit of chivalry. The success of the Crusades founded for some time (1099–1187) a Latin kingdom at Jerusalem ; but the Greeks profited little by them ; in fact a Latin army conquered Constantinople, and founded (1204–1261) a Latin kingdom in that place, during which time the Greek emperors transferred their seat to Nice, until Michael Palæologus (1261) reconquered the lost, and destroyed the Latin, empire.

(*a*.) The first Crusade was projected by Peter of Amiens, and sanctioned by Pope Urban II., in the Council of Clermont (1095). Godfrey de Bouillon conquered Jerusalem the 15th June, 1099, and became Protector of the Holy Sepulchre. The second Crusade was set on foot by Pope Eugene III. and Bernard of Clairvaux, in which King Louis VII. of France and the Emperor Conrad III. went to Palestine, 1146, but returned 1149. After this, the Sultan Saladin of Egypt conquered Jerusalem (1187), so that only Antioch, Tyre, and Tripoli remained in possession of the Christians. Pope Clement III. invited Frederick Barbarossa to a Crusade (1189), which was rendered ineffectual by the death of that emperor in Syria, and the plague which swept away a greater part of the armies. The fourth Crusade was undertaken by Richard Cœur de Lion of England and Philip II. of France (1191). Philip soon returned ; but Richard routed Saladin, and, after having made a truce (1192), he likewise returned home. A fifth army, which went out under Henry VI. (1195), was beaten. The sixth Crusade, under Count Baldwin of Flanders, took (1204) Constantinople, and there founded a Latin Empire. A seventh, led by

Frederick II. (1228) to Palestine, obtained, by treaty, possession of Jerusalem; Frederick crowned himself King of Jerusalem, and then returned. The eighth army of Crusaders was led by Louis IX. (Saint), King of France, to Egypt, where they were routed, and Louis made prisoner, 1254; nevertheless, after he was ransomed (1268), he led a new army to Africa, and conquered Carthage; but, with the greater part of his army, he died before Tunis, of the plague. Ptolemais, the last stronghold of the Christians, was lost in 1291.

§ 352.

The Turks, who had accepted the doctrines of Mahomet and had fought victoriously against the Crusaders, founded, under Othman or Osman (in the year 1320), the present Ottoman or Turkish Empire, which already, in the middle of the fourteenth century, had gained a firm footing in Europe, but which was certainly shaken by the Mongols, who, under Timour Beg, or Tamerlane, had also vanquished Christian Russia (from 1230–1477); yet it revived. Mahomet I. took (1453) Constantinople; the shadow of a Greek empire in Trebizond disappeared in 1461, and the Greek Church fell under the despotism of the Mahometans, who sold to the highest bidder the Patriarchal Chair of Constantinople, which was permitted to exist for the vanquished. After the expulsion of the Mongols, a new and free branch of the Greek Church was founded in Russia. (Respecting the schismatical parties who remained in the East, see § 382 *sq.*)

§ 353.

In the constitution and doctrine of the Greek Church nothing of consequence was at this period altered. A sect of devotees, under the name of *Bogomilians* or *Euchites*, who, it is said, professed very free principles (*a*), were, by force, subdued by the Emperor Alexius Comnenus. The Grand-Duke Ivan Vasilievitch, after having freed from

the dominion of the Mongols those Russians who were under the Patriarch of Constantinople (1477), gave them a Patriarch of their own, whom they retained until Peter the Great.

(a.) They rejected the Old Testament, the doctrine of the Trinity, the worship of pictures and relics, despised Baptism, the Eucharist, churches, and clergymen.

II. THE LATIN CHURCH.

(a.) *Its External Fate.*

§ 354.

The propagation of Christianity in the Eastern countries made during this period but slow progress, and in no way supplied the great loss suffered by the Church from the Mahometans. Otto, Bishop of Bamberg, converted (1124) the Pomeranians; in 1186 the natives of Rugen were, by force of arms, brought to Christianity; the Fins, 1157; 1148 *sq.* (by Henry the Lion) the Wends; 1230, the Livonians and Esthonians; 1283, by the Teutonic Order, the Prussians; and, after a long struggle, the Lithuanians were converted through the marriage (1386) of the Duke Jagello with the Christian Queen of Poland. In Spain the Christians gradually subdued the Moors, and entirely destroyed their power by the conquest of Granada (1492).

(b.) *Church Constitution.*

§ 355.

In this period the Theocratic monarchy of the Bishops of Rome, who were now called Popes (a), was accomplished in their gradually extended Patriarchal dioceses (b). It reached its greatest height under Innocent III. (+1216), after which it again sank gradually,

since the usurpation of the Popes has never been so unconditionally acknowledged by the Princes and the Church, although the Popes to the present day have not withdrawn one of their pretensions. From the commencement of this period alone, the origin of the Roman Catholic Church, *i. e.* an existing Christian community under the Pope as supreme Bishop, is dated; and from this time only did the election of the Pope become quite independent of the authority of the Emperor (*c*).

(*a.*) Formerly every Bishop, especially the Patriarch of Alexandria, was called *Papa* (Father, Grandfather). Gregory VII. first appropriated to himself and the Roman Patriarchs this title exclusively, as well as the title of the Roman Bishop's Chair, *Sedes Apostolica*, Apostolical Chair, which, before, every Church that had been founded by an Apostle had possessed.

(*b.*) See § 336 (*a*). Calabria and Sicily were only after the fall of the Greek Empire entirely subjected to the Roman Patriarchal Chair.

(*c.*) Gregory VII., before he became Pope, had, through Nicholas II., ordained that the right to choose the Pope should be only assigned to the highest priests of Rome (*Cardinales*). Innocent IV. (+ 1254) bestowed on the Cardinals the red hat. Boniface VIII. (+ 1303) doubled the Papal crown.

§ 356.

The Popes asserted and vindicated that the Christian Church was a commonwealth, independent of all earthly power, whose absolute head was the Pope, as infallible Vicar of God and Christ. All Christian kings and princes, with their dominions, were subject to this spiritual monarchy, and therefore also tributary to it (*a*). All worldly power was only an emanation of the spiritual, as the light of the moon is only one reflected from the sun, and the Popes could therefore dethrone and instal emperors, kings, and princes (*b*). In the church itself absolute obedience was due to the decisions of the Pope (*c*); he alone could call œcumenical councils and sanction their decrees. The Pope was Bishop of all Christendom,

and the other Bishops only his vicars ; he alone had therefore the ecclesiastical jurisdiction (*d*) ; he alone could instal and depose Bishops (*e*) ; he was the only authentic expositor of all Church laws, and could give dispensations from them (*f*). The Popes Gregory VII. (1073–1085), Adrian IV. (1154–1159), Innocent III. (1198–1216), Innocent IV. (1242–1204), and Boniface VIII. (+1303), distinguished themselves especially by vindicating these doctrines.

(*a.*) These were the principles of Gregory VII. ; he also asserted that the homage of foot-kissing was due from Princes to the Pope. He was the first who omitted inserting in his letters the year of the Emperor's reign. Frederick I., at his coronation in Rome (1155), was compelled to acknowledge the Pope's supremacy by holding the stirrups of Pope Adrian.

(*b.*) Gregory VII. dethroned the Emperor Henry IV., excommunicated him, and compelled him to submit to a disgraceful penance in the Court of Canossa. When the German Princes could not agree on the election of an Emperor, Innocent III. arbitrarily declared Duke Otho of Saxony Emperor. Innocent IV., at a Synod held at Lyons, pronounced (1245), "as Vicar of God," excommunication on the Emperor Frederick II., declared him dethroned, and absolved all his subjects from their oath of allegiance. Henry II. of England was obliged to humble himself before Adrian IV., and to be scourged by the monks ; but he had also received (1056) from the Pope the permission to conquer Ireland, which the latter had given him under the promise to pay to Rome an annual tribute for every house. Innocent III. absolved the subjects of John of England from their oath of allegiance (1208), and gave England to the King of France. John was obliged to buy his pardon by promising to pay an annual tribute of one thousand marks for England and Ireland to Rome. The first King of Portugal, Alphonso I., was also obliged to promise (1179) a yearly grant to St. Peter's chair.

(*c.*) In the well known Bull *Unam sanctam* of Pope Boniface VIII. (1302), it was asserted, "that all human creatures are subjected to the Pope ;" and that no one could be saved who did not believe this, and did not obey the decisions of the Pope. (The infallibility of decisions of the Pope was afterwards limited to those decisions which were given from the *Cathedra Petri* [the presiding chair in the Papal Consistory, hence called *Bullæ ex Cathedra*].)

(*d.*) Gregory VII. demanded of the Archbishops an oath of vassalage, in which they were obliged to vow obedience to his Legates also. It was this Pope who introduced the Legates. Alexander assumed that to the Popes exclusively (1173) belonged the right to canonize saints. Innocent III. asserted their right to absolve from canons: and they agreed in declaring that all ecclesiastical jurisdiction proceeded from the Pope.

(*e.*) This was effected by Gregory VII., who tried to wrest from the princes the right of the direct appointment of bishops and abbots, a right which the Princes in Germany lost by the Concordat of Worms (1122).

(*f.*) They often absolved subjects from the oath of allegiance to their sovereigns. Clement VI. gave to the confessor of the King of France the power to absolve the King, his Queen, and his successors from all oaths the keeping of which might become troublesome to them, those oaths and vows only excepted which concerned religious affairs.

§ 357.

The most important supporters of Popedom, raised and strengthened by the power of the Popes, in addition to the ignorance and bigotry of the time, were the Interdict (*a*); the acquisition of independent territories, whereby the Popes ranked amongst the reigning princes (*b*); the large revenues which they tried to procure by any means and ways (*c*); the canon law, spread by the University of Bologna (*d*); the defective constitution of the German Empire, which lessened the power of the Emperor; the Crusades (*e*); and the new Orders, the religious orders especially, which were all directly dependent on the Pope (*f*).

(*a.*) The Excommunication was called an Interdict when it extended over whole countries, which happened especially under Innocent III. and his successors. Spittler says (in his 'Grundriss der Geschichte der christlichen Kirche,' p. 314), "It must have been a most awful sight when a whole country was under an interdict. All external religious service was to cease at once [churches were closed; no Mass was read]; altars were stripped of their ornaments; all statues of the Saints [miraculous images] were thrown down (or covered); no church bell was heard; no dead were buried in consecrated ground;

they were buried, without prayer and song, in unconsecrated soil. Matrimonial blessings were not pronounced at the altar, but in the churchyard; no one was allowed to salute another; every appearance announced that the whole country was laden with a curse. What an indelibly deep impression must such a ceremony have made on an age full of superstition, which placed the whole worship of God in ceremonies [and believed that closing the churches was closing heaven also]! How must a nation have cursed its prince, who, by his sins (disobedience against the Pope), deprived his whole country of temporal and eternal happiness!

(b.) The present Pope's territory. The statement that Constantine the Great had presented a territory to the Roman Bishops (*Patrimonium Petri*) is a fable. Through Pepin they received the Exarchate of Ravenna, a donation which Charlemagne confirmed, and to which he added Benevento and Etruria; but he still had and exercised supremacy over the territory of the Popes. Charles the Bald gave the Popes, on the reception of the Imperial crown, the sovereignty over their territory. Gregory VII. induced the Margravine Mathilde to leave her possessions to the Apostolic Chair, of which Innocent III. received at last the Margraviate of Ancona and the Dukedom of Spoleto, usurping besides the sovereignty in Rome after having bound the Imperial *præfectus urbis* to allegiance.

(c.) See § 356, b. The Popes further drew money from palliums, dispensations, exemptions of cloisters, indulgences, from the latter more especially, when Clement VI. by a Bull sanctioned publicly (1350) the tenet on the disposal of the abundant merits of Christ, the saints, and martyrs, which the Popes had to administer. Boniface VIII. (1301) invented the lucrative Jubilee, when all pilgrims coming to Rome should receive plenary indulgence for money. It was to be solemnized only every hundredth year; but Clement VI. decreed (1350) that it should be kept every fiftieth year; Urban VI., that it should be kept every thirty-third year (because Christ had lived to that age), and Paul II. (+1471) every twenty-five years. Boniface IX. (1390) decreed that indulgences could be obtained by sending the money, which would have been spent for travelling, to Rome. The Popes also sent, if they were in want of money, indulgence-sellers (*Stationaries*) into different countries; and for the appointments to bishoprics and abbeys they caused heavy taxes to be paid to themselves. John XXII. appropriated (1318) to the Papal chair the one year's income of each ecclesiastical office (*Annates*). He had gathered in his twenty years' reign a treasure of 20,000,000 gold florins. Paul II. decreed (1470) that the income of each ecclesiastical office, every fifteenth year, was to be paid to the Papal exchequer (*Quindena*). They reserved for them-

selves further the *fructus mediæ temporis*, i. e. the income during the vacancy of any ecclesiastical office; the *fructus male perceptos*, i. e. the income before the Papal sanction of the choice was received; and (after the thirteenth century) they claimed in Germany the *jus spoliæ* or *exuviarum*, the right to inherit the property of deceased clergymen. All this flowed from the tenet that the Pope was the only Bishop of Christianity, and that all ecclesiastical property belonged to the Papal Chair.

(d.) At the University of Bologna (where often 10,000 students from all countries were collected), not only Justinian's Roman Law was taught, but also, especially after 1140, the Canon Law, on which Gratian's Abridgment soon became distinguished. This included not only the decrees of the Popes, but also the Pseudo-Isidore, and was from time to time increased by additions. Still this University became dangerous to the clergy, because, as the Roman law was taught there, the study of Roman literature was awakened, and by this means a class of jurists was formed, who not only brought more correct ideas of Right in circulation, but also offered to princes judicial instead of ecclesiastical advice.

(e.) The Crusades weakened the power of princes and of the higher nobility, brought an immense landed property into the hands of Bishops, monasteries, and chapels, furthered the sale of indulgences, and offered to the Popes many opportunities. From the Crusades arose also the titular bishops (*in partibus infidelium*) and the Papal grandvicars. The Bishops frequently styled themselves from this time "by the grace of God and the Apostolic Chair."

(f.) The Order of Grammont (1083), the Carthusian Order (1086), Anthony Brothers (1095), Cistercian Monks (1098), the Premonstratensians (1122), the Dominicans' Order (1215), the Order of Mendicant Friars (the Franciscan Friars, Minorites), 1210, Austin Friars (1201). The Orders of Mendicant Friars were especially active satellites of the Popes. The Crusades gave birth to the ecclesiastical Orders of Knights, 1118, the Knights of St. John (since 1310 Knights of Rhodes, and since 1530, when Charles V. presented to them Malta, Knights of the Order of Malta); the Order of Knights Templars, 1118, abolished by Clement V., 1311; the Teutonic Order, 1190.

§ 358.

The causes of the decay of the Papal power were already active. It began to decrease under Boniface VIII. King Philip IV. of France was the first who successfully

opposed the Popes (*a*), and, after the death of Boniface, induced Clement V. (1305) to transfer the Papal seat from Rome to Avignon, in France, where it remained for seventy-two years. This made the Popes appear as instruments of the Kings of France, in whose power they were; excommunication and interdict lost their force, and the Popes their influence in the election of the Emperors (*b*). These consequences became still more apparent when the contention arose concerning Papal elections, between those Antipopes who condemned and excommunicated each other (*c*), and when the great principle of the Catholic Episcopal system, that a General Council was superior to the Pope, was first generally asserted and carried into execution by the Councils at Pisa (1409), at Costnitz (1414), and at Basle (1431), and was in France, if not in other countries (§ 430), laid down as a principle of church law (*d*).

(*a*.) This he effected, 1, by forbidding all remittances of money out of the country; 2, by causing it to be taught that a General Council could judge the Pope; 3, by resting his power on the States of the Realm; and, 4, thus freeing his royal authority from subjection to the Church. "Sciat," he wrote to the Pope, with the pungent wit of his time, "Sciat tua magna fatuitas, in temporalibus nos alicui non subesse; secus autem credentes fatuos et dementes reputamus."

(*b*.) When John XXII. excommunicated the German Emperor Louis, and laid an interdict on those countries which should acknowledge him as Emperor, the States appealed against it, 1327, to a General Council. In 1328 Louis caused himself to be crowned in Rome, with the imperial crown, by four Roman barons; and, in an assembly of the Roman people, John to be dethroned, and Nicholas V. to be elected. The electoral union at Rennes (1338) destroyed forever the Pope's influence over the election of the Emperors.

(*c*.) Urban VI. in Rome, and Clement VII. in Avignon, who even demanded a Council. Boniface IX. and Benedict XIII. In order to redress these disorders, the University of Oxford called a General Council, and the Sorbonne in Paris proved that the Pope should defer to it. The Council at Pisa dethroned both Popes, and chose Alexander V. There were now three Popes. The Council at Costnitz de-

throned two, and Martin V. was chosen. It was at the same time decided that a General Council was superior to the Pope, and that he must submit to the reformed Canons (which however were never made) of the same, and that a General Council should be held every ten years.

(*d.*) The Council at Basle met of its own authority, summoned the Pope, and proved that he was only *caput ministeriale* in the Church, and that the legislative power belonged to a General Council only ; they dethroned him, and elected Felix V. The reigning Princes however did not support these courageous decisions.

§ 359.

The Papal system, which, although it had never remained undisturbed, and was never brought to the degree of perfection desired by the Popes, was (in addition to these quarrels) shaken, and its overthrow unavoidably prepared, by the consequences of the Crusades (*a*) ; by the advancement of science (*b*) ; the foundation of many Universities (*c*) ; the Grecian literature transplanted into Italy by Greek refugees ; the invention of printing (1440 *sq.*) ; the licentiousness of many Popes (*d*) ; the abuses which, as the development of the social and political state of nations progressed, gradually became intolerable ; and by the numerous attacks of the opposing parties, whose power continued increasing.

(*a.*) The consequences of these were—more intimate acquaintance of nations ; increase of ideas, wants, arts, commerce ; furtherance of geography and natural philosophy ; mechanics ; the use of the magnetic needle and glass (probably also of gunpowder, paper of linen rags) ; the diminution of slavery ; the lowering of the higher nobility ; the opulence of cities ; and the increase of the secular Princes' power.

(*b.*) In the twelfth century, Peter Aheilard and Peter the Lombard, in France ; in the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lully ; in the fourteenth century, William Occam, John Duns Scotus, Nicholas de Lyra, John Tauler, Dante Alighieri, Franc. Petrarch, John Boccaccio ; in the fifteenth century, Æneas Sylvius, John Gerson, John Huss, John Reuchlin, Lorenzo Valla, Thomas-à-Kempis, etc.

(c.) In the episcopal cities connected with chapters and cloisters, there already existed schools, which Charlemagne governed. In Paris (date uncertain) there arose a school, which soon received the title of University, and which, in the twelfth century, especially began to flourish. In the middle of the thirteenth century, a clergyman, Robert of Sorbonne, founded in this University a theological college, the afterwards celebrated Sorbonne. Academies were founded in the thirteenth century at Pavia, Modena, Naples, Capua, Toulouse, Lisbon, Oxford, Cambridge, Salamanca, and academic degrees were instituted. The Universities at Prague, 1348; Vienna, 1365; Heidelberg, 1386; Cologne, 1388; Erfurt, 1392; Leipzig, 1409; Rostock, 1419; Greifswald, 1456; Basle, 1460; Freiburg, 1463; Ingolstadt, 1472; Mainz, 1477; Tübingen, 1477; Copenhagen, 1479; Wittenberg, 1502; Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, 1506, were also founded. As cities flourished, the lower schools arose.

(d.) Innocent VIII. had so many natural children that his income was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Alexander VI. was one of the worst men; his successor, Julius II., a warrior.

(c.) *History of the Religion and Doctrine.*

§ 360.

The public doctrine of the Western Church in this period suffered few changes; yet the Popes strengthened many things which had been hitherto only usages (a). The Aristotelian philosophy became from the eleventh and twelfth centuries predominant in the Schools (hence scholastic Philosophy). This, though in the beginning favourable to the established church doctrines (b), yet as it led to a more solid and connected method, it soon became dangerous to the Popes and to the Church (c). Worship, on the other hand, became more and more superstitious (d); the number of useless festivals were increased (e); indulgences were still more extended, and, by this and the immorality of the monks, ethics and morals became more and more corrupt (f).

(a.) Innocent III. at the Lateran Synod, 1215, sanctioned Transub-

stantiation, and decreed that every adult, on pain of condemnation to the public works; should confess *all* his sins (auricular confession) at least once every year, and should at Easter receive the Lord's Supper. He also repeated the prohibition of the Council at Tolosa (1129) to translate the Bible into the vulgar tongue.

(b.) Especially in its first period. Anselm (+ 1109) laid down the doctrine of the Expiation, and Peter the Lombard that of the Sacraments.

(c.) Especially in the second age of the Scholastic Divinity (Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus), when, by making a difference between theological and philosophical truth, they cunningly obtained permission to preach doctrines which contradicted the Church doctrine. Innocent III. therefore decreed at the Lateran Synod (1215) a limitation of the use of the Aristotelian philosophy, which decree however had no effect.

(d.) In the twelfth century the attempt was already made to withhold the cup in the Lord's Supper from the laity, and the doctrine of the Concomitance (that the blood of Christ is already in the body of the same) was appealed to, to justify the withdrawal. For some time suckers (*fistulæ Eucharisticæ*) were used. The Synod of Costnitz legalized (1415) the withholding of the cup. The enclosing of the Host in a case (*Remonstrance*), its worship, and, in the thirteenth century, the ringing of bells at the elevation of the Host, came into vogue. The Latin tongue was exclusively used in Divine service. The worship of Saints and relics was still more increased.

(e.) In the twelfth century the feasts of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, the Transfiguration of Christ, and Mary Magdalene. In the thirteenth century the Corpus Christi Day, the feast in honour of the spear with which Christ was pierced (1354), and the feast of the Nativity of Mary; in the fourteenth century, the feast of the Visitation of Mary, and the feast of the Wounds of St. Francia.

(f.) Respecting this, see Henke's *Kirchengesch.*, part ii. p. 406 *sq.*

§ 361.

Besides men who rose singly either against the Hierarchy and its corruptions (*a*), or urged the improvement of morals and the exercise of faith (*b*), united bodies of men, who perceived the corruptions of the Church and tried to abolish them, increased in number, to whom the hated name of Heretic (*c*) was given, and whom the

Church strove to extirpate by the institution of the infamous Inquisition (*d*). The crimes of these heretics however consisted principally in rejecting the Papal system, the false doctrines and abuses which had been forced upon Christianity.

(*a*.) Arnold of Brescia (first half of the twelfth century), who urged that the clergy should return to the simplicity of life and the poverty of the Apostles. The priest Peter of Bruges (burnt 1124) and the monk Henry of Lausanne (+ 1149) attacked the Mass, the sacrifices offered for the dead, and the baptism of children. Bernard of Clairvaux also taught that God alone could forgive sins; that good works are not an indemnification for guilt; that the Mosaic dispensation was less complete than Christianity, and that the Pope should be a brother, not a ruler, of the other Bishops. The lawyers Marsilius of Padua and John of Ghent (1324 *sq.*) denied that Peter had a primateship, and that the Church should have a visible head; and taught that the Emperor had the chief inspection over the Pope and Clergy, and that the Bishops had been originally all equal, etc.

(*b*.) The so-called Mystics, especially John Tauler at Strasburg (+ 1361), John de Ruysbroek in Brabant (+ 1381), Gerhard Groot (+ 1334), in whose convents the Bible was read in the vulgar tongue, Thomas-à-Kempis at Zwoll (*De Imitatione Christi*, published more than eighteen hundred times).

(*c*.) In the tenth century there appeared in France, Germany, Italy, and other countries, men who despised and blasphemed the Roman Church, who were called Manichees.

(*d*.) Instituted in France by Gregory IX., at the Council at Toulouse, 1229, against the Waldenses, independent of Bishops, and conferred upon the Order of Dominicans (1233); it was increased by Innocent IV., who enacted that all enemies of God and the Church should (if condemned by the Inquisition) be publicly burnt by the civil authorities; that, if they recanted from fear of death, they should be imprisoned for life. The children of heretics, to the second generation, were to lose all civil rights, unless these innocent children had informed the Inquisition of the secret wickedness of their parents. It was also to proceed against the guilty without accusers. All civil officers were to be bound by oath to obey the decrees of the Inquisition, or were to expect that after a space of twelve months the orthodox authorities would take possession of the country under their jurisdiction. Whoever harboured, protected, or defended heretics, fell under similar punishment. A heretic could convict another, etc. In

Germany, under the Emperor Frederick II., the attempt was made to introduce the Inquisition, but the Inquisitor, Conrad de Marburg, was soon killed by the German knights, whereupon the attempt was withdrawn. See Henke's 'Kirchengeschichte,' part ii. p. 302 sq.

§ 362.

The Albigenses and Waldenses, who are at present not quite extinct (*a*), belonged to these bodies; the Beghards, or the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit (*b*), the Stedingers (*c*), the Wickliffites in England (*d*), and the Hussites in Bohemia (*e*).

(*a*.) There were already early in the south of France, particularly in Gascony, Albigenaian (therefore *Albigensis*) Christians, who contradicted the Papal system and the introduced abuses. There are also traces to be found which show that from the eighth century enemies of the Popedom existed in the valleys of the Italian Alps (Piedmont, Savoy), who were called Valdenses; but in the twelfth century they became more known, when a merchant from Lyons, Peter de Vaux (Peter Waldus) (1170), attempted to form a community according to apostolic morals and church constitution. These rejected the Papal authority, read the Holy Scripture in the vulgar tongue (which Peter Waldus partly translated), had a kind of community of goods, were strict in their morals, and rejected indulgences, auricular confession, purgatory, intercession for the dead, the mass, and the worship of Saints. They were certainly severely persecuted; they however extended themselves and maintained their doctrine, accepted some things from the Reformers, and still exist, chiefly in the valleys of Piedmont (numbering about 15–20,000 souls). Napoleon gave them church-liberty, which they however have lately lost again.* Their confession of faith is to be found in 'Der Katechismus der rechtgläubigen böhmischen Brüder,' by Joh. Gyrk, 1554.

(*b*.) Beghards; especially in the countries along the Rhine, and in France. They were Pietists, who despised the clergy and distinguished themselves by strict morals, severe expiations, and much fanaticism.

(*c*.) Stedinger, at the mouth of the Weser. These were enemies of the clergy and Roman divine service; they were (1232), in a crusade raised by the Pope against them, overpowered, and most of them killed.

(*d*.) John Wickliff, Professor at Oxford, attacked the supremacy

* They enjoy it now again under the free institutions of Piedmont.—ED.

of the Pope, monastic vows, and Transubstantiation ; pronounced all arbitrary precepts annexed to the Gospel to be the product of superstition, and translated and explained the Bible to the people, by which he gained great applause. After his death (1384) his disciples were to be found chiefly in England.

(e.) John Huss, Professor at Prague, a pupil of Wickliff, attacked the Popedom, indulgences, the immorality and indecorous riches of the clergy, and other faults of the Church ; and James de Miess, a preacher at the same place (+1429), the withholding of the cup in the Lord's Supper. With this Jerome of Prague agreed. Huss and Jerome were by the Council of Costnitz condemned and burnt (1415 and 1416), as heretics. The effect of the Imperial safe-conduct was rendered useless by the principle that it was not necessary to keep faith with heretics. His disciples (Hussites) defended themselves by arms ; and the Council of Basle (1433) was at last obliged to grant them the use of the cup in the Lord's Supper.

THIRD PERIOD.

FROM THE REFORMATION UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME.
1517 *sq.*)

I. THE GREEK CHURCH.

§ 363.

Mahomedanism placed invincible obstacles in the way of the propagation of the Greek Church in the East. On the other hand, it spread considerably by the growth of the Russian empire : since 1554 Astrakhan, 1581–1598 Siberia, 1654 the Cossacks in the Ukraine, were subjected to the Russian sceptre. Christianity was by these means brought into these countries ; and in the eighteenth century it advanced to the Ostiaks, Kalmuks, and Laplanders. The orthodox Greek Church (respecting the separated Church see § 341 *sq.*) numbers now probably about 45,500,000 souls, of which 34,500,000 live in Russia, 6,500,000 in the Turkish empire, and 3,500,000 in the Austrian States (*a*).

(a.) Hasselt numbers in Russia 40,351,000 Greek Christians, including the heretical sects. Von Humboldt numbers 33,000,000 of Greek Christians in Europe.

§ 364.

The Popes often, it is true, took pains to reunite the Greek with the Roman Church; but all attempts made in this case were without success (a), and they only succeeded in establishing a kind of union in those places where Catholic princes had subjects of the Greek persuasion (United Greeks), as, 1596, in Poland, but especially in the Austrian States (b).

(a.) Pope Gregory XIII. (1585) founded a Greek College at Rome. The Patriarch Cyril Kontaru, at Constantinople, declared himself for the Roman faith, but was strangled 1640, and his innovations gave occasion for the Metropolitan of Kief to write an Orthodox Catechism (*Orthodoxa Confessio Eccles. Orient.*), which was approved of by all four Patriarchs (at Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria), 1542, and received the authority of a creed in the Greek Church.

(b.) In Hungary and the incorporated countries; the Union succeeded less in Transylvania and Wallachia. It was only demanded of them to acknowledge that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son, Purgatory, soul-masses, and the primacy of the Pope. In Croatia and Slavonia, in 1795, there were 377,977 Greeks, of which number only 8552 were United Greeks.

§ 365.

In the constitution of the Greek Church in the Eastern countries nothing is changed. According to its principles, the legislative power rests with Church Synods, the execution rests with the four priestly orders,—Patriarchs, Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons. The Patriarch of Constantinople, with the title of Œcumenic Patriarch, has the superiority and a permanent Synod at his side, by whom he is chosen; the choice is then confirmed by the Sultan, on payment of a large sum of money. The Russian Church had in the beginning a Patriarch

at Moscow, as fifth Patriarch; but Peter the Great abolished this dignity and instituted the Holy Synod,—a kind of Consistory, in which the Emperor, as head of the Russian Church, had a veto. The schismatical sect of the Raskolniki, which arose after 1654, refused to accept the improved liturgy, and therefore separated from the Russian Church; their number in northern Russia is not inconsiderable (*a*).

(*a*.) See 'Geschichte der Irrlehren and des Sectenwesens in der Griechisch-Russischen Kirche,' by Strahl; in the 'Kirchenhistorisches Archiv von Stäudlin, Tzschirner and Vater,' Jahrg. 1824.

§ 366.

The doctrines of faith in the Greek Church remained essentially the same, as the attempt failed which Cyril Lukaris made for a Reformation (*a*). The Greek Church, like the Roman, receives the Holy Scriptures as the source of knowledge of the faith, with the exception of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, Tradition, the Fathers, according to whose decisions the Scripture is to be explained (*b*), and the canons of Œcumenical Synods (*c*); on the other hand, it rejects the Papal decrees, the proceeding of the Holy Ghost from the Son, the doctrine of the inability of man to amend, of predestination, of indulgences, of the efficacy of supererogatory merits, of purgatory; but considers fasting, almsgiving, and the reciting of certain prayers, as meritorious before God. In conformity with the Acts of the Apostles xv. 20, its members abstain from blood and from things strangled. At the present time it represents the Eastern Church as constituted in the eighth and ninth centuries.

(*a*.) He was in 1602 Patriarch of Alexandria, and became in 1621 Patriarch of Constantinople. He knew the doctrine of the Evangelic Church, and sent young clergymen to Germany and England. In his

doctrine of faith (1629), he professed chiefly the doctrines of the English Church. Through intrigues of Rome, he was four times deposed, and at last, in 1638, strangled.

(b.) The Fathers dated the Greek Church only as far back as to John Damascenus (+ 760); the Latin, to Peter the Lombard (+ 1160).

(c.) The Greek Church accepts only seven Œcumenical Synods, one at Nice, three at Constantinople, one at Epheaus, one at Chalcedon, and a second at Nice (787).

§ 367.

The Greek, like the Roman Church, numbers seven Sacraments (a), admits the worship of Saints and pictures, the mass, fasting, and convents, which are still principally governed by the rules of St. Basil, but does not absolutely forbid the clergy to marry (b).

(a.) See § 343. Baptism is celebrated by dipping three times, and Confirmation is solemnized immediately after baptism. Both the bread and wine are taken at the Lord's Supper, and both administered in a spoon. The wine is mixed with water. A special mention of committed sins is not required at confession. Extreme Unction is used as a means of recovery, and therefore often repeated.

(b.) The number of the Saints is fixed, and cannot, as in the Roman Church, be increased. They use pictures in place of images. The chaplet is just as customary as in the Roman Church. Bishops and Archbishops are not allowed to marry, and are chosen from the regular clergy. The inferior clergy may marry, but only once, and before ordination; they are forbidden to marry widows. The Laity is also prohibited from marrying more than three times.

II. THE WESTERN CHURCH.

1. *Of the Reformation and the Churches which have arisen from it.*

§ 368.

From the facts related in § 358 and following, the desire for a Reformation of the Church was awakened in

the minds of the people, so that there was wanted only an occasion to call it into life (*a*). This occasion was afforded by the Papal seller of Indulgences (Stationary), Tetzel, whose shamelessness, and the sad moral consequences arising from it, gave courage to Martin Luther, Doctor and Professor of Theology at Wittenberg (*b*) (October 31, 1517), to lay down publicly ninety-five Theses, upon which to dispute with any one. Educated by the reading of Austin's writings (the study of which was his duty as an Augustinian monk), he attacked not only the abuses of Indulgences, but also the whole doctrine on which they were based,—the forgiveness of sins on account of good works. The people, tired of the irksome extortions of money and of abuses so often reproved in vain, highly approved of Luther's step. The insolent attacks of his enemies assisted still more to rouse general attention to the subject.

(*a*.) Among others, Reuchlin especially rendered service in preparing the way for the Reformation, by furthering the knowledge of the Hebrew language. But above all stood Erasmus of Rotterdam, an elegant and spirited writer, formed by the reading of the Classics, who improved the theological method, propagated philological and exegetical studies, and exercised, by writing and preaching, the most beneficial influence upon the Reformation.

(*b*.) Luther, born in Eisleben, 1483, attended the school at Eisenach, and (1502) the University of Erfurt, entered (1505) the Order of Augustinian Friars, and became (1512) Professor of Theology at Wittenberg and Doctor of the Holy Scripture (*Doctor in Bibliis*). He married, in 1528, Catherine of Bore, and died in 1546, on a journey into Mansfeld, in Eisleben, February 18th.

§ 369.

The spirit of the age had taken such a turn that the Papal ban against Luther and his disciples, which appeared in 1520, was received with scoffing and contempt, and was in most places, as well as Saxony, not allowed to

be published. The quarrel led Luther further in knowledge. He blamed the withholding of the cup, the mass, the celibacy of the clergy, monastic life, and the primacy of the Pope, appealed to a General Council, and renounced, with his disciples, the Papal Church, by the solemn burning of the Canon Law book (December 10, 1520). The power of his German preaching, his penetration, his clearness, and his firm keeping to the Holy Scripture, gained him friends in all parts of Germany. Philip Melanchthon (*a*), his colleague, was to him of the greatest assistance in the rising Reformation of the Church.

(*a*.) Melanchthon (properly Schwarzerde), born in 1497, at Bretten, in the Palatinate, entered in 1518 the University of Wittenberg, as Professor of the Greek language. He deserves the name of *Præceptor Germaniæ*. He combined with solid learning practical sense and fine taste, true and deep piety, which alone gave him, in spite of his natural timidity, the courage to further steadfastly the work of the Reformation amid so many dangers. Luther's great courage rested not alone upon the steadiness of his religious sense, but also upon the natural valour of his disposition.

§ 370.

The severe edict issued against Luther by the Imperial Diet at Worms (1521), did not take effect, and Luther found leisure at Wartburg to undertake the translation of the Holy Scriptures into the German language, which he partly published; an admirable work, by which he rendered the Reformation the greatest service. The revolt of the peasants (1524 *sq.*) would have become dangerous to the Reformation, if Luther had not manifested his abhorrence most energetically against these violences. Still his enemies found in it a welcome cause of odious accusations, which have been repeated in our time.

§ 371.

Excommunicated by the ban of the Pope from the communion with the Roman Church, which obstinately rejected all improvements, Luther, and all who believed with him, obtained the right to found a new church community (§ 297 *b*). The first step to this was the new ritual, drawn up by Luther, 1527, by command of the Elector John, of Saxony; and further, after the uselessly held Imperial Diet at Spire (1529) (*a*), the Confession drawn up by Melancthon, which was delivered at the Imperial Diet at Augsburg, June 25, 1530, by the Princes and States who had embraced the Reformation, and which has remained a General Confession of the Evangelic Church founded by Luther, and forms the basis of the doctrine and constitution of this Church. The political acknowledgment of the Evangelic Church in Germany by the Emperor and the Empire took place only first in the Treaty of Passau, 1552; then in the religious Peace at Augsburg, 1525; and in the Westphalian Peace after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which had been stirred up by the Jesuits. The rights of the Evangelic Church were confirmed by the Congress of Vienna (June 9, 1815), although the Pope then, as in 1648, protested against it.

(*a*.) The Evangelical States entered a Protest against the Edict of Spire, and from this they were termed Protestants.

§ 372.

Which countries in Germany had embraced at that time the Lutheran Reformation, may be seen from the signatures to the Confession of Augsburg (*a*). But the Reformation had extended itself also to Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, Transylvania, and Poland. In the Austrian dominions the Evangelic Christians were several

times greatly oppressed (especially in 1671–1681), and principally at the instigation of the Jesuits, until the Emperor Joseph II. introduced, 1781, toleration, which was also formally confirmed at the Congress of Vienna. In Poland, sects who dissented from the Catholic Church received equal rights (1573), which they have preserved through the latest changes. The Lutheran Reformation had, through John Jansen, reached Denmark in 1521; it was accepted and introduced by the Kings Frederick I. and Christian III. (1536), and from thence went to Norway and Iceland. In Sweden it was introduced by the Brothers Olof and Lorenzo Peterson, in 1519, and the King Gustavus Vasa solemnly introduced it in 1527. Albert, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, quitted the Order, married, changed Prussia into a secular dukedom (1525), and introduced the Lutheran Reformation, which spread also to Courland and Livonia. By emigration, especially from Würtemberg, it reached North America, from the Danish Colonies to the East Indies (Tranquebar), and was still further propagated (*b*) by the later-formed sect of Evangelic Brethren.

(*a*.) The Augsburg Confession was signed by the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, the Dukes of Lüneburg and Saxony, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Prince of Anhalt, the town of Nürnberg and Reutlingen. To this Confession were afterwards annexed, as symbolic books of the Lutheran Church, the two Catechisms by Luther, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, the Articles of Smalcald, and the Concordat Formulary, which together form the Concordat accepted in Germany by the Electors of Saxony, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, the Dukes of Saxony, Brunswick, Lüneburg, Mecklenburg, Würtemberg, and a great number of Princes and Free Cities.

(*b*.) The Lutheran faith prevails in Saxony, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Livonia, Esthonia, Courland, Finland. The greater part of the subjects of Baden, of Würtemberg, Hesse, Hanover, Prussia, are Evangelical; they are numerous in Bavaria, Hungary, and Transylvania; less numerous in Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Russia, America. The number of Lutherana is about

thirty millions. The sect of the United Brethren likewise adhere to the Augaburg Confession; their number is not accurately ascertained. This sect arose from the Moravian Brethren, a branch of the Waldenses and Hussites, who still exist in Moravia, Silesia, Dresden, Berlin, Poland, and Lithuania. The Count Nicholas Louis de Zinzendorf (born May 26, 1700) harboured several Moravian Brethren at his estate of Berthelsdorf, near Zittau, and allowed them to settle at Hutberg (1722), from whom arose Herrnhut: he joined them to a community of Evangelic Brethren, who acknowledged the Augaburg Confession (1727). They hold the doctrine of the sinfulness of man and the atonement of Christ, and are especially distinguished by their church discipline and constitution. As they do not consider the differences between Lutherans and Reformers as essential, and receive both parties into their community, Zinzendorf (1744) divided the community into three divisions, called Tropes (*τρόποι παιδείας*), namely the Moravian, Lutheran, and Reformed Tropea. Each Trope has its own Antistes, or Bishop, and the Lord's Supper is administered in each separately. Doctrines, Divine service, and church constitution, are however universal among them. The church government is exercised by the community, directed in each place by œcumenical synods, and by a permanent committee of these synods, the principal conference of the Union having its seat at Berthelsdorf. The chief places in Germany where these communities are found are Niesky, Kleinwelke, Gnadau, Gnadenfeld, Neusalz, Neudietendorf, Ehersdorf, Neuwied, etc.; besides these, there are colonies in Denmark, Holland, England, Zealand, Russia, North America, Greenland, West India, South America, the Cape of Good Hope. Compare 'Von der Entstehung und Einrichtung der Evangelischen Brüdergemeinde,' by Ch. F. Schulze (Gotha, 1822).

§ 373.

Contemporary with Luther was Ulrich Zwingli (born January 1, 1484, at Wildhausen, in Toggenburg), and since 1518 pastor at Zürich. He began the Reformation in Switzerland, in the same spirit as Luther, had as assistants Œcolampadius, Capito, Rhenanus, and taught the new doctrine in many cantons (October 11, 1531), in Alsace and Swabia. By Calvin—who, since 1536, was Professor of Theology at Geneva—the work was not only continued, but greatly advanced, especially in France, and

the form of church-government was more clearly defined. The Reformed Church was, like the Lutheran, acknowledged in Germany at the Peace of Westphalia, and afterwards, at the Congress of Vienna. The reason why the Swiss Reformation did not come to a common understanding with that of Saxony was, because Zwingli held a different opinion on the Lord's Supper (§ 307), and because Calvin stubbornly adhered to his doctrine on Grace and Absolute Predestination (234 *a*), from which arose differences in some institutions concerning the Divine service (*a*). These differences have been now considered so unimportant, that a union of the parties has been carried out with great success (since 1817) in Nassau, Baden, the Palatinate of the Rhine, and in Prussia. The doctrine of absolute predestination has, in its strictest form, been insisted on in Holland, especially by the Synod of Dordrecht (1618) against the disciples of James Arminius (Arminians, or Remonstrants), who denied it; at present there exist about 40,000 of this sect.

(*a*.) The Reformers rejected the wafer, fonts, candles, organs, and church music.

§ 374.

The Helvetic, or Reformed system, spread into the Netherlands, particularly after a long and bloody struggle with Spain, and at length became predominant in the northern Provinces, which formed (1609) a separate State. In France, where the Reformers were very numerous, 30,000 were brutally massacred on Saint Bartholomew's Eve (night of the 25–26th August, 1572), which act the Pope praised as a work pleasing in the sight of God. They had toleration granted to them by the Edict of Nantes, passed by Henry IV.; but after Louis XIV. revoked the Edict of Nantes (1652), they

were greatly persecuted (*a*). At the French Revolution they again obtained church rights, which they still possess. By the conversion of the Electors of the Palatinate, 1583, and of Brandenburg, 1614, and the Landgrave of Hesse, 1592, the Reformation prevailed in the dominions of these Princes; and by the influence of Calvin and of the Church of Geneva, Presbyterianism in Scotland, *i. e.* the Church which dominates in that country, was connected with the Reformation (*b*). The new doctrine spread also in the Dutch colonies, in America, Russia, Hungary, Prussia, and Transylvania. The number of Reformers (including the Presbyterians) is about 12,000,000.

(*a*.) Those English Protestants who had taken refuge in Switzerland, under the persecution of Queen Mary,—and after her death had returned to England, but were attached to Calvin's Presbyterian constitution and rejected episcopacy, and would not acknowledge the supremacy of the Sovereign in church matters, nor take the oath of supremacy,—received the name of Puritans.

(*b*.) The churches and schools of the Reformers were destroyed, they were pronounced civilly dead, were oppressed by new taxes, and Catholic priests were sent into their houses: they were flogged by dragoons to Mass, they were plundered, tortured, and killed, and the Reformed clergymen were executed. Half a million of them took refuge in foreign countries; one-twentieth part lost their lives. Eight Reformed clergymen were, from 1745–1770, executed. In Nîmes, a few years before, above 2000 Protestants had been murdered.

§ 375.

The English Episcopal Church is a branch of the Reformed Church. King Henry VIII. (+1547), from disgraceful motives, renounced allegiance to the Pope; yet the Reformation was accomplished only after the cruel government of Queen Mary (1552–1558); and the fundamental laws of the English Church, called the Thirty-nine Articles, were published under Elizabeth,

1571. This Church, which dominates in England and Ireland (though in the latter country 'two-thirds of the inhabitants are Catholics), prevails also in all the English colonies, and especially in Australia and North America (*a*). Its promotion is owing principally to the Bible and Missionary Societies. This Church may number about 12,000,000 followers.

(*a*.) In North America, the Church had, in 1808, five Bishops, 225 pastors, 238 churches. All Christians who do not belong to the Episcopal Church (including the Lutherans and Calvinists) are in England called Dissenters, and do not enjoy full church rights.

§ 376.

A general creed, which, like the Augsburg Confession received by the Lutherans, might be accepted by all Reformed communities, does not exist. In Switzerland, the *Confessio Helvetica II.*, and the *Helvetic Consensus Formulæ* ("Formula Consensus Ecclesiarum Reformatarum"), drawn up by Heidegger; in Germany, the *Heidelberg Catechism*, compiled by Zacharias Ursinus, 1563; in Holland, the *Confessio Belgica*, and the canons of the Synod of Dordrecht; in France, the *Confessio Gallica*; and in England, the *Thirty-nine Articles* of the English Church, are received as containing the fundamental doctrine of faith.

§ 377.

The followers of the Saxon, Swiss, and English Reformation have the common name of Evangelical Christians, or, in opposition to the traditional Churches (§ 292), of Evangelical Churches (*a*), since they all, in opposition to the Roman and Greek Churches, acknowledge the principle that the word of God alone, contained in the canonical books of the Holy Scriptures, can give the highest rules

of faith and life to Christians; that the canons of the Councils, the decisions of the Church Fathers, are subject to this authority; and that the judicial authority of the Pope in religious matters is entirely inadmissible; and therefore they make the reading of the Holy Scriptures the duty of every Christian. The English Episcopal Church attributes to the Fathers a higher authority, still subordinating them to the Holy Scriptures.

(a.) There are supposed to exist 75,000,000 of Evangelical Christians. Humboldt however gives Europe 52,000,000 Protestants, and America 11,287,000.

§ 378.

With regard to the doctrine of God the Son, and the Holy Ghost, they unanimously, with the Roman Church, embrace the three general creeds (the Apostolic, Nicene, and Athanasian), but reject all worshipping of Angels, Saints, and Mary, as well as relics. In the doctrine of moral freedom they teach, in common with the Roman Church, the existence of original sin arisen through the fall of man; they however differ as to its consequences (a). Respecting the forgiveness of sins, they teach that the atonement was made only *once*, by Jesus; that its influence is eternal. Acting upon this principle, they reject all propitiatory atonement by the priest and the so-called good (expiatory) works, the mass, and every other means of expiation (by fasting, almsgiving, praying, pilgrimages, gifts to churches and monasteries, which is the doctrine of the Roman Church), and assert that only by faith in the reality of the atonement can men become partakers of it. In regard to the Divine law, they reject the doctrine of Christian perfection which the Roman Church has introduced, and with it the merits of the Saints, monachism, indulgences, and all sanctification through

mere voluntary works. They unconditionally permit their clergy to marry. Respecting the idea of immortality, they reject unanimously the doctrine of Purgatory, and the soul-masses connected with it.

(a.) According to the Roman Church, man has, since the Fall, still the power of perceiving and desiring the Good, and therefore the power to work actively for his improvement. According to the Lutheran Church (at least as far as the Concordat Formulary has authority) man has lost that power, but can still resist or yield to the amending grace of God, and therefore co-operate passively to his improvement. According to the Reformed Church, he does not possess the power of doing so, but he resists the amending Grace; and therefore it depends absolutely on the Will of God (predestination) whether man shall be bettered or not. This is at least the definition given by the public confessional writings, which only can here be considered.

§ 379.

Regarding public worship, all the evangelical Churches embrace two sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper; they differ respecting the explanation of consecration (§ 307) (a); and respecting external worship, they do not maintain a strict conformity, because they do not consider it as essential, and because nothing is positively taught in the Scriptures on this point. All however consider preaching as a chief part of Divine service. Instead of the private confession retained in the Lutheran Church, a general confession has been lately substituted in most Churches. The Reformed Church has only a preparation for the Lord's Supper. Confirmation in the English Church is solemnized by Bishops only.

(a.) It is rather the opinion of Calvin than that of Zwingli, on the spiritual presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, that has been embraced as a public doctrine by the Reformed, as well as by the English Church.

§ 380.

With respect to Church constitution, they altogether reject the usurped primacy of the Roman Bishop, and the rights of the hierarchy as a divinely instituted guardian of the laity, and have in common the principles, (1) that Christ is the invisible Head of the Church, who governs them through the Holy Ghost and the Word of God; (2) that Church power is invested in the Church as a community; and (3) that this power is to be exercised not by the clergy alone, but by the clergy and laity conjointly. In practice this constitution has worked differently according to the different countries where it exists (*a*).

(*a*.) In the Lutheran and Reformed Churches the rank of clergyman is considered generally as a rank appointed by the Church for the instruction of the community and the administration of Divine worship, though Bishops have been retained in Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia. The English Episcopal Church alone pronounced the episcopal dignity as divine, through their possessing the transmitted power of consecration. In most countries the reigning prince, if he belong to the Church, is considered as its head or its executive power. In England the legislative power in Church matters is exercised by the King and Parliament (to which the Bishops also belong); in Germany the church constitution was formed more accidentally. The Evangelical sovereign, assisted by Consistories and Synods, exercises the legislative and executive power, as a power conferred upon him expressly or tacitly by the Church. In republics (Switzerland, Free Cities) the first magistrate takes the place of the sovereign. If the sovereign be a Roman Catholic, the directing right is conferred by him upon an Evangelical college. The Presbyterian Church in Scotland is governed by Presbyteries (consisting of clergymen and laity), Provincial Synods, and by the General Assembly, held every year at Edinburgh, to which the Presbyteries send their representatives.

§ 381.

With regard to public teaching, the Evangelical Churches have not, in the course of time, undergone

any change, though the convictions of their followers appear to have done so. The influence of Freethinking, proceeding from Italy, France, and England (at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century), though hostile to Christianity and partly to all religion, was but transient; a deeper influence was felt from the explanations of the Holy Scripture, founded on a subtle Philology (Ernesti), from the critico-historical treating of Theology (Semler), from a more profound and fertile Philosophy (Kant), and from a refined taste, which began with the classical writers of Germany (Gellert, Weise, Ramler, Hagedorn), and with which the general progress in all sciences, and the increase and improvement of all learned institutions, powerfully co-operated. The consequence of this was, that not only a greater tolerance was exercised towards different opinions on matters of faith (Frederic the Great, Joseph II.), especially when these differences had no influence on morals; but Theology, which previously had been *ecclesiastical* (symbolic), became now *biblical*; and it was acknowledged that a difference existed between the Church and the Evangelical doctrine, and that the New Testament was the true source of the Christian doctrines (Michaelis, Heilmann, Storr, Reinhard). Hence was maintained the opinion, that the doctrine contained in the Holy Scripture proceeded directly from God; that its authority rested on its direct Divine origin, and was therefore raised above human reason,—not needing its sanction, and claiming its subjection (Supernaturalism).

§ 382.

Under the influence of Philosophy and historical criticism another system was also started, *i. e.* Rationalism,

which either considered the opinion of direct Divine revelation to be inadmissible, and adjudged to Reason, as the first and most universal source of revelation, the right of religious instruction; submitting also to its judgment the doctrines of Jesus and the Apostles, whom it acknowledged as teachers of religion raised up by Divine Providence (Critical Rationalism) (*a*); or it considered the religious ideas of reason as a Divine revelation, these ideas being represented symbolically in the doctrines and usages of Christianity (Mystical Rationalism) (*b*). But these opinions did not however change the morality or practical part of Christianity.

(*a*.) Röhr, Wegscheider; Critical Rationalism separates from Christianity, or considers as an adaptation to the religious opinion of the time of Jesus, all that is not in accordance with philosophical Theology.

(*b*.) Marheinecke, Daub, Schleiermacher, and all who embrace the Pantheistic Idealism, and place religion in an internal feeling of God and our dependence on him. They use the forms of the orthodox ecclesiastical system as a symbolical representation of Idealism, or Philosophy of Nature.

2. *The Romish Church.*

§ 383.

The Popes exerted, though unsuccessfully, every means in their power, to suppress the Reformation. The stability which the new Churches had gained; the distinct form that marked their doctrine, expressed in their public confessions; the powerful appeals of the Catholic Princes, of the German Emperor especially, for a General Council, to which the Protestants also had always called; and above all, the necessity of preserving the ancient system, upon which the power of the Popes and clergy rested,—all these causes combined, at length so

far prevailed over the Popes as to induce them to convene a General Council at Trent, which (though with many interruptions) continued to be held from 1533 to 1542. The Popes however, through craftiness, but more especially through the influence of the Jesuits, so far succeeded in their aims as to contrive that the decrees of the Council should be issued according to their will. This Council therefore, instead of reconciling the antagonistic Churches, served only to perpetuate their separation. The decree of Pius IV., that no one but the Pope should have the right to explain the decrees of the Councils, was to no purpose; and Sixtus V. in 1586 constituted a special body, whose business it was to make this explanation. A Catholic Catechism, after the model of the Lutheran, was also framed (*Catechismus ex Decreto Concilii Trid.*, or *Catechismus Romanus*), which by Gregory XIII. (1572) was raised to the rank of a symbolic book (*a*). By these means the Roman Church was more decidedly separated from the Evangelical, and formed its system as it exists at the present time (*b*).

(*a*.) The Council of Trent had not been allowed to discuss the dogmas of the Pope and the Church. In order to further the unity of the Church now appeared a Romish Breviary (1568), a Missal (1570), and a Book of Martyrs (1586).

(*b*.) The Council of Trent and the Catechism confirmed those doctrines of the Romish Church which had gradually grown up, especially in those points which hitherto had not received any solemn confirmation. It was alleged that the Holy Scriptures were obscure and insufficient, and therefore the laity should not be allowed to read them in the vulgar tongue; that Tradition was equal with the Scripture, and that the former should be used to explain the latter; the sense of Tradition was however to be fixed by the Pope. This Council pronounced all books of the Vulgate, and also the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament, as canonical and of equal authority; that the Vulgate (the old Latin translation) was the authentic text of the Scriptures, *i. e.* the only text having authority in Church matters and in deciding disputes; and that the Church is their only legitimate interpreter; that

the Church (Bishops) possessed a lasting inspiration, the same as the authors of the Scriptures, and that its decisions were infallible; that without the Church it is impossible to be saved; that all doctrine contrary to the opinion of the Church was therefore nothing but heresy, and that every means should be tried to convert heretics, even though they had been condemned; and that the priesthood is an order instituted by Christ to govern the Church, and possesses the legislative and executive power. Further, the Seven Sacraments were sanctioned, and with them Transubstantiation, adoration of the Host, the withholding of the cup, the Lord's Supper as a bloodless sacrifice, the Mass, Indulgences, Invocation of Saints, the worshipping of images, the necessity of fasting and good works, purgatory and soul-masses, almsgiving, fasting, and other exercises of penance of the living, in order to effect the speedier redemption of souls out of purgatory. The Catechism accepted also the opinion of a *limbus* of the Fathers.

§ 384.

The Popes (Pius IV.) to strengthen their power introduced the oath of Faith, which all Bishops, Abbots, ecclesiastics, and converts were obliged to take on their appointment (*a*). They also introduced the prohibition of books (*b*). Sixtus V. appointed (1586) an especial committee of judges of books, or qualificators. Blind faith, obedience, and humility towards the clergy, and zeal in the external forms of worship of God, became now the indispensable qualifications of the Romish Christian. The notorious Bull *In Cæna Domini* (*c*) marked the crowning point of all Papal pretensions.

(*a*.) According to this *professio fidei*, all swear a faithful obedience (*veram obedientiam*) to the Pope, and pledge themselves to reject and curse all errors and heresy which the Church (the Pope) condemns, curses, and rejects.

(*b*.) Paul IV. published the first catalogue of prohibited books (*Index Librorum Prohibitorum*) (1557); Pius IV. a second (1564), in which was included the Bible in the vulgar tongue. Even now this catalogue is constantly increased. The lately deceased Pope, Pius VII., as well as the present, have emphatically renewed the prohibition of the Bible.

(*c*.) The Bull *In Cæna Domini*, issued by Pius V. A.D. 1567, which

up to the present time is annually read aloud in Rome on the Thursday in Passion Week. It curses all heretics and all protectors of the same, all princes who make alliance with them. It pronounces a ban against all those who subordinate the Pope to a General Council, and consider it necessary to subordinate his commands to the sanction and examination of governments.

§ 385.

A great support to the Pope arose in the Order of Jesuits (*Fratres Societatis Jesu*), founded by Ignatius Loyola, authorized by Pope Paul III., 1540, and fully established under its second General, Lainez (1567). The members of this Order were bound by oath to blind and unconditional obedience to their superiors (*a*). The publicly acknowledged purpose of the Order is the defence of the Pope and Papacy, the extermination of all heresy, and particularly the destruction of the Evangelical Churches (*b*). Effectively however they showed that they really strove after the elevation of their Order above princes (*c*) and nations, and became particularly dangerous to those princes over whom they sought to gain ascendancy as father confessors, especially by a loose and highly dangerous morality (*d*). The Catholic Princes, especially those of Spain and Portugal, therefore, caused the Order to be entirely abolished (1773) by Pope Clement XIV. They remained however publicly in Silesia and Russia, and secretly (ex-Jesuits) in other countries, and were restored by Pope Pius VII., A.D. 1814, at the desire of the Court of the Bourbons, because the Order spread the belief that the French Revolution had only been a consequence of their abolition.

(*a*.) The Jesuit is bound to execute all which his superior commands, even immoral acts. The head of the Order resides in Rome, and holds secret correspondence with all the branches of the Order. They are under the immediate jurisdiction of the Pope, who gave the Jesuits the right to preach everywhere, to administer the Sacraments,

and to dispense with Church discipline, fasts, and such-like. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Order numbered more than ten thousand members. They prefer recruiting their members amongst those possessing either high station, great riches, or distinguished mental gifts.

(b.) By means of their pupil, the Emperor Ferdinand II., they kindled the Thirty Years' War in Germany. In England, they unceasingly fanned the spirit of rebellion, and were universally suspected to be the originators of the Gunpowder Plot, 1605. The Massacre on St. Bartholomew's Day in France was particularly their work. To convert the Evangelical princes to Popery, to attack the Evangelical Church in pamphlets, and especially to throw out suspicions against it as the author of all political revolutions—this is their chief work in our days.

(c.) They teach the legality of regicide, if a prince will not obey them and the Pope. According to a calculation, sixty-eight Jesuitical authors have propounded this doctrine; and no Jesuit dares to print anything without the permission of his Order. Chatel, a tool of the Jesuits, attempted to murder the King of France, Henry IV.; and Ravallac, who had been a monk, perpetrated the deed (1616) at their instigation. When the King of Portugal (1758) was shot, they were accessories. In Paraguay they secretly established a kingdom of their own, which they tenaciously maintained against the Spaniards. In Martinique and other West Indian islands they carried on secret commercial operations as a Society, even after they were forbidden.

(d.) Jesuitical morality has become synonymous with immorality. They distinguish between philosophical and theological sins, *i. e.* between doing evil without the will to offend God, and doing it with this will. The latter only is sin. If any reason or purpose for a forbidden deed, which should render it venial, can be shown, then the deed is not punishable (*Probabilism*). An action would be allowed if it were only apparently useful. A sin is not punishable, if, in committing it, we think of God. The end sanctifies the means. Perjury and murder are allowed, if they are committed for the honour of God, the Roman Church, or their Order. Assassination of an heretical king, of a perverse prince, or the rebellion of an ecclesiastic against his liege lord, is allowed. Mental reservations are allowed to witnesses, etc. It is allowed to swear that such and such a thing has not been done, if at the time something else is thought of, or with the mental reservation of its not having been done today, yesterday, or before birth.—See Pascal's 'Lettres Provinciales' (1656); Arnauld, 'La Morale Pratique des Jésuites' (8 vols. 1669–95); Perrault, 'La Morale des Jésuites, extraite fidèlement de leurs livres' (1667); 'Das Evangelium

der Jesuiten,' by Franz Gerhardt (Leipzig, 1822); 'Geheime Verhaltungsbefehle der Jesuiten, oder Monita Secreta Societatis Jesu' (Aix-la-Chapelle, 1825).

§ 386.

Although the Popes have always tried to establish the authority of the Papal System in all Catholic States, and have never given up, even in the present day, the least of their pretensions (*a*), they have been prevented from gaining their object. For the Gallican Church firmly supported the principles of the Episcopalian system, according to which the assembly of Bishops is above the Pope (*b*); and in the long Jansenistic dispute was formed, in the Catholic Netherlands, a Catholic party, still extant, which is out of communion with Rome (*c*). Joseph II., and the other Catholic Princes, resolutely asserted the right of assent to the publication of Papal decrees, as necessary to their legal authority (the *placitum regium*). The dissolution of the German Empire destroyed all the Ecclesiastical States of that Empire; and the Papal States themselves were, under Napoleon (1809), for a time, lost to the Roman Church, till they were restored (1814) to Pope Pius VII. after the fall of Napoleon.

(*a*.) When in a Concordat more authority is ceded to Princes than is conformable with the dignity of the Roman Curia, the Pope still tacitly reserves to himself the right to withdraw these merciful grants. Pope Pius VII. issued a letter to the Elector (afterwards King) of Bavaria, in which the decree "that any other than a Catholic can be citizen of the State" is highly disapproved of, and its withdrawal strongly urged. In the instruction given to the Pope's Nuncio, at Vienna, 1803, concerning the confiscation of the lands of the Ecclesiastical Princes of Germany, which were to be given to the Evangelical Princes as a compensation, it is stated—"The Church has established as a punishment the confiscation of the property of heretics. In regard to the dominions and fiefs, it is a strict rule of the Canon Law that the subjects of an openly heretical prince remain absolved from all allegiance, faith, and obedience to him. He who is but little versed in history must know the sentences of deposition pronounced by Popes and

Councils against Princes who persevere in heresy. Certainly it is not now possible to strictly apply this holy maxim against enemies and rebels; but even if the Church cannot exercise her right, cannot deprive the followers of heresy of their princely dominions and declare their property to be forfeited, can she ever positively suffer that they (these heretical Princes) shall receive new principalities and estates, and thus rob herself?"

(b.) The Kings of France not only asserted the right to appoint to bishoprics and monasteries, but Louis XIV. also decreed that the four principles, or the so-called Gallican Church liberties, should be acknowledged by the bishops of his kingdom (1682), namely—1. That the Pope has no authority whatever over the secular supremacy of Kings. 2. That the spiritual power of the Popes should be subordinate to the decrees of General Councils. 3. That the Papal decisions in law affairs should have authority only in as far as they agreed with the decrees of Councils and usage. 4. That the Pope's decisions in matters of faith should only have authority when they were approved by the Church.

(c.) Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, at his death (1638), left a book ('Augustinus') in which he brought forward Austin's doctrine on the Moral Corruption of Man, and attacked the lax opinions of the Jesuits, teaching a stern doctrine on Penitence. The Jesuits caused this book to be prohibited (1643) by Pope Urban VIII., and made use of the quarrel which arose from this to overthrow all their opponents. A large part of those thus oppressed fled to the Netherlands, and formed a church at Utrecht, independent of the Romish jurisdiction, which, in spite of all Jesuitical enmity, has been maintained to the present day, and which pronounces the Pope as fallible, and subordinates him to the General Councils. See Henke's '*Kirchengeschichte*,' vol. V. p. 155 *sq.*

§ 387.

That which the Roman Church lost in Europe was richly made up to her in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, especially in America; since the Spaniards and Portuguese, wherever they came, forcibly introduced the Romish profession, especially in Mexico, Chili, Peru, the Brazils, and the African coast (Mozambique), in the East Indies (Goa), and in the West Indian Islands. Their missionary zeal, especially that of the Jesuits, extended also to other countries out of Europe (China and Japan),

and received a better foundation from the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, founded 1622, to which was added (1627) a Seminary for the education of missionaries. The entire number of Romish Christians is estimated at above 100,000,000 (*a*).

(*a*.) Others reckon more, *e.g.* Humboldt states that in Europe alone 103,000,000 exist, and in America 11,287,000.

3. *Some smaller Christian Sects following the Reformation.*

§ 388.

The Anabaptists—under which name all fanatics were included, who, at the time of the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, deceived by millenarian dreams, created disturbances by pretended revelations, rejecting infant baptism and re-baptizing adults, and rejecting also all public authority, the military service, and the taking of oaths—despite the severity used against them, were not entirely extirpated; and at length they were assembled and organized by Simon Menno, a Catholic priest, who joined them, 1536; hence their name, Mennonites. But they are not unanimous among themselves, and they are scattered (to the number of perhaps 350,000 souls) in Holland, Westphalia, Prussia, England, and North America (*a*).

(*a*.) According to the latest calculation there are 6000 in Russia, and 100,000 in North America.

§ 389.

The Unitarians, founded by the brothers Lælius and Faustus Socinus (born at Siena, 1525 and 1539), first extended to Poland, and afterwards to Transylvania, where they still enjoy religious freedom. After their

expulsion from Poland, they (1661) dispersed into Prussia, Brandenburg, Silesia, Holland, and England; but particularly into North America. They absolutely reject the doctrine of Three Persons in the Godhead (hence their name), the doctrine of atonement for sin by the death of Jesus, original sin, eternal punishment in hell, the mysteries in the sacraments; and, further, they reject punishment by death, war, the taking of oaths, but they acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the rule of faith and life; in their explanation, however, they make use of the axiom, that nothing ought to contradict human reason. Their number in Europe consists of about 50,000 souls. Their doctrines are to be found in the Catechism published at Rakow in 1605.

§ 390.

The Schwenkfelders were founded by a Silesian nobleman (Caspar Schwenkfeld, born 1490): they teach that the external word of God in the Scriptures is not sufficient, but must be accompanied by an internal word (Inspiration); that eating and drinking in the Lord's Supper is an appropriation of the Spirit of Christ; that adults only, and not children, are to be baptized; that the ministry and the Church Constitution are unnecessary. They exist chiefly at Liegnitz; but they have spread, by emigration, into North America, where they have formed communities.

§ 391.

The Swedenborgians, founded by Immanuel Swedenborg (born at Stockholm, 1689, died 1772), teach, according to the writings of Swedenborg (*a*), that the Bible has a threefold sense,—the literal sense, the inner spi-

ritual sense (which their founder has disclosed), and the heavenly sense, known only to angels; that the Last Judgment has already taken place, and that the Heavenly Jerusalem exists in the interior of Africa; that God has appeared, first in Christ, then in Swedenborg. They reject the doctrines of the Trinity, justification through Christ, election, and the resurrection of the flesh. This sect is to be found in Sweden, England, the East Indies, and North America.

(a.) 'Göttliche Offenbarungen bekannt gemacht durch Immanuel von Swedenborg; aus der lateinischen Urschrift, von J. F. T. Tafel' (Leipzig, 1823). According to Tafel there are in England fifty communities, and in America more than twenty preachers.

§ 392.

The Independents, a party separated from the Presbyterians, insist particularly on the following points, namely, that every community has the right to exist as an independent church, body, or society, and that it should be self-governed and entirely independent from any other community, because each stands immediately under Christ. This sect rose in England at the end of the sixteenth century, and is still numerous in that country, but particularly in North America (a).

(a.) The Independents in North America are called *Congregationalists*, because sometimes they call together synods of preachers for the direction of church matters. These have now twenty-five thousand churches, and follow the doctrine of the Reformed Calvinistic Church.

§ 393.

The Methodists, a sect of the English Episcopal Church, whose Liturgy they retain, are devotees (Pietists) who profess the possession of a better *method* of Christian life and perfection than that of the Episcopal Church

(hence their name). Their doctrines and constitution resemble those of the Evangelical Moravian Brotherhood, and therefore they teach chiefly the doctrines of the natural corruption of man, of the forgiveness of sins and amendment of life through Christ, without differing essentially from the Evangelical Church, except in their strict moral discipline, their internal constitution, and the doctrine that a lie, even in a case of necessity, is not allowable.

This sect was founded by John Wesley (born 1702, died 1791), and is very numerous (half a million) in England and North America (*a*).

(*a*.) According to an American paper, the whole number of Methodists amounted, A.D. 1822, to 526,500.

§ 394.

The sect of Quakers (*a*) was founded (1647) by George Fox, a shoemaker, born 1624, at Drayton, in Leicestershire, who in his nineteenth year set himself up as inspired and illumined by heavenly light to make a strict reform of morals, and gained followers in England and America. The noble William Penn (+ 1718) moderated their fanaticism, supplying them at the same time with a free State, by the acquisition of Pennsylvania. They teach that there is in man a spark of the Divine Being (the inner light), which is suppressed by the body, but which stands higher and is also more universal than the external word, the Bible; that the flesh will not rise again, and that all sinful, however trifling, pleasures must be avoided. They make obeisance to none, call every one *thou*, take no oaths, do not fill any magisterial office, nor serve in war. They reject the external Divine service, have therefore no singing, no baptism, no Eucharist, no priests; but hold meetings, in which each one mounts the

pulpit who feels himself awakened by the inner light, or, where this is not the case, they separate in silence. Their manners and church discipline are strict, and their dress, in the highest degree, simple (*b*).

(*a*.) They take their name from the circumstance of Fox having cried out to a judge in a trial, "*Quake* before the word of God!"

(*b*.) They reject the chase, theatrical amusements, dancing, and games of hazard, also trading in articles of luxury or implements of war. Since 1786 a small community has established itself in the Vale of Peace (Friedensthal) in Pyrmont. In England (where they number probably 600,000) they have toleration, and in America (where there are 300,000), like all other religious sects, they have freedom. In later times they have relaxed from their strictness.

THE END.

